


# 1

**PM-1 3 1/2" x 4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET  
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT**



**PRECISION<sup>SM</sup> RESOLUTION TARGETS**

PIONEERS IN METHYLENE BLUE TESTING SINCE 1911



1900 COUNTY ROAD 6, BURVILL, TN 38007 USA  
TEL. 615 485 7887 FAX 615 485 7887 TLA 5100000000



National Library  
of Canada

Acquisitions and  
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale  
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et  
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington  
Ottawa (Ontario)  
K1A 0N4

*Your file - Votre référence*

*Our file - Notre référence*

## NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

## AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

**Canada**

**THE OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEF SYSTEM AND  
LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOUR: THE CASE OF  
INDIRA GANDHI**

by

**Rukmani Jayaraman, B.A., M.A., M.A.**

**A Thesis submitted to  
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research  
in partial fulfilment of  
the requirements for the degree of**

**Doctor of Philosophy**

**Department of Political Science**

**Carleton University  
Ottawa, Ontario  
4 October 1991**

**© copyright  
1991 Rukmani Jayaraman**



National Library  
of Canada

Acquisitions and  
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale  
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et  
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington  
Ottawa (Ontario)  
K1A 0N4

Your file / Votre référence

Our file / Notre référence

**The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.**

**L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.**

**The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.**

**L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.**

ISBN 0-315-79886-6

**Canada**




The undersigned hereby recommend to  
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research  
acceptance of the thesis,

THE OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEF SYSTEM AND LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOUR:  
THE CASE OF INDIRA GHANDI


submitted by

Rukmani Jayaraman, B.A., M.A.


in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy



Chair, Department of Political Science



Thesis Supervisor



External Examiner

Carleton University

November 27, 1991

## **ABSTRACT**

**This dissertation focuses on the impact of the operational code on foreign policy decision making. Guided by the framework developed by George and Holsti, a model of Indira Gandhi's operational code was systematically constructed with a view toward examining its influences on India's foreign policy from 1966-1977.**

**The theoretical framework is drawn from the cognitive process approach and is expressed in the form of an operational code. The major assumption is that in order to cope with the complexity of the environment, decision makers form simplified and structured beliefs about the nature of the world. When there is structural uncertainty in decision making, such as in a crisis situation, the operational code influences the decision-makers's definition of a situation, search and evaluation, and the choice of options.**

**Two data bases were created, one by a content analysis of documents, and another from interviews with several members of the Indian political elite. The congruence procedure was used as a method for testing the relationship between beliefs and the options preferred in three key foreign policy decisions. A comparative study of Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs with that of other political leaders was made by employing Holsti and Selim's typologies.**

**Mrs. Gandhi possessed a complex and sophisticated code with multiple levels of operation. Central subsets of highly stable and interconnected beliefs exhibiting situational and issue-area variability were more salient in foreign policy crisis conditions. One subset of beliefs revolved around her definition of politics as conflictual but a temporary phenomena which was highly dysfunctional and undesirable. Her optimism with respect to goal-achievement and belief in the predictability of political life and control over historical development led her to select optimal goals. The second subset was associated with the negative image of the opponent combined with the advocacy of deterrence and the avoidance of force unless absolutely necessary.**

**The congruence procedure showed a high degree of relationship between Mrs. Gandhi's belief system and policy preferences in all of the three cases examined. The results lend credence to the argument that the study of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code contributes to a better understanding of Indian foreign policy during those critical years.**

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I am deeply indebted to Prof. John. H. Sigler, under whose guidance my interest in foreign policy deepened, especially in the realm of cognitive approaches to decision-making. My work on the operational code commenced as a result of his more than favourable reaction to a paper I had written as part of the tutorial for the comprehensive exam. Without his support and valuable supervision this dissertation may not have been completed. Despite the long delay in its completion, Prof. Sigler did not seem to lose faith in my work, and his encouragement dispelled any doubts that I may have had in working on this project off-campus.

Prof. N. H. Chi introduced me to the intricacies of Quantitative Research Methodology and I appreciate the amount of time and energy he spent on trying to educate me on the finer points of Mathematics and Statistics. He taught me the real meaning of the term 'analytical' and inspired me to adopt a scientific bent of mind. I thank him very much for that.

Prof. V. Subramaniam helped me get a proper perspective of Mrs. Gandhi and her role in Indian politics, and guided me in my interpretation of her operational code belief system. His suggestions regarding the interviews that I had to conduct was invaluable.

I would also like to thank all the persons that I met at New Delhi, Madras and Bangalore, for the enthusiasm with which they answered my questions. They were a great source of information on Mrs. Gandhi. I will always be grateful to Prof. M.S. Rajan at JNU, who spent a number of hours giving me valuable information and advice.

Bhavani Ramesh painstakingly entered my data on the computer and Barry Scholl edited my manuscript in record time, and I am really indebted to them both. I would like to express my thanks to the University of Utah for allowing me to use its library facilities, without which this project could not have been completed at Salt lake City. The library at JNU, New Delhi and the Nehru Foundation Library provided me with a large volume of research material for which I am grateful. I would like to acknowledge the help of Mr. Mahajan at the Nehru Library in my search for essential documents.

Most of all I am enormously indebted to my late grandparents, who could not live to see this project completed. This was more their dream than mine. The one person who I will be eternally grateful to is my husband who really saw me through the ups and downs during the writing of this thesis and he never allowed me to lose faith in myself or give up hope of its completion. I cannot express in words the thanks I owe to both our families and friends for their unfailing support and encouragement.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## SECTION I

	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>Abstract</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>Table of Contents</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>List of Tables</b>	<b>x</b>
<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>xiii</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
1. The Research Problem	1
2. Approach	2
3. Significance	6
<b>CHAPTER I THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY</b>	<b>8</b>
1. The Individual and Foreign Policy Decision Making	8
A. Third World Context	
B. Decisional Context	
C. Crisis Context	
2. Cognitive Processes and Foreign Policy	14
A. Cognitive Constraints on Rationality	
B. Subjective vs Objective Reality	
C. Cognitive Perceptual Frameworks	
3. The Belief System	19
A. Historical and Conceptual Background	
B. Definition of Beliefs	
4. Beliefs and Foreign Policy Decision Making	23
A. Information Processing	
B. Resolution of Uncertainty	
5. Application of the Cognitive Process Approaches	27
A. Cognitive Map	
B. Cognitive Simplicity/Complexity	

6. Limitations of the Cognitive Approaches	32
A. Criticisms	
B. Counterarguments	
<b>CHAPTER II THE OPERATIONAL CODE</b>	<b>35</b>
1. Conceptual Framework	35
A. Theoretical Premises	
B. Types of Beliefs	
2. The Operational Code as a System of Beliefs	38
A. Centrality	
B. Stability	
C. Consistency	
3. Operational Code Hypotheses	48
4. The Operational Code Belief System and Decision Making	49
A. Diagnostic Propensities	
B. Choice Propensities	
C. Usefulness	
5. Operational Code Beliefs and Policy preferences Some Theoretical and Methodological Questions	54
6. Research on the Operational Code	58
7. Assessment of the Operational Code Approach	61
A. Criticisms	
B. Counterarguments	
<b>CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY</b>	<b>65</b>
1. Data Sources and Operational Definitions	65
2. Reliability	78
A. Intercoder Macro Test	
B. Intercoder Micro Test	
C. Intercoder Single Category Reliability	
D. Scott's Reliability Index (Intercoder)	
E. Intracoder Macro Test	
F. Intracoder Micro Test	
G. Intracoder Single Category Reliability	
H. Scott's Reliability Index (Intracoder)	
I. Conclusions	

<b>3. Validity</b>	<b>89</b>
A. Face Validity	
B. Content Validity	
C. Concurrent Validity	
D. Construct Validity	
E. Conclusions	

## **SECTION II**

<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>109</b>
<b>CHAPTER IV MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE PHASE I: THE YEARS OF CHALLENGE (1966 - 1969)</b>	<b>116</b>
A. Issues	
B. Philosophical Beliefs	
C. Instrumental Beliefs	
D. Conclusions	
<b>CHAPTER V MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE PHASE II: THE YEARS OF ENDEAVOUR (1970 - 1972)</b>	<b>187</b>
A. Issues	
B. Philosophical Beliefs	
C. Instrumental Beliefs	
D. Conclusions	
<b>CHAPTER VI MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE PHASE III: RIDING A HEADY WAVE (1973 - 1977)</b>	<b>262</b>
A. Issues	
B. Philosophical Beliefs	
C. Instrumental Beliefs	
D. Conclusions	
<b>CHAPTER VII MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS</b>	<b>298</b>
1. Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code: Database 2	298
2. Beliefs and foreign Policy Preferences - The Consistency Question	319

<b>3. Mrs. Gandhi and the Three Options - The Congruence Procedure</b>	<b>332</b>
<b>A. The Decision to Militarily Intervene in Bangladesh</b>	
a. Prelude to the Crisis	
b. Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code	
c. Available Options	
d. Congruence between Beliefs and Choice of Action	
e. The Decision Process	
f. Summary and Conclusions	
<b>B. The Decision to sign a Treaty with the Soviet Union</b>	
a. Prelude to the Treaty	
b. Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code	
c. Available Options	
d. Congruence between Beliefs and Choice of Action	
e. The Decision Process	
f. Summary and Conclusions	
<b>C. The Decision to Conduct a Nuclear Explosion</b>	
a. Prelude to the Explosion	
b. Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code	
c. Congruence between Beliefs and Choice of Action	
d. The Decision Process	
e. Summary and Conclusions	

**4. Conclusions**

<b>CHAPTER VIII MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS</b>	<b>373</b>
<b>1. Structural Characteristics</b>	<b>374</b>
1A. Richness	
1B. Differentiation	
1C. Centrality	
1D. Stability	
1E. Interdependence	
<b>2. Functional Relevance</b>	<b>413</b>
2A. Issue area Variability	
2B. Contextual Salience	
2C. Diagnostic Propensities and Choice Propensities	
<b>3. Summary and Conclusions</b>	<b>428</b>
<b>CHAPTER IX MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS</b>	<b>430</b>
<b>1. Holsti's Typology</b>	<b>431</b>
<b>2. Selim's Typology</b>	<b>439</b>
<b>3. A comparative study</b>	<b>442</b>

4. Comparison of Mrs.Gandhi's and Nasser's Operational Code	444
5. Summary and Conclusions	445
<b>CHAPTER X SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</b>	<b>446</b>
1. Summary	446
2. A Model of Mrs.Gandhi's Operational Code	447
3. The Operational Code Hypotheses	448
4. Conclusions	451
5. Evaluating the Operational Code Approach	453
<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b>455</b>
<b>APPENDIX 1: Coding Manual</b>	<b>475</b>
<b>APPENDIX 2: Questionnaire 1</b>	<b>519</b>
<b>APPENDIX 3: Questionnaire 2</b>	<b>527</b>



## **LIST OF TABLES**

<b>TABLE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
1	Type of Documents Content Analyzed	76
2	Type of Paragraphs Content Analyzed	77
3	Types of Reliability for Nominal Data	80
4	Intercoder Macro Test	83
5	Intercoder Micro Test	83
6	Single Category Reliability (Intercoder)	85
7	Scott's Reliability Index	86
8	Single Category Reliability (Intracoder)	88
9	Type of Document: (Public vs Private)	95
10	Type of Document: (Premeditated vs Spontaneous)	97
11	Type of Audience: (Domestic vs Foreign)	99
12	Type of Audience: (Intellectual vs Masses)	101
13	Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code (Measure1)	104
14	Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code (Measure2)	105
15	References to issues (Phase I)	132
16	References to Nature of Politics (Phase I)	141
17	References to Opponents (Phase I)	160
18	References to Optimism (Phase I)	163

19	References to Predictability (Phase I)	164
20	References to Role of Leader (Phase I)	168
21	References to Nature of Goals (Phase I)	176
22	References to Goal Pursuit (Phase I)	181
23	References to Action (Phase I)	182
24	References to Force (Phase I)	185
25	References to Issues (Phase II)	200
26	References to Nature of Politics (Phase II)	212
27	References to Opponents (Phase II)	222
28	References to Regional System (Phase II)	230
29	References to Optimism (Phase II)	232
30	References to Predictability (Phase II)	234
31	References to Role of Leader (Phase II)	237
32	References to Nature of Goals (Phase II)	245
33	References to Goal Pursuit (Phase II)	251
34	References to Action (Phase II)	253
35	References to Risk (Phase II)	255
36	References to Force (Phase II)	259
37	References to Issues (Phase III)	274
38	References to Nature of Politics (Phase III)	276
39	References to Opponents (Phase III)	278
40	References to Regional System (Phase III)	282

41	References to Optimism (Phase III)	284
42	References to Predictability (Phase III)	285
43	References to Role of Leader (Phase III)	287
44	References to Nature of Goals (Phase III)	290
45	References to Goal Pursuit (Phase III)	292
46	References to Action (Phase III)	293
47	References to Risk (Phase III)	293
48	References to Force (Phase III)	295
49	Mrs.Gandhi's Operational Code: An Analysis of Richness	375
50	Mrs.Gandhi's Operational Code: An Analysis of Differentiation	378
51	Mrs.Gandhi's Operational Code: An Analysis of Centrality	383
52	Mrs.Gandhi's Operational Code: An Analysis of Stability	387
53	Response-Response Consistency	394
54	Analysis of Consistency: Percentage Method	396
55	Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code: Contingency Analysis	401
56	Mrs.Gandhi's Operational Code: Belief Clusters	404
57	Mrs.Gandhi's Operational Code: A Simple Correlaoun	408
58	Contextual Distribution of Mrs.Gandhi's Beliefs	420
59	Mrs.Gandhi's Operational Code: Crisis Situations	422
60	Holsti's Operational Code Typology	434
61	Goodness of Fit: Mrs. Gandhi and Holsti's Typology	438
62	Selim's Typology	440

## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	DESCRIPTION	PAGE
1	Role of Cognitive Factors on Behavioural Outcomes	9
2	Situations where the Cognitive Process Approach is useful	28
3	Linkage between Central Beliefs and Policy Choices	41
4	Congruence Procedure	57
5	Intercoder Macro Test: An Example	82
6	Intercoder Macro Test: Crosstabs Matrix	82
7	Congruence between Beliefs and Choice of Action	342
8	Congruence between Beliefs and Action(Treaty 1971)	358
9	Typology of Centrality of Beliefs	380
10	Hawkish Dovish Typology	393
11	Mrs.Gandhi's Operational Code; Interlinked System of Beliefs	406
12	Dynamic Interdependence	412
13	Types of Beliefs about the Nature of Political Life	431
14	Scores for Belief Categories	436

# **SECTION I**

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **1. Research Problem:**

The main objective of this project is to study the impact of an individual's Operational Code belief system on decision making. The aim is to find out how much of the variance in policy preferences can be explained by a leader's beliefs. The principal idea is to link theoretical findings in cognitive psychology associated with the belief system with the empirical study of a political leader. As a powerful Indian leader not bound by institutional and other constraints, Mrs. Gandhi seemed an appropriate subject for study, and India's foreign policy from 1966 was shaped by her pragmatic approach to world affairs. Foreign policy decision making in India was idiosyncratic in important respects. This work seeks to examine Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code in the context of India's foreign policy from 1966-1977, with a view toward analyzing the influence of that code on policy preferences and choices.

The research is organized as follows:

1. Based on the framework developed by George (1969, 1979) and Holsti (1977), an empirically supportable and systematic construction of Indira Gandhi's Operational Code belief system is presented, and its general characteristics and fundamental components are appraised. The analysis is divided into three time periods - from 1966 (when she took office) to December 1969; from January 1970 to December 1972 (end of the Bangladesh crisis); from January 1972 to 1977 (when she lost the elections);
2. There is a qualitative analysis of the impact of Indira Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs and foreign policy preferences, i.e., a study of the relationship/congruence between her belief system and (i) The signing of the treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with Russia in 1971; (ii) Military intervention in Bangladesh in 1971;

(iii) Conducting the underground nuclear explosion in 1974;

3. A quantitative analysis of the structural characteristics of Mrs. Gandhi's belief system - centrality, stability, consistency etc., and tests of the Operational Code hypotheses have been conducted;

4. A comparative study of Indira Gandhi's Operational Code with those of other political leaders has been presented.

## **2. Approach:**

The reason for the focus on an individual decision-maker is that foreign policy is not just a result of the interaction of structural, systemic, economic, political or other factors. Rather, it is how these factors are perceived by the decision-maker that becomes important in the formulation of decisions. Perceptions in turn are influenced by beliefs which has an impact on information-processing that precedes and accompanies the decision-maker's choice of action. Beliefs intervene between the more remote determinants of foreign policy and actual choices.

For this project we have employed the cognitive process approach, which uses psychological variables of perception, beliefs, motivation and cognitive information processing. One part of the cognitive process approach which deals with belief systems has been chosen and this approach is best expressed in the form of an Operational Code. The decision to use the Operational Code has been motivated by the fact that beliefs are central to the study of foreign policy preferences, and according to Bonham and Shapiro (1973, 161) account for more of the variance than any other single factor. The Operational Code is a particularly significant portion of an actor's entire set of beliefs about political life. The Operational Code approach is one part of the socio-psychological paradigm that deals with cognitive structures and processes. It take the individual or a small group as the unit of analysis. The major assumption of the Operational Code approach is that, in order to experience and cope with the complex confusing reality of the environment, decision makers form simplified and structured beliefs about the nature of the world. Information that comes in from the outside is

filtered through clusters of beliefs, and they provide a basic framework within which the actor approaches the task of information-processing. In other words beliefs have an impact on how the decision-maker defines a situation, how he/she approaches the task of search and evaluation of information, and on the choice of options.

*A political leader's beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical developments can be shaped and his notions of correct strategy and tactics - whether these beliefs be referred to as 'Operational Code', 'weltanschauung', 'cognitive map', or an 'elite's political culture' are among the factors influencing that actor's decisions (George 1969, 197).*

### **Justification:**

The importance of individual leaders in the decision-making process, especially in certain contexts such as in the developing countries, is highlighted in Chapter I. It is argued that in countries undergoing rapid changes, the role of a leader is less well defined, the institutions are weak and hence the personalities of decision-makers or the idiosyncratic variable are likely to influence foreign policy.

*Although we recognize that numerous domestic and international factors can and do influence foreign policy behaviour, these influences must be channeled through the political apparatus of a government which identifies, decides and implements foreign policy. Within that apparatus is a set of authorities (who are) the 'ultimate decision unit' (Hermann et al. 1987, 309).<sup>1</sup>*

Hermann identifies three types of decision units: 1. Predominant leader; 2. Single group; 3. Multiple autonomous groups. She argues that if the ultimate decision unit is a predominant leader, he/she will have the power to make the choice for the government in the foreign policy arena. Hence the critical set of variables for explaining the decision or policy becomes the personal characteristics of the predominant leader. An examination of India's foreign policy decision-making will show that the ultimate decision unit was a single leader, Mrs. Gandhi. There was no decentralization of the decision process.

The reason for my choosing Indira Gandhi as a case study is based on several other factors. The literature on personality and foreign policy suggests that belief sets and preferences are likely to play an important role when the policy maker has more

---

<sup>1</sup>Author's parentheses

authority over a nation's foreign policy machinery and the fewer the people there are above him/her in the foreign policy bureaucracy to change his/her decision (M. Hermann 1974, 209).

Mrs. Gandhi was one of India's most powerful leaders. Traditionally, foreign policy decision-making in India has been concentrated in the hands of one person. In the post-independence days it was dominated by Nehru and later by Mrs. Gandhi. Foreign policy under Indira Gandhi was more centralized and even less institutionalized than under her father. It was an overly personalized regime where Mrs. Gandhi's consolidation of power resulted in the creation of a pyramidal decision-making structure both in the party and in the government.

Not only did Mrs. Gandhi dominate in the area of domestic policy making but her word was final in all cabinet discussions on foreign policy. She chose ministers for her cabinet - especially external affairs - who had no independent bases of support and power, and with no standing in their home states. In external affairs, when an important matter demanded immediate response, it was brought to her. Less pressing issues would be deferred or handled as routine within the existing framework of policy. In some cases, decisions taken by the prime minister involved little or no consultation with the ministry of external affairs. Sometimes the ministry was simply informed of a decision taken. For example, in the case of India's recognition of Kampuchea, the ministry learnt of the decision only a few days before recognition was formally announced. Often Mrs. Gandhi would make a snap decision while the Ministry of External Affairs was still formulating a position or assessing the available options, as she did in support of Mrs. Thatcher on the Falkland Island issue.

Although formal institutions existed, Mrs. Gandhi either ignored them or used them merely to ratify her policies. Her dominance of foreign policy reached its peak between 1969 and 1977.

*The less a group context is used in decision making, the more likely are personality variables to assert themselves (Verba 1961, 103).*

Secondly, it has been proposed that the more training in foreign affairs the leader has had, the more likely his/her beliefs about the world are to affect foreign policy



behaviour. According to M. Hermann (1974, 208), the leader who has had training has some knowledge about what will succeed or fail in the international arena. As a result of his/her experience, he/she has very likely developed strong beliefs about the effects of certain strategies in foreign affairs and about the nation's ability to be successful in foreign policy. Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs about the nature of the world and politics may have been shaped in large part by her family's involvement in the freedom struggle and through the process of helping her father run the country after independence. She travelled extensively all over the world with Nehru. As his hostess and confidant, she partook in all diplomatic meetings and negotiations and witnessed Nehru's private assessments of persons and events, and may have thus been able to grasp the essentials of international politics and diplomacy. So it can be assumed that when she took office in 1966, she possessed wide knowledge of world politics and a well established belief system.

The three decisions chosen for the congruence procedure meet the conditions identified by Holsti (1976, 30-31) for the fruitful application of the cognitive approach. All three were non-routine situations that required more than the application of standard operating procedures or decision rules. The decisions were made at the top of the government hierarchy by leaders who were relatively free from bureaucratic and other constraints. So under these conditions the belief system of a decision-maker was very likely to play a large role in influencing the complex behaviours and motivations that constituted Indian policy in 1971 and 1974. It has already been established that Indira Gandhi was a central figure in the formulation of foreign policy during this period.

The Indo-Soviet treaty was remarkable for the secrecy with which it was negotiated and the speed with which it was concluded. Though the Russians were coaxing the Indian government to sign such a treaty from 1969, when Brezhnev first proposed a South Asian Security Pact, the Indian government did not seem very interested. The brewing crisis in the subcontinent and the establishment of friendly ties between the U.S., China and Pakistan were perceived as threats to India. Also the need to settle problems in East Pakistan, which was creating an economic and military burden for India, was the biggest immediate challenge on the national agenda of the congress

government. Right from the start the opposition urged Mrs. Gandhi to send the Indian army into East Pakistan and liberate the country. But she wanted to explore other options before using military force and insisted that limited force would be used only as a last resort. In both these cases, one can see that Mrs. Gandhi's definition and analysis of the situation and her beliefs regarding options, timing and search for alternatives had a bearing on the conflict itself.

The 1974 decision to explode the bomb was not a crisis decision, but neither was it routine. Given Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs about the nature of national security, she maintained that the country's defence and security would be of paramount consideration in the formulation of the government's nuclear policy. She later reinforced this statement by asserting that she would keep the option open.<sup>2</sup> In this case one cannot ignore the importance of situational and domestic factors, but one can see that this decision was also mediated by Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding peace and security.

### **3. Significance:**

This study is certainly unique, because no one else has attempted to conduct a systematic and empirical study of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs.

There has not been an analytic study of Mrs. Gandhi's belief system and its effects on policy preferences, to date. There have been a number of political biographies (Sahgal 1982, Masani 1975, Bhatia 1974, Vasudev 1974, Sahota 1972, Sharma 1972 etc.) but these focus more on the historical chronology of events in Mrs. Gandhi's life and she complained about her biographers during an interview,

Most of the books to which my attention has been drawn are very very superficial (Masani 1975, 259).

In another interview, with Bose, just prior to her assassination, she said,

But none of these biographers had ever met me, nobody has talked to me (1984, cover).

Though there are extensive references to her mental and emotional involvement in India's external affairs, none of them shed light on the cognitive processes underlying and

---

<sup>2</sup>She primarily believed in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but this did not rule out its utility as a deterrent.

preceding some of her major foreign policy choices. Attempts to analyze her personality by these authors have been more speculative than analytical and systematic.

In the study of decision making (in the Indian context), very few scholars have made use of the cognitive approach. Brecher (1968) introduced the cognitive framework which focused on beliefs, images and information-processing in the study of Menon's world view. Although this was a sort of an Operational Code study, it did not make an analysis of the categories of different kinds of beliefs, and how diagnostic propensities influenced choice propensities. It was more a study of perception and images. Carras' (1979) study of Mrs. Gandhi's personality and motivations and its impact on Indian politics does not extend into the foreign policy realm. Hoffman (1972) and Vertzberger (1978) have also used a similar approach to study Indian decision making during the 1962 crisis. But no such research has been undertaken to study later conflicts or to assess the importance of the individual factor in other major foreign policy events after 1962. My analysis of the 1971 and 1974 decisions will shed some light on the cognitive processes underlying the decision maker's choice of options during these periods.

This study will be significant in some respects:

**Theoretical and Conceptual:**

It is an attempt to move away from the traditional historic descriptive approaches that have characterized most studies of Indian foreign policy in the past. While much of the research was focused on analyzing aspects of the policy, very little attempt has been made to deal systematically with the determinants of behaviour. This project has used sophisticated analytic methods which are aimed at producing more explanations than description of India's foreign policy preferences in the three cases. In particular, by applying the Operational Code construct to analyze the effects of individual belief systems on policy choices, I am attempting to introduce a whole new dimension to Indian foreign policy studies.

**Methodological:**

This study aims to make a methodological contribution to Indian foreign policy studies by using rigorous techniques of quantitative content analysis in the construction of the Operational Code of an Indian political leader.

## **CHAPTER I**

# **THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY**

### **1. The Individual and Foreign Policy Decision Making:**

**'Who' or 'What' determines the foreign policy of a state? What factors mould a state's behaviour in relations with other states? Is foreign policy a result of conscious deliberation or is it determined by forces outside one's control? are some of the questions that are repeatedly asked by students of international relations. Answers to questions such as these have been varied. Scholars belonging to different theoretical orientations have attempted to provide scientific explanations from various levels of analysis, which range from individual and small group determinants to the societal and systemic. Without attempting to revive and rehash the controversies regarding the levels of analysis problem (i.e., my research efforts are not toward establishing the 'best' or 'only' means of studying foreign policy), I am making a strong case for the decision-making approach and more specifically the importance of the study of individual decision makers in the decision-making process. It is argued that a systematic analysis of the role of the individual in the making of foreign policy is valuable as an input into international relations theory and it would provide a conceptual and empirical tool for analyzing much of what happens in international relations today. The theoretical basis for this study is derived from propositions and findings in social psychology and particularly from developments in cognitive psychology.**

**Although it has been generally understood that the factors which influence foreign policy decisions obviously do not function in a simple fashion (i.e., a single factor alone does not operate in all situations, but rather a number of determinants work in the background) and the particular mix of major determinants impinging on foreign policy depend on the circumstances and actors involved, one can point to cases or situations**

where the individual factor has outweighed the rest. Although we can speak of structural and situational factors influencing foreign policy choices, ultimately those choices are made on the basis of what is perceived by the decision maker. Jensen (1982, 33) argues that it is not the power position of a state, its domestic political and economic conditions, or its national belief system that determine the choices made in foreign policy. Rather it is the question of how these various factors are perceived by foreign policy decision-makers that becomes critical in foreign policy choices. This idea is graphically presented in Figure 1. International events are perceived by decision makers on the basis of the images they hold about the world.

In the causal chain which culminates with verbal and physical behaviour toward other actors in the interstate arena, the policy maker - and his or her perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and values - intervene between the more remote determinants of foreign behaviour and the actual outputs. Environmental factors influence state decisions indirectly; the impact is always mediated by the individual decision maker (Hopple 1980, 5).




Fig. 1. Role of Cognitive Factors on Behavioural Outcomes

Holsti (1982, 80) urges some caution in assuming that attention to individual political leaders can safely be neglected because they will yield results of limited political relevance. It would seem unreasonable to argue that individual beliefs and perceptions are entirely irrelevant to official decision-making and consequently studies dealing with variables of this type must *a priori* be rejected as of no interest in explaining foreign policy formulations.

Because of their preoccupation with political structures, the tendency of political scientists to neglect the significant role which leadership plays in political life has been deplored by Rustow (1970, 7). Structurally oriented political analyses either ignore the leadership variable or treat it as a variable that sets the limits within which political events can be explained in terms of political structure.

By the time one has taken into account systemic, societal, governmental and bureaucratic constraints on decision makers, much of the variance in foreign policy making has been accounted for; attributes of the individual decision makers are thus often regarded as a residual category that may be said to account for the unexplained variance (Holsti 1976, 29).

There are, however, political contexts in which structural analyses tell only part of the story, and the variable of leadership can be omitted only at the cost of a significant gap in explanation (Dettman 1974, 245). The available research indicates unambiguously that the personal characteristics of foreign policy elites are related strongly to external behaviour, especially for certain types of international actors and in certain situational contexts.

#### **A. Third World Context:**

The potency of the individual factor is assumed to be great in less developed countries. In the Third World context, political structures are undergoing rapid and substantial change with particular leaders playing a significant role in bringing about this change. Consequently, explanations of Third World politics cannot be limited to structural analysis, but must give due consideration to the impact of the leadership variable. Developmental theorists (Binder, Verba and Pye, 1971), concur that in most Third World countries, the role of the leader in shaping political development and in nation-building was likely to be significant, as there would be fewer of the restraints which bureaucracy and large scale organizations impose in more developed countries.

Moreover, roles are less well defined in these political contexts. As M. Hermann (1974, 201-234) has pointed out, the less well defined the policy maker's role, the more likely that personality characteristics are to influence foreign policy. Based on this rationale it can be said that the personalities of heads of state and foreign ministers will probably have more impact on the foreign policy behaviour of their governments than the personalities of the occupants of most other governmental positions. Rosenau (1971, 149) argues that, especially in the area of foreign policy, individual and idiosyncratic variables would be more important than either systemic or structural variables, and the idiosyncratic variables is one of the five types of variables which determines a nation's foreign policy.

In their Interstate Behavioural Analysis Project (1980), Wilkenfeld and his associates analyzed the relative potency of a set of societal, interstate relational, global and psychological variables for explaining foreign policy behaviour and discovered that all four sets of factors contributed significantly to explain the variation in conflict behaviour. However, when they looked at specific types of government (Western type, Closed and Third World types) the psychological variables increased in potency. The result was particularly applicable to explanations of foreign policy behaviour of Third World countries.

#### **B. Decisional Context:**

The higher in the hierarchy of the foreign policy organization an individual's role is, the more likely are his/her personality characteristics to affect foreign policy decisions (Hermann 1974, 202). Snyder and Robinson (1961) observed that when asked if personal characteristics play as great a part in behaviour as organizational factors such as communication, officials who are at the lower echelons tend to say 'no', while those at higher echelons tend to say 'yes'. So what an individual at the higher echelons believes or desires can influence decisions made by that organization. Roles according to Hermann (1974) are less likely to be well defined, the higher in the organization one climbs, and the individual has more opportunity to delimit or expand his/her functions. Thus the personal characteristics of the heads of state is expected to have more of an impact on foreign policy formulation.

### **C. Crisis Context:**

Crises tend to provide decision-makers with greater decisional latitude. A decision-maker has a greater chance of asserting his/her personality in a crisis situation, in which vital interests are seemingly at stake (Holsti 1977, 16-18). In such situations the need for secrecy and quick decisions will enhance the role of the decision-maker and reduce the scope and influence of bureaucratic and organizational factors on the decision making process. A detailed discussion of this will follow in section 5 of this chapter.

Working at this level of analysis is important because it offers another perspective of the foreign policy decision-making process. It provides important insights into the process mechanisms underlying the formulation of policy. One can no longer accept the notion that foreign policy is a reaction to external stimuli without taking into consideration how the decision maker reacts to that stimuli and forms a response.

Second, despite the existence of structural, societal and systemic factors, it is the decision-maker who ultimately makes a choice from several policy options. The foreign policy of a state is not automatically formulated by the interaction of the first three variables alone. Given the existence of these variables, the human factor mediates between the causes and actual outcomes. To a large extent, the cognitive mechanism of individual decision makers will have an impact on the choice of action<sup>1</sup>.

The influence of psychology and the behavioural revolution in the post-war era produced many schools of thought which dealt with the individual and his/her psychological traits as the central focus of analysis. One of the popular approaches following World War II, was the 'war begins in the minds of men' approach. Followers of this approach took an optimistic view of human nature and they believed that conflict was a result of misunderstanding, lack of communication and inadequate knowledge. They had a firm belief that world peace could be established by channeling men's energies into having peaceful interactions within the framework of a world organization (Waltz 1959).

---

<sup>1</sup> Once again it will be asserted that this work does not intend in any way to deny the importance of structural, societal or systemic factors in foreign policy formulation. It just focuses on the impact of the individual variable.



The second approach introduced Freudian psychology to the study of political elites and attempted to analyze how psychological and pathological needs and aberrations of these elites were projected into the international arena. Laswell (1930, 1948) advanced the thesis that political behaviour results from intrapsychic predispositions being displaced on public objects. The examples of Hitler and Stalin seemed to provide special relevance to this perspective.

The power school was also rooted in psychological theories of political man. Human nature was largely interpreted in Hobbesian and Machiavellian terms and portrayed man as ambitious and egotistic.

Although these approaches concentrated on the individual decision-makers, and applied concepts from social psychology, they did not focus on the dynamics underlying the decision-making process. There was a relative neglect of cognitive and perceptual factors.

Snyder, Bruck & Sapin (1962) were the first to produce a systematic decision-making model for the analysis of foreign policy. They placed the individual at the centre of a complex network of organizational and other influences. The major empirical application of the model - the American decision to resist the invasion of South Korea (Snyder & Paige 1958, Paige 1968) made fairly extensive use of the organizational and informational variables. It also explored in some detail the internal and external setting of the decision.

Also, foreign policy decision-making analysis was dominated by approaches which saw decisions as being the outcome of rational calculation of means and ends by a unitary rational actor<sup>2</sup> or as a product of routine standard operating procedures in a large organization or bureaucracy<sup>3</sup>. But recent research has indicated that those models have several limitations and inadequacies, and a set of assumptions about the decision process distinctly different has emerged on the fundamental problems of the human mind.

---

<sup>2</sup>The analytic paradigm

<sup>3</sup>The cybernetic model

## 2. Cognitive Processes and Foreign Policy:

Research on the cognitive processes of decision makers has had great impact in the study of foreign policy. Work in this area has been largely influenced by developments in social psychology, particularly cognitive theory. Political scientists engaged in decision-making analyses were influenced by developments in psychology which produced a major paradigm shift, referred to by some scholars as a cognitive revolution in psychology. George (1979, 98) points out to two important aspects of this paradigm shift. First is the shift in the fundamental 'model of man' assumption - away from the conception of man as a passive agent who responds to environmental stimuli and back to a conception of man as actively and selectively responding to and shaping his environment. Second, within the conceptualization of man as an active agent, an additional shift has occurred - away from the fundamental premise of earlier cognitive balance theories, which viewed man as a 'consistency seeker' and towards the quite different premise of recent attribution theory, which view man as a 'problem solver'. He argues that men seek as best as they can

To infer the causes of social events in everyday life, to discern the attributes of other actors and social phenomena, to predict historical trends and the behaviour of other persons - all in order to be able to exercise some control over the outcome of social situations (George 1979, 98).

Man represents rather than react to his environment. This view is different from the notion accepted earlier on, of man as an emitter of response and an organism to be manipulated.

It was the cognitive approach with its emphasis on the policy maker and his/her subjective definition of the situation, which provided much of the stimulus for interest in psychological and cognitive attributes of political leaders. It reflected concern for how information is processed, i.e., the process of searching for alternatives, the organization of cognitive components, perception of others and the definition of the situation within which decision making occurs etc. The cognitive process approaches recognized that the individual was less than 'objectively rational', and it was precisely because there are important cognitive constraints on rationality that analysts searched for methods of dealing more effectively with beliefs, perceptions, information, and related phenomena.

### **A. Cognitive Constraints on Rationality:**

There has been a realization in recent years, especially with the influence of cognitive theory on decision-making analysis, that there are important cognitive constraints on rational decision-making. Cognitive limits on rationality include limits on the individual's capacity to receive, process and assimilate information about a situation, and an inability to formulate the entire set of policy alternatives. There is fragmentary knowledge about the consequences of each option and an inability to order preferences for all possible consequences on a simple utility scale (March & Simon 1958, 138).

One of the cognitive limits on rationality is due to structural uncertainty. The physical world is made up of structural uncertainty and as Holsti (1975, 30) points out, there are a number of situations in international relations that are non-routine and unpredictable; situations which are highly ambiguous and is open to a variety of interpretations.

Uncertainty may result from a scarcity of information; from information of low quality or questionable authenticity; or from information that is contradictory or is consistent with two or more significantly different interpretations coupled with the absence of reliable means of choosing between them (Holsti 1975, 30).

It has been observed that structural uncertainty often characterizes important foreign policy choice situations (Holsti et al. 1962, 1975; Paige 1968; Steinbruner 1974). The cognitive process models provided the answer for the handling of multiple objectives and response to structural uncertainty. It is the management of uncertainty which marks cognitive theory.

### **B. Subjective vs. Objective Reality:**

It is a basic theorem in the social sciences that if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences (Merton 1957, 421-422).

Stated somewhat differently, the theorem asserts that an individual responds not only to the objective characteristics of the situation but also the meaning the situation has for him/her. The person's subsequent behaviour and the results of that behaviour are determined by the meaning ascribed to the situation.

Like the blind men, each describing the elephant on the basis of the part he touches, different individuals may describe the same object or situation in terms of what they have been conditioned to see (Holsti 1971, 258).

Similarly the foreign policy of a nation addresses itself not to the external world, as is commonly stated, but rather to the image of the external world that is in the minds of the decision-makers.

*It is ... one of our basic choices to take as our prime analytical objective, the recreation of the 'world' of the decision makers as they view it. The manner in which they define situations becomes another way of saying how the state oriented to action and why (Snyder et al. 1962, 65).*

Policy-makers do not respond to the objective facts of the situation but to their image of it. It is what they think the world is like and not what it is really like, which determines their behaviour. This view is different from the one assumed by earlier decision-making theorists that the individual was objectively rational. The unitary rational actor model assumed that the decision-maker could relate to the objective facts of the situation and had a complete understanding of the causal forces which determined outcomes. But the psychological environment may only imperfectly correspond to the 'real' or operational political environment. Perceptions and cognitions intervene between the individual decision-maker and his/her objective environment and therefore the decisions he/she makes about his/her environment are subjective (Boulding 1959, 120-121). Objective reality cannot be reconstructed without distortion by the observer's operations. There is a distinction between an individual's view of reality, which is certainly a matter of belief, and reality itself, which is independent of anyone's belief. Since an individual's actions are based on not just reality, but perceived reality, it is important to study the manner in which one perceives, diagnoses and evaluates the environment.

In the sixties, the Sprouts (Harold and Margaret Sprout 1960) reacted against writers who implicitly theorized that the environment determined national policies. They argued that the environment could only affect national policies in so far as it was perceived or misperceived and therefore considered in the calculations of decision makers. Their two main contentions were that the operational environment taken by itself was inadequate to explain decisions, and that decisions could only be understood with reference to the perceptions of the decision-makers or their psycho-milieu.

Snyder et al. (1962) made a clear distinction between the operational and psychological environment but did not pay too much attention to the psychological environment. The Brecher (1969) framework was an improvement on the Snyder model.

Brecher considered elite images and perceptions as a decisive input into the foreign policy system. These perceptions were filtered through attitudinal prisms to produce certain actions or decisions.

The recognition that foreign policy decision-makers act in accordance with their perception of reality and not in response to objective reality gave rise to several studies. By attempting to employ the findings and analytical concepts pertaining to the dynamics and mechanisms of perception and in order to analyze better the patterns by which nations cope with situations of crisis and threat, a number of scholars attempted an analysis of specific historical events.

### **C. Cognitive Perceptual Frameworks:**

Roberta Wohlstetter's study (1962) was intended to apply to human perceptions in any crisis situation. Her central thesis was that the attack on Pearl Harbour resulted not from a lack of relevant intelligence data but from misperception of the available information. American policy-makers tended to act upon bits of information that was in accord with their own preconceived notions. Handel (1977) sought to further sharpen and delineate Wohlstetter's concepts and definition, which he applied to the 1973 Arab Israeli war. He adhered to her basic premise and her predisposition to view the recurrent phenomena of surprise in terms of certain perceptual tendencies inherent in the decision-makers.

Holsti, Brody and North (1964), in their study of the Cuban missile crisis, provided a psychological model. The conceptual framework which they developed for their analysis was a two-step mediated stimulus response model; S-r:s-R. This model attempted to analyze the decision processes within the 'black box'. In this model, the acts of one nation is considered as an input to another nation. The nations are looked upon as information-processing and decision-making units whose outputs (behavioural responses) in turn become inputs to other nations. Stimulus S is an event in the environment which may or may not be perceived by a given actor or which two or more actors may perceive and evaluate differently. The perception (r) of stimulus (S) within the national decision-making systems corresponds to the definition of the situation. For example, the Soviet missile sites in Cuba (S) was perceived by President Kennedy as a

threat to the security of the United States (r). Finally, the (s) stages in the model represents the actor's expression of his own intentions, plans, actions or attitudes toward another actor, which becomes an action response (R).

Perhaps the most elaborate work on perceptions and misperceptions was the Stanford project - the study of the 1914 crisis. The Stanford (Holsti et al. 1968, 1972) group's main concern was to assess the impact of perceptions on foreign policy behaviour. In their analysis of the decision making process prior to World War I, they found that perceptions of time, alternatives and information were crucial in determining a nation's entry into war. They generated important hypotheses on the impact of crisis-induced stress on perception/misperception. Basically, there was agreement that prolonged stress decreases the complexity of information-processing. This meant a lesser likelihood of accurately distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant information, reduced search for new information, ignoring unpleasant information, making stimulus bound response, and attitudes becoming increasingly stereotyped (Holsti, Brody and North 1964, 1968; Holsti 1972).

George and Smoke (1974), in their comprehensive study *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, drew upon perceptual notions, such as the 'image of the opponent', as the principal explanatory tool for understanding the dynamics and mechanism of human behaviour in crisis situations.

One's image of an opponent affects one's interpretation of available intelligence, even when it is not inherently ambiguous on the opponent's intentions. An incorrect or defective model of the opponent's behavioural style can distort even reasonably good factual information on what he may be up to (George and Smoke 1974, 583).

Jervis (1968, 1976) has provided some important insights regarding perceptions/misperceptions. He looks at an actor's perception as one of the immediate causes of behaviour and discusses the types of misperception of other states' intentions which states tend to make. Most of the propositions advanced in his book (1976) are generalizations about how decision-makers perceive others' behaviour and form judgements about their intentions; and how, why and when, highly intelligent and conscientious statesmen misperceive their environment in specific ways and reach inappropriate decisions. But, he fails to provide a conceptual framework by which one

can systematically study perceptions and images.

There are limitations to this kind of perceptual approach.

1. Most of the studies assume a one-to-one relationship between perceptions and behaviour. Perception is not the direct cause of behaviour. The cognitive perceptual framework constitutes a reductive fallacy.
2. They have ignored the importance of intervening variables such as beliefs and images and even though some take them into considerations, for example Brecher et al., they are not treated as central variables and are secondary to perceptions.

A decision-maker's perception of, orientation to, and interpretation of, the political environment is mediated by his/her beliefs. Beliefs influence perceptions and information-processing that precede and accompany the decision maker's choice of action. Perceptions can be understood only in the context of beliefs. The beliefs and images that an individual holds will determine the manner in which he/she perceives/misperceives an event, object or phenomena. Although perceptions are important, one must move beyond that concept and analyze other cognitive aspects, especially the belief system, which underlie the decision making process.

### **3. The Belief System:**

One of the central concepts in cognitive theory is the belief system.

If cognitive processes are accepted as central to the analysis of policy choices and behaviour, beliefs as a major cognitive variable, deserve particular attention (Selim 1979, 21).

Beliefs are the fundamental building blocks in an individual's conceptual structure.

Whether it be from the standpoint of philosophy, history, psychology, sociology, economics or political science, students of human behaviour have long agreed that any individual must necessarily simplify and structure the complexity of his world in order to cope with it. This applies also to the political actor for he too must somehow comprehend complex situations in order to decide how best to deal with them (George 1969, 200).

The world, and especially the international political arena, is so complex but people are able to make some sense out of it. National leaders do make more-or-less 'intelligent' interpretations about political events and relationships (Axelrod 1973, 1248). This is because the actor engages in a definition of the situation, i.e., a cognitive structuring of the situation that will clarify for him/her the nature of the problem, relate

it to his/her previous experience and make it amenable to appropriate problem-solving activities. The individual perceives and simplifies reality through a prism which comprises his/her belief system. So, despite uncertainty and complexity, the mind operates to establish strong beliefs and acts upon them. The process of resolving ambiguity and uncertainty by imposing an inferential structure is a critical assumption of cognitive theory.

#### **A. Historical and Conceptual Background:**

At least since the time of Plato, men have considered knowing or believing as analytically separate from wanting or valuing. Important areas of philosophy correspond (if imperfectly) with the basic human processes of believing and valuing. Epistemology or the problem of knowledge, is concerned with describing how an individual arrives at knowledge, and with stating criteria for evaluating the adequacy of his/her knowledge (Popper 1963; Kuhn 1962). Philosophy has maintained the distinction it first made between questions of fact and question of value, between questions 'what is true' and 'what is best'. These basic questions have been appropriated by psychologists on the supposition that some scientific explanation might be given of how individuals actually function in the domain of beliefs and in the domain of values.

The phenomenism and the dynamisms of Gestalt psychology were important for the study of beliefs.

Together, these principles encouraged the view that 'forces' influence psychological activity and that experience is a product of active commerce with the environment rather than a mere passive registration of what is 'out there' (Schiebe 1970, 12).

The most important link between the Gestalt tradition and a modern psychology of beliefs is the work of Kurt Lewin (1951). Lewin formulated the concept of life space (totality of psychological influences operating upon an individual at a given point in time) primarily to take into account the partially unique nature of the psychological environment. The life space was differentiated into regions corresponding to the individual's conceptual organization of his/her environment. He introduced the concept 'subjective probability' to represent an individual's state of uncertainty about the possibility of achieving a particular objective. Using these basic conceptions, Lewin was able to present the dynamics of enormously complex psychological situations - conflicts,



crises, uncertainty etc. All the necessary features for a psychology of beliefs are present in Lewin's theories.

According to Tolman (1951, 59) organisms develop cognitive maps as a function of experience in their ecology. These maps are composed of expectancies or means-ends readiesses concerning what actions might lead to what consequences in the environment. He notes that for all practical purposes, means-ends readiesses, expectancies and beliefs are but different names for the same theoretical construct - a purely cognitive, acquired disposition of the organism. Tolman looked upon cognitive dispositions as intervening variables - determinants of behaviour that logically fall between existing stimulus conditions (independent variable) and the organism's responses (dependent variable).

It was necessary for Lewin to make Gestalt psychology behavioural, for Tolman to make behaviourism cognitive, and for the psychoanalytic concepts to become accepted, before a solid conceptual basis was established for theories incorporating beliefs (Scheibe 1970, 21).

Behaviourism, like Gestalt psychology, contributed to the development of a psychology of beliefs. Research on beliefs was influenced not only by general developments in the behavioural sciences but also because of the changes in society itself. The most important influences were:

- i. The post-war developments in social and cognitive psychology;
- ii. The growth and diversification of psychology in general, which gave rise to the formulation of problem centered theories;
- iii. The growth of an interdisciplinary approach to problems, one of which is the problem of decision making;
- iv. The socio-political-economic climate which demanded the development of a psychology of beliefs, because human conflicts are frequently framed in these terms (Schiebe 1970).

In 1950, the classic study of the 'Authoritarian Personality' (Adorno et al. 1950) was published with the specific objective of describing the genesis and operation of Anti-Semitic beliefs. This work provoked a number of other research efforts to understand more general kinds of beliefs (see Rokeach 1960). Lasswell (1948) and Freud (1967) have stressed the psychoanalytic perspective, in which certain conflicts and tensions within the individual psyche condition an ensuing set of beliefs. This perspective has

been followed through by psycho-biographical studies which document how individuals convert certain fears and inadequacies or perceived threats into a set of behavioural predispositions (George and George 1956; Erikson 1948). Greenstein (1969), in his *Personality and Politics* has attempted to isolate various personality traits which are the basis of, or are converted into, political beliefs.

Perhaps the most popular predecessor to the research on beliefs has been the study of ideology.

Ideology has been treated in a variety of ways ranging from a set of tenets on how one should behave, to a set of interrelated facets of a highly articulated belief system (Cobb 1973, 123).

Converse (1964, 207) has indicated that the popularity of belief systems was due to its predecessor, ideology, being used in so many different ways that researchers were looking for a new term which was not as 'murky' and did not have the normative overtones of ideology.

#### **B. Definition of Beliefs:**

The belief system, composed of a number of images of the past, present, and the future, includes all the accumulated, organized knowledge that the organism has about itself and the world (Miller et al. 1967, 16).

Either on the basis of direct observation, or data derived from outside sources, or by way of various inference processes, a person learns or forms a number of beliefs. The totality of a person's beliefs serves as the informational base that ultimately determines his/her attitudes, intentions and behaviour.

Beliefs can be thought of as a set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his/her environment, defining it for him/her its salient characteristics.

Our beliefs provide us with a more or less coherent code by which we organize and make sense out of what would otherwise be a confusing array of signals picked up from the environment by our senses (Holsti 1970, 23).

It is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-maker's beliefs about the world and their image of others.

These cognitions are part of the proximate cause of the relevant behaviour and other levels of analysis cannot immediately tell us what they will be (Jervis 1976, 28).

Beliefs, attitudes and values are all organized together to form a functionally-integrated cognitive system. Attitudes refer to a person's favourable or unfavourable evaluation of

an object, while beliefs represent the information he/she has about the object. A person's attitude toward an object is based on his salient beliefs about that object (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, 12).

Values, on the other hand, have to do with modes of conduct and end-states of existence. To say a person has a 'value' is to say that he/she has an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternate modes of conduct.

Once a value is internalized it becomes, consciously or unconsciously, a standard or criteria for guiding action, for developing and maintaining attitudes toward relevant objects and situations, for justifying one's own and other's actions and attitudes, for morally judging self and others, and for comparing self with others (Rokeach 1968, 160).

Beliefs have three components (Rokeach 1968, 113).

- a. A cognitive component which represents a person's knowledge about what is true or false, good or bad, desirable or undesirable;
- b. An affective component, as the belief under certain conditions is capable of arousing affect of varying intensity regarding the object of the belief, taking a positive or negative position with respect to the object of the belief or around the belief itself when its validity is seriously questioned;
- c. A behavioural component, because the belief being a response predisposition must lead to some action when it is activated. The kinds of action it leads to, according to Rokeach (1968, 114), is dictated by the content of the belief.

#### **4. Beliefs and Foreign Policy Decision Making:**

A 'decision' is a deliberate choice of ends and means in a given concrete situation (Sprout and Sprout 1965, 24). The process of deciding or decision-making denotes the process which precedes the decision. This process includes efforts to define the situation, select goals, formulation of alternative courses of action, processing of incoming information, as well as the choice of the final line of action. This definition of decision-making does not include the actual implementation of a decision.

### **A. Information Processing:**

The need to fit data into a wider framework of beliefs, even if doing so does not seem to do justice to individual facts, is not, or at least is not only a psychological drive that decreases the accuracy of perceptions of the world, but is essential to the logic of inquiry (Kaplan 1964, 86).

Our perceptions and the way in which we define reality, are largely governed by our general beliefs about the world in which we operate, i.e., our belief system.

The belief system thus serves as an instrument that enables us to impose a degree of order on the constant stream of impulses we receive from the outerworld (Brodin 1972, 99).

Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images. In other words, actors tend to perceive what they expect. For example, John Foster Dulles followed his usual mode of analysis when he interpreted a large cut in the size of the Russian army as being due to Russian economic weakness, as possibly leading to an increased production of atomic weapons, and not as lessening world tension (Holsti 1962).

The operation of the perceptual mechanism then, is such as to bring stored information to bear on incoming data in order to build the stable, integrated, meaningful content of conscious perception (Steinbruner 1974, 93).

Facts can be interpreted or identified only with the aid of beliefs. The influence of beliefs on perceptions is apparent when we examine how different people interpret the same information. All images are stereotyped in the trivial sense that they oversimplify reality. It is this characteristic that makes beliefs/images functional or dysfunctional. Unless beliefs coincide in some way with what is commonly perceived as reality, decisions based on these beliefs/images are not likely to fulfill the decision maker's expectations.

In addition to organizing perceptions into a meaningful guide for behaviour, the belief system has the function of establishing goals and ordering preferences. Thus it actually has a dual connection with decision making. The direct relationship is found in the aspect of the belief system which tells us 'what ought to be', acting as a direct guide in the establishment of goals. The indirect link - the role that the belief system plays in the process of scanning, selecting, filtering, linking, re-ordering, organizing and reporting arises from the tendency of the individual to assimilate new perceptions to familiar ones (Rokeach 1960, 50).

## **B. Resolution of Uncertainty :**

It is the management of uncertainty which marks cognitive theory. To the cognitive theorist, the inferential capacity of the mind, which imposes structure on otherwise highly ambiguous data is a fundamental force in the decision process. According to Steinbruner;

*Great uncertainty does not in every case boggle the human mind or render it incapable of action. Nor is uncertainty in every case controlled or avoided, as in the simple cybernetic process (1974, 89).*

Uncertainty is decisively resolved in the minds of individuals. General structures of belief are set up within which the decision process proceeds quite smoothly. The belief system is a mechanism for resolving ambiguity, and the mind is capable of powerful logical operations on inherently ambiguous data.

*If despite uncertainty, the mind operates so as to establish strong beliefs and to act upon them, then neither the analytic nor the cybernetic paradigm can accurately reflect the implications of uncertainty for the decision process (Steinbruner 1974, 109).*

The phenomenon of a firm belief becoming established on the basis of meager or even contradictory evidence is alien to the rational actor models. Cognitive theory readily accounts for firm, categorical, non-probabilistic beliefs in situations of uncertainty. At higher orders of complexity, when the reality constraint is weakened, the internal inference mechanism of the mind are likely to become all the more important. Structure will be imposed and uncertainty resolved not by probabilistic judgements, but by categorical inferences (Steinbruner 1974, 110).

Cognitive theory suggests several ways by which uncertainty is resolved.

- i. **Reinforcement:** One of the major assumptions is that the strength of a belief is a function of past reinforcement and the number of times its use was followed by a reward to some important value. Intermittent success with specific decisions, based on the general beliefs attached to the information received, will tend to give strength to the general beliefs. So such beliefs become established in the general cognitive structure even if they have very weak or contradictory connections to reality.
- ii. **Inferential Process:** The strength of some beliefs depend not on direct information or evidence, but rather on inferential logic connecting them to other established beliefs.

The presence of uncertainty means the burden of establishing a stable pattern of beliefs by which one can process information and depends, to a great extent, on the imagination of the decision maker.

iii. Images and arguments from analogy: One of the means by which a decision-maker anchors a set of beliefs when information is insufficient or contradictory, is to utilize a structure well established in simpler situations. Simple images and analogies are widely used in high level policy processes.

To the cognitive theorist, images and analogies provide internal anchors around which the inference mechanism of the mind can structure ambiguous information (Steinbruner 1974,115).

iv. Impossibility Inferences: This blocks off whole ranges of calculations and thus allows for obvious simplification of belief systems and these have been critically important in the development of that structure of belief which is 'scientific understanding' (Steinbruner 1974, 119). In cognitive theory, impossibility argument is another inference mechanism used by the human mind to organize its internal structure in situations of complexity. Impossibility arguments block off a whole range of calculations, when substantial incoming information threatens to make the decision process more complex. For example, during the 1962 Sino-Indian crisis, Nehru adopted this means to cope with the complexity of the situation. Despite increasing information which indicated an impending Chinese attack, Nehru tended to minimize the threat by denying that the Chinese, whom he considered brothers, would ignore the principles of the Panchsheel and attack India. This belief in turn blocked off a whole range of calculations and added simplicity to the decision process (Vertzberger 1978).

v. Small group interaction: This is a process by which the simplicity of the belief system is maintained by a process of social corroboration. Judgements are bolstered by the concurring views and opinions of other people. If several people in a group make the same judgments on the same information, it adds to the belief strength of the decision maker (Janis 1972). When under pressure of inconsistency people will prefer supportive opinions, and beliefs will remain stable when strong social support is available.

## **5. Application of the Cognitive Process Approaches :**

Holsti (1976) identifies situations where the cognitive process approach is useful.

- i. **Non-routine or unanticipated situations which require more than merely the application of standard operating procedures and decision rules. In international relations there are a number of non-routine situations which must be dealt with individually. For example, war, negotiation of a ceasefire etc. Here one cannot apply a set of standard rules in choosing an alternative. Cognitive processes will play an important part in decision-making in this case.**
- ii. **When the situation is highly ambiguous and is open to a variety of interpretations. An ambiguous situation may be defined as one which cannot be adequately structured or categorized by the individual because of the lack of sufficient cues. Budner (1962, 30) identifies three such situations. 1. A completely new situation in which there are no familiar cues; 2. A complex situation in which there are a great number of cues; 3. A contradictory situation in which different elements or cues suggest different structures. In short, situations characterized by novelty, complexity or insolubility. Several studies have indicated that in highly ambiguous situations, perceptions and images will play a very important role. When there is too much or too little information and contradictory messages, errors in perception will occur.**
- iii. **Stressful situations: It is customary to regard stress as the anxiety or fear an individual experiences in a situation which he/she perceives as posing a severe threat to one or more values. There is considerable evidence in the literature on stress (Holsti 1972; Hermann 1979; Holsti and George 1975) that persons experiencing intense stress tend to suffer increased cognitive rigidity, and there is an erosion of general cognitive abilities including creativity and the ability to cope with complexity. Beliefs will be kept as simple as possible and perception will be selective. Tolerance for ambiguity will suffer from high stress, with the result that conclusions will be drawn more quickly than is warranted by the evidence.**
- iv. **Decisions made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy, by leaders who are relatively free from organizational and other constraints.**

v. Long-range planning which involves considerable uncertainty and in which conceptions of 'what is', 'what is important', 'what is likely', 'what is desirable', 'what is related to what' are likely to be at the core of the political process.




Fig. 2. Situations where the Cognitive Process Approach is Useful.

#### iv. Crisis Situations:

Crisis situations in the international arena are characterized by structural uncertainty. Information is either scarce or contradictory or is consistent with two or more significantly different interpretations, or information is surrounded by noise and is misleading. The decision-maker's ability to make a 'rational decision' is impaired, and his/her capacity for receiving, processing and assimilating data from the outside, and the ability to generate a whole range of policy preferences will be affected during a crisis. In situations where a decision-maker perceives a threat to important values combined with a finite time to respond to that threat, and given the structural uncertainty of the situation, the cognitive process mechanism of the decision maker will be influential in the formulation of policy. In other words, the decision maker's perceptions, beliefs and images will influence his/her interpretation of and response to the situation.

Predictions about the future behaviour of other nations (threat perception), perception of the other nation's characteristics (trust or distrust), and conception of appropriate ways of dealing with other nations (responsiveness) will be defined by the



decision-maker's definition of the situation based on his/her beliefs (Pruitt et al. 1969, 361). Perceptual behaviour is disrupted and becomes less well-controlled than under normal, routine circumstances and hence less adaptive. When leaders are faced with the necessity of making decisions, the outcomes of which they cannot foresee, they fall back on their own instinctive reactions, beliefs and modes of behaviour.

*Certain perceptions are actively excluded from consciousness if they do not fit the chosen world image (Rapoport 1960, 258).*

In international relations, the evidence available to the decision-maker almost always permits several interpretations. According to Jervis (1968, 455-456), a belief will have greater impact on an actor's interpretation of data when: (a) the greater the ambiguity of the data and; (b) the higher the degree of confidence with which the actor holds the belief. This is confirmed by Wohlstetter's work on Pearl Harbour.

*For every signal that came into the information net in 1941, there were usually several plausible alternative explanations, and it is not surprising that our observers and analysts were inclined to select the explanation that fitted the popular hypothesis (Wohlstetter 1965, 393).*

Also, in some cases accurate clues to others' intentions are surrounded by noise and deception (Handel 1976). Decision makers who reject information that contradicts their views, or who develop complex interpretations of it, often do so in highly ambiguous situations.

The threat to important values along with a limited time to respond induces stress and this condition is further enhanced by the complexity of the situation. Holsti (1965) offers several hypotheses on the effects of stress on crisis decision-making. As stress increases, time is perceived as being very salient, and leaders view policy alternatives for their own nation and allies in contrasting ways from their opponents. This is due to cognitive rigidity, and cognitive mechanisms dominate over decision-making as the crisis proceeds.

So, when all or some of these situations are present, the decision maker must fall back upon his/her beliefs in order to make some sense out of the confusing signals from the environment and establish a criteria by which he/she can make a 'right' decision. According to George (1969), the decision-maker relies on the following beliefs

(a) The nature of political life and international politics; (b) Belief in the ability to

control events; (c) Beliefs about opponent's goals and strategies; (d) Beliefs regarding the best approach for goal selection, strategy and tactics etc.

So it can be argued that under these conditions, a successful application of the cognitive process models of decision-making is possible. This includes the belief system that has been referred to in the past as the Operational Code of the political actor (Holsti 1976).

#### **A. Cognitive Map:**

As a theoretical approach, cognitive mapping was first developed by Axelrod (1972), and Bonham and Shapiro (1973). This approach offers a series of snapshots of mental circuitry in action in a decision-making situation. This breaks away from the mechanical study of perceptions and cognitions by focusing on the mental images and processes involved. It is a graphic representation of the cognitive processes in a particular policy-making situation. It is an inductive approach, in the sense that it traces the path of cognitions from stimulus through to response. The cognitive map represents beliefs structures related to a specific problem and stimulates the thought processes that occur in order to make a choice. According to Bonham and Shapiro (1973), the cognitive map as a theoretical approach seeks explanation of the cognitive dynamics which occur when an individual receives information about an international event, processes it through his belief system and reaches a conclusion about what has happened and what should be done. This approach largely relies on (1) Psycho-logic as developed by Abelson and Rosenberg (1958) i.e., how people deduce new attitudes by combining two old ones with an element in common; (2) Digraph, which renders structural properties of concepts and linkages in graphic forms, and (3) Causal analysis.

**Limitations of the Cognitive Map:** 1. The cognitive map comprises the total set of relevant beliefs or concepts in a given situation and refers to the cognitive organization related to a specific policy problem. Unlike the Operational Code, it does not set up a number of master beliefs which are likely to have great impact on many situations. What is gained in specificity it loses in generality.

2. Also, in its attempts to simplify the decision procedure, the cognitive map operates with a static time concept (Heradstveit and Narvessen 1978). A Cognitive map seeks to

include the universe of concepts regardless of their centrality. An exhaustive list of concepts and their casual linkages becomes of paramount importance for making successful predictions. As soon as the decision-maker employs new concepts, the simulation may lose its validity. This presents an obstacle in considering dynamic processes over time (Heradstveit and Narvessen 1978). This is clearly demonstrated in the cognitive map study of the Norwegian oil policy. Given the focus on beliefs at a higher level of generalization in the Operational Code, this approach is less sensitive to new developments.

3. Thirdly, it looks for direct links between beliefs and actions. Beliefs are treated as an independent variable.

The cognitive map approach can be useful, as it offers some important insights into the cognitive processes of decision-makers. But, the main drawback is that it does not go as far as the Operational Code to study the 'master' beliefs, which I think is very important to understand policy preferences.

#### **B. Cognitive Simplicity/Complexity :**

This framework is derived from the psychological research on information-processing and cognition. It concerns the way in which individuals structure their world - how many dimensions they use in characterizing their world and how many rules they make use of to integrate the resultant information (Schroder and Suedfeld 1971; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977). The person who uses many dimensions and more rules is considered to be cognitively complex. Adorno et al. (1950) found that individuals who were cognitively simple were given to stereotyping and took an ethnocentric view of other nations. There have been other studies (Holsti, Brody and North 1964; Holsti 1972) which look at information-processing in crisis situations. They argue that when there is a threat to important values under time pressure and information overload, the decision-makers under stress are bound to be less complex in processing information; there is reduced information search, in group conformity, a tendency to make premature closure and stimulus bound response. Previous studies have found that the cognitive performance of government decision-making declines in crises that result in war. This decline has been attributed to crisis produced stress which leads to simplification of information-

processing. For example, Suedfeld et al. (1977) found that the complexity of Arab and Israeli speeches at the United Nations regularly fell prior to major wars in the Middle East. Diplomatic communication exchanged in crises that culminated in war were less complex than those exchanged in crises that were resolved peacefully (Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977).

But this kind of approach has its share of problems too:

1. The hypotheses on crisis-induced stress producing cognitive simplicity has been disproven in the Japanese case (Levi and Tetlock 1980). Comparisons between statements made in the early and late periods of the 1941 crisis yielded only weak evidence of cognitive simplification. This result challenges the fundamental assumption of this approach. The authors have tried to explain it away by introducing auxiliary hypotheses.
2. Although the study of information processing is important, this approach does not focus on the belief system and its impact on information processing. Beliefs are studied only in passing.

## **6. Limitations of the Cognitive Approaches :**

### **A. Criticisms:**

Research on the cognitive processes of elite decision makers has had the greatest impact in the study of foreign policy, yet this approach has several limitations.

1. **Lack of a comprehensive framework:** The cognitive process approach is extremely broad and lacks a clear conceptual framework. While frameworks such as the Cognitive Map, Conceptual Simplicity/Complexity, Cognitive Perceptual Frameworks and the Operational Code can be grouped under this broad umbrella, there does not exist a central theory of cognition and choice, by means of which one can integrate these various approaches. One of the reasons for this is because the psychologists themselves have failed to achieve consensus on important questions about belief systems, attitude change, and related concerns. So it has often been asked as to why students of foreign policy add to their own burdens by introducing the controversies of other disciplines.

But Holsti argues that the starting point and the criterion of relevance should be the substantive concerns of the foreign policy analyst. He says that,

*It is probably no accident that among the most insightful studies of foreign policy by psychologists, are those that have started with problems that emerge in a real foreign policy setting and then worked back towards the psychological literature than vice-versa (1976, 26).*

2. **Laboratory-influenced research:** Another criticism regarding this approach is that most of the assumptions made in the socio-psychological literature on cognitions and perceptions have emerged from research in laboratories. The laboratory atmosphere has little resemblance to the complex international environment, and one cannot employ some of the techniques used in laboratory experiments in foreign policy research.

3. **Methodological difficulties:** One of the most widely articulated arguments against the cognitive approaches to foreign policy decision-making, focus on the methodological problems - the difficulties in systematically collecting and analyzing behavioural data. Content analysis as a method of data collection has been widely criticized. There have been arguments against the relevancy of beliefs and perceptions extracted from public documents because it is difficult to reconcile between what is said by decision-makers privately and what is announced in public.

*Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study of quantification (Converse 1964, 206).*

4. Another persisting difficulty in decision-making research is that it is easier to make lists of the variables that should be included to explain decisions than it is to demonstrate their relative potency as explanatory factors.

5. The investigator's knowledge of the actor's general belief system can assist, but not substitute for analysis of specific situations and assessment of institutional and other pressures on the political actor's decisions (George 1969, 200). Operational Code beliefs do not unilaterally determine the individual's choice of action as decisions may also be sensitive to other variables - domestic, political, structural etc.

## **B. Counterarguments :**

In his counterarguments Selim states that

*The cognitive approach like other theoretical and conceptual approaches cannot and should not be considered as the ultimate paradigm. Given the complexity of human behaviour, especially in the area of international politics, every approach has a limited explanatory power (1979, 14).*

The nature of international relations is very complex and it is unrealistic to think of a grand theory which will explain all foreign policy behaviour. Rather than have idealistic and grand schemes to produce 'the theory of foreign policy', there should be continued efforts to provide partial explanations which will shed light on a few but relevant independent and intervening variables that have a bearing on foreign policy behaviour. This kind of an approach will facilitate comparative studies, both cross-nationally and cross-situationally.

Moreover, as Selim puts it, no cognitive researcher is naive enough to claim that a cognitive approach alone is capable of explaining a wide range of behaviour. Rather, it is argued that emphasis on structural processes need not exclude a concern for cognitive processes of the individual decision-makers, and that, under certain conditions, a cognitive perspective may be the proper way to approach human information-processing and decision-making (Selim 1979, 14-15).

Methodologically, it can be said that content analysis so far happens to be the only method to collect data for this kind of an approach, and in the absence of a better method has to be relied upon heavily. However, several investigators have employed systematic and rigorous assessment methods (Heradstveit 1977; Selim 1979; Walker 1979).

It should be emphasized that empirical models have demonstrated partial success with respect to limited types of decisions and this is significant. Zinnes (1972, 209-251) who reviewed and compared the finding of societal structural explanations of foreign policy behaviour and the cognitive approach, found that the cognitive models offered better explanations and predictions for foreign policy behaviour.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **THE OPERATIONAL CODE**

#### **1. Conceptual Framework:**

For this project we have adopted George's (1969, 1979) formulation of the Operational Code construct as a framework for analysis. The Operational Code sets up a specific set of master beliefs which are central to the decision-making process. The function of an Operational Code belief system in decision-making, is to provide the actor with 'diagnostic propensities' and 'choice propensities' (George 1979). The Operational Code as dealt with by George, Holsti, Walker and others offers a useful starting point for our analysis. It points out the value of looking at beliefs as a system, of examining the centrality of different beliefs within this system and offers theory and hypotheses as to how these beliefs may influence information-processing and the selection of options.

#### **A. Theoretical Premise:**

The fundamental assumption on which this study rests is that in situations of structural uncertainty, the Operational Code belief system of a decision-maker will have an impact on decision-making. These beliefs provide norms, standards and guidelines which influence the actor's choice of strategy and tactics, and for the structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action.

In cognitive psychology, schemata refers to an individual's generalized principles about social life, which exist on a subjective and relatively private level. It enables him/her to order his/her relationship to the social environment.

The construct of the Operational Code belief system deals with schemata so defined, but it limits itself to the set of generalized principles about political life that an individual acquires and applies in information-processing for the purpose of exercising judgement and choice in decision-making (George 1979, 97).

The assumption that Operational Code beliefs have a major impact on decision-making follows from the specific nature of those beliefs. The Operational Code does not, and

was never intended to, encompass all dimensions of belief systems, much less all cognitive and psychological aspects of political decision-making (Holsti 1982). The construct of the Operational Code belief system does not refer to the cognitive organization related to a specific problem. Neither does it comprise the total set of relevant beliefs in a given situation. The Operational Code approach assumes that the content of some central belief dimension will have a strong impact on certain types of approaches to political action. It sets up a number of master beliefs which have a great impact in many situations. They are at a higher level of generalization and are likely to influence the diagnosis of any foreign policy situation. These Operational Code beliefs concern fundamental and basic issues of politics, history and political action and provide the basic framework within which the actor approaches the task of attempting to process information. It follows from the central position in the hierarchy that they are frequently used as organizing principles by the individual (Heradstveit and Narvessen 1978,79).

Second, beliefs of this kind influence decision-making indirectly by influencing the information-processing tasks that precede and accompany the decision-maker's choice of action. It is not correct to establish direct links between beliefs and foreign policy behaviour. George (1979) argues that the Operational Code beliefs do not unilaterally determine foreign policy decisions and that the influence of an actor's beliefs is more likely to be weighty in his policy preferences - the options he prefers - rather than in determining the option he finally chooses. Hence,

It is more useful, whenever possible, to regard the decision-maker's policy preferences rather than his final choice as the dependent variable (George 1979, 104).

So one cannot assume a one-to-one relationship between belief systems and foreign policy actions. According to George (1969, 191), the term Operational Code is a misnomer insofar as it implies, incorrectly, a set of recipes or repertoires for political action that an individual applies mechanically in his/her decision-making.

Holsti (1976) argues that the role beliefs play in policy making is much more subtle and less direct. Rather than acting as direct guides to action, they form one of the several clusters of intervening variables that may shape and constrain decision-making behaviour. The literature on bureaucratic politics has illustrated many potential sources



of slippage between executive decisions and the implementation of policy in the form of foreign policy action.

Third, the Operational Code restricts itself to an analysis of the content and structure of beliefs seen as a system and how this belief system accounts for variance in patterns of political choice behaviour. The Operational Code does not examine the process leading up to political choice but will constrain the way in which events will be explained and choices made. It defines choice propensities and offers a range of probable options.

Also, it is understood that knowledge of the actor's approach to calculating choice of action does not provide a simple key to explanation, but this kind of an approach will help the investigator bound the alternative ways in which the subject may perceive different types of situations and approach the task of information-processing.

Knowledge of the actor's beliefs helps the investigator to clarify the general criteria requirements and norms the subject attempts to meet, in assessing opportunities that arise, to make desirable gains in estimating the costs and risks associated with them, and in making utility calculations (George 1969, 199).

## **B. Types of beliefs:**

George offers a typology of two sets of beliefs.

### **Philosophical Beliefs:**

The political actor's philosophical beliefs are a set of more general issues and questions that are part of an Operational Code. They refer to assumptions and premises he/she makes regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, the role of the individual in history etc.

1. What is the 'essential' nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental characteristic of one's political opponents?

A political actor's belief system about the nature of politics is shaped particularly by his/her orientation to other political actors and most important of these are one's opponents. The way in which the adversaries are perceived and the characteristics the political actor attributes to his/her opponents, exercise a subtle influence on other

philosophical and instrumental beliefs in the Operational Code.

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
4. How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one's role in moving and shaping history in the desired direction?
5. What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?

The afore mentioned beliefs about fundamental philosophical issues concerning politics are related to one another. This set of beliefs in turn, is psychologically related to a set of instrumental beliefs which refer more specifically to key aspects of the problem of knowledge and action. The decision-maker's instrumental beliefs are affected by his/her philosophical beliefs.

**Instrumental Beliefs:**

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

How best to select one's goals may be influenced by the general philosophical beliefs regarding determinist or indeterminist conceptions of future historical developments, the view of one's role in 'moving' history in the right direction, and the predictability of the political future.

2. How are the goals to political action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled and accepted?
4. What is the best timing of action to advance one's interests?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interest?

## **2. The Operational Code as a System of Beliefs:**

It is assumed that the Operational Code is a system of beliefs and there are certain forms of interdependence among the beliefs constituting the code. In other words, the Operational Code addresses not only the content of separate beliefs, but also the relationship between them.

**Beliefs constitute a system, Rokeach defines a belief system as one,**

**Representing all the beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious or unconscious that a person at a given time accepts as true of the world he lives in (1960, 33).**

**Converse defines it as**

**A configuration of attitudes with the elements bound together by functional interdependence (1964, 207).**

**He argues that a belief system in some way sorts out relationships among various belief elements.**

**A belief system points to a state of boundedness, to the fact that beliefs hang together and may be defined as having represented within it, in some organized psychological but not necessarily logical form, each and every one of a person's numerous beliefs about physical and social reality. Logical or rational attributes such as 'coherence' or 'logical consistency' and the like, are hardly applicable to a belief linkage. Indeed single belief elements could be logically contradictory but psychologically compatible. Consistency in formal logic and the psychological principle of consistency are different. Beliefs cluster in a system, though not in rationally congruent and organized systems.**

**By definition, we do not allow beliefs to exist outside the belief system, for the same reason that the astronomer does not allow stars to remain outside the universe (Rokeach 1972, 2).**

**Rather than viewing beliefs as a random collection, the Operational Code approach tries to capture the rules for action as they are constrained and governed by beliefs.**

**The code deals with how we relate our knowledge of the world to action, and what rules for action we believe in (Heradstveit 1979, 16).**

**The Operational Code assumes that beliefs are linked in the cognitive structure of individuals with a certain order and stability which makes it possible to analyze beliefs as belonging to a system.**

**Key issues:**

**A. Centrality:**

**The concept of centrality refers to the relative position of idea elements in a more comprehensive set of beliefs conceived of as a system (Heradstveit 1979, 18).**

**It refers to the degree to which other beliefs in the system are dependent on the central belief in question and focuses upon the intensity with which the individual holds a given**

belief.

Beliefs that are so very close to the central core of the individual that he would, under no circumstances change them, have greater centrality, than others located at the periphery of a belief system that would occasion only minor dissonance if changed (Luttbeg 1968, 399).

Also 'A' is more central than 'B' if 'A' is more frequently activated as a problem-solving instrument than 'B'. Central beliefs are used more frequently as an organizing tool in the individual's information-processing, and it also tends to be kept simple in structure.

The principle of simplicity is expected to obtain for the core structure of beliefs. A high degree of organization of perceptions and beliefs will be maintained and that organization will be as simple as possible (Steinbruner 1974, 102).

The Operational Code assumes that the content of some central belief dimension will have a strong resemblance to certain types of approaches to political action. The main concern of the Operational Code is to search for these crucial belief dimensions, point out the relative centrality of different beliefs, and offer guidelines on how to approach the issue. So the Operational Code sets up questions which focus on the basic and fundamental issues of political life and the appropriate strategy to achieve one's goals. As stated before, the code does not comprise the individual's total set of beliefs, but only those that are significant to political action. So the set of 'master beliefs' is assumed to have an impact on the way information is processed and options are evaluated and formulated.

The rationale of the Operational Code approach is to deal with a few manageable categories that will presumably extract the essential elements of the person's political belief system. Knowledge of these belief dimensions will be useful in the prediction of the decision-maker's policy choices.




Fig. 3. Linkage between Central Beliefs and Policy Choices

For example, a subset of the first philosophical belief - belief about the opponent, will determine the response that is calculated or the strategy that is chosen, vis-a-vis the opponent in an international conflict. Similarly, the choice of goals or strategy also depends on the central philosophical belief number four, i.e., whether one has any control over events. Holsti's study (1970) shows that philosophical beliefs regarding the opponent were central in Dulles' Operational Code. Walker's analysis (1977) of Kissinger's Operational Code also shows that Kissinger's responses and policy preferences were based on the beliefs that he maintained about the role of the individual in shaping history.

*His goals and behaviour during the Vietnam negotiations appear to be rational extensions of his general beliefs regarding effective political action (Walker 1977, 155).*

The Operational Code makes some assumptions of centrality before starting data collection. The construct offers a number of categories at the outset which limit data collection and implies that these are the belief dimensions we should look for.

Cognitive theory postulates that the beliefs more resistant to change are the most central ones. This is based on the idea that individuals are conservative in that they tend to change as little as possible. The most consistent and stable beliefs are also the most

central ones, and all beliefs are not held with the same degree of confidence.

The beliefs most likely to change are the weakest beliefs, or those less central in the system, while the strongest beliefs, or those most central in the system, will remain most resistant to change (Etzioni 1968, 549).

While beliefs themselves remain stable across situations, their centrality varies from one situation to another. The relevance or centrality of different beliefs in the code may change with different types of situations in international relations. The centrality of the image of the opponent, for example, may be more central in a conflict situation than in a cooperative situation (Heradstveit 1979, 19).

### **B. Stability :**

Stability of beliefs is important because the Operational Code beliefs would lose their usefulness as predictors if the cross-situational consistency of the beliefs is weak. Since cognitive theory proposes that stable beliefs are also the most central beliefs, an assessment of stability is therefore an assessment of centrality (Heradstveit 1979, 18). The usefulness of the Operational Code construct depends on the stability of beliefs. An inherent mechanism in the individual works against change, so very little change is expected and cognitive theorists have examined in detail the rules governing their process.

Since it would be dysfunctional for change to take place each time inconsistencies occur, resistance to change in beliefs is highly functional (Heradstveit 1979, 19).

A single instance of inconsistency is not usually enough to force an individual to reconsider his/her beliefs.

### **Stability in Central vs Peripheral Beliefs :**

Cognitive theory states that central beliefs remain relatively stable over time. The principle of stability asserts that cognitive inference mechanisms resist change in the core structure of beliefs. Because of extensive lateral and hierarchical relationships within a system of beliefs - each of which must be held to some level of consistency - a major restructuring of beliefs is likely to set off a chain reaction, imposing severe burdens upon the information-processing system. Economy thus requires a bias against change in major components of belief structures once they have been established (Steinbruner 1974). Rokeach makes a distinction between central and peripheral beliefs and argues

that the more central a belief the more it will resist change (1972, 41). Osgood (1960, 357) also argues that people change as little of their belief structures as possible.

*If they must change something, they will first alter those beliefs that are least important, that are supported by the least information, and that are tied to fewest other beliefs (Osgood 1960, 357).*

According to Harvey and Schroder (1963, 110), those parts of the image that are least central, i.e., the fewest other cognitions depend on them, and least important, will change first. Jervis (1976, 298) argues that several peripheral elements would be altered instead of a smaller number of more central beliefs, thereby minimizing the magnitude of the eventual change.

*To take a general category of political beliefs, when one country thinks that another is its enemy, the perception of hostility is usually more central than other aspects of the image. To decide that the other is no longer hostile, requires that many other beliefs must also be changed. So when the other acts with restraint, our hypothesis would predict that the actor would be more likely to change his view of the other's strength than of its intentions (Jervis 1976, 299).*

In the late fifties and early sixties most Americans felt that Russian weakness and not Russian friendship was the reason why Russia built fewer missiles than the U.S. had predicted. George (1979, 102-104) also maintains that the central or master beliefs remain relatively stable over time than less central ones. Converse (1964, 239), related the centrality of a specific belief in the belief system with relative stability over time.

Based on this discussion, it can be said that the philosophical beliefs that an individual holds remain relatively stable, while the instrumental beliefs which deal with strategy and tactics may exhibit cross-situational variability. Several Operational Code studies have shown that the philosophical beliefs were maintained, with very little change over time. Senator Vandenberg's philosophical beliefs were stable and only his instrumental beliefs changed.

*Most striking is the stability in the philosophical subset .... Their stability through the three periods is impressive evidence that those questions did get at fundamental beliefs (Anderson 1974, 247-250).*

Walker (1977) emphasizes that Kissinger's beliefs regarding man's control of historical development and the roles of chance and strategy in human affairs remained unchanged, from the time he was a student when he wrote his Masters and Doctoral thesis, up to the time he was involved in the negotiations in Vietnam.

The overall change and stability of the central beliefs may rely on several factors.

i. The degree of interconnectedness of the different beliefs in the system:

First, stability or change depends on whether the belief system is tightly connected. A tightly-connected belief system will only sometimes change in an incremental fashion. As long as the discrepant information can be handled by several mechanisms, the incremental model applies quite well. Discrepant information may either be ignored, its validity explicitly rejected or the source discredited (Jervis 1976, 292-304).

Second, if the connections between the central and peripheral beliefs are weak, the person will be quick to change individual beliefs, because views on one question will not be strongly reinforced by views on another. For the same reason, an alteration in relatively central beliefs will not bring in its wake a series of derived changes. It has been found that people with more centralized belief systems change fewer beliefs in the face of low pressure to change, than do people with less centralized beliefs, but that they change more than the latter under high pressure. (Sears 1967, 142- 151; Crockett and Meisel 1974, 290-299).

ii. Attributions :

The tendency to preserve central beliefs helps explain why people fail to see the basic causes of undesired events and instead focus on the supposedly idiosyncratic acts of a few individuals (Jervis 1976, 301).

Unexpected and undesired events need not alter many important beliefs, if they can be attributed to the machinations of a small evil group. For example, Indians who favoured close ties with China said that

It is difficult to understand the aggressive moves of the People's Republic of China on India's border, except that the leaders of that seemingly great country have become insane (Hansen 1968, 288).

When one observes consistent behaviour of an opponent under different conditions, we are most likely to explain that behaviour as being caused by some internal traits of the actor. Environmental influences and constraints are not sufficient to explain enemy behaviour, and internal attributions will be made, and in situations where we perceive alternative courses of action available to the actor, his/her particular choice will most likely be attributed to the internal traits. Perceived freedom of choice may sometimes



explain the casual analysis made (Heradstveit 1979, 24). When such dispositional attribution of the enemy is inappropriate, others will be sought that also leave unchanged the person's central beliefs. Also, one's own failure or 'bad' behaviour will be attributed to external sources or situational causes.

Jones and Nisbett hypothesize that,

*There is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions (Jones and Nisbett 1971, 80).*

In making our inference about behaviour, there is a tendency to overemphasize situational variables when explaining our own behaviour, while when observing the behaviour of the opponent, there is a tendency to overemphasize dispositional variables. The parties to a conflict want control of their environment and therefore they want their assumptions and general theories on the conflict to be valid (Bonham and Shapiro 1973, 49). So the tendency to infer dispositional causes is enhanced when the observer dislikes the actor who performs the blameworthy act (Jones and Nisbett 1971, 93). Heradstveit's study of the Arab-Israeli conflict (1979) shows that the actors were overwhelmingly dispositional when observing their own good and opponent's blameworthy behaviour and overwhelmingly situational when observing their own blameworthy and opponent's good behaviour.

Attributional patterns may explain how stability of central beliefs in the Operational Code is maintained. The image of the opponent as being fundamentally hostile or expansionist will be maintained, despite contradictory information which suggests that the opponent only reacted to external or situational variables, by attributing it to his dispositions and traits, or when the opponent is being conciliatory, by attributing it to situational constraints.

This discussion on stability does not, however, rule out the fact that even rigidly-maintained belief systems may change over time, under certain pressures. For example, an individual may undergo a religious or political conversion and most of the central or core beliefs may change or be modified. A war or revolution may trigger fundamental changes in the Operational Code beliefs. An analysis of Nasser's Operational Code before and after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war shows that there was some reorganization of

his beliefs. Sometimes the change in the central beliefs may be minimal and may occur over time. There were slow changes in Dulles' belief system (Holsti 1970). But there are other cases where there has been a radical reorganization of the content and structure of the central beliefs. The finding of Senator Fulbright's Operational Code study shows that his central beliefs changed from the late forties to the sixties.

**By late 1963, the stark cognitive simplicity of the aggressor - defender model gave way to a more differentiated model of mixed cooperative conflict relationship between the superpowers, his threat perception and image of the dominant enemy changed, and so did the mechanist presumption of monolithicity (Tveraser 1974, 75).**

### **C. Consistency :**

One of the assumptions of cognitive theory is that the inference mechanism of the mind is constrained by the principle of consistency. This means that the mind operates in such a way as to keep internal beliefs (both lateral and hierarchical) consistent with one another (Steinbruner 1974, 97). The Operational Code assumes that there is a degree of consistency among the various elements of the code. This refers to the degree to which the political leader's stand on one belief affects his/her stand on other beliefs. The Operational Code defines consistency as connectedness or linkages between idea elements in the Operational Code beliefs conceived of as a system.

**Converse defines consistency both in a static and dynamic sense. Statically,**

**The success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge, that an individual holds a specific attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes (1964, 207).**

**In the dynamic case as,**

**The probability that a change in the perceived status (truth, desirability and so forth) of one idea element would psychologically require from the point of view of the actor, some compensating change(s) in the status of idea elements elsewhere in the configuration (Converse 1964, 207).**

The consistency notion refers to the idea that individuals strive toward consistency between beliefs that are seen as relevant and toward consistency between beliefs and behaviour. For example, if the decision-maker holds an image of the opponent as being hostile and aggressive, all the other beliefs in his/her system will be negative and thus may necessitate him/her to behave in a manner consistent with his/her beliefs. In explaining why this is the case, cognitive theory claims that learning depends on perceived regularities and patterns in our environment, which impel consistencies in our

beliefs (Steinbruner 1974, 98-99). Our preference for balanced states makes us remember balanced states better than imbalanced ones (Shaw and Constanzo 1970, 191).

A 'balanced' structure is one in which

All relations among good elements (i.e., those that are positively valued) are positive (or null); all relations among bad elements (i.e., those that are negatively valued) are positive (or null); and all relations among good and bad elements are negative (or null) (Abelson 1958, 5).

There is a tendency to believe that countries that one likes will do things that one likes, support the goals that one supports, and oppose countries that one opposes. One tends to think that countries that are enemies would make harmful proposals that would work against the interests of one's friends and aid the opponents. One feels more comfortable when the configurations are balanced. One learns them more quickly and remembers them better when they are balanced, and one would interpret new information in such a way as to maintain or increase the balance (Jervis 1976, 118). Jervis holds that the explanation of why people see the world this way, for example, is because balanced structures form a good Gestalt or because they maximize simplicity. It is of interest mostly as they bear on the related question of the validity of the perceptions produced, and the impact of this way of thinking on the quality of decision-making (Jervis 1976, 118).

Cognitive theorists hold that much of our learning is a search for regularity in causality. We find lawfulness in events. Although each interaction is unique, the mind makes events similar or minimally different. The person's idea elements are consistent because this represents the most efficient way of processing information. The organization of ideas along rules of consistency enables a person to interpret his/her environment without too much pain (Heradstveit and Narvessen 1979, 28). The individual will strive toward consistency within his/her cognitive system and also between the cognitive system and behaviour.

The theory of Cognitive Dissonance was derived from this basic idea. Cognitions can either be relevant or irrelevant to each other. The earlier cognitive dissonance theorists (Festinger 1957; Brehm and Cohen 1962; Aronson 1968 etc.) argued that for consistency to be operational between two given beliefs or between beliefs and behaviour, the individual must see them as being relevant to each other. If they are relevant but

inconsistent, they will produce tension and strain. Here the situation could be dealt with in a number of ways, with change of beliefs being one of the ways in which consistency is restored. But this assumption came under a lot of attack and later experiments in the field of dissonance theory indicated that individuals did tolerate inconsistent cognitions without experiencing dissonance. (Gerard et al. 1974).

It is only after we have passed a certain 'threshold' that we experience dissonance. It is generally agreed that individuals do have a lot of inconsistency which they are not even aware of. There may be inconsistent unconscious beliefs, but the need for consistency becomes more operational when beliefs are activated (Converse 1964, 209). The amount of inconsistency has to reach a certain threshold to produce change. Imbalance does not always cause stress or tension toward inconsistency.

Cognitive theory proposes that consistency works more strongly on central beliefs than on peripheral beliefs. We therefore expect consistency to apply to the more fundamental cognitive orientations as opposed to the less central or peripheral beliefs which are expected to be more inconsistent. Consistency can thus serve as an aid in assessing centrality. We hypothesize that those Operational Code belief dimensions that are most consistent in their structure will also tend to be the most central ones. This stems from the fact that central beliefs, being used more frequently as an organizing tool in the individual's information-processing, tend to be simple in structure and have a high degree of consistency (Bem 1970, chap 2).

### **3. Operational Code Hypotheses:**

**HP 1: The Operational Code of the decision-maker is richer in its philosophical subsystem than in its instrumental subsystem.**

**HP 2: The Operational Code is more differentiated in its philosophical subsystem than its instrumental subsystem.**

**HP 3: The Operational Code is generally characterized by the dominance of a specific subset.**

**HP 4: The most stable beliefs are also the most central ones.**

**HP 5: The beliefs most likely to change are the less central ones in the system.**

**HP 6: The philosophical part of the Operational Code tends to be more stable than the instrumental part**

**HP 7: Logical and psychological inconsistencies of the Operational Code are separate phenomena.**

**HP 8: The most consistent beliefs are also the most stable ones.**

**HP 9: The more interdependent the beliefs, the more stable they will be.**

**HP 10: Elements of the Operational Code tend to be basically interdependent.**

**HP 11: Decision-makers answer the Operational Code beliefs differently depending on the issue areas.**

**HP 12: Decision-makers use specific clusters of beliefs when dealing with specific issue areas.**

**HP 13: The decision-makers' political beliefs are more likely to be salient in foreign policy decision-making than in domestic policy decision-making.**

**HP 14: A decision-makers belief system is likely to become more salient under foreign policy crisis conditions than under foreign policy non crisis conditions.**

#### **4. The Operational Code Belief System and Decision-making:**

Various hypotheses can be developed with respect to the effects that different kinds of beliefs can have on one or another functional aspect of information-processing. It introduces two types of propensities into decision-making.

##### **A. Diagnostic Propensities:**

This extends or restricts the scope of search and evaluation and determines the decision-maker's definition of the situation in certain directions.

i. **Definition of the situation:** The Operational Code beliefs influence the decision-maker's definition of the situation. It has already been argued that the definition of the situation shapes the individual's response to the situation. Based on his/her interpretation of the situation, certain policy alternatives may be eliminated from consideration and others chosen. Empirical studies show that in a crisis situation the image of the opponent, an aspect of the first philosophical belief, is important in shaping the decision-maker's definition and interpretation of the environment and particular threat perception. A general image of one's opponent as being hostile and aggressive is likely to lead the decision-maker into defining situations of interaction with the enemy as posing dangers

to one's side. Ambiguous situations are perceived as threatening and ambiguous information about the opponent's behaviour is generally interpreted as evidence of hostility and any information to the contrary is discounted or ignored. (Holsti 1967; Jervis 1976; George 1974, 1979).

U.S. policy making in the 1961 Berlin crisis demonstrates the role of the Operational Code beliefs and in particular, the image of the opponent, in information-processing. George's study (1974) indicates that there were two groups of policy advisors to Kennedy who interpreted Khrushchev's statements regarding Berlin differently. The soft liners interpreted Khrushchev's actions in Berlin as being essentially defensive, aimed at consolidating Soviet control over Eastern Europe and closing off the 'escape hatch' of West Berlin through which East Germans were fleeing to the west. The hardliners argued that Khrushchev was pursuing an offensive and expansionist strategy in Berlin which would pose serious dangers to the west.

A decision-maker's perception of threat also depends on what he/she believes is the general nature of politics, i.e., whether it is conflictual or harmonious.

**HP 15: A decision-maker's perception of threat is mediated by his/her beliefs about the nature of politics.**

It is also assumed that the decision-maker's image and definition of the situation would influence his/her choice of goals and strategies and perception of his/her role in directing historical development.

**HP 16: Beliefs about the nature of politics influences calculations of national goals and choice of strategy.**

**HP 17: Beliefs about the nature of politics influences perceptions of leadership role in shaping history.**

Attribution theory suggests that a decision-maker chooses options based on his/her image of the opponent's attributes, i.e., situational or dispositional.

**HP 18: A decision-maker who attributes dispositional explanation to the opponent is likely to recommend unconciliatory policies.**

The decision-maker is more likely to recommend conciliatory or accommodating policies if he/she attributes the opponents' behaviour to situational factors.

ii. Influence on search and evaluation:

Operational Code beliefs influences the search and evaluation aspects of information-processing. For example, a decision-maker holding a unitary image of the opponent will favour hawkish policy positions as compared to one who holds a pluralistic view of the enemy.

**HP 19: The decision-maker who holds a pluralistic view of the opponent is more likely to favour compromising policies than one who holds a unitary image of the opponent.**

The main idea behind this is that the views and preferences in a pluralistic group of leaders may not be homogenous in important respects and could result in more conciliatory behaviour. This would not be the case if the opponent's decision-making unit comprised of a single individual.

It is assumed that a decision-maker who believes that chance and unforeseeable circumstances govern human affairs and historical development (fifth philosophical belief), is less likely to engage in extensive search behaviour and analysis of possible consequences of various policy options. On the other hand, if the decision-maker believes that the future is predictable, he/she will choose options based on long term and optimal interests.

**HP 20: If one believes that the political future is predictable, one is more likely to engage in extensive analysis of possible consequences of various policy options.**

**HP 21: Belief in the predictability of future events will produce a policy option based on calculations of long term optimal interests.**

Search and evaluation is also affected by the fourth philosophical belief, i.e., control and mastery over historical developments. An actor who believes in control over history is more likely to engage in extensive search and evaluation as opposed to the decision-maker who believes that one has no control.

**HP 22: Belief in the ability to control events will give rise to extensive search.**

### **B. Choice Propensities:**

In addition to the diagnostic propensities, an actor's Operational Code beliefs can also introduce choice propensities into information-processing, which lead him/her to favour a particular option over others.

### 1. Influence on Policy Preferences:

The first philosophical belief (nature of opponent) may influence choice of options. For example, one will attempt to match the opponent's hostility by choosing optimal goals and by shifting from earlier passive policies.

**HP 23: Belief in the opponent's hostility will lead to the choice of optimal goals.**

**HP 24: Belief about opponent's hostile intentions produces shifts from earlier passive policies.** Second, choice is also affected by the second philosophical belief regarding optimism/pessimism. It is believed that a fundamentally optimistic person would choose accommodating policies and would recommend compromise, and this would lead him/her to favour low-risk options.

**HP 25: The decision-maker who is optimistic will recommend compromising policies and a pessimist will recommend uncompromising policies.**

**HP 26: If the decision-maker is optimistic about the achievement of fundamental political values, he/she is less likely to choose high risk options.**

**HP 27: If one is optimistic about the ability to achieve goals, one is more likely to use controlled risk options.**

The softliners in the 1961 Berlin crisis advocated negotiations as an alternative to confrontation with the Soviets. Only by opening negotiations promptly could the U.S. convince the Soviets that their legitimate minimum-security interests would be respected, thereby minimizing the risk of war. Their policy choice was also based on their image of the opponent (first philosophical belief).

Also, choice is likely to be influenced by the actor's philosophical belief regarding control over events. If the decision-maker believed in total control, he/she would be an 'optimizer' rather than a 'satisficer' in his/her approach to goal selection. The decision-maker would choose options that offered greater payoffs because of his/her belief in the ability to control events.

**HP 28: Belief in the ability to control events will lead to the choice of a maximizing strategy.** Again, during the 1961 Berlin crisis, the hardliners, based on their image of the opponent, advocated that offensive Soviet strategy could only be contained by vigorous deterrence and defence efforts by the US.



### **C. Usefulness:**

Our conception of the role of Operational Code beliefs in decision-making is that they serve as a set of general guidelines and heuristical aids to the decision process. An individual's Operational Code beliefs influence the way in which he/she copes and deals with the cognitive limits on rationality.

They serve to define his particular type of 'bounded rationality' (George 1979, 103).

Knowing a policy-maker's Operational Code beliefs could serve as an aid in determining where his/her choice propensities will most likely be in any given problem area. The Operational Code assumes that the content of some central belief dimension will have a strong impact on certain types of approaches to political action, and introduce and define the rules for selecting among alternatives.

The code offers a guide on how to increase the possibility of predicting and explaining a person's political behaviour. The relevance criterion of different beliefs offers an analytical tool for arriving at essential elements of a person's belief system (Heradstveit and Narvessen 1978, 32).

In addition to being parsimonious, the Operational Code propositions have generality and can be applied to a number of cases. According to Holsti (1975, 207), the central beliefs of the Operational Code, or the political actor's philosophical beliefs, assumptions and premises he/she makes regarding the fundamental nature of politics, nature of political conflict, the role of the individual in history etc., satisfy a number of epistemological and research requirements. They are relatively few in number, large in scope and likely to be salient in any decision-making situation. There have been a number of successful studies which have used the Operational Code approach effectively. Beginning with Leites' ground breaking study of the Bolshevik Operational Code (1951, 1953), attempts have been made by several scholars to make the conceptual framework more rigorous and sophisticated (Holsti 1977; Walker 1977; Selim 1979 etc.).

Fourthly, knowledge of a decision-maker's belief system provides one of the important inputs needed for behavioural analyses of political decision-making and leadership styles.

The Operational Code framework does this insofar as it encompasses that aspect of the political actor's perception and structuring of the political world to which he relates and within which he attempts to operate to advance the interests with which he is identified (George 1969, 220).

This approach would be useful in studying an actor's decision-making style and its application in specific situations.

In his rather illuminating article, George (1969), has clearly stressed the possibilities of effectively studying the Operational Code of decision-makers. According to him, beliefs about politics associated with the concept Operational Code can be investigated without reference to psychoanalytic hypotheses.

These beliefs, implicitly or explicitly held by the political actor, can be inferred or postulated by the investigator on the basis of the kinds of data, observational opportunities, and methods generally available to political scientists. In this respect, the Operational Code approach does not differ from the research efforts to identify many other beliefs, opinions and attitudes of political actors (George 1969, 195).

## **5. Operational Code Beliefs and Policy Preferences: Some Theoretical and Methodological Questions:**

Scholars conducting research on the Operational Code belief system of individual decision-makers have been confronted with several theoretical and methodological questions. The problem, which is of great significance, is establishing congruence or consistency between the belief system and policy preferences. Four methodological questions must be addressed.

### **1. Is consistency genuine or spurious?**

Causal interpretation of consistency will obtain some support if it can be brought within a framework of nomothetic explanation, i.e., if a general law or statistical generalization can be found to support the consistency between specific beliefs and the specified decisional characteristics. The more specific the generalization, the more powerful will be its support of the causal interpretation (George 1979, 106). But in the absence of more specific generalizations, psychological theories of cognitive consistency provide some support to the fact that individuals strive to achieve consistency between their beliefs and actions. Also, confidence that consistency between beliefs and actions is of causal significance is enhanced if it is encountered repeatedly in a series of

interrelated decisions taken by an actor over a period of time. Stephen Walker (1977), in his study of the role of Kissinger's Operational Code beliefs in the bargaining with North Vietnam and in his joint study with Hoagland (1979), has developed highly systematic and explicit methods for employing the congruence procedure. In his 1977 study, Walker incorporated in his research design several methods by which one could cope with the epistemological problem of falsifiability.

*If the code is evoked as a constant to explain all the variations in Kissinger's behaviour, then it really explains none of his behaviour because by definition the hypotheses is not capable of being disconfirmed (Walker 1977, 134).*

Falsification required at least the possibility and preferably the opportunity to observe some variations in the initial conditions as well as in the phenomenon that they explained. Three aspects of the research design managed the problem of falsifiability. 1. The instrumental elements of Kissinger's code were carefully explicated. 2. The behavioural data, both variable and semi-quantitative events data, were scaled with appropriate reliability and validity tests. 3. The behavioural data were longitudinal and could therefore be analyzed as a variated series of stimulus - response chains with the Operational Code as an intervening constant. Although the code remained constant in the analysis, it prescribed different responses to different stimuli which varied over time in the events data. This procedure was also used by Burgess (1968) to explain the Norwegian decision to join NATO.

2. Are beliefs a necessary condition? How much do they explain? Are Operational Code beliefs really a necessary condition or do they merely 'favour' the decisional output? Could a decision have emerged in the absence of those beliefs?

In this case, the researcher may have to rely on analytical imagination to provide a safeguard against a premature and unwarranted inference that those beliefs were a necessary condition. The analyst can consider a broader range of relevant empirical materials and engage in what George (1979) calls 'mental experiments'.

*This term refers to simulated experiments that the investigator conducts in his own mind, i.e., mental rehearsals in which he varies critical variables in order to estimate variance in outcomes (George 1979, 108).*

But George argues that even if the investigator cannot find or imagine any instances in which the same type of decision occurs in the absence of such beliefs, he/she cannot

claim more than that the beliefs in question may be a necessary condition i.e., it favours the emergence of certain decisional characteristics, but is not a necessary condition for them.

3. How much explanatory power can be attributed to the Operational Code beliefs? How much do situational or systemic variables matter?

It has already been argued that in certain types of decisional settings, the actor's cognitive beliefs are neither accounted for nor dwarfed by situational or systemic variables and hence their impact on the individual's decisions may be substantial. Holsti (1976) has suggested that a decision-maker's beliefs may play an important role in shaping policy choices in situations of structural uncertainty, non routine or unanticipated situations where there is substantial ambiguity and is open to a variety of interpretations, situations where decisions are made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy by leaders free from other constraints; and in the Third World context.

Walker's study (1977) clearly shows that Kissinger's beliefs were idiosyncratic in important respects and not easily accounted for by situational or role variables. Kissinger's beliefs and the policy preferences that were consistent with those beliefs were probably not those that anyone else in his position would have displayed (Walker 1977). Also, Kissinger's role as National Security Advisor was not well defined, giving him considerable latitude for choice. Selim's study of Nasser (1979) also indicates that Nasser's belief system was particularly salient under foreign policy crisis conditions. Nasser maintained a highly personalized decision-making system and his position as head of state was not well-structured as a result of which he was able to wield considerable authority over foreign policy matters.

4. Can other decisions by the individual in the same situation be consistent with the same beliefs or is it possible to conceive of any credible policy options in the same situation that would not be consistent with the same beliefs?

George (1979) points out that since only one value of the dependent variable is available, it is easy for the analyst to overlook the possibility that other values of the dependent variable could be consistent with the given beliefs.

Also, if all the possible choices that the decision-maker may have made are consistent with his/her Operational Code beliefs, then the explanatory power of the beliefs is negligible. But, on the other hand, if other policy choices which were not consistent with the individual's beliefs were available, then the explanatory power of the Operational Code beliefs is stronger. George (1979, 112) offers a hypothetical example;




Fig. 4. Congruence Procedure

Variable XX is consistent with A which the decision-maker has chosen. But can XX explain only option A or would B,C,D not chosen by the decision-maker also be consistent with XX? If so, the explanatory power of XX is weakened. But if there are other options in the situation which are not consistent with XX - i.e., G,H,I (options proposed and favoured by others in the administration), then XX has more explanatory power on the grounds that its presence tended to exclude choosing options G,H and I. Moreover, if options A,B,C and D share a common characteristic, i.e., are conciliatory responses to an opponents' behaviour and G,H, and I are hard line responses, the explanation becomes even stronger. If an actor's belief regarding the utility and role of different means of advancing one's interests influence him to prefer option A rather than B,C,D (in other words, a combination of several beliefs may further narrow his choices) then it can be said that the explanatory power of beliefs is considerable.

The actor's adherence to belief XX does not determine in a linear, specific way his decision choice, but it does bound and delimit the general range or types of response he is likely to make in a given situation (George 1979, 112).

Several investigators (Walker 1977; Walker and Hoagland 1979; Selim 1979) have addressed these questions/problems in their research design, and have clearly

demonstrated that it is possible to establish congruence between beliefs and policy preferences by employing systematic and rigorous modes of analysis.

## **6. Research on the Operational Code:**

The Operational Code has been quite successful in generating empirical research. George's article (1969) on the Operational Code as an approach to the cognitive aspects of political decision-making appears to have stimulated a lot of interest and several studies have employed this approach to analyze the beliefs of political leaders, including several Heads of State, American Secretaries of State and Senators, etc.

The earliest study of the Operational Code was by Leites (1951) who employed the phrase to refer to the precepts or maxims of political tactics that characterized the classical Bolshevik approach to politics. Leites was referring to a set of general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics as they bear on the problem of action. In his later work (1953) he looked at the philosophical components of the Bolshevik code and attempted to relate both the features to the philosophical and historical experience that shaped the Bolshevik approach to politics. The maxims of political strategy which comprised the Operational Code took on the characteristic of the rules of conduct and norms of behaviour for Bolsheviks, which was supposed to be internalized by them in order to acquire a new and different character structure. Holsti (1967) analyzed the cognitive dynamics associated with images of the enemy, and the hypotheses generated were used in the study of John Foster Dulles and his attitudes toward the Soviet Union. He developed the theoretical framework from two major sources - the first from the literature on the relationship of an individual's belief system to perception and action, and the second from more specific propositions from the experimental literature on the cognitive dynamics associated with attitude change and 'balance' theories. Based on this he made specific predictions about Dulles' attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

Since George's codification of Leites' work, there have been other efforts to use the Operational Code in the study of important decision-makers. As a follow up to his

1967 study, Holsti (1970) conducted a qualitative analysis of Dulles' belief system using George's typology of philosophical and instrumental beliefs. In that article, he suggests that in order to make generalizations about the relationship between beliefs and action, it is necessary to develop more general typologies of Operational Codes based on answers to the ten questions. The need for a typology is also argued on the basis of the necessity for making research cumulative, as well as for research economy. Unless one is able to arrive at meaningful typologies, comparisons and cumulative research on the Operational Code becomes very difficult.

Holsti's typology (1977) is based on the assumption that an individual's view on the nature of political life is a central belief and constrains the individual's other political beliefs. He constructed the typology by first classifying an individual's beliefs regarding two fundamental aspects of political life. Next, he generated a series of hypotheses about other political beliefs which every individual was likely to possess. He then tested its validity by applying it to the studies of the Operational Code by other scholars.

McLellan's (1970) study of Dean Acheson's Operational Code and Tweaser's (1975) analysis of William Fulbright's Operational Code belief system more or less followed Holsti's approach.

One of the most systematic and rigorous analysis of the Operational Code is Walker's study of Kissinger's belief system and its impact on his bargaining behaviour in Vietnam. Comparisons of Kissinger's Operational Code with his role in the Vietnam negotiations indicates that the pattern of American behaviour corresponded to the code's instrumental components, while the rationale was consistent with the philosophical principles of the code.

The congruence between this code and his conduct of the Vietnam negotiations implies that a knowledge of Kissinger's Operational Code is a necessary condition for the explanation of his behaviour (Walker 1977, 155).

Walker and Hoagland (1979) have applied the Operational Code to the study of international crisis and have linked them with the aid of concepts from the international bargaining literature. These links were tested empirically for the 1948 and 1961 Berlin crises. They attempted to assess the congruence between descriptions of Soviet and U.S. Operational Codes and their crisis behaviour, tested the generalizability of the

Operational Code construct from an individual to an aggregate (rational) level of analysis, and related the dispositional traits of decision-makers to systemic (dyadic) outcomes. This study is different from the others because it was an attempt to move away from the individual level of analysis to the aggregate level. George's (1978) analysis of the 1961 Berlin crisis was somewhat similar. He classified the American decision-makers into softliners and hardliners and sought to explain how the 'image of the opponent' that one held would determine policy preferences.

Heradstveit and Narvessen (1978) have also applied this approach to study a relatively large sample of elites in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It offered a new dimension to the Operational Code studies, in that it attempted to provide a highly visible and specific conflict domain on which to study the Operational Code, as opposed to dealing with an actor's more general perceptions of international affairs.

Selim (1979) conducted a systematic study of Nasser's belief system by applying quantitative methods of analysis. He was one of the first investigators to successfully use the elaborate coding scheme developed by Holsti in 1977 and apply the technique of quantitative content analysis to construct the Operational Code. His method of data collection was further refined by introducing rigorous tests of reliability and validity.

Cutler (1982) has attempted to unify the cognitive map and Operational Code approaches into a mutually compatible framework, and called the framework for the synthesis "Conceptual Dependency Analysis". This is a cognitive model that systematically represents the existence of a hierarchy of levels of abstraction in thinking (Cutler 1982: 91). Cutler further argues that because the Cognitive Map and Operational Code approaches can each be associated with a distinct level of human information-processing, Conceptual Dependency Analysis can provide the basis for combining the two approaches.

Overall, it can be said that research on the Operational Code of decision-makers has gained increasing conceptual, analytical, as well as methodological sophistication over the years.



## **7. Assessment of the Operational Code Approach :**

### **A. Criticisms:**

First we can look at Sjoblom's criticisms and Holsti's rejoinders and then make a broader assessment of this approach. Sjoblom (1982) criticizes this approach on several grounds.

1. He argues that the relation between beliefs and actual decision-making is just probabilistic. To analyze decision-making, other determinants besides the actor's Operational Code should be taken into account.
2. He criticizes the approach as being more descriptive than explanatory. The study of the Operational Code is useful, he says, for understanding the relationship between beliefs and behaviour, but at most it provides us with a residual indeterminate explanation.
3. It is not clear as to whether the belief system is an independent, intervening or dependent variable.
4. He argues against using individuals as units of analysis as opposed to collectivities, only because, as he puts it, it is easier to construct in a valid way the content of a collective code, because the content of the Operational Code has to be communicated between the members of the collectivity in question - making the latent structure of beliefs more manifest.
5. In our insistence on stability of beliefs, by the use of our analytical categories, we construct a degree of stability that lacks any counterpart at the phenomenological level.
6. He argues that beliefs are built into the standard operating procedures and decision rules - which means that they are primarily operative in routine situations.
7. He also believes that the Operational Code studies cannot be exclusively confined to cognitive beliefs, but should include non-cognitive and value beliefs.

In addition to Sjoblom's criticism, we have to look at a number of other limitations of the Operational Code.

8. One of the persisting difficulties in decision-making research is that it is easier to make lists of the variables that should be included to explain decisions than it is to

demonstrate their relative potency as explanatory factors.

9. Also, there is the problem of holding other variables constant while looking for correlation between beliefs and policy preferences. There may be other critical variables which have an impact on decisions and their influence may vary considerably depending on the situation. It would be difficult to hold these variables constant.

10. A test of the importance in practice of the Operational Code beliefs would be to chart the beliefs of the individuals whose behaviour we want to predict, and then look at their behaviour. This introduces another limitation to the study, in that we have no direct test of the pragmatic validity of the construct.

11. One might also in Operational Code studies easily fall into the trap of circularity. The problem may occur if, from observing some designated behaviour of a person, his beliefs are inferred and these beliefs then used to explain the very same behaviour.

12. The Operational Code predictions may run into danger of being so general that it loses interest for policy problems. In many cases it is the specific actions to be taken which are of interest, not general propensities to act in various ways.

#### **B. Counterarguments: (Holsti's rejoinders)**

1. Holsti (1982) counters the first criticism by saying that while it is true that situational factors are important, one can successfully apply the cognitive process approach and in particular the Operational Code in the study of decision-making. The conditions he lists have been referred to earlier.

2. He does agree with the fact that some studies are stronger on descriptive accuracy than on theoretical linkages to decision-making processes and that while the Operational Code approach has been quite successful in generating empirical research, progress has been uneven in several respects.

3. Also, Holsti in another article (1976) clearly indicates that the Operational Code beliefs are to be regarded as intervening variables, that they cannot be treated as either an independent or dependent variable.

4. With respect to the idea of studying collectivities as opposed to individual actors, Holsti says that it would be a mistake to do so because few organizations, whether

cabinets or bureaucracies, are homogeneous with respect to central political beliefs. He states that though it would be interesting to determine the Operational Code of a group, it would be more valuable if one could do so after having first established the basic political beliefs of each actor. Also a group context does not necessarily elicit the clearest statement of beliefs. The 'group think' phenomenon (Janis 1972) has been shown to exist at even the highest levels of decision-making.

5. Regarding stability, he agrees with Sjoblom that one should be somewhat relaxed in invoking this criterion. While it is important to include central beliefs that are unlikely to be discarded casually, or that are excessively shaped by specific situations, it is equally important to use categories that are sensitive to shifts in world views.

6. As regards the idea of beliefs being built into the standard operating procedures and decision rules, Holsti believes that it can only happen when leaders revise their standard operating procedures so broadly throughout the government that the resulting procedures will faithfully reflect the Operational Code. But this is not possible because of extreme rigidity in the standard operating procedures and routines. The correlation between bureaucratic position and politically relevant beliefs are by no means equal in their ability to shape political outcomes.

7. He responds to Sjoblom's criticism regarding the non-inclusion of other beliefs in the study of the Operational Code by arguing that there can be little disagreement with the observation that the Operational Code does not, and was never intended to, encompass all dimensions of belief systems, much less all cognitive or psychological aspects of political decision-making and there is substantial agreement among virtually all who have dealt with the Operational Code approach.

If the coherence of the research tradition is to be understood in terms of rules, some specification of common ground in the corresponding area is needed (Kuhn 1974, 44).

He also criticizes Sjoblom's revised version of George's typology and argues that the revisions are quite drastic and leave intact virtually nothing of the original George approach. His criteria appear rather different than those that have guided past efforts. He argues that Operational Code questions should be at a moderately high level of generality and should not be vague generalities of the 'peace and prosperity' type, and

states that goals which all leaders have espoused need not be politically relevant. Those proposed by Sjoblom are at a lower level of generality and lack more general philosophical questions.

Heradstveit and Narvessen (1978, 80) emphasize the explanatory nature of the approach. Instead of calling the selection of belief dimension a theory of relevance or centrality of beliefs to behaviour, it is more appropriate to view these dimensions as a set of questions serving as an aid in assessing what the control components could be.

Beliefs are an important explanatory variable and as such cannot be ignored. Knowledge of the belief system provides one of the important variables need for the behavioural analyses of political decision-making. According to George,

One of the attractive features of the Operational Code construct for behaviourally inclined political scientist, is that, it can serve as a useful bridge or link to psychodynamic interpretations of unconscious dimensions of belief systems and their role in behaviour under different conditions (1969, 195).

The Operational Code provides a bridge to other personality variables, particularly the first, second and third philosophical beliefs, as well as to role variables, to ideology and to situational variables.

There is a strong possibility that this approach can be expanded. Walker (1983) has suggested the feasibility of including motivations in addition to the study of beliefs - whether a political leader's belief system will allow him/her to behave in ways consistent with his/her need for power, affiliation and achievement. This will not only bring about a certain amount of integrative cumulation in the cognitive process approach, but will also explain foreign policy events better.

George (1979) is right in stating that the Operational Code should be viewed not as a final product - to be adopted in whole or rejected - but as the starting point for another attack on one of the most persistently difficult problems in political analysis.

## CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGY

#### **1. Data Sources and Operational Definitions:**

This research project has two data bases. The Government of India has collected and compiled all of Mrs. Gandhi's speeches, addresses, press conferences, interviews, letters, articles and some minutes of cabinet meetings, from the time she took office to the time she went out of power in 1977. These are compiled in three volumes. More documents were also available from other books<sup>1</sup>. All of her public pronouncements were accessible, and the documents were studied for possible relevance. Unfortunately, confidential documents such as minutes of closed meetings, cabinet discussions and other private communication were not available, as these were considered classified information and would be declassified and made available to the public only after several years.

The first data base was established through a content analysis of the available documents. This data base contains the fundamental Operational Code beliefs of Indira Gandhi. The philosophical and instrumental beliefs are operationalized as follows:

#### **Philosophical Beliefs**

- 1A. What is the essential nature of political life?
- a. Conflictual
  - b. Mixed
  - c. Harmonious

#### **Beliefs about conflict**

- 1B.1 What is the source of conflict?
- a. Human nature
  - b. Ideological attributes
  - c. Political attributes

---

<sup>1</sup> See References

- d. Economic attributes
- e. Nationalism
- f. Power politics
- g. Imperialism/colonialism/racism
- h. Inequalities

**1B.2 What are the conditions of peace?**

- a. Education/communication/negotiation
- b. Eliminate offending nations
- c. Eliminate inequalities
- d. Maintain balance of power
- e. Transform the system
- f. Promote Nonalignment
- g. Promote regional cooperation
- h. Improve economic conditions
- i. Non-interference

**1B.3 What is the nature of conflict?**

- a. Zero sum
- b. Non-zero sum
- c. Mixed

**1B.4 What is the scope of conflict?**

- a. All issues are linked
- b. Issues are separable
- c. high spillover

**1B.5 Role of conflict**

- a. Desirable
- b. Undesirable
- c. Mixed
- d. Functional
- e. Dysfunctional

**Belief about opponents**

**1C.1 Character of opponent**

- a. Destructive,
- b. Expansionist
- c. Aggressive
- d. Defensive
- e. Conciliatory
- f. Active seeker of peace
- g. Domestic developmental
- h. Restorative

**1C.2 Sources of opponent's goal**

- a. Ideology/Religion
- b. Historical goals
- c. Internal dispositions (needs and aspirations)
- d. Leader traits
- e. Power politics
- f. External pressures

**1C.3 Generality of opponent's hostility**

- a. General/permanent
- b. General/temporary
- c. Specific/permanent
- d. Specific/temporary

**1C.4 Opponent's response to conciliatory moves**

- a. Reciprocate in this situation
- b. Reciprocate in other situations
- c. Ignore
- d. Take advantage in this situation
- e. Take advantage in other situations

**1C.5 Opponent's response to a policy of firmness**

- a. Back down
- b. Ignore
- c. Reciprocate in this situation
- d. Reciprocate in other situations
- e. Respond impulsively/irrationally

**1C.6 Opponent's image of one's own nation**

- a. Destructive
- b. Expansionist
- c. Aggressive
- d. Defensive
- e. Conciliatory
- f. Active seeker of peace
- g. Domestic developmental
- h. Restorative

**1C.7 Opponent's view of conflict**

- a. Inevitable
- b. Avoidable
- c. Desirable
- d. Undesirable
- e. Inevitable/desirable
- f. Inevitable/undesirable
- g. Avoidable/desirable
- h. Avoidable/undesirable

**1C.8 Opponent's decision-making process**

- a. Unitary actor
- b. Bureaucratic model
- c. Competing factions.

**1C.9 Opponent's decision-making style**

- a. Calculating
- b. Impulsive

**1C.10 Opponent's choice of objectives**

- a. Optimizer
- b. Satisficer
- c. Realistic
- d. Unrealistic
- e. Flexible
- f. Inflexible
- g. Predictable
- h. Unpredictable

**1C.11 Opponent's pursuit of objectives**

- a. Prepare ground
- b. Try and see
- c. Incremental strategy
- d. Blitzkrieg strategy
- e. Mobilizing strategy

**1C.12 Opponent's strategy**

- a. Turn other cheek
- b. Non punitive
- c. Accommodating
- d. Deterrent
- e. Gratuitously aggressive



**Nature of the Contemporary International/Regional system**

- a. Conflictual
- b. Mixed
- c. Harmonious

**1D.1 What is the source of conflict?**

- a. Human nature
- b. Ideological attributes
- c. Political attributes
- d. Economic attributes
- e. Nationalism
- f. Power politics
- g. Imperialism/colonialism/racism
- h. Inequalities

**1D.2 What are the conditions of peace?**

- a. Education/communication/negotiation
- b. Eliminate offending nations
- c. Eliminate inequalities
- d. Maintain balance of power
- e. Transform the system
- f. Promote Nonalignment
- g. Promote regional cooperation
- h. Improve economic conditions
- i. Non-interference

**1D.3 Structure of the International system**

- a. Bipolar
- b. Detente
- c. Nonalignment as a key feature
- d. Existence of regional systems
- e. Interdependence

**1D.4 Stability of the International system**

- a. Stable
- b. Mixed
- c. Unstable

**National Role Conception**

- a. Regional leader/protector
- b. Active independent, nonaligned nation
- c. Example
- d. Nation concerned with internal development
- e. Mediator/peacemaker
- f. Faithful ally
- g. Friendly neighbour
- h. Crusader against imperialism/colonialism/racism/oppression

**Prospects for eventual realization of goals****2A.1 Should one be optimistic or pessimistic**

- a. Optimism
- b. Mixed
- c. Pessimism

**2A.2 Optimism with reference to**

- a. Long-term goals
- b. Policy undertaking

**2A.3 Optimism/pessimism conditional?**

- a. Conditional
- b. Unconditional

**2A.4 On whose side is time**

- a. On our side
- b. On adversary's side

**Beliefs about the predictability of events****3A.1 Is political life predictable?**

- a. Predictable
- b. Capricious
- c. Mixed

**3A.2 What aspects are predictable?**

- a. Historical developments/long term trends
- b. Opponents and their behaviour
- c. Policy outcomes
- d. Specific events

**3A.3 Degree of predictability**

- a. Certainty
- b. Probability
- c. Uncertainty

**Beliefs about control over historical developments****4A.1 Ability to control events**

- a. Full ability to control
- b. Some ability to control
- c. Inability to control

**4A.2 Should leader accept active role?**

- a. Must play active role
- b. Must play passive role
- c. Must intervene only when necessary
- d. Intervene when feasible
- e. Mediate between contending forces
- f. Discern historical trends
- g. Avoid intervention

**Instrumental Beliefs****Beliefs about goal selection****1A.1 Nature of one's goals**

- a. Achievement of hegemonial position
- b. Elimination of other key actors
- c. Achievement of national interests
- d. Protecting security of home territory
- e. Maintenance of status quo
- f. Promote regional cooperation
- h. Promote peaceful coexistence

**1A.2 Best approach for goal selection**

- a. Comprehensive framework/ master plan
- b. From immediate problem at hand
- c. Mixed

**1A.3 Type of goals**

- a. Optimal goals
- b. Feasible goals
- c. Mixed

**1A.4 Paths to achieve goals**

- a. Single path
- b. Multiple paths

**1A.5 Linkage between goals**

- a. All goals compatible and linked/no trade offs
- b. Trade-offs necessary
- c. Goals compatible, but trade-offs possible

**Beliefs about the effective way to pursue goals****2A.1 Goal modification**

- a. Modify goals
- b. Do not modify goals
- c. Substitute goals
- d. Do not substitute goals
- e. Abandon goals if not working
- f. Do not abandon
- g. Modify means
- h. Substitute means
- i. Do not modify/substitute means

**2A.2 Means to achieve goals**

- a. Prepare ground
- b. Try and see
- c. Incremental approach
- d. Blitzkreig
- e. Mobilizing

**2A.3 Strategy**

- a. Aggressive
- b. Conciliatory
- c. Mixed
- d. Turn other cheek
- e. Non punitive
- f. Deterrent
- g. Gratuitously aggressive
- h. Cooperative

**2A.4 Which actions preferable**

- a. Unilateral
- b. Multilateral
- c. Bilateral

**Beliefs about risks****3A.1 How are risks calculated**

- a. Comprehensive framework
- b. Specific undertaking
- c. Specific tactics

**3A.2 Controlling risks**

- a. Scaling down goals
- b. Scaling down means
- c. Assessment of means
- d. Assessment of opponent's strategies
- e. Change strategy

**3A.3 Assessment of risk**

- a. Risks to be avoided
- b. Take risks if necessary

**3A.4 Trade offs associated with risks**

- a. Maximize potential gains
- b. Minimize potential losses

**3A.5 High and low risk policies**

- a. HRP mandatory
- b. HRP permissible
- c. HRP prohibited
- d. LRP mandatory
- e. LRP permissible
- f. LRP prohibited

**Beliefs about timing****4A.1 Importance of timing - long term**

- a. Very important
- b. Not very important
- c. Somewhat

**4A.2 Importance of timing for specific policies**

- a. Very important
- b. Not very important
- c. Somewhat

**Beliefs about action****5A.1 When to act**

- a. Act quickly when opportunities arise
- b. Act when enemy provocation is intolerable
- c. Delay conciliatory action until strong
- d. Delay escalatory action until strong
- e. Avoid premature action
- f. Do not yield to enemy provocation
- g. Do not act without assessing relevant issues
- h. Act before opposition gains position of strength

**Beliefs about the utility and role of means to advance one's interests**

**6A.1 Military force**

- a. Avoid use of force
- b. Use force as last resort
- c. Only visible means to advance one's interests
- d. Resort to it rather than surrender/be defeated

**6A.2 Method of using force**

- a. Use alone
- b. Supplemented by other types of political/economic actions
- c. On large scale
- d. On small scale

**6A.3 Military tactics**

- a. Don't launch first strike
- b. Take initiative
- c. Retreat/regroup rather than be trapped
- d. Hold and fight rather than retreat

**6A.4 Military supremacy**

- a. Crucial
- b. Not crucial

**6A.5 Conception of power**

- a. Military
- b. Multidimensional

ii. The second data base was established by interviews. Mrs. Gandhi's speechwriter, her assistants and foreign policy advisers, were interviewed at great length. Also several members of the Indian political elite, bureaucrats, former ambassadors, opposition members, ministers of the cabinet and a chief minister were interviewed and were very forthcoming. Another major source of information were the professors at the school of International Affairs at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Some journalists provided critical and scathing reviews of Mrs. Gandhi's performance in the foreign policy arena.

There were two sets of questionnaires. The first included categories of the Operational Code beliefs, and the questions pertained to the interpretation of Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs by the interviewees. The second questionnaire consisted of open ended questions regarding the three foreign policy decisions and contained references to specific

issues and actors.

One of the main reasons for the establishment of two data sets is for the sake of comparison and to establish validity. Also it is useful for several other reasons:

1. It will facilitate cross-sectional comparisons of the interpretation of the three events by Mrs. Gandhi and the other members of the elite.
2. There was an attempt in these interviews to find out if there were other options in all three decision situations which were inconsistent with Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs, options put forth by other members of the decision-making unit and other options credible in that particular situation. If there were other options inconsistent with Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs and were not chosen, then our explanation of beliefs being a necessary condition for policy preferences is enhanced (George 1976).

The data obtained by interviews has not been coded or quantified. It remains as qualitative data and will be used for comparison with the results obtained by content analysis.

**Procedure:**

For the content analysis, a total of 634 documents were collected. Those which did not contain at least one Operational Code element were eliminated and a total of 266 documents were coded which represents roughly one third of the collected documents. The paragraph was used as a unit of analysis and a total of 1642 paragraphs were coded. The breakdown of documents and paragraphs is presented in Table 1 and Table 2.

**TABLE 1**  
**TYPE OF DOCUMENTS CONTENT ANALYZED**

YEAR	TYPES OF DOCUMENTS CODED									DOCUMENTS		PARAGRAPHS	
	SPEECH	PRESS CONF.	INAUG. ADDRES	LETTERS	MEMOIR DIARY.	MINUTE	BOOKS	BROAD- CASTS.	PRIVATE COMM.	TOTAL EXAMIN	TOTAL CODED	TOTAL EXAMIN	TOTAL CODED
1966	19		4					5		54	28	482	144
1967	14							1		49	15	241	52
1968	27		2				2	1		63	32	537	192
1969	15	1	1	1				4		65	22	314	94
1970	18	1					3			74	22	362	118
1971	40	9		1		1	1	2	1	89	55	742	467
1972	23	2	1				1		1	23	28	443	200
1973	11	1	1							44	13	391	106
1974	9		1	1						38	11	211	39
1975	12	1	3				1			65	17	285	60
1976	14		3				4		2	70	23	398	170
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>634</b>	<b>266</b>	<b>4406</b>	<b>1642</b>



**TABLE 2**

**TYPE OF PARAGRAPHS CONTENT ANALYZED**

YEAR	NUMBER OF PARAGRAPHS CODED									PARAGRAPHS		DOCUMENTS	
	SPEECH	PRESS CONF.	INAUG. ADDRES	LETTERS	MEMOIR DIARY.	MINUTE	BOOKS	BROAD-CASTS.	PRIVATE COMM.	TOTAL EXAMIN	TOTAL CODED	TOTAL EXAMIN	TOTAL CODED
1966	85		29					30		482	144	54	28
1967	50							2		241	52	49	15
1968	171		10				5	6		537	192	63	32
1969	63	16	6	5				4		314	94	65	22
1970	107	7					4			362	118	74	22
1971	337	101		8		5	1	10	5	742	467	89	55
1972	129	21	2				44		4	443	200	23	28
1973	82	9	15							391	106	44	13
1974	33		4	2						211	39	38	11
1975	49	1	9				1			285	60	65	17
1976	101		17				45		7	398	170	70	23
TOTAL	1207	155	92	15	0	5	100	52	16	4406	1642	634	266

## **2. Reliability:**

The measurement of any phenomena always contains a certain amount of chance error. The goal of error-free measurement is very much sought after, but unfortunately very rarely attained in most areas of scientific research. Errors whether large or small are present to some extent. Two sets of measurements or two coders measuring or coding the same features of the same individual or phenomena will never exactly duplicate each other. Also, repeated measurements over time may not yield the same results, or equal one another. Unreliability is always present to some extent. While repeated coding does not precisely duplicate one another, they have to be consistent from one coder to the next. If there is consistency in repeated measurements of the same phenomena/ individual, then the probability of unreliability is minimized.

The reliability of communication content refers to the degree of internal consistency of the data as indicated by an appropriate statistic (Spiegelman 1953, 174).

Content analysis involves two kinds of consistency.

### **i. Intercoder consistency:**

Different coders should produce the same results when they apply the same set of categories and criteria to the same content.

Reliability considered as consistency among judges is itself a function of a communication situation and maybe considered as an answer to the question: How communicable are the criteria? The criteria themselves and any instructions for their use which accompany them constitute a body of symbolic material under which the judges are constrained to make a series of decisions respecting another body of symbolic material - the communication content (Spiegelman 1953, 175-176).

Reliability is expressed as a function of the agreement achieved between coders regarding the assignment of values to categories. If agreement among coders is perfect for all values, then reliability is assured.

If agreement among coders is not better than chance, which might be observed when coders do not care to examine the units or instead throw a die to decide on category assignments, reliability is absent (Krippendorff 1980, 133).

Consistency among the coders will depend on the degree to which the coders have common cultural and linguistic background and frames of reference, and on any previous experience or training which they received. This is more important in coding situations which involve more than a simple word count. If the coders have similar backgrounds and also have had prior experience, then there may be conformity in the coding pattern.

ii. Consistency over time:

This entails that the same coder should produce the same results when he/she applies the same set of categories and criteria to the same content at different times i.e.,  $T_1$  and  $T_2$ . I.e. the language of content analysis, the same material is coded by one coder at two different points in time - preferably with a six month interval. This is to prove that there is consistency in the coding procedure.

Reliability is expected to be high in the intra coder tests or the test-retest situation. This assumption is based on the argument that the same coder coding a stable source of data, i.e., documents (as opposed to interview responses, where the subject may change over time and respond differently) may only create random or chance errors, unless the coder's interpretation of either the instructions or the data material has changed drastically in six months. It will be argued that this is not very likely and, hence, reliability is expected to be high.

For this project we have chosen eight different types of reliability tests which are presented in Table 3. Each of them test for intercoder and intracoder agreements, intercoder and intracoder consistency.

**TABLE 3**  
**TYPES OF RELIABILITY FOR NOMINAL DATA**

TYPES OF RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY DESIGN	ERRORS ASSESSED
1. Intercoder Macro Test (Reproducibility)	Test-Test (Sample cases, all variables)	Intercoder Disagreements
2. Intercoder Micro Test (Reproducibility)	Test-Test (Sample cases, all variables)	Intercoder Disagreements Intracoder Inconsistencies
3. Intercoder Single Category Reliability	Test-Test (Sample cases, sample variables)	Intercoder Disagreements Intracoder Inconsistencies
4. Scott's pi	Test-Test (Sample cases, sample variables)	Random, Chance Errors
5. Intracoder Macro Test (Stability)	Test-Retest (Sample cases, all variables)	Intracoder Disagreement
6. Intracoder Micro Test (Stability)	Test-Retest (Sample cases, all variables)	Intracoder Inconsistency
7. Intracoder Single Category Reliability	Test-Retest (Sample cases, sample variables)	Intracoder Disagreement Intracoder Inconsistency
8. Scott's pi	Test-Retest (Sample cases, sample variables)	Random, Chance Errors

For the purpose of establishing reliability in this project, three documents were chosen.

1. Speech at a meeting with other heads of state on "Some aspects of our foreign policy" (1966)
2. Speech at an AICC<sup>2</sup> (domestic) seminar on "Some aspects of our foreign policy" (1970)
3. "India and the World", Foreign Affairs Quarterly 1972.

---

<sup>2</sup>All India Congress Committee

64 Variables<sup>3</sup>, were considered and 88 cases (paragraphs) in all, were used. Two other coders in addition to the author participated in the coding. The two coders were from different academic but similar cultural backgrounds. Each had different levels of familiarity with content analysis and the coding procedure. But as the codebook was very detailed and provided specific and exact coding instructions, it did not give room for too much guessing on the part of coders.

**Criterion for Acceptance:**

What is the acceptance level for reliability coefficients? How high or low can they be, in order for a coding procedure to be reliable? It can be argued that

*In most situations in which observation, message contents, and texts are coded into categories of a data language, the standards against which the accuracy would be established are rarely available. In content analysis, it is therefore largely unrealistic to insist on this strongest reliability criterion (Krippendorff 1980, 132).*

But the higher the coefficient between 0 and 1, the stronger the argument that can be developed in support of the reliability of a measurement procedure. If the coefficient is below .5 then the argument supporting the reliability of a procedure is weak.

*In assessing the level of agreement between coders or the intercoder reliability there is no absolute standard....The level of reliability considered acceptable is also related to the complexity of the categories (Emmert and Barker 1989, 209).*

The researcher must decide the level of acceptability, depending on how complex or exhaustive the categories are, and how useful the information derived from the categories will be (Holsti 1969, Krippendorff 1980, Stempel 1981).

Due to the complexity of our categories and the coding scheme, it can be said that a coefficient above .5 for the micro test is acceptable and can be taken as reliable. Any coefficient falling below that will indicate unreliability of our measure. Hence, we either have to get another coder or change our coding scheme.

#### **A. Intercoder Macro Test:**

For this test, the values for each of the 64 original variables were combined, and two dichotomous values were created. If the coder had assigned a particular variable a value, it was coded as a 'yes'. If the coder did not assign a value it was coded as a 'no'.

---

<sup>3</sup> Document ID number, year, month, paragraph number, audience, and type of document were omitted from the tests.

In other words the coder had to make just two decisions - to code or not to code. For example:

VARIABLES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	64
CODER A	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
CODER B	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0

0 = No      1 = Yes

Fig. 5. Intercoder Macro Test: An Example

The Crosstabs matrix would be as follows:


		Coder A				Coder A				Coder A	
		Yes	No			Yes	No			Yes	No
Coder B	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Coder B	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Coder B	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	No	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		No	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		No	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Var 1				Var 2	—————			Var 64	

Fig. 6. Intercoder Macro Test: Crosstabs Matrix

The same procedure was used for all of the coders and the 64 original variables. For this test, reliability was expected to be very high as only two decisions - 'yes' or 'no' were to be correlated. After recoding, a crosstabs matrix was run, in order to find agreement between coders. The formula for the test uses coefficients based on a ratio of agreements among coders (or number of agreements about categories) over the number of times a coding decision is made (Holsti 1969, Stempel 1981).

2

PM-1 3 1/2"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET  
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT



PRECISION<sup>SM</sup> RESOLUTION TARGETS

PIIONEERS IN METHYLENE BLUE TESTING SINCE 1974



4180 LOUNTY ROAD & BURNVILLE, NH 03024 USA  
TEL: 603 486 7800 FAX: 603 486 7801 T.L.X. 810000000

The formula is as follows:

$$C.R. = \frac{2M}{C_1 + C_2}$$

M = agreement between coders  
C<sub>1</sub> & C<sub>2</sub> = # of coding decisions made

The reliability coefficient for all 64 variables were calculated. The results were as follows:

**TABLE 4  
INTERCODER MACRO TEST**

<b>A &amp; C = .95</b> <b>A &amp; B = .93</b> <b>B &amp; C = .97</b>	<b>Average = .95</b>
--	----------------------

As expected, the C.R. was very high with an average of .95.

**B. Interccder Micro Test:**

The previous test measured agreement between coders on whether a code was assigned to a category or not. In a way, that test is biased in favour of dimensions with a smaller number of categories, as one would expect much better agreement on a two category than on a five or six category scale. But this test is more specific to the original variables. It determines whether each coder assigned the same value to a variable. This measures agreement between coders on the values in each of the 64 variables. Here, reliability was expected to be lower, as it is a micro test. The results are presented in the following table.

**TABLE 5  
INTERCODER MICRO TEST**

<b>A &amp; C = .67</b> <b>A &amp; B = .54</b> <b>B &amp; C = .76</b>	<b>Average = .66</b>
--	----------------------



The average C.R. is .66, or 66% agreement, which is above what we have set as our acceptable score. So it can be said that our Micro Test proves that our measurement procedure is reliable.

### **C. Intercoder Single Category Reliability:**

This test examines reliability within each category or a single variable. It goes one step further than the Micro Test. While the Micro Test calculates the C.R. for all the categories (variables) as a lump, this test is designed to examine reliability for each of the variables. It assesses the reliability of a subset of values within a variable. This is one device to determine which parts, or which variables, of the data set whose reliability as a whole is high, is worth keeping. This test is useful because, based on our theoretical construct, we can determine which variables are important and test for each of those categories. If the correlation is high, then we can rest assured that at least the categories that are important for testing hypotheses and which are at the core of our study will be useful.

A sample of ten variables (core belief categories) were selected and intercoder coefficients were calculated separately. The results are presented in Table 6.

**TABLE 6**  
**SINGLE CATEGORY RELIABILITY (Intercoder)**

VARIABLES	CODERS A & C	CODERS A & B	CODERS B & C
Nature of Politics	.71	.51	.70
Conditions for Peace	.76	.77	.79
Role of Conflict	.67	.56	.83
Optimism	.67	.52	.72
Predictability	.82	.70	.85
Control	.85	.71	.77
Nature of Goals	.88	.59	.65
National Role	.69	.60	.92
Action	.53	.64	.90
Strategy	.72	.59	.87

The results are impressive and show that intercoder reliability is high for each of the categories. The slightly lower coefficients in our intercoder micro test may be due to lower scores on other variables. This will not affect our estimates of reliability in any significant way.

#### **D. Scott's Reliability Index: (Intercoder)**

There have been criticisms against the earlier methods of assessing reliability (Krippendorff 1980, Singleton Jr et al. 1988), that they are biased in favour of small samples and do not take into account the number of agreements that may be expected on chance alone. The percentage of agreement could be spurious or occur due to chance. Scott (1955,323) suggests the use of  $P_i$ , the index of intercoder agreement, which

corrects for the number of categories in the code, and the frequency with which each is used.

$$P_i = \frac{P_o - P_e}{1 - P_e}$$

$P_o$  = observed % agreement  
 $P_e$  = expected % agreement

$P_i$  is the ratio of the actual difference between obtained and chance agreement, which takes into account the complexity of the category system, the agreements expected by chance alone, and over the maximum difference between obtained and chance agreement. It can be roughly interpreted as the extent to which the coding reliability exceeds chance. Another test was conducted using the above formula. The results were as follows.

**TABLE 7**  
**SCOTT'S RELIABILITY INDEX**

<b>A &amp; C = .64</b> <b>A &amp; B = .64</b> <b>B &amp; C = .66</b>	<b>Average = .65</b>
--	----------------------

This agreement would indicate that in about 65% of the cases, the observed co-occurrences are explainable by the pattern of perfect agreement rather than what would be expected by chance, or in other words, observed co-occurrences are 65% above chance.

**E. Intracoder Macro test:**

This is one of the tests to determine stability of the coding procedure and its consistency through time. The three documents were coded once again by the author after a six month interval. Just as in the Intercoder Macro test, the variables were recoded into 'yes' and 'no' categories. Because it was the same person coding, and also because it was a Macro test, reliability was expected to be extremely high. The result is as follows:

## **INTRACODER MACRO TEST**

**C.R. = .98**

### **F. Intracoder Micro test:**

This again follows the test pattern laid out for the intercoder test and although the results were not expected to be as high as for the intracoder macro test, it was expected to be higher than what was obtained by the intercoder micro test.

## **INTRACODER MICRO TEST**

**C.R. = .84**

A C.R. of .84 indicates congruence of the coding procedures from T<sub>1</sub> to T<sub>2</sub>.

### **G. Intracoder Single Category Reliability:**

The C.R. for each of the categories coded at T<sub>1</sub> and T<sub>2</sub> are very high as can be evidenced in the following table.

**TABLE 8**  
**SINGLE CATEGORY RELIABILITY (Intracoder)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b>TIME T1 &amp; T2</b>
Nature of Politics	.77
Conditions for Peace	.88
Role of Conflict	.83
Optimism	1.0
Predictability	.95
Control	.84
Nature of Goals	.87
National Role	.83
Action	.97
Strategy	.81

**H. Scott's Reliability Index: (Intracoder)**

Once again, we conducted this test in order to discover how much of the congruence between the two sets of documents T<sub>1</sub> and T<sub>2</sub>, were due to chance or random errors. The result is as follows:

**SCOTT'S RELIABILITY INDEX**

**C.R. = .72**

**I. Conclusions:**

Overall reliability seems to be quite high in all of the tests conducted. Even though the two other coders were from different academic backgrounds with different levels of familiarity with content analysis and the coding procedure, the correlation

between their scores indicated that similarity of their cultural backgrounds may account for their high coefficients. Intercoder reliability, has been established and also there has been consistency in the coded categories over time. Based on these results, we can proceed towards establishing validity of the data set.

### **3. Validity:**

Reliability assessment is relatively simple. The procedures listed above are rather straightforward and yield almost precise estimates of consistency and random error. But these procedures are independent of the theory and concepts under investigation. That is, they can be applied and interpreted without regard to what is actually being measured. Validity assessment, by contrast, is more problematic. Systematic errors, which affect validity but not reliability are more difficult to detect than random errors.

Validity cannot be assessed directly. If it could - if we knew a case's true position on a variable independently of a given measure - then there would be no need for a measure (Singleton Jr. et al. 1988, 117).

Therefore, to assess validity one must subjectively evaluate whether an operational definition measures what it is intended to.

For this research project we have attempted to assess four types of validity -

1.Face; 2.Content; 3.Concurrent; 4.Construct.

#### **A. Face Validity:**

If a measurement looks as though it measures what one claims it measures, it is said to have face validity.

Face validity refers simply to the judgment that an operational definition appears, on the face of it, to measure the concept it is intended to measure. In some cases this claim alone would seem reasonable to establish a measure's validity (Singleton Jr. et al. 1988, 118).

This type of validity has been most frequently relied upon by content analysis (Holsti 1969, 143). Face validity is usually established through informed judgment of the investigator. For face validity, three questions have to be answered.

1. Are the categories representative of the total universe of possible items that could have been included? In other words, are they adequate?

**a. Variables or Categories:**

We have already defined and identified clearly the various components of the total construct and the test items adequately represent these components. For this study, first, the operational definitions were derived from George's (1969, 201-216) original classification of philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Second, the variables that have been derived seem extensive and exhaustive. The measures include all of the beliefs necessary to test our hypotheses and also to study the overall tenets of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code. Most of the categories are straightforward and measure specific and explicit expressions of a belief. For example, "Pakistan's aggressive stance has persisted over time and is unlikely to change in the near future". This sentence indicates a belief about an adversary - Pakistan; its nature - aggressive; hostility - permanent; prediction - unlikely to change.

**b. Values:**

The values of each variable or category also are exhaustive and leave little room for guesswork. Each category has several values, and some of the variables such as "sources of conflict" and "conditions of peace" have two references, just in case a paragraph makes two references to the above. This eliminates the possibility of missing out any value due to the fact that the variable in that particular unit has already been coded. The values also appear to be consistent with the categories of the Operational Code construct.

**2. Were the documents analyzed representative of her beliefs?**

As already stated in the section "data sources", almost all of the available documents were obtained and examined. Although most of them did not pertain to international affairs or foreign policy, they were examined carefully, and those that contained even a single belief were coded. The documents were fairly representative. A check for content validity is made in the next section.

**3. Was the coding reliable?**

This question has already been answered in detail in the previous section of this chapter.

### **B. Content Validity:**

One of the criticisms frequently articulated against content analysis and the subsequent analysis of data, is regarding the validity of the documents. How faithfully do the documents or the ideas, beliefs and sentiments expressed in them correspond to the true ideas, sentiments and beliefs of the author? What is said in public may not represent what the author thinks in private.

In other words, does the measure really measure what it claims to measure? Or do the Operational Code beliefs extracted by coding the documents really represent the true beliefs of Mrs. Gandhi? How authentic are the documents?

#### **a. Document Authenticity:**

Can it be said that Mrs. Gandhi was the real author of all the written documents? Were all of the verbal utterances correctly reported word for word, without distortion or omission? It is a known fact that politicians generally have their speeches, public statements and articles written for them. Is it possible to rely on documents purported to be original, but as a matter of fact written by somebody other than the author?

One answer to this question is that it is highly unlikely that a speechwriter will write a document that is diametrically opposed to the political leader's views. It is also equally unlikely that a leader will accept the document or even present it as his/her own. These assumptions are hypothetical. In order to find out the truth of these assumptions in Mrs. Gandhi's case, the author in an interview with one of Mrs. Gandhi's aides<sup>4</sup> and closest confidant (Mr. Sharada Prasad, author interview), addressed the question of authenticity of the documents, whether it was indeed written for her, and if so whether Mrs. Gandhi's true beliefs coincided with what was reflected in her speeches and other documents. He said that while she wrote most of her speeches and public statements herself, the few that were written for her were in total conformity with the explicit guidelines that Mrs. Gandhi would provide before hand. Then the finished document would be thoroughly reviewed by Mrs. Gandhi, to make sure that there was no misunderstanding or misinterpretation of her guidelines. "She knew absolutely what she

---

<sup>4</sup> who was also her speechwriter



wanted to say and always spoke her own mind" (Sharada Prasad, author interview). Mr. Prasad was one of the people who had worked very closely with Mrs. Gandhi and knew the workings of her mind. He confirmed that all of the documents were authentic and reflected her views, ideas and beliefs accurately.

**b. Document Sincerity:**

Another often heard criticism regarding this approach is that - what a political leader says in public will not reveal his/her 'true' or 'actual' beliefs. There is always a gap between what he/she thinks and what he/she articulates in public.

K. Brodin (1972, 105-107) argues that a decision maker will not make a statement which contradicts his/her beliefs in public for several reasons.

- i. The credibility of the holders of power upon which the legitimacy of power ultimately rests, is contingent upon a certain measure of consonance between word and deed, doctrine and decision.
- ii. Foreign policy doctrines tend to create commitments which serve as barriers against sudden or sharp changes of policy, particularly if these declarations reflect a high degree of uniformity over a long period of time. Decision makers are likely to be subjected to a certain amount of pressure to act in accordance with previous declarations.
- iii. A spectacular and obvious discrepancy between an established doctrine and subsequent action carries with it the risk of gradually eroding confidence in the political leadership.

So one can expect that most of what a political leader says in public is not too discrepant with what he/she thinks or believes in private.

The author also enquired of the interviewees if what Mrs. Gandhi said in public was what she believed in. Mr. Subrahmanyam said that it was not a problem of sincerity as much as it was a problem of having organized beliefs and ideas about international politics. He said that Mrs. Gandhi did not understand the configurations of international politics, did not have a 'world view' to guide her decision-making, and that overall her pronouncements were vague and general. But most of the individuals who had worked closely with her (Sharada Prasad, Gujral, Damodaran, Seshan, C. Subramaniam,

Parthasarathy, Rao, confidential interviewee) did not agree with Mr. Subrahmanian and were certain that she was sincere, unless a situation demanded that she be diplomatic (for example, Indian posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union during the 1967 Czechoslovakia incident), then she would hide her real judgments behind rhetoric. This, they all concurred, did happen in a few situations, but she did not tell an untruth or deliberately misguide anyone regarding her real intentions. They all agreed that she did convey quite sincerely what she believed, in all of her documents.

Despite these assertions, we have devised a few tests to determine document sincerity:

1. Type of Document:

This test is based on the assumption that political leaders are more likely to be honest, straightforward and sincere in private communication than in public. It is easier to reveal true feelings in private without having to be publicly accountable for what is said. The same can also be true for spontaneous documents as opposed to premeditated ones. If this assumption is validated by our tests, then we will have to face questions regarding the usefulness of the documents to elicit Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs. But on the other hand, if our tests show no significant difference or discrepancy between the different types of documents, i.e., if Mrs. Gandhi articulated the same types of beliefs across different documents then the validity of the data is high, or the beliefs elicited from the documents is true and can be counted upon to provide accurate indicators of her Operational Code.

a. Public vs Private Documents:

The coded documents were sorted and recoded into two categories:

1. Public documents - such as speeches, addresses, broadcasts, journal articles, press conferences etc., and; 2. Private documents - letters, minutes of meetings, private communication.

Twelve major Operational Code categories were chosen, from the original seventy, which are as follows:

1. Nature of the political universe
2. Role of conflict
3. Character of political opponents
4. Nature of the regional system
5. Prospects for goal realization
6. Predictability of political life
7. Control of historical development
8. Role of leader
9. Nature of one's goals
10. Best approach for goal selection
11. Strategy
12. Military force

The measures of association for public vs private documents are presented in Table 9.

**TABLE 9**

**TYPE OF DOCUMENT (Public vs Private)**

	I	II	III	IV																																				
	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>5</td><td>338</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	5	338	B			<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>281</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	281	1	B			<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>154</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	154	1	B			<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>5</td><td>221</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	5	221	B		
	1	2																																						
A	5	338																																						
B																																								
	1	2																																						
A	281	1																																						
B																																								
	1	2																																						
A	154	1																																						
B																																								
	1	2																																						
A	5	221																																						
B																																								
	V	VI	VII	VIII																																				
	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>19</td><td>182</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	19	182	B			<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>10</td><td>287</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	10	287	B			<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>12</td><td>201</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	12	201	B			<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>131</td><td>98</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	131	98	B		
	1	2																																						
A	19	182																																						
B																																								
	1	2																																						
A	10	287																																						
B																																								
	1	2																																						
A	12	201																																						
B																																								
	1	2																																						
A	131	98																																						
B																																								
	IX	X	XI	XII																																				
	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>111</td><td>43</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	111	43	B			<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>1</td><td>358</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	1	358	B			<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>119</td><td>17</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	119	17	B			<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>205</td><td>26</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A	205	26	B		
	1	2																																						
A	111	43																																						
B																																								
	1	2																																						
A	1	358																																						
B																																								
	1	2																																						
A	119	17																																						
B																																								
	1	2																																						
A	205	26																																						
B																																								

A: PUBLIC B: PRIVATE

**I. NATURE OF POLITICS**  
1 = Harmonious 2 = Conflictual

**II. ROLE OF CONFLICT**  
1 = Undesirable 2 = Desirable

**III. CHAR. OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION**  
1 = Aggressive 2 = Defensive

**IV. NATURE OF INT/REG SYS.**  
1 = Harmonious 2 = Conflictual

**V. PROSPECTS FOR GOAL REALIZATION**  
1 = Pessimistic 2 = Optimistic

**VI. POL. LIFE PREDICTABILITY**  
1 = Capricious 2 = Predictable

**VII. CONTROL**  
1 = No control 2 = Full control

**VIII. NATURE OF ONE'S GOALS**  
1 = National interest 2 = Security

**IX. GOAL SELECTION**  
1 = Immediate 2 = Master plan

**X. STRATEGY**  
1 = Aggressive 2 = Cooperative

**XI. MILITARY FORCE**  
1 = Avoid 2 = Only means

**XII. ROLE OF LEADER**  
1 = Active 2 = Passive

**Conclusion:**

The recoding and crosstabs show no values for the variable 'Private documents'. As has been stated earlier, very few of Mrs. Gandhi's private documents were available. Hence, this test is inconclusive.

**b. Spontaneous vs premeditated:**

This test is based on the assumption that an individual is more likely to speak his/her mind and reveal true feelings in spontaneous situations such as press conferences or interviews rather than in documents such as speeches or letters, which are premeditated. Here again we have to find no difference in order for the data to be valid.

The documents were recoded into 1. Spontaneous - press conferences, minutes, private communication; 2. premeditated - speeches, broadcasts, articles, letters.

A crosstabs matrix was obtained and the measure of association were as follows:

TYPE OF DOCUMENT (Fremeditated vs Spontaneous)

I	II	III	IV																																				
<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">8</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">4</td><td style="text-align: center;">330</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .13221</p>		1	2	A	1	8	B	4	330	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td style="text-align: center;">6</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">275</td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .00880</p>		1	2	A	6		B	275	1	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td style="text-align: center;">10</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">144</td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .02116</p>		1	2	A	10		B	144	1	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">9</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">5</td><td style="text-align: center;">212</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .03063</p>		1	2	A		9	B	5	212
	1	2																																					
A	1	8																																					
B	4	330																																					
	1	2																																					
A	6																																						
B	275	1																																					
	1	2																																					
A	10																																						
B	144	1																																					
	1	2																																					
A		9																																					
B	5	212																																					
V	VI	VII	VIII																																				
<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">3</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">18</td><td style="text-align: center;">179</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .07572</p>		1	2	A	1	3	B	18	179	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">10</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">10</td><td style="text-align: center;">277</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .03484</p>		1	2	A		10	B	10	277	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">12</td><td style="text-align: center;">201</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = -</p>		1	2	A			B	12	201	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">130</td><td style="text-align: center;">97</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .01367</p>		1	2	A	1	1	B	130	97
	1	2																																					
A	1	3																																					
B	18	179																																					
	1	2																																					
A		10																																					
B	10	277																																					
	1	2																																					
A																																							
B	12	201																																					
	1	2																																					
A	1	1																																					
B	130	97																																					
IX	X	XI	XII																																				
<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">111</td><td style="text-align: center;">41</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .18430</p>		1	2	A		2	B	111	41	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">5</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">353</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .00628</p>		1	2	A		5	B	1	353	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td style="text-align: center;">3</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">116</td><td style="text-align: center;">17</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .05677</p>		1	2	A	3		B	116	17	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td style="text-align: center;">2</td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">A</td><td style="text-align: center;">1</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td style="text-align: center;">B</td><td style="text-align: center;">204</td><td style="text-align: center;">26</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .12348</p>		1	2	A	1		B	204	26
	1	2																																					
A		2																																					
B	111	41																																					
	1	2																																					
A		5																																					
B	1	353																																					
	1	2																																					
A	3																																						
B	116	17																																					
	1	2																																					
A	1																																						
B	204	26																																					

A: SPONTANEOUS B: PREMEDITATED

I. NATURE OF POLITICS  
1 = Harmonious 2 = Conflictual

II. ROLE OF CONFLICT  
1 = Undesirable 2 = Desirable

III. CHAR. OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS  
1 = Aggressive 2 = Defensive

IV. NATURE OF INT/REG SYS.  
1 = Harmonious 2 = Conflictual

V. PROSPECTS FOR GOAL REALIZATION  
1 = Pessimistic 2 = Optimistic

VI. POL. LIFE PREDICTABILITY  
1 = Capricious 2 = Predictable

VII. CONTROL  
1 = No control 2 = Full control

VIII. NATURE OF ONE'S GOALS  
1 = National interest 2 = Security

IX. GOAL SELECTION  
1 = Immediate 2 = Master plan

X. STRATEGY  
1 = Aggressive 2 = Cooperative

XI. MILITARY FORCE  
1 = Avoid 2 = Only means

XII. ROLE OF LEADER  
1 = Active 2 = Passive

**Conclusion:**

The results again show very little difference between spontaneous and premeditated documents.

**2. Types of audience:**

Does a political leader articulate different sets of beliefs to different people? Here too, we can expect validity to be high if we can determine that beliefs expressed by Mrs. Gandhi across various types of audiences - both domestic and foreign; masses and intellectuals were similar.

**a. Foreign vs Domestic:**

The documents were recoded into 1. Foreign - addresses to other heads of state, international and regional conferences etc.; 2. Domestic - speeches and broadcasts to domestic audiences.

The results were as follows:

TABLE 11

TYPE OF AUDIENCE (Domestic vs foreign)

	I	II	III	IV																																				
	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>2</td><td>131</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>3</td><td>207</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .00306</p>		1	2	A	2	131	B	3	207	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>110</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>171</td><td>1</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .04771</p>		1	2	A	110		B	171	1	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>113</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>41</td><td>1</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .13218</p>		1	2	A	113		B	41	1	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td></td><td>118</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>5</td><td>103</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .15722</p>		1	2	A		118	B	5	103
	1	2																																						
A	2	131																																						
B	3	207																																						
	1	2																																						
A	110																																							
B	171	1																																						
	1	2																																						
A	113																																							
B	41	1																																						
	1	2																																						
A		118																																						
B	5	103																																						
	V	VI	VII	VIII																																				
	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>3</td><td>81</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>16</td><td>101</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .17034</p>		1	2	A	3	81	B	16	101	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>8</td><td>118</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>2</td><td>168</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .14197</p>		1	2	A	8	118	B	2	168	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>7</td><td>74</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>5</td><td>127</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .10220</p>		1	2	A	7	74	B	5	127	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>91</td><td>67</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>40</td><td>31</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .01175</p>		1	2	A	91	67	B	40	31
	1	2																																						
A	3	81																																						
B	16	101																																						
	1	2																																						
A	8	118																																						
B	2	168																																						
	1	2																																						
A	7	74																																						
B	5	127																																						
	1	2																																						
A	91	67																																						
B	40	31																																						
	IX	X	XI	XII																																				
	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>79</td><td>17</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>32</td><td>24</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .32579</p>		1	2	A	79	17	B	32	24	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>1</td><td>100</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td>258</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .08447</p>		1	2	A	1	100	B		258	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>57</td><td>17</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>62</td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .34596</p>		1	2	A	57	17	B	62		<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>114</td><td>18</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>91</td><td>8</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .08699</p>		1	2	A	114	18	B	91	8
	1	2																																						
A	79	17																																						
B	32	24																																						
	1	2																																						
A	1	100																																						
B		258																																						
	1	2																																						
A	57	17																																						
B	62																																							
	1	2																																						
A	114	18																																						
B	91	8																																						

A: DOMESTIC B: FOREIGN

I NATURE OF POLITICS  
1 = Harmonious 2 = Conflictual

II ROLE OF CONFLICT  
1 = Undesirable 2 = Desirable

III CHAR. OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS  
1 = Aggressive 2 = Defensive

IV. NATURE OF INT/REG SYS.  
1 = Harmonious 2 = Conflictual

V. PROSPECTS FOR GOAL REALIZATION  
1 = Pessimistic 2 = Optimistic

VI. POL. LIFE PREDICTABILITY  
1 = Capricious 2 = Predictable

VII CONTROL  
1 = No control 2 = Full control

VIII NATURE OF ONE'S GOALS  
1 = National interest 2 = Security

IX. GOAL SELECTION  
1 = Immediate 2 = Master plan

X. STRATEGY  
1 = Aggressive 2 = Cooperative

XI MILITARY FORCE  
1 = Avoid 2 = Only means

XII ROLE OF LEADER  
1 = Active 2 = Passive



**Conclusion:**

The low pi scores show very little difference in the categories according to the type of audience. Similar sets of beliefs were expressed across different audiences.

**2. Masses vs Intellectuals:**

For this type of audience test the documents were recoded into 1. Those addressed to masses 2. Those addressed to intellectuals. Axelrod has stated that,

*A small audience composed of people who can check the veracity of the communication is likely to elicit a sincere expression of the speaker's beliefs rather than an audience composed of masses (1976, 272-273).*

If this statement were true, we would discover that there was indeed a difference in the articulation of beliefs across both audiences. If this statement is nullified, this final test would prove content validity of our data. See Table 12.

**TABLE 12**

**TYPE OF AUDIENCE (Intellectual vs Masses)**

	I	II	III	IV																																				
	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>3</td><td>258</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>2</td><td>80</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .04589</p>		1	2	A	3	258	B	2	80	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>218</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>63</td><td>1</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .11010</p>		1	2	A	218		B	63	1	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>101</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>53</td><td></td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .05809</p>		1	2	A	101	1	B	53		<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>5</td><td>165</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td>56</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .08633</p>		1	2	A	5	165	B		56
	1	2																																						
A	3	258																																						
B	2	80																																						
	1	2																																						
A	218																																							
B	63	1																																						
	1	2																																						
A	101	1																																						
B	53																																							
	1	2																																						
A	5	165																																						
B		56																																						
	V	VI	VII	VIII																																				
	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>19</td><td>125</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td>57</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .20328</p>		1	2	A	19	125	B		57	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>10</td><td>209</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td>77</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .11140</p>		1	2	A	10	209	B		77	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>8</td><td>154</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>4</td><td>47</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .05376</p>		1	2	A	8	154	B	4	47	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>85</td><td>63</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>46</td><td>35</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .00621</p>		1	2	A	85	63	B	46	35
	1	2																																						
A	19	125																																						
B		57																																						
	1	2																																						
A	10	209																																						
B		77																																						
	1	2																																						
A	8	154																																						
B	4	47																																						
	1	2																																						
A	85	63																																						
B	46	35																																						
	IX	X	XI	XII																																				
	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>81</td><td>30</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>30</td><td>11</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .18431</p>		1	2	A	81	30	B	30	11	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>1</td><td>288</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td></td><td>70</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .02601</p>		1	2	A	1	288	B		70	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>86</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>33</td><td>11</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .26139</p>		1	2	A	86	6	B	33	11	<table border="1"> <tr><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>A</td><td>155</td><td>19</td></tr> <tr><td>B</td><td>50</td><td>7</td></tr> </table> <p>phi = .01857</p>		1	2	A	155	19	B	50	7
	1	2																																						
A	81	30																																						
B	30	11																																						
	1	2																																						
A	1	288																																						
B		70																																						
	1	2																																						
A	86	6																																						
B	33	11																																						
	1	2																																						
A	155	19																																						
B	50	7																																						

A: INTELLECTUALS B: MASSES

**I NATURE OF POLITICS**  
1 = Harmonious 2 = Conflictual

**II ROLE OF CONFLICT**  
1 = Undesirable 2 = Desirable

**III CHAR. OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS**  
1 = Aggressive 2 = Defensive

**IV. NATURE OF INT/REG SYS.**  
1 = Harmonious 2 = Conflictual

**V. PROSPECTS FOR GOAL REALIZATION**  
1 = Pessimistic 2 = Optimistic

**VI POL. LIFE PREDICTABILITY**  
1 = Capricious 2 = Predictable

**VII CONTROL**  
1 = No control 2 = Full control

**VIII. NATURE OF ONE'S GOALS**  
1 = National interest 2 = Security

**IX. GOAL SELECTION**  
1 = Immediate 2 = Master plan

**X. STRATEGY**  
1 = Aggressive 2 = Cooperative

**XI MILITARY FORCE**  
1 = Avoid 2 = Only means

**XII ROLE OF LEADER**  
1 = Active 2 = Passive

### **Conclusions:**

The results show that audience again did not make a difference in the expression of Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs.

Overall, content validity is said to be high, as there is very little difference in the articulation of beliefs across different types of documents or audiences. So it can be said that the data set obtained by content analysis is valid to elicit Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code.

### **C. Concurrent Validity:**

Concurrent validity is established by comparing the results obtained by one measurement procedure with the results of another measurement procedure.

*These comparisons should be scrutinized to the extent that there is little or excessive correspondence between the types of sources and supplemented by small scale, preferably private interviews relating to anomalies in the comparisons (Bryder 1981, 84).*

In the previous section, we tested for content validity or consistency of beliefs across types of documents and audiences and discovered that there was no difference in the types of beliefs that Mrs. Gandhi articulated, whether it was a public or private documents, spontaneous or premeditated; whether it was to a foreign or domestic audience, to intellectuals or the masses. So we concluded that the data possessed high content validity.

We decided to go another step forward and test for concurrent validity. Here, one has to determine whether the results obtained through content analysis is consistent with the results obtained through interviews, i.e., are the Operational Code beliefs elicited through the documents congruent with the interpretation of Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs by the interviewees?

A sample of 14 of the major Operational Code categories was selected for this test.

1. **Measure 1** represents the content analyzed documents and the beliefs extracted therefrom.
2. **Measure 2** represents the interviews, wherein individuals who knew Mrs. Gandhi well expressed what they thought to be her beliefs. The interviewees were from varied

political, academic, journalistic and administrative backgrounds and at one time or another worked very closely with Mrs. Gandhi. But despite the refusal by some to answer some of the questions, we did manage to elicit a fairly good response to most of the categories.

**Procedure:**

This is more of a qualitative test. The interviewees were asked specific questions regarding the categories, and to answer them based on their understanding of Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs. The number of responses for each of the categories in Measure 2 were coded and totalled, and a comparison was made with Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code taken from Measure 1. They have been presented in Table 13 and Table 14.

TABLE 13

## MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE (Measure 1)

VARIABLES	VALUES
Nature of Politics	Conflictual
Sources of Conflict	Power/Imperialism/colonialism/racism/inequality
Conditions for Peace	Eliminate inequality, improve economic conditions, non-interference
Character of Opponents	Aggressive
Sources of opponent's goals	Ideology/Religion, External Pressures
Role of Conflict	Undesirable
Optimism	Optimism
Control	Full ability to Control
Role of Leader	Active Role
National Role	Active Independent/nonaligned
Nature of Goals	National Interests/security
Strategy	Cooperative
Action	Bilateral
Power	Multidimensional

TABLE 14

## MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE (MEASURE 2)

VARIABLES	VALUES	# OF INTERVIEW RESPONSES
NATURE OF POLITICS	Conflictual	12
	Mixed	5
SOURCES OF CONFLICT	Nationalism	2
	Power Politics	9
	Imperialism/Colonialism	11
	Inequalities	4
CONDITIONS FOR PEACE	Communication/Negotiation	3
	Eliminate Inequalities	2
	Transform System	1
	Promote Nonalignment	3
	Promote regional cooperation	6
	Improve economic conditions	6
	Non-interference	5
CHARACTER OF OPPONENT	Destructive	1
	Expansionist	1
	Aggressive	8
SOURCES OF OPPONENT'S GOALS	Ideology/Religion	7
	Leader Traits	2
	External Pressures	8
ROLE OF CONFLICT	Undesirable	11
	Functional	3
	Dysfunctional	1
OPTIMISM	Optimism	13
	Mixed	5
CONTROL	Full Control	11
	Some Control	7
ROLE OF LEADER	Active	18
	Intervene when necessary	1
	Discern Historical Trends	1

**TABLE 14 - Continued**

<b>VARIABLES</b>	<b>VALUES</b>	<b># OF INTERVIEW RESPONSES</b>
<b>NATIONAL ROLE</b>	Independent/Nonaligned	17
	Internal Development	4
	Mediator/Peacemaker	1
	Friendly Neighbour	3
	Crusader	3
<b>STRATEGY</b>	Cooperative	9
	Deterrent	2
<b>NATURE OF GOALS</b>	National Interests	16
	Security	6
	Promote regional cooperation	2
	Peaceful Coexistence	3
<b>ACTION</b>	Bilateral	13
	Multilateral	2
<b>POWER</b>	Military	2
	Multidimensional	12

**Conclusions:**

As we can see there is correspondence between Measure 1 and Measure 2. The two sets are particularly congruent for some of the categories such as the nature of the political universe, role of conflict, role of the leader, national role conception, nature of one's goals, strategy, action and power. The only discrepancy that can be determined is the interviewees' response to the category 'conditions for peace'. The answers to this are more varied. One of the reasons for this could be that the interviewees probably had particular or specific answers in mind while addressing this category and hence the number of responses are lower for each of the values.

Based on this, it can be said that our data set also has concurrent validity.

#### **D. Construct Validity:**

This is concerned not only with validating the measure, but also the theory underlying the measure.

Construct validity is woven into the theoretical fabric of the social sciences, and is thus central to the measurement of abstract theoretical concepts....Fundamentally, construct validity is concerned with the extent to which a particular measure relates to other measures consistent with theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the concepts or constructs that are being measured (Carmines and Zeller 1979, 23).

One requirement of construct validity is that hypotheses derived from the theory should yield similar results in a different study i.e., the results should be generalizable rather than be specific to a single case. The issue of measurement validity generally cannot be divorced from larger theoretical concerns. Sooner or later one must ask what the nature of one's concept is, what it means, and whether one's operational definition faithfully represents this meaning or something else.

The process of construct validation is, by necessity, theory laden. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to 'validate' a measure of a concept in this sense, unless there exists a theoretical network that surrounds the concept. For without this network, it is impossible to generate theoretical generalizations which in turn, lead directly to empirical tests involving measures of the concept. As Carmines and Zeller (1979, 23) point out, this should not lead to the erroneous conclusion that only formal and fully developed theories are relevant to construct validation. On the contrary as Cronbach and Meehl observe,

The logic of construct validation is involved whether the construct is highly systematized or loose, used in ramified theory or a few simple propositions, used in absolute proportions or probability statements (1955, 284).

What is required is that one is able to state several theoretically-derived hypotheses involving a particular concept.

According to Krippendorff (1977, 51), in order to establish construct validity a research project should meet the following requirements:

1. A valid theory, established hypotheses or at least some defensible generalizations about the source are given.
2. The construction of the analytical procedure (method) is logically derived from the



theory, so that the analysis is in fact a valid operationalization of the theory.

3. Therefore, the inferences now drawn from data by the method may be accepted on account of the underlying theory's independently established validity.

Thus, construct validity derives entirely from established theory, tested hypotheses and generalizations about the source of the construct - whatever the evidential status of this knowledge might be at that time.

Our project meets the above mentioned criteria. In response to requirement (1), Chapters I and II clearly outline the theory/construct underlying this study. Although the Operational Code, as mentioned, is not a theory in itself, it is a construct which is derived from a larger psychological theory of cognition and choice. The Operational Code hypotheses have been derived from that theory and can be generalized. Requirement (2) has also been fulfilled. The operational definitions are again derived from the above mentioned theories. Some analysts (Walker 1977; Selim 1979) have established an impressive methodology and the results are evidence enough to reconfirm and support the validity of both the measure and its underlying theory.

The analytic procedure adopted for this project follows logically from the theory, as will be evinced in the following chapters.

#### **E. Conclusions:**

Based on these arguments, it can be said that this study had construct validity. We have examined four different types of validity - face, content, concurrent and construct validity, and based on the evidence come to the conclusion that our data is valid. Hence, we can rely on the documents to provide us with accurate information.

In this chapter we have presented the sources of data, the operational definitions, established reliability and validity by means of several tests. These tests have proven the usefulness of the documents as an effective source of data.

Based on the strength of the reliability and validity test results, the following chapters will examine in detail Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code and its main characteristics.

## SECTION II

### **Introduction:**

The person who became a potential candidate for Prime Ministership when Shastri died in 1966 was 48 years old and did not have a major political profile. Whether or not Nehru groomed Indira Gandhi to be the country's leader still remains a disputed fact. But Mrs. Gandhi was a contender to the leadership, albeit a passive one. Her eligibility for the position was linked to the Congress party's desire for a smooth transition and for a leader who would be acceptable both to the Congress and to the country. Also important in the Congress leaders' calculations was the fact that she belonged to a famous family, had the Nehru mass appeal and an all India image, seemed shy and reticent and was not the type who would be embroiled either in controversy or ambition. She also had wide international contacts which could be valuable at a time when food and foreign exchange were scarce.

When Nehru was the Prime Minister she was still comparatively unnoticed as a person in her own right and she mostly stayed in the background and did not assume a political role. It was only in February, 1959, that Indira Gandhi made her debut on the Indian political stage by accepting the membership of the Congress working committee. In 1959 she was pressed to accept the post of president of the Congress party, which some observers have noted she did with reluctance. But even then the levers of power remained firmly in the hands of the party bosses. The Congress president was powerless without the cooperation of the provincial Congress bosses, who ultimately controlled the party machinery.

In 1966, when the question of leadership came up, the most decisive factor in her favour, however, was the decision of then Congress president Kamaraj to back her, and in January, 1966, she became the Prime Minister with the party bosses and many chief

ministers behind her. The reason for her selection for the post was not because of a positive vote of confidence in her capabilities as much as it was a negative vote against her opponent, Desai.

With the demise of Nehru, the Prime Minister's role had been considerably devalued while the importance of the organizational and provincial leadership of the Congress had correspondingly increased. Mrs. Gandhi was expected to act as a non-controversial and unifying figurehead for a badly divided party until a suitable replacement emerged after the general election a year later. Political observers termed her a lame duck or an ornamental election mascot who would be replaced after serving her purpose.

The elevation of a supposedly malleable woman to the Prime Ministership indicated the desire of her sponsors to neutralize the independent powers of that office and manipulate it to their own advantage (Masani 1975, 145).

When Mrs. Gandhi came to power she appeared uncertain, hesitant, inexperienced and overly cautious. She was also faced with major problems such as the growing food shortages due to monsoon failure and drought, the resulting inflation, and numerous regional problems. The forces of regionalism and linguism were becoming unmanageable, and there was a north-south cleavage over language, a movement in one of the states for linguistic partition, and in another state for secession.

The cost of the wars with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965 had put a dent in India's third and fourth five year plans. The U.S. had suspended economic aid to India and simmering economic discontent in the country threatened to erupt into violence.

There were also problems in foreign relations, and especially with Pakistan. The Tashkent agreement was not greeted with too much enthusiasm in India, especially in the conservative right-wing circles like the Jan Sangh. The Sino-Indian dispute which though settled on the borders in China's favour had yet to be formalized by a diplomatic settlement. The China-Pakistan axis began to pose a serious threat to India's security and divert the country's meager resources from the urgent tasks of economic development. Also, the Soviet Union was moving slowly and noticeably towards a new role in the sub-continent which like the U.S. involved the maintenance of a balance of power between India and Pakistan. India's preeminence and stature in the nonaligned circles had

diminished.

The Cairo-Belgrade-Delhi axis which Nehru had cultivated so assiduously had been allowed to wither under the neglect of his more parochial successor, a fact which was brought home by the pro Pakistan sympathies of the Arab world (Masani 1975, 148).

If Mrs. Gandhi was indeed staggering beneath the weight of her political inheritance, she gave no sign of it at her first press conference as Prime Minister-designate on the 19th of January.

I feel neither excited nor nervous. This is just another job I have to do. I have done a number of jobs in the past and, yes, I feel up to it (21 Jan 1966).

The Prime Minister's new orientation first became apparent in the sphere of foreign policy. Unlike Shastri, she shared her father's keen interest in world affairs and she began to reestablish contacts with foreign statesmen quite early in her career as Prime Minister. Her cosmopolitan background and her long diplomatic experience had given her considerable advantages over other Congress leaders, thus enabling her to set the dominant tone of Indian foreign policy. By September 1967 she had taken direct charge of the external affairs portfolio. Also on the domestic front she began to assert herself more and more. Some of the party bosses who had attempted to manipulate her in the past were not re-elected in the 1967 elections. When the Congress split occurred in 1969, resulting in the total elimination of the syndicate, her popularity was unrivalled and it left her in an extremely strong political position. After the split, she became the unquestionable leader of both the Congress party as well as the cabinet and government.

She had astonished people by her flair for cold assessment, shrewd timing, the telling theatrical gesture, and above all, by her capacity for a fight to the finish (Sahgal 1975, 205).

Until 1967 she had been a Prime Minister on trial. But she weathered all the storms and emerged with an enhanced political and personal prestige which was a testament both to her perseverance and her growing political skill.

### **Mrs. Gandhi and a World View:**

Did Mrs. Gandhi have a world view or a philosophy of politics and political life?

We have argued in our first chapter that the cognitive process of an individual plays a very important role in influencing the individual's definition of a situation, in processing of information and in the framing of a response. We have established that

the decision-maker will have an orientation or a black box composed of beliefs about the nature of the external world, and these beliefs are organized in a highly sophisticated and complex network. It is assumed that all political leaders and decision-makers will have some sort of a world view or philosophy of politics with the help of which they formulate policies and frame responses to actors, events or situations, although the degree of sophistication may vary.

Based on this assumption an attempt will be made to establish Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code, and a detailed examination as to whether she interpreted events, formulated policies and responded to international situations in keeping with the main tenets of that code.

A preliminary analysis of our first data set (documents) reveals that Mrs. Gandhi had clearly articulated beliefs about political life and international politics. There were very few contradictions, if any, in her beliefs and the data indicates that she had a well established world view.

But in order to be sure if our interpretation of the first data set was correct, we turned to our second data set (interviews). The author's interviews with the members of the Indian political elite, journalists and academics inevitably began with the question "Do you think Mrs. Gandhi had a world view or a philosophy of politics and political life?" followed by an explanation of the question.

The question drew mixed responses.

1. Negative:

On the one hand, her critics absolutely denied that she had either a political philosophy or a vision of the world. They said that she did not have any grand designs or a theory, with which she interpreted information and formed a response, but that she mostly reacted to situations and events in an adhoc fashion. They said that even in the area of foreign affairs, her policies were merely reactive. But some of these critics (Subrahmaniam, Hegde) did concede that she learned from her mistakes and in the second phase, she managed to have a grip on events and situations and shape India's foreign policy accordingly. But even then they did not openly admit that she must have had some beliefs about international life, however fragmentary. A sample of the critics

responses are listed below:

Her mediocrity was more than made up for by her guts and ability to carry a decision through....she would not have been so innocent in the first few years, she also would not have taken some decisions and then retracted them later, because she had not thought it through. She made only vague and broad generalizations in policy (K.Subrahmanyam, author's interview, New Delhi, 1<sup>st</sup> Dec 1988).

Mrs. Gandhi did not have a world view, but just followed that norm set by Nehru (Era Sezhiyan, author's interview, Madras, 2 Jan 1989).

She did not have a world view or a vision of her own. Her vision was formed by what she could understand from Nehru's dreams....She only had vague ideas about world politics (Hegede, author's interview, Bangalore, 20 Jan 1989).

The foreign policies framed in Nehru's days came to enjoy national consensus in the broader framework of policy....She did not have to alter it or take any major decisions (Advani, author's interview, New Delhi, 23 Dec 1988).

Throughout her Prime Ministership, Mrs. Gandhi indicated no desire to formulate a vision of the world and to direct India's foreign policy towards it (Tharoor 1982, 74).

As Prime Minister, she provided no grand designs, no sweeping analysis of current affairs to educate her audiences, no world vision to point the way India should take....She did not project preconceived theories on the phenomenal world (Mansingh 1984, 27).

## 2. Positive:

On the other hand, some of the interviewees acknowledged that she had definite ideas on politics and political life and that her beliefs and views were clearly organized and refused to either comment or elaborate on that. But most of those who thought that she had a world view said that it was shaped by the vision, broad ideals, values and goals already laid down by great men from ancient history such as Buddha and Ashoka; and from modern leaders like Nehru and Gandhi. They all agreed that concepts like non alignment which has its roots in the idea of non attachment, peaceful coexistence (again meaning positive peace rather than the absence of war), friendship and mutual cooperation with all countries of the world, absolute and total independence for all peoples of the world, freedom from intervention and freedom from want, were all ingrained in India's foreign policy.

The interviewees claimed that although her beliefs and ideas were by no means new, what was original about it was how she put them in proper perspective, in the light of the present day world with all its problems and challenges. They all concurred

that her views were also shaped by the realities of the existing international system and her belief system was composed of the ideals of her forefathers mixed with pragmatic goals, strategies and tactics which could be applied to the present times. Their responses were as follows:

**She had a world view and a long-range vision but faced constraints in enforcing it because of India's limitations and short-term problems (Confidential interview, New Delhi, 28 Dec 1988).**

**She had a well-articulated viewpoint. But no one can translate their world view into concrete instances of foreign policy (Jain, author's interview, New Delhi, 20 Dec 1988).**

**Yes! She had a world view, in some ways more pointed and practical than Nehru's. Nehru had ideas, but she had specific ways to implement those ideas (Rao, author's interview, Bangalore, 21 Jan 1989).**

**She had a clear world view when she came to power, although she was a little naive about the economic aspects (Damodaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).**

**She had a definite world view based on the realities of the current international politics. She did have a basic foreign policy framework (Bhambri, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).**

**She did have a concrete belief system inherited from the freedom movement and the previous great leaders (Dutt, author's interview, New Delhi, 19 Dec 1988).**

**Yes! She did have a world view like anybody else (Venkateswaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 21 Dec 1988).**

**She did have a clear-cut idea as to what she wanted and believed in. Her world view was panchsheel (C.Subramanian, author's interview, Madras, 2 Jan 1989).**

**Mrs. Gandhi had a definite and clear cut world view or philosophy of the world, although it was reactive in some instances....She adapted her fathers's policy to present day circumstances and situations. She was not an idealist like her father but a pragmatist (Seshan, author's interview, New Delhi, 12 Dec 1988).**

**She had a world view. She inherited her philosophy of life from Nehru. She was a Nehruvian insofar as her beliefs in foreign policy was concerned. Most of her views were within the parameters of the framework set out by Nehru (Gujral, author's interview, New Delhi, 21 Dec 1988).**

**She did have a world view. She was extremely well-informed about world politics and had definite beliefs. She had a clear understanding of world history and had set ideas about the state of the world and India's role in it (Sharada Prasad, author's interview, New Delhi, 8 Dec 1988).**

**Unlike Nehru, she did not articulate clearly her philosophy of life. She must have had a mental framework and her ideas and world view was not fundamentally different from Nehru's, but she only differed on how to translate those visions into practical policies. While he was very idealistic, she was a realist (Rajan, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).**

Mrs. Gandhi's world view was not very different from Nehru's. The principles were the same but the style was different. She adopted and adapted those principles to the changing world conditions (Confidential interview, New Delhi, 22 Dec 1988).

Based on our theoretical framework, our data set and on the observation and assessment of most of the people who knew Mrs. Gandhi closely, it can be said that Mrs. Gandhi had a well established world view or an Operational Code belief system.

Although she did not commit her political views in print, it is rather harsh to conclude that she did not possess the ability to theorize or that her formulations were vague, evasive and contradictory. On the contrary, a study of her speeches delivered during 1966-1976 reveals an unusual clarity of expression and consistency of ideas. For her politics has been like basic English to an Oxford schoolboy (Deol 1982, 124).



## **CHAPTER IV**

### **MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE PHASE I THE YEARS OF CHALLENGE (1966- 1969)**

In the next few chapters we will examine the general characteristics of Indira Gandhi's Operational Code in the context of India's foreign policy. We will study in detail the main tenets of Mrs. Gandhi's philosophical and instrumental beliefs and wherever possible relate it with specific policy choices. The Operational Code will be drawn from both sources - documents as well as interviews. The discussion of the Operational Code in all of the three phases will be preceded by a general discussion of India's foreign policy, which will provide a historical background. The analysis will be divided into three phases - Phase I consists of the years 1966-1969. These were what was termed the years of challenge for Mrs. Gandhi. She entered politics hesitantly, only to emerge by 1969 as a powerful and undisputed leader with an extremely strong political base and with an enhanced capability in conducting the foreign affairs of the country.

#### **A. ISSUES:**

This segment is concerned with the various issues that Mrs. Gandhi had to deal with as prime minister during the first phase. It is based on the references made in the documents to domestic and/or foreign issues, and we have examined them in order to provide a background or scenario wherein the Operational Code beliefs can be interpreted.

From 1966 to 1969, Mrs. Gandhi had to deal with a wide range of issues as a new and relatively inexperienced prime minister. There were more or less equal references in the documents to domestic as well as foreign matters.

#### **DOMESTIC:**

In the domestic sphere, most of the references were regarding issues related to the state of the economy, economic independence and self-reliance, development, and

national integration. Between 1966 and 1969, the issues that were the focal point on the national front were 1. Economic crises - food shortages, inflation, rupee devaluation, and failure of the fourth five year plan. 2. Regional instability - language and secession problems 3. Congress rout in several states in 1967 elections 4. Bank nationalization and abolition of privy purses 5. The congress split and elimination of the party syndicate.

During this phase, Mrs. Gandhi had to concern herself with the major economic problems facing the country. The emphasis in her speeches and other documents was more on economic and developmental issues, which was not surprising given the fact that there was an economic crisis of unprecedented magnitude. There were several unforeseen disasters. 1965 was a year of unparalleled drought resulting in acute food shortage and spiralling inflation. The most urgent problem was that of food supplies, which was creating a law and order problem of alarming dimensions. The drought had also coincided with the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict. The cost of the wars with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965 had made a big dent in India's third five year plan and involved a sharp rise in military expenditure, depleting still further the country's scarce resources for development. The U.S., India's largest aid-giver, had suspended all economic assistance, thereby seriously jeopardising the future of the fourth plan. As a condition to the resumption of American aid, Mrs. Gandhi had to devalue the rupee, which had disastrous consequences for the already staggering economy.

In addition there were major regional, linguistic and communal problems. There was a north-south cleavage over language, which posed a threat to national integration. In addition, there was also a demand for a separate state by the Sikhs who refused to cooperate with the Hindu and hindi speaking people in that region. The Naga tribes, who were resisting integration into the Indian union ever since 1947, were attempting to secede from the union.

To top it all, Mrs. Gandhi faced opposition, criticism and hostility from within her own party regarding her handling of the country's problems. The party leaders were still attempting to dictate policy and expected the Prime Minister to acquiesce to their wishes. But with the Congress party being swept out of power in several states in the

1967 elections, and with the defeat of some of the party leaders, the power structure within the Congress slowly started to change. Mrs. Gandhi's position was becoming stronger and now she was able to effect a number of changes on the domestic front without much interference or opposition from the party leaders. The nationalization of banks and the abolition of privy purses were her major policy initiatives during this period. This period culminated with the big Congress split in 1969 when the party syndicate was eliminated.

From 1966 to 1969, economic problems and party affairs had taken up most of her time. But the documents indicate that, although she was very much involved with the trials and tribulations of domestic politics, she did not ignore foreign affairs.

#### **FOREIGN:**

More than one half of the references in the documents are related to foreign issues.

#### **Relations with the United States: 1966-1969**

Indo-American relations from 1966-1969 was governed mainly by four parameters.

1. The politics of dependence and U.S. economic assistance;
2. Diverging strategic perceptions - Southeast Asia and West Asia;
3. U.S. perceptions of its interests in the subcontinent - the Pakistan angle;
4. Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding independence, non-intervention and self-reliance.

When Mrs. Gandhi first came to power, she had hoped for a good working relationship between India and the U.S. (20 March 1966), although before 1966, she did not entirely share in the high expectations which Nehru and the right-wing faction in the congress had for Indo-American friendship. During Nehru's time there was a brief spell of cooperation and friendship between the two countries. The U.S. provided military assistance in 1962 when India needed it most to counter Chinese aggression. But this soon came to an end when military assistance to both India and Pakistan were suspended in light of the 1965 hostilities. From 1966 onwards, both countries developed divergent interests, differing perceptions of the international system and their roles in it, followed different strategic and security needs and developed contrasting foreign policy courses.

1. The politics of dependence and economic assistance:

First, one of Mrs. Gandhi's main concerns in foreign policy during this phase and which was directly related to the Indian economic situation was with American economic assistance. Up until now, the U.S. was the largest single source of bilateral economic assistance to India. But economic aid was suspended in 1965 and due to famine and food shortages, Mrs. Gandhi was forced to make a controversial trip to Washington in 1966 to persuade the Johnson administration to lift the ban on food aid and other forms of economic assistance. In return the U.S. attempted to induce major changes in India's economic and foreign policy in order to bring them into closer alignment with U.S. interests. By 1966, India had reached its highest level of dependence on the U.S., and American officials identified that dependence with amenability to pressure. The terms and conditions were (a) India had to resolve the Kashmir problem with Pakistan by making more concessions; (b) tone down public criticisms regarding American involvement in Vietnam; and (c) devalue the Rupee. In return, the U.S. agreed to provide emergency food aid, reduction in debt service payments and would raise the level of economic assistance from the world bank.

During the early months of Mrs. Gandhi's term as Prime Minister, Indian foreign policy had been greatly inhibited by the compulsions and implications of American aid. Soon,

*Personal, political and economic factors ...combined to ensure that the Indo-American honeymoon would be no more than a brief marriage of convenience (Masani 1974, 164).*

Mrs. Gandhi, according to Masani, may have well persisted in her initial friendliness with the West if it had not been for the somewhat crude and heavy-handed diplomacy of the Johnson administration, especially in the delicate matter of food aid. Food supplies from the U.S. were irregular and dilatory and each shipment had to have the personal sanction of the President. So this ship-to-mouth existence was a bitter lesson in the disadvantages of living on foreign charity and Mrs. Gandhi in particular is reported to have felt this humiliation keenly, and it appears to have left a permanent scar on her view of Indo-American relations. L.K. Jha is reported told Masani during an interview,

*It was not a position she liked being in, and she was determined never to be in it again (Masani 1974, 164).*

Sharada Prasad (author's interview) also reaffirmed that Mrs. Gandhi disliked this dependence on America for food aid. She attempted to achieve self-sufficiency with a vengeance and thereby put an end to food imports. Mr. Prasad reported one incident wherein Mrs. Gandhi, after the termination of a phone conversation with President Johnson, said in disgust,

*I will make India self-sufficient in food, if that is the last thing I will do (Mrs. Gandhi as quoted by Sharada Prasad: author's interview, New Delhi, 8 Dec 1988).*

From a reading of her views on foreign policy, it seems probable that her ideas on total economic independence and self-reliance were developed mostly as a response to American pressures. This was confirmed by Mr. Prasad. The initial disenchantment that she developed vis-a-vis the U.S. regarding aid persisted throughout her career as prime minister.

## 2. Diverging strategic perceptions:

Second, the two countries had diverging strategic perceptions, especially regarding Southeast and West Asia. Mrs. Gandhi constantly challenged the validity of U.S. perceptions of its interests in these two regions. She believed that one of the reasons for instability in the third world was because of interference of outside powers. She also rejected the idea propagated by some U.S. officials that India's long term security interests would best be served by an American military presence in Vietnam. She was convinced that problems in Southeast Asia were political and economic and no amount of military force could solve them.

The Indo-American entente, which was most noticeable in Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington and India's subsequent approach to Vietnam, was slowly breaking down, and resulted in the end of the government's temporary silence on Vietnam. By 1968, Mrs. Gandhi was unsparing in her criticisms of U.S. involvement in the Third World and especially in Vietnam.

*Indira Gandhi could not entirely conceal the disdain she and her colleagues had for the poor judgment, the ineptitude and insensitivity, and the racism and brutality displayed by the U.S. in Vietnam (Harrison 1978, 178).*

The Americans never forgave Mrs. Gandhi for signing a communique in Moscow in July 1966, which contained a reference to imperialists in Southeast Asia (16 July 1966).

She developed a hostile perception of American strategic and military interests in the region as inimical to India, which created a strong distrust of U.S. bonafides (Tharoor 1982,79).

Also, differences over West Asia had a deep effect on Indo-American relations as did differences on Southeast Asia. In 1967, Mrs. Gandhi was outspoken in her support for the Arab cause. India's attitude towards Israel attracted far stronger American disapproval than that shown to any other country<sup>1</sup> with a similar stand on the Arab Israeli conflict.

The divergence in strategic perspective was wide enough to prevent a partnership from developing between the U.S. and India. But differences between the two countries were not such to make them enemies.

### 3. U.S. subcontinental interests:

Third, the biggest difference arose between the two countries because of the divergences of strategic and security interests in the subcontinent. U.S. policy in South Asia had immediate and vital ramifications for the political and security interests of India and was combined with differing policies towards other important areas and issues. This clouded their relationship during this phase. Throughout this period, Mrs. Gandhi attempted to limit American involvement in the subcontinent. The U.S. regarded as naive India's claims that problems of South Asia would be better solved if the great powers withdrew from the region and allowed the forces of nationalism and non alignment free play.

The U.S. policy on the subcontinent was, according to Mrs. Gandhi, to deal with small countries that permitted a substantial American military and economic presence in their territory than with India, which opposed such a policy. One such country was Pakistan. The American partiality for Pakistan was first expressed through its support of Pakistan's case on Kashmir in the UN Security Council debates in January 1948. Subsequently, Pakistan's entrance into the western military alliance network and the provision of military bases to the U.S. confirmed its assumptions of support for Pakistan.

---

<sup>1</sup>Such as Pakistan

Despite Mrs. Gandhi's protests that the weapons supplied by the U.S. to Pakistan would be used against India, it was ignored by the U.S. and Mrs. Gandhi believed that it was because American strategic interests demanded alignment with a willing Pakistan. The alignment served two purposes. It gave the U.S. a valuable foothold in South Asia and bases for its military alliance network. It also provided a useful lever of pressure against a recalcitrant India, which flaunted its independence and refused to become a part of the military alliance system.

From Mrs. Gandhi's standpoint, there was no doubt that the military support provided by America to Pakistan was the major obstacle to improved Indo-American relations. Her government regarded outside military assistance to Pakistan as the most important impediment to normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. She reasoned that successive military regimes in Pakistan were encouraged to be intransigent with India because foreign arms blinded them to the realities of the power balance on the subcontinent which should have prompted them to accommodation with India.

In the late sixties, official U.S. policy did not openly or obviously discriminate between India or Pakistan, as there was an awareness in America of Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to diversify sources of supply and wanted to prevent excessive dependence on the Soviet Union. But India did not receive as considerate a treatment from the U.S. defence establishment as did Pakistan. The persistent U.S. policy of maintaining parity between India and Pakistan and its obvious bias towards the latter remained a basic element of discord between the U.S. and India.

#### 4. Independence, non-intervention, and self-reliance:

Finally, the entire trend of Mrs. Gandhi's comments during this period indicates that big power interference in the affairs of the smaller countries was what concerned her the most. She believed that one of the reasons for instability in the third world was because of interference of outside powers. Independence from manipulation constituted a cardinal principle of Indira Gandhi's foreign policy. In keeping with the centrality of this belief, Mrs. Gandhi's prime animus against the U.S. was precisely its tendency, as she saw it, to push the smaller nations around.

Efforts by the U.S. to pressure India at a crucial moment for a major turning away from its policies, left an undoubted mark on subsequent developments bringing about a resolve in Delhi to urgently strive for self-reliance and self-sufficiency even while courting American assistance to get over the short-term crisis.

There was a basic contradiction in India's policies vis-a-vis the U.S. during this period. On the one hand Mrs. Gandhi had to win U.S. support and assistance for India's economic growth in order to meet developmental goals. On the other hand, she persisted in policies to maintain and further India's basic and fundamental goals, even in the absence of U.S. support and in the face of U.S. opposition. Overall, between 1966 and 1969, the limited and sporadic nature of U.S. assistance, the increasing realization of the price of abandoning nonalignment, and an independent role in world affairs, the Soviet factor and valuable Soviet assistance, the arming of Pakistan and the continuing western solicitude for Islamabad - all of these inhibited relations with Washington.

#### Indo-Soviet Relations: 1966-1969

Indo-Soviet relationship during this period had its roots on the one hand in the mutual struggle against what they considered Western imperialism and colonialism, and on the other hand, in the national interests and requirements of India since independence. There were two elements of continuity in Mrs. Gandhi's perceptions: scepticism about fears spread by the West regarding Soviet designs, which she regarded as highly exaggerated, and conviction about a certain complementarity of interests between India and the Soviet Union. This perception was strengthened by Moscow's vigorous espousal of the causes that were dearest to the emerging countries of the world and was particularly reinforced by its support to India on vital national issues. The Soviet support for India in the Security Council on Kashmir in 1948, thereby their acceptance of the position that Kashmir was an integral part of India, and their refusal to accept the Chinese position on its conflict with India, made the Soviets more dependable as an ally. Also indispensable was Soviet aid in developing a heavy industrial complex in India. Moscow became a supply source of military weapons with no obvious strings attached and this was to assume highly significant proportions later on. In May 1969, Kosygin publicly pledged Soviet support for India in case of an external attack.



In the mid-sixties, the Soviet Union began to play an increasingly significant, and from the point of view of India, a valuable role on certain vital issues - political, economic and strategic. For India, the Soviet relationship was many sided, and in conflicts with both China and Pakistan, and differences with the U.S., Soviet friendship was most advantageous. Mrs. Gandhi's deep cynicism about American principles and policy influenced her willingness to turn to the Soviet Union. Friendship was an aspect of her world view that also drew her to the Soviet Union.

India's relationship with the Soviet Union achieved a high level of collaboration during Indira Gandhi's first term of office. Economic cooperation between the two countries was expanded and strengthened. Political interests converged at several points in international affairs, with each country filling a need of the other in its global or regional strategies.

*This mutualism reduced the asymmetry of power and enabled India to maintain their dignity in their dealings with the Russians (Mansingh 1983, 130).*

Also, the Soviets made a fourfold contribution to the Indian government through its economic assistance - (a) It bolstered India's self-esteem when it needed it the most. (b) It projected an image of aid without strings. This was what Mrs. Gandhi advocated in international forums when she spoke of international economic cooperation. The Soviet Union could offer aid in specific priority areas without attempting to make changes elsewhere. (c) The Soviet Union entered into long-term five year comprehensive commitments without fear of legislative interference in the appropriations procedure. The Indian government on an extremely tight budget preferred such predictability. (d) Soviet aid went exclusively to the public sector. India's heavy industry and defence production benefited.

By its collaboration in establishing the public sector heavy industry in India and by offering trade and assistance in many areas where other countries were not willing to help much, Mrs. Gandhi claimed that the Soviet Union had actively aided the enhancement of Indian self-reliance and therefore independence. She appeared to believe that by offering industrial and technical knowhow to India, the Soviet Union was helping alleviate Indian dependence on the West but she chose to ignore the fact that in the

process, a new Indian dependence was being created on the Soviet Union. There were areas of both convergences as well as divergences in interests, but the divergences were not allowed to make a dent in the relationship.

**Interest Convergence on subcontinental interests:**

Indian and Russian interests in the subcontinent were not congruent but parallel. Soviet involvement in the subcontinent between 1965 - 1967 was intensified when their differences with the Chinese Communists deepened. The fundamental rivalry with Washington and the more recent conflict with China; U.S. predominance in Southeast Asia and the Chinese drive towards affiliation of Southeast Communist parties served to heighten Soviet interest in South Asia in the search for viable countervailing factors. The Soviets detected the possibility of befriending both India and Pakistan which could provide perhaps the only real counterrelationship to an increasingly belligerent China and U.S. dominance over Southeast Asia. It would also limit Pakistan and India's dependence on the West.

During the sixties, the Soviet Union made a determined effort to neutralize its southern neighbours - Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and if possible detach them from CENTO. This effort coloured Soviet attitudes towards Indo - Pak disputes.

Mrs. Gandhi too wanted the U.S. and China out of that region but for different reasons. She believed vehemently in non-interference and the right of all nations in the subcontinent to determine their own futures free of external pressure. She saw with dismay Pakistan's growing dependence on the U.S. and China, and saw these two countries as playing an increasingly significant role in the affairs of South Asia. She also believed that the U.S. and Chinese efforts was to strengthen their foothold in South Asia, by playing upon and accentuating the differences among the countries of the region. But for some reason she believed that Russia did not seek a presence in South Asia and that it only wanted to keep China and the U.S. out, and gain the confidence of all the countries in the region. In that sense Mrs. Gandhi saw a complementarity of Indian and Russian interests in the sub-continent.

4. Their mutual antipathy towards China also brought them closer together. Moscow's military support to India increased in the late 60's, because of the Chinese factor.

But on the other hand there were several divergences of other vital interests and in their approach to specific actors, events and situations in the sub-continent.

a. Soviet relations with Pakistan: While the period 1964-1967 was marked by India's increasing dependence on the U.S., there was an evolution of Soviet-Pakistan relationship. The Soviets wanted to woo Pakistan away from the U.S. and China. Hence the seemingly categorical support given to India in earlier years was diluted. The Soviets, who were once the most loyal supporter of India's stand on Kashmir, were moving towards a slowly but noticeably new role in the subcontinent, which like the U.S., involved the maintenance of a balance of power between India and Pakistan. The evidence of a Soviet entente with Pakistan was obvious in the Soviet position of neutrality during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and at the Tashkent conference in January 1966.

The Soviet sale of arms to Pakistan in 1968 was watched with suspicion by the Indian government. But Mrs. Gandhi was determined not to allow Indo-Soviet relations to be damaged by this development. Although she conveyed her fears in private to the Soviet leaders, she publicly stated that Soviet motives was not to contain Indian strength or to prevent India from emerging as a major force or even to hurt Indian national interests. She perceived it as the Soviet desire for counterbalancing forces to the rising Chinese and the existing American challenges in the region, and moves towards friendship of the entire continent.

Every country is free to give aid to anybody. It is none of our business to interfere  
(11 July 1968).

This attitude contrasted sharply with the ringing denunciations of U.S. aid to Pakistan. This double standard represented not a refusal to be realistic about arms aid to Pakistan in general, but instead constituted an acknowledgment that India had more to lose by criticizing the Soviet Union than by attacking the U.S.. For a variety of reasons, Mrs. Gandhi decided that India needed the Soviet Union and did not want to do anything to disrupt relations with Moscow.

b. Collective security in Asia:

In the late 60's, when Brezhnev proposed an Asian collective security system to contain China, Mrs. Gandhi did not seem enthusiastic and refused to participate. This

permanent alliance did not come into being because security interests of the two countries differed widely.

c. In 1968, Mrs. Gandhi also turned down non-military forms of cooperation between the Soviet Union and India in the Indian Ocean. She declined to sign a fisheries agreement for joint deep-sea fishing off the coast of India and attempted to avoid even the appearance of sponsoring enhanced superpower presence in the Indian Ocean.

d. Even during the Czechoslovakian crisis, despite Mrs. Gandhi's commitment to the concept of non-interference in the internal affairs of a country, she had to avoid being too critical of the Soviet Union, and hence did not "condemn" the invasion. India's abstention in the UN vote on Czechoslovakia further testified to her desire not to alienate an arms supplier and economic ally. The fact that she vehemently criticized American involvement in Vietnam but did not do the same for Russians in Czechoslovakia indicates the level of bias in Indira Gandhi's evaluation of international situations, and her interpretation of what constituted India's national interests. She constantly stated that her preferences were guided by what she considered to be in India's best interests and preferred to judge situations and events in the light of what she thought would suit India's purposes. Mrs. Gandhi's aides, when asked about Mrs. Gandhi's position vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia, concurred that Mrs. Gandhi was guided by what she believed to be in India's best interests. The Americans had proved to be unreliable as an ally as indicated by their stand on Kashmir, their military and economic assistance to Pakistan and their fickleness when it came to food and economic assistance to India. Hence Mrs. Gandhi did not hesitate to condemn the U.S. and its military activities in Vietnam, in the harshest of terms.

On the other hand, the Soviets had proved to be a staunch supporter of India and despite their sale of arms to Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi believed that Russia would come to India's aid in the future and that there would be no point in open criticism. Two of the interviewees Damadoran and Gujral<sup>2</sup> explained that Mrs. Gandhi had protested Russia's

---

<sup>2</sup>both former ambassadors to the Soviet Union

invasion of Czechoslovakia in a private letter to Moscow. They said that one should never criticize friends in public.

*Unlike her behaviour with the Americans, she never made her displeasure public and she mastered the art of making statements applicable to both superpowers while leaving no doubt as to which one she really meant (Tharoor 1982, 69).*

The divergences in their respective approach to international issues were obscured by India and the Soviet Union through a conscious emphasis on the positive elements in their relations. The two governments constructed links in areas of common concern which were strong enough to withstand the occasional strain and difference of approach in other areas of policy. But these divergences remained as inherent in the relationship between a great power and a regional power, and resulted from the different foreign policy objectives of the two states.

#### India's Relations with China and Pakistan:

The causes of India's conflicts with China and Pakistan were many. They ranged from disputes over territory and threats to security, through more complex questions of national ideology and religion, to abstract considerations of status in the international power hierarchy.

*There was a real ideological clash between the secular territorial nationalism of India, on the one hand, and the Islamic nationalism of Pakistan, or the nationalist blend of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism in China on the other (Mansingh 1984, 193).*

Further sources of rivalry lay in the different foreign policies followed by the three countries and the support each sought in the international sphere. Mrs. Gandhi perceived India's foreign relations in the context of its conflicts with Pakistan and China.

China played an important role in the formation of India's foreign policy since independence. Nehru's idealistic belief in a Resurgent Asia envisaged friendship and cooperation between what he considered as the two big giants of Asia with both enjoying prominent status and playing important roles in world affairs. India's nonalignment was based on cordial relations with China as well as the superpowers and on an absence of threat to India from any of them. This notion resulted in the panchsheel agreement between the two countries as a non-military solution in the Himalayas. Nehru advocated a policy of helping to bring China into the mainstream of international politics and the world community and helping China set up contacts. This way he had hoped to avoid

conflict and preserve security and peace in the Himalayas. For some time there was noticeable convergence between Indian and Chinese policies in the region, with China making vigorous efforts to reduce American influence and encirclement and promote friendship and make common cause with the newly independent Asian and African nations. India's support to many of China's causes at the UN and elsewhere was not a minor factor in this convergence. Relations between India and China developed and became fairly close for some years, but slowly the foreign policy of both countries took divergent paths as India's relations with Washington and Moscow became closer.

After 1962, mutual hostility determined their foreign policy. There were no ambassadors and virtually no personal contact. Internationally, they traded abuses and generally adopted opposing standpoints. China was engaged in a full-scale campaign against India, the chief purpose of which was to demonstrate that India was not genuinely nonaligned but was in the American camp. China had hoped to compel Moscow to stop its assistance to India and ally itself with Peking but when that failed it denounced India's relationship with both Washington and Moscow and was clearly working towards neutralizing India's position and prestige in the Afro-Asian communities, according to Mrs. Gandhi. In addition, a similar policy of creating or encouraging dissensions between India and its other neighbours was adopted by China, particularly in relation to Nepal and Sri Lanka. By then the official Indian interpretation of Chinese actions was that China wanted to dominate Asia.

One important feature of Mrs. Gandhi's approach to this region was that while China was a huge neighbour, she could not and did not regard it geographically as part of South Asia. As far as this region was concerned China was, in Mrs. Gandhi's eyes, an outside power. India's major policy imperative in this region was, of course, the exclusion of foreign interference.

It has been extensively discussed and documented that Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs about the realities of present-day politics was shaped in large part by the Chinese attack in 1962 and the subsequent humiliating defeat for India. She witnessed the shattering of Nehru's ideals after what was popularly known as the Chinese betrayal (Mullik 1972). She believed that her father was very naive when it came to China and an innocent when it

came to the ramifications of power politics. Nehru's ideals of peace and security and peaceful coexistence seem somewhat irrelevant when seen in the Chinese context. Nehru thought that the principles of Panchsheel would ensure that all countries would live in peace and hence did not think in terms of strengthening India's military capability to ensure security of its borders. The Chinese attack brought home the reality that broad statements regarding peace and coexistence alone was not enough and, in order to ensure peace, India had to have military strength. Mrs. Gandhi was more realistic than her father in her assessment of China, especially after 1962, and with regard to India's security. She learned that no trust was better than misplaced trust. She admitted that she was no great admirer of China and attributed it entirely to China's intransigence (6 Feb 1975). She blamed Chou En Lai personally for the breakdown of relations with India and the war that shattered Nehru's hopes. Her beliefs about national interest and security may have been shaped by the 1962 war, and her feelings and beliefs regarding China since 1962 remained consistent throughout her rule as prime minister (Tharoor 1982, 86-87).

#### **Pakistan:**

The source of conflict between India and Pakistan lay in the evolution of their national movements and the differing perceptions of the policy-makers of the two countries regarding each other's motivations and strategies.

The Indian freedom struggle led by the Indian national congress was based on the vision of the fundamental unity of an infinitely diverse India. Its main push was towards territorial nationalism and pride in being Indian, towards secularism, social reform and political democracy. The Indian leaders accepted partition but not the two nation theory, which was the basis on which Pakistan had come into existence.

The Pakistani leaders' perception of India was that it was not reconciled to the fact of partition and was out to undo it and dismember their country. When India set out to build a secular state according fair treatment to all minorities, Pakistan took it as a challenge to the ideological basis of Pakistan. The founders and early leaders of Pakistan were from Hindu-dominated areas in India. Their anti Hindu feeling was transmuted into an anti-India sentiment.

Since partition, India was Pakistan's chief antagonist. As it was, a smaller country's fears about a large country would have influenced the relations between the two in any case, but the history and legacy of the two decades before independence added a peculiarly disruptive dimension of its own. Security considerations were overlaid with a strong sense of rivalry and competition. The anxieties, real or imagined, about Pakistan's security were consequently heightened, and since security became a major preoccupation, Indo-Pak relations plunged into a deep abyss.

All the problems were symbolized in the Kashmir tangle, which plagued relations between the two countries since partition. Pakistan's repeated invasions of Kashmir began in 1948 and Kashmir became a major bone of contention, a symbol of opposing ideologies and religion, and the target of persistent efforts to fulfill them. For Pakistan, Kashmir represented a component of a Muslim state and its remaining in India a contradiction of the two nation theory. Pakistan's case in Kashmir was based on the two nations theory. The Pakistani leaders therefore contended that Indian action there and the subsequent Indian stand on the question was a refusal on the part of India to reconcile itself to the partition. Not content with the portion of Kashmir it occupied in 1947-48, Pakistan attempted to annex the rest of Kashmir by various means - armed infiltration, sponsored uprisings, force of arms, through the UN and other great power mediation.

The 1965 war came after a long tension-ridden period starting from the rival claims on Rann of Kutch and ending with Pakistan's infiltration into the Indian part of Kashmir. The end of the war and the Tashkent agreement brought the Soviets into the picture and Soviet interest in the affairs of the sub-continent deepened. When the U.S. suspended military assistance to Pakistan in wake of the 1965 hostilities, Pakistan moved closer to the Soviets. Soviet-Pak friendship reached its peak when the Soviets decided to sell arms to Pakistan in 1968. In the meantime, the Tashkent agreement reached a stalemate. Increasing recriminations, bitterness, frustration and mutual accusations marked the Indo-Pak scene. The two countries interpreted the Tashkent agreement differently and their expectations of it were very different. For Pakistan, it was the first decisive step towards unfreezing the Kashmir issue, which meant only the working out of a formula for the integration of Kashmir with Pakistan. It meant the holding of a



plebiscite which Pakistan was confident of winning and its optimism rested on the belief that appeal to religion would prove irresistible.

Mrs. Gandhi underlined the fact that India had signed the Tashkent agreement abjuring the use of violence and proclaiming its faith in peaceful methods to resolve differences among nations and strongly denied allegations that India was not reconciled to the existence of Pakistan. India wished in its own interests to see the growth of a stable Pakistan devoted to the path of peace. To this end, India was prepared to open frontiers and to work out joint economic projects but would absolutely not negotiate on Kashmir.

This period was finally marked by stalemate on Kashmir, Pakistan's attempt to balance a trilateral relationship with the U.S., Soviet Union and China; and the Indian move towards the Soviet Union.

It should be remembered at this point that this section is not an examination of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code beliefs in isolation, but we have attempted to study those beliefs in the context of India's foreign policy behaviour. The above discussion regarding issues, provides a background for the lay person who is not familiar with Indian foreign policy during the concerned period.

Although Mrs. Gandhi was preoccupied with domestic issues, she was actively involved with foreign policy affairs. There were more or less equal references in the documents to both foreign policy and domestic issues as can be evidenced in Table 15.

**TABLE 15**  
**REFERENCES TO ISSUES (PHASE I)**

<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<b>DOMESTIC</b>	235	52.1%
<b>FOREIGN</b>	216	47.9%

The following sections in this chapter deals with the fundamental components of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code beliefs during the periods 1966-1969. This is not a quantitative analysis of the basic structure of her belief system. Also we will not deal in detail with inconsistencies or contradictions if any in her beliefs in this chapter. This is just a presentation of the empirical results obtained from the content analyzed documents. In other words this and the following two chapters are a summary of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code. The analysis of stability, centrality and consistency follows in chapter VIII.

## **B. Philosophical Beliefs:**

### **Philosophical belief # 1.**

#### **Nature of the political Universe** **Conflictual**

Mrs. Gandhi interpreted the political universe as being essentially conflictual. She believed that conflict was the normal state of affairs in political life and an inherent aspect of politics. In the present-day world, she did not believe that there were too many shared interests.

Unfortunately conflict continues to erupt every now and then in ugly forms (19 Sept 1967).

At all times in the world there have been wars over something or the other (13 Nov 1968).

Sheer power seemingly prevails over principles, seeking obedience and demanding respect instead of commanding it. Force continues to be used to attain political ends and to promote national or global interests (14 Oct 1968).

As we have evolved, the human race has found greater knowledge of and power over nature. Instead of using this knowledge and power for doing away with war, we find that man has made wars more cruel, more efficient in inflicting cruelties and atrocities on people (13 Nov 1968).

Mrs. Gandhi felt that the world was caught up in a vicious circle because of which any viable international machinery to regulate relations between states was being progressively undermined, and faced the danger of eventual collapse ( 14 Oct 1968).

Everytime there is some little hope of a turn towards peace, it is soon frustrated (25 Jan 1968). But even though she believed that conflict was a normal state of affairs, there is nothing in the documents to indicate that she considered it permanent or a non-manipulable

feature, or that mankind was doomed to remain in a permanent state of conflict in the future.

One important observation should be made here. Mrs. Gandhi in most of the documents explicitly referred to conflict only in terms of violent conflict - wars, revolutions and the like, although she implicitly makes a distinction between such violent conflicts and conflict. She makes frequent references to turbulences and instability associated with change and transformation of societies, there are no direct associations of the literary expression 'conflict', as used in western political, economic and sociological analyses, with non-violent change. She sometimes refers to such 'conflicts' as 'struggles' or 'movements'. But in our interpretation of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code from the documents we have taken into consideration both kinds of conflicts - violent and non-violent.

### Sources of Conflict

#### 1. Inequalities

#### 2. Power Politics

Conflicts arise in this world because of the power concept, because there are the haves and have nots, because there is economic disparity. These are some of the seeds of conflict (13 Nov 1968).

One of the main sources of conflict, according to Mrs. Gandhi, stem from the division of the world into rich and poor countries, haves and have-nots, strong and weak, technologically developed and economically backward nations.

Inequality is one of the sharpest causes of tension in the world creating situations which are explosive and exploitable (9 Aug 1968).

Endangering our peace and stability is the widening gulf between the rich and the poor. It is a world problem as well as a national one (19 May 1968).

The two major questions before mankind today, according to Mrs. Gandhi, was the question of disparity between the rich and the poor, and the question of violence and peace. She argued that the second was somewhat dependent on the first for it is such disparities which create tensions (15 Feb 1969).

Although Mrs. Gandhi did not articulate her ideas on the sources of conflict in the form of a theory or a theoretical framework and did not directly refer to conflict as

a class struggle, her views are essentially Marxist. She made references to two types of inequalities.

1. Inequalities within each nation:

First, conflict begins within each country due to the disparities between social and economic classes. Inequalities between the rich and the poor; between the socially backward and the urban elites, a revolution of rising expectations combined with stark poverty and lack of essential resources, or means and know how to exploit the available ones, creates social and economic tensions which in turn has political repercussions. Especially with the newly awakened consciousness in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, people were beginning to realize that being poor was not their destiny. The vast masses of the people who could see a better life on the horizon would understand that they could achieve it and also that the world had the resources to help them. When such help, according to Mrs. Gandhi, was not forthcoming and expectations not fulfilled, it would create unrest which would erupt into violence and would eventually engulf the whole world.

2. Disparity between nations:

The division of the world into rich and poor countries, haves and have-nots, technologically developed and underdeveloped, was another major source of world tension. The newly independent countries with lack of resources and technical knowhow, which the developed countries had an abundance of, were slowly becoming impatient with the existing situation. Also, the affluence of the developed nations exerted a certain pull on the more fortunate sections of the society in the developing countries resulting in the alienation of the elite from the rest of the society, which was exacerbating the existing tension between the haves and have-nots. She believed that the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few would only aggravate the existing tensions rather than solve it. She kept asserting that the rich countries could not afford not to help the poor (12 Oct 1968).

In most of her speeches and other documents between 1966-1969, she kept pointing out that the chasm between the rich and the poor nations was not shrinking but growing. She warned that this situation was fraught with danger for the future well-

being of the world (14 Oct 1968).

There have always been discrepancies among nations, but the gap is increasing. Greater knowledge has been acquired - but it is not being used to solve the problems of the world. Instead of that, it is being used for purposes which increase the disparities (13 Nov 1968).

Another existing reality, which was closely related to the above source and which contributed to the tensions and conflicts were the evils of imperialism, colonialism and racism. The roots of conflict were inequality, poverty, want and ignorance, but these problems were magnified due to the continued exploitation of the poor countries by the developed nations. The need for expansion in order to further one's economic, political, strategic and territorial interests was what caused countries to come into conflict with one another and more so when this was resisted by the country that was being exploited.

Along with economic disparity between nations there are also other sources of conflict. One is the urge for domination. There can be no peace as long as one nation rules over another or claims superiority by virtue of military might or of race (8 Jan 1968).

She believed that threats to newly independent countries are subtle and varied. There are economic and political pressures and overt and covert efforts to undermine the integrity of composite societies. Conflict, according to Mrs. Gandhi,

Stems largely from attempts to exercise pressures on or interference in the affairs of some nations by others; the continuing existence of remnants of colonialism as well as of entrenched racialism; the failure to take more determined action to resolve the oppressive problem of poverty with its attendant tensions and the increasing resort to force (2 Nov 1966).

She underscored the exploitative nature of colonialism and the fact that the exploitative system established during the colonial rule had not completely ended.

Today there is also a new kind of colonialism, the economic variety, the constant pressure exercised on those of us...who are susceptible to such pressure (14 Oct 1968).

Economic imperialism, with its constant pressure on the weak and the resistance to this pressure by the peoples and governments of the third world was creating stresses and strains.

Colonialism is dying but its ghost will haunt the world until political independence is matched with economic viability (27 March 1967).

Peace could be threatened by imperialism, through outside interference and subversion, through ideas of spheres of influence, through total economic dependence, through belief in violence and the use of force to change established frontiers (27 March 1969). The attempts to infuse ideological divisions of one kind or another or to impose a particular

way of life, further aggravates the existing tensions (19 Sept 1969).

Equally explosive is the continued denial of basic human rights on the grounds of race (14 Oct 1968).

Racism was being perpetrated despite enlightenment and knowledge that one race was not superior to another. Racial conflict was another major source of world tensions and Mrs. Gandhi attempted to fight this throughout her tenure as Prime Minister, especially through the nonaligned forum.

#### **Power Politics:**

Power politics, according to Mrs. Gandhi, was another major cause of conflict throughout history. The urge to dominate by sheer military might was characterized by her as dangerous and repulsive (19 Sept 1968). Power politics with its resulting race for arms, cold war, and carving of spheres of influence was leading to global instability.

Economic and military power continue to dominate politics. The carving out of spheres of influence still motivates policies and actions (14 Oct 1968).

There can be no peace so long as one nation rules over another or claims superiority by virtue of military might or of race (19 Sept 1968).

During this phase, Mrs. Gandhi was deeply concerned about the international implications of the continuing nuclear arms race and the proliferation and testing of nuclear weapons for military purposes. The race for nuclear arms by the big powers, she believed, was self defeating.

### **Conditions for Peace**

- 1. Eliminate Inequalities and improve Economic Conditions**
- 2. Non-interference**
- 3. Promote nonalignment**

In order to ensure the conditions for peace she did not suggest the revolutionary overthrow of the existing system. Instead, she offered an affirmation of faith that international politics could be infused with the consensual and humanistic principles of Democracy, and not degenerate into a zero sum game of power conflicts. It was more of a reformist stance.

Mrs. Gandhi took a positive view of peace. Peace, according to her, was not only the absence of war but the creation of conditions which would prevent and stop

wars, which would enable individuals to develop their personality and talents to live in harmony with themselves and their environment (15 Aug 1969). She discounted the possibility of a private or national peace, if there was no peace outside one's existence or if war raged outside national boundaries. There were many conditions which had to be fulfilled before a lasting peace could be established.

Because disparity among nations was a major source of tension and conflict, she said that eradication of inequalities would move the world a step closer to positive peace.

There can be no peace without erasing the harshness of the growing contrast between the rich and the poor (1 Feb 1968).

The rich and the industrially-advanced nations had to play a major role in closing the gap.

It is incumbent on industrially advanced nations to help correct the imbalance created by the wide disparity between the rich and poor countries...and prevent this gap from growing (21 Oct 1966).

Also the best safeguards against conflict was to strengthen the economic conditions of each country of this region.

Unless we sense this urgency and use our energy to eradicate the economic causes which make for conflict, men and women will be impelled to revolt and use violent means to bring about change (1 Feb 1968).

She believed that a country's freedom and independence could be safeguarded only if it possessed inner strength, and by its economic progress, self-reliance and social justice. She said that it was only in this manner that a country could have a firm foundation and face the many challenges of today's changing world (27 March 1969).

Non-interference of one country in the affairs of another country was essential for peace. All countries were to be allowed to run their affairs in their own way without direct or indirect military, economic and political interference.

Every country, no matter how small or big it is, has its own personality, its own ideas and its own way of life, and that no country should interfere with another country (11 Oct 1968).

When one country attempts to impose its will on another, it would give rise to conflicts. Non-interference would ensure peace.

Mrs. Gandhi's antipathy towards power politics and all its manifestations, especially the arms race which created enormous tensions made her a staunch advocate of disarmament. Throughout her career as prime minister, Mrs. Gandhi fought for

disarmament. One important observation made here is that Mrs. Gandhi did not condemn the use of nuclear energy as such, or ignore the implications it had for economic development, but she strongly opposed its utilization for military purposes.

Nuclear weapons today represent the ultimate in force. Thus any attempt to eliminate force as the determining factor in international relations must begin with practical steps towards disarmament....It is by restricting, reducing and eventually eliminating the growing nuclear menace that firm foundations of peace can be laid (14 Oct 1968).

She saw nonalignment as a stance which could harmonize tensions between conflicting nations in the cold war era.

Non alignment can harmonize the tensions which grow out of changing alignments. Its existence permits and eases departures from the conformity of ideological power groups. It lends support to independent nationalisms against external pressures (14 Oct 1968).

Non alignment has raised a voice of reconciliation and human conscience above the harsh din of armaments, cold war polemics and angry clash of alliances. It is a means towards a larger end of peaceful coexistence (21 Oct 1966).

Mrs. Gandhi shared Nehru's belief that in a world torn by alliances and ideological factions, the best path to peace was nonalignment, with its governing principles of friendship, tolerance, independence of thinking and decision making, belief in peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation.

### Scope of Conflict

#### **All Issues are linked with potential for spillover**

Mrs. Gandhi believed that all issues were linked as part of a broader, more fundamental conflict. Because of its structural linkages, conflict readily spilled over from one issue area to another, rather than remain contained within the original issue, for example, economic conflict to the political sphere; and from one geographical area to another.

The arena of battles has moved from Europe to various parts of Asia since the end of World War II. But neither Europe nor America, neither Africa nor Asia can escape the consequences of an escalating conflict in any part of the world (19 May 1968).

She cited the examples of Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967 to emphasize her belief. She warned that the Vietnam conflict was going to spread to the rest of the world. She also believed that economic and social tensions would spillover into the political sphere and seriously undermine national integration and independence.



### Role of Conflict Undesirable and Dysfunctional

We yearn for peace not merely because it is good in itself, but because without peace there can be no improvement in the lives of the vast majority of the world's peoples. There can be no development without peace. Development is an integral function of peace (14 Oct 1968).

From the beginning, Mrs. Gandhi denounced the role of conflict and in specific the use of force<sup>3</sup> as undesirable. She believed that conflict was dysfunctional as it obstructed the achievement of important goals, retarded progress and caused stagnation. Any prospects for development and growth would be diminished.

Peace is not an end in itself, it is required to fight another war - a war against poverty, disease and ignorance (15 Aug 1969).

A stable peace<sup>4</sup> was necessary for the poorer nations to concentrate on the tasks of development and absolutely necessary to achieve important goals. Without peace, there could be no political, economic or social development.

The war against poverty cannot be won when there is threat of military war. For military war uses up the world's resources, uses up the industry....It thus hinders the human race from securing all that it wants. A better world, a more progressive world, gets pushed into the background when the atmosphere is surcharged with hatred (13 Nov 1968).

The poor nations have to secure for themselves the conditions of peace as a single war or a single conflict not only retards their future progress but also takes them backward economically on account of diversion of scarce resources from the task of development to the task of self defence or destruction (14 Oct 1968).

---

<sup>3</sup>whether it was direct military force or economic and political pressure

<sup>4</sup>as opposed to just absence of war

TABLE 16

## REFERENCES TO NATURE OF POLITICS (PHASE I)

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<b><u>Nature of Politics</u></b>		
- Conflictual	99	86.8%
- Mixed	13	11.4%
- Harmonious	2	1.8%
<b><u>Sources of Conflict</u></b>		
- Human Nature	3	2%
- Power Politics	56	36.8%
- Imperial/colonial	33	21.7%
- Inequalities	60	39.5%
<b><u>Conditions for Peace</u></b>		
- Eliminate inequalities/ Improve economic condi	91	44.2%
- Non Intervention	70	34%
- Non Alignment	45	21.8%
<b><u>Scope of Conflict</u></b>		
- All Issues Linked	12	54.5%
- High Spillover	10	45.5%
<b><u>Role of Conflict</u></b>		
- Undesirable	112	99.1%
- Dysfunctional	1	.9%

**Philosophical Belief # 2****Character of political Opponents**  
**Aggressive**

This Operational Code belief relates to specific opponents. The chief opponents that Mrs. Gandhi referred to during this period were China and Pakistan. Needless to say, she characterized them both as aggressive. This is not surprising given the fact that India's relations with China had deteriorated after the Sino Indian conflict of 1962 and

relations with Pakistan had seldom, if not never, been cordial since partition. Mrs. Gandhi regretted the fact that China had adopted a hostile posture from 1962 and ignored any overtures of friendship from India. She also believed that it was Pakistan that initiated most conflicts, disregarding India's efforts at peace, friendship and cooperation with that country. When Indira Gandhi first came to power in 1966, rivalry with both China and Pakistan appeared to be an inescapable fact.

*In spite of our constant efforts to promote peace and develop friendly relations with all countries, we have had problems with two of our neighbours. We have been subjected to unprovoked aggression four times since independence...and it has compelled us to divert valuable resources to defence (22 May 1968).*

China:

*Unfortunately China and India are in a state of political and military confrontation. The situation is not of our choosing (19 July 1968).*

She believed that China was responsible for the hostility.

*China continues to maintain an attitude of hostility towards us and spares no opportunity to malign us and to carry on anti Indian propaganda (22 Dec 1967).*

Mrs. Gandhi perceived Chinese aggression as three fold:

1. Attempts by China to forcefully influence Afro Asian countries and reduce the importance of India's role in the nonaligned movement:

In the Chinese ideological spectrum, India was the key to the vast intermediate zone of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Mrs. Gandhi believed that China wanted to see India reduced to the status of a secondary power in Asia and wanted to destroy the policy of nonalignment which had earned for India respect and prestige in the Asian African world. China was engaged in a campaign to malign India's foreign and domestic policies and convey the impression that India was no longer opposed to imperialism as it was doubly aligned with the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Mrs. Gandhi accused China of attempting to aggressively influence the Third World countries, as well as certain factions in India, and convince them that the revolutionary and self reliant path tried by Mao Tse Tung was better than India's middle path of nonalignment and mixed economy, in the process of development. She said that China projected itself as a friend and sympathizer against a reactionary, bourgeois, imperialist India. Mrs. Gandhi believed that China rather than wanting peace and

peaceful coexistence, stirred up trouble wherever it could. She perceived China as wanting to use the 'rural countryside' of Afro-Asian countries to launch an assault on the industrially advanced 'cities of the west' (26 March 1967).

She found threatening China's exploitation of what she saw as two basic weaknesses in India. One was the government's inability to integrate the tribal peoples of the northeast into the mainstream of Indian life. Another was the failure to ameliorate the conditions of the rural peasants and landless labour in some parts of India. China encouraged what it called the 'raging flames' of the revolution in India and the cause of the rural peasants and landless labourers and encouraged the role played by the Indian Communist party and the Naxalities. A similar policy of creating and encouraging dissensions between India and other neighbours was adopted, especially in the case of Nepal and Sri Lanka. All of this had an impact on India's relations with China and Mrs. Gandhi charged China with interfering in India's internal and external affairs (12 April 1969).

## 2. Direct Chinese threat to India's security:

There were constant exchange of fire and skirmishes on the Sino-Indian border which Mrs. Gandhi repeatedly said was initiated by China. Speaking to the Lok Sabha, she drew a parallel between the Chinese posture towards India and the Soviet Union, and accused China of provoking border incidents in order to reopen the whole boundary question (8 April 1969). Also in June, the Chinese explosion of a hydrogen bomb demonstrated the rapid advance of its nuclear weapons program which the Indian government found intimidating.

## 3. China's involvement in South Asia - Friendship with Pakistan:

Apart from India's differences with China over territory during the 60's, Mrs. Gandhi's perception of Chinese hostility and aggressiveness deepened as China became Pakistan's diplomatic supporter and military supplier. Although India was able to counter the new Pakistan-Soviet links by its own ties with the Soviet Union, it exercised no leverage over the Sino-Pak entente. During the Indo Pak war of 1965, China and Pakistan drew together based on common enmity towards India. During the first phase, official Chinese statements firmly supported Pakistan's struggle against what they saw

as Indian aggression and the Kashmiri people's struggle for the right to self-determination. Mrs. Gandhi said that even though India did not change its stance on Tibet and Taiwan, China shifted its position on Kashmir. China slowly became a major source of economic and military aid to Pakistan. In October 1967, when China and Pakistan signed an agreement to build a highway connecting both countries on Pakistan occupied Indian territory, Mrs. Gandhi perceived a threat to India's security and an infringement of India's legal borders and lodged a formal protest, which was ignored by both countries.

Although Chinese aggression did not culminate in war during this phase, Mrs. Gandhi nevertheless perceived Chinese hostility as a threat to India's peace and security.

#### **PAKISTAN:**

*we have had differences with Pakistan. We have been the victims of aggression and hostile propaganda (15 Aug 1968).*

*During the last twenty years Pakistan has committed aggression against us on three occasions (22 July 1968).*

*Pakistan acquired a vast number of arms which they eventually used against India. Inevitably this accretion of strength had the effect of encouraging Pakistan in its intransigent and aggressive attitude towards India (22 July 1968).*

Mrs. Gandhi characterized Pakistan as aggressive and expansionist, and perceived it as a hostile nation. She accused Pakistan of expansionist aims, and with wanting to extend its territorial control over Kashmir. What Mrs. Gandhi found threatening about Pakistan was not Pakistan acting alone but the fact that it was aligning itself with the two superpowers and China, and attempting to play them off against India.

She believed that Pakistan's strategy had all along been to secure foreign intervention to change the power equation on the subcontinent as well as to undo Kashmir's accession to India. Partition and the creation of a separate state, according to Mrs. Gandhi, had not solved the fundamental problem and an acute sense of rivalry and competition with India reinforced by fear, suspicion and insecurity, pervaded all aspects of thinking and in the policies of the ruling elite. This according to her led Pakistan to walk into the Western alliance system and subsequently to befriend China.

If India tried to block foreign intervention in the region, Pakistan invited it. Mrs. Gandhi perceived India and Pakistan as moving in opposite directions - India towards nonalignment, Pakistan toward alignments, India toward minimizing foreign intervention, Pakistan towards maximizing it. Mrs. Gandhi believed that Pakistan's attitude had stiffened and that the increasingly belligerent posture was because of its association with the U.S. and China and increasing entente with the Soviet Union during this phase.

As a member of CENTO and SEATO, Pakistan got access to two to three billion dollars worth of free arms in the early sixties which was meant for protection against Communist threats, but which was eventually used against India in 1965.

Mrs. Gandhi informed the U.S. authorities that

The reported resumption of military supplies, such as spare parts for tanks and jet aircraft, to Pakistan at a time when Pakistan was adopting a belligerent attitude against India and strenuously rearming itself would only encourage that country in its aggressive and hostile designs against India (18 Aug 1966).

She believed that Pakistan was getting prepared for a second round of hostilities and that Pakistan's motivation in acquiring arms from the U.S. was not to use them against China, but only against India. She saw the supply of arms as posing a serious threat to India's security.

When the U.S. suspended military aid to Pakistan in 1965, Pakistan looked for a new supply source and found a willing donor in China. Mrs. Gandhi began to view with alarm the growing friendship between China and Pakistan which led to the construction of a road linking the two countries through Indian territory. Mrs. Gandhi viewed all these developments with suspicion and concern for India's security and safety. During the 1965 war, China gave full support to Pakistan through public pronouncements on Kashmir, in addition to arms supplies and by demanding that India dismantle military installations on the Sikkim frontier. In Pakistan, Bhutto agreed publicly that the PRC was the only country sympathetic to Pakistan's real requirements as its interests in the subcontinent coincided with that of Pakistan.

Pakistan made overtures to the Soviet Union, assuring Moscow that it had no quarrel or conflict with the Soviets and that its only concern was security against India. It held out the bait that if Moscow could show greater regard for Pakistan's concerns,

it would automatically reduce Pakistan's dependence on the West. Mrs. Gandhi interpreted this move by Pakistan as directed towards securing a balance that would confer a decided advantage on Pakistan, which would drive a wedge between Soviet Union and India. This culminated in the Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan.

From the early fifties, India had objected to any outside military aid to Pakistan on the grounds that such transfers were inimical to peace on the subcontinent. Indira Gandhi was no less outspoken in criticizing Soviet arms shipment to Pakistan than Nehru had been to the U.S.- Pak military tie. She remonstrated against Soviet interference in South Asia, although not publicly.

Explaining to the Lok Sabha her government's protests to the Soviet Union on its sale of arms to Pakistan, she reiterated the Indian position that

Pakistan had no reasonable justification to seek the augmentation of its armed strength. Such augmentation had the effect of encouraging Pakistan in its intransigent and aggressive attitude towards India (22 July 1968).

In addition to the existing problems, Mrs. Gandhi accused Pakistan of interfering in India's internal affairs. There were large scale infiltrations by what she considered Pakistani soldiers disguised as tribesmen from across the eastern borders into Assam, creating problems with law and order in that state. The communal question was also the cause for much tension between the two countries - Pakistan using such communal disturbances in India to propagate its own causes and justification of the two nation theory. There were also confirmed reports of Pakistan's assistance to the Mizo and Naga rebels. Regarding Kashmir, Pakistan was intractable in its stand, according to Mrs. Gandhi, and despite the Tashkent declaration, did not relinquish its aggressive stance vis-a-vis India. Interestingly enough, in most of her references to Pakistan and China, Mrs. Gandhi has portrayed India as a victim.

The conflict in which we were involved with Pakistan last year was not of our making (14 July 1966).

She insisted that India did not believe in aggression or hostility towards any country. Peaceful coexistence, a phrase which appeared constantly in all of her public and private articulations, was what India sought in its foreign policy.

**Sources of Opponents' Goals**  
**Ideology / Religion**

In formulating goals and policies, both China and Pakistan were believed to be acting primarily as a result of their own qualities and dispositions. For example, in China's case, its ideology, historical goals and policies, the structural requirements of its society and government determined its policy towards other foreign states. On the other hand, Mrs. Gandhi believed that Pakistan's goals, especially where India was concerned, were largely determined by its religion.

China:

Mrs. Gandhi believed that Chinese goals were in keeping with the Communist ideology as interpreted by Mao-Tse-Tung, and that China's foreign policy originated from this ideological source. She also believed that the Chinese interacted differently with each country, depending on that country's political and social composition. She called on China to fashion its diplomatic relations without looking into the social or political structure and process of the governments concerned (5 April 1968).

The real threat from China, however, is less military than political and economic. The Chinese influence will be diminished if its neighbours in Asia and the nations of the developing world can build up popular and forward looking nationalist governments. It is precisely by a successful effort to develop democracy, that India can answer the Chinese challenge (22 Dec 1967).

Its ideology led China to support the tribal rebels in Northeast India and promote the cause of the rural peasantry and landless labour in the lower Ganges valley.

China continues to carry on anti Indian propaganda...against the whole way of our democratic functioning and even our national integrity (22 Dec 1967).<sup>5</sup>

India's conflict with China was rooted in their separate nationalist movements. Although the similarity of the post-colonial problems suggested that their international roles would be complementary, the divergence of approach to those problems indicated a distinct sense of rivalry which was probably intensified by comparisons of the 'democratic' and 'revolutionary' models.

Pakistan:

During this phase Mrs. Gandhi attributed the sources of Pakistan's goals to

---

<sup>5</sup>Chinese writings described India as decadent bourgeoisie and a lackey to Anglo American imperialist designs.



religion. Religion was the main factor which provided the impetus for separation and formation of the state of Pakistan and it became its *raison d'être*. Mrs. Gandhi believed that the enmities and conflicts that the Indo-Pak relationship witnessed were an inevitable part of the psychology of separation and division. What was a religious basis for partition led to deeper rivalries and Pakistan's search for security and parity with India led to divergent foreign policy perceptions and equally divergent goals in foreign policy.

According to Mrs. Gandhi, even after the establishment of the state of Pakistan, this religious war did not abate. The urge for parity with India was deep and compulsive. Pakistan's case in Kashmir was based on religion. For Pakistan, it was axiomatic that the muslim majority area should become a part of the Islamic republic. Kashmir represented a natural and inevitable component of a separate Muslim state, its absence a contradiction of the two nation theory and the principle of partition along religious lines. The Pakistani leaders, therefore, contended that the Indian action there and the subsequent Indian stand on the question were a refusal on the part of India to reconcile itself to partition. This resulted in Pakistan joining Western sponsored alliances, despite India's efforts to keep the subcontinent free of big power interference. The religious factor, Mrs. Gandhi felt, largely determined Pakistan's policies towards India during this period.

### Likely Response to Conciliatory Moves Ignore

For many years in the past, India has emphasized the importance of the two countries agreeing that all disputes and differences between them should be settled peacefully, without resort to arms. Unfortunately no agreement could be reached on such a declaration with either Pakistan or China (15 Feb 1966).

Our successive offers of a No War pact was repeatedly turned down by Pakistan (22 July 1968).

China and Pakistan are close neighbours of ours. We wish them well and make no claims on either except those of good neighbourliness and friendship. We are willing to come to a just and honourable settlement with China at any time (15 Feb 1966).

We have extended the hand of friendship to Pakistan and hope that they will no longer hesitate to grasp it (8 April 1967).

I once again commend a No-War pact for Pakistan's consideration. A No War pact will be of mutual advantage to both and will afford us an opportunity to face internal problems and to make progress (15 Aug 1968).

I am sorry that the Chinese response...to our wish for normalization of relations...thus far has been not merely negative but hostile. However on our part we shall keep the door open (8 April 1967).

#### **Pakistan:**

After a prolonged period of crises, Mrs. Gandhi offered a No-War pact to Pakistan on 15 August 1968, in order to relieve tensions and encourage a return to the process of detente. Nehru had also offered this earlier, only to elicit rejection from Pakistan. Pakistan elaborated its standpoint and laid down certain conditions before such a pact could be signed, essentially the resolution of the Kashmir issue. Mrs. Gandhi told the Rajya Sabha (12 Dec 1968) that the conditions which President Ayub had stipulated "made it rather difficult for us to consider it." She said that he wanted certain things to be decided before a No-War pact was signed, whereas normally a pact would be signed first and issues settled later through peaceful negotiations.

In early 1969, the No-War pact offer was once again repeated with more compromises made on India's side, according to Mrs. Gandhi (1 Feb 1969), but which was turned down again by Pakistan. Also, while India was willing to abide by the Tashkent agreement, Pakistan was increasingly reluctant to execute some parts of it. In the enforcing of the Tashkent agreement, Mrs. Gandhi observed that although Pakistan was interested in the ceasefire and in reestablishing telecommunication and air links, which would allow easy contacts between the two wings of Pakistan, they were not too keen on trade or cultural exchanges with India - nothing that denoted positive ties of friendship and cooperation. During this period, Mrs. Gandhi believed that repeated attempts at compromises or conciliatory moves made by India were either rejected or ignored by Pakistan.

#### **China:**

Regarding China also, Mrs. Gandhi's attempts at conciliation were ignored or ridiculed. In the first place India's attempts to secure for China membership in the UN and a permanent seat on the security council was not appreciated.

Second, Mrs. Gandhi also did not shift her policy on either Tibet or Taiwan in the face of Chinese hostility. She made it clear that India adhered to its policy of regarding Tibet as part of China, and recognized the government based in Peking as the government of China and had therefore no intentions of establishing relations with Taiwan (25 July 1968).

Mrs. Gandhi believed that whatever concessions one might make it was quite irrelevant to China's policy calculation regarding India. China's goals and the means of pursuing them were not sensitive to any actions India might undertake.

### **Nature of the International /Regional System** **Conflictual**

Mrs. Gandhi perceived the international and regional system as conflict ridden. She regarded the international system as comprising different but closely interrelated subsystems each of which were engulfed in conflict.

These conflicts were threefold:

1. Superpower conflicts which resulted in the cold war, the alliance system, arms race, spheres of influence, American military involvement in Southeast Asia, superpower backed conflicts in West Asia etc.
2. North South conflicts triggered by economic disparities - inequalities in wealth and resource distribution etc.,
3. Conflict between Third World nationalism and the demands of imperialism, colonialism and racism.

We cannot say that the threat of a clash has receded; only that the reluctance to use the most potent weapons has given occasion for smaller wars. Two such wars have been dragging on causing untold human suffering (5 June 1969).

The two major problems which confront the world still remain unresolved. They are Vietnam and West Asia (22 Jan 1969).

During this phase, the two main regional subsystems that were engulfed in conflict were Southeast Asia and West Asia. Although India's relations with Pakistan and China were characterized by hostility and tension, Mrs. Gandhi generally cited Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli crises, when making reference to global or subsystem conflict. She found

the situation in both regions highly explosive.

She also made several references to the conflict in Eastern Europe in general and Czechoslovakia in particular.

Recent events in Czechoslovakia have cast yet another shadow on the fragile structure for a new world order (14 Oct 1968).

### **Sources of International /Regional Conflict**

#### **1. Power Politics**

#### **2. Imperialism, Colonialism, Racism**

Mrs. Gandhi perceived conflicts in any or all of the subsystems as being part of a broader conflict or as an extension of overall global discord and disharmony. The crisis in Vietnam was interpreted as an extension of super power politics to Southeast Asia; in terms of power politics, imperialist designs<sup>6</sup>; and of foreign dominance and interference in the internal affairs of another country. Most documents were replete with repeated denunciations of the American involvement in Vietnam.

The dominant approach to global and subsystem conflict which Mrs. Gandhi subscribed to was that instability in the third world was caused primarily by unpopular regimes, economically and politically dissatisfied peoples and the interference of outside powers. According to this approach the main sources of conflict was the suppression of national movements by the injection of outside military power into economically backward and politically weak countries and by the efforts of the superpowers to obtain spheres of influence. In brief, her view was that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were equally guilty of expansionist tendencies and provocative military stances.

She was convinced that the problems in Southeast Asia were political and economic and no amount of military force could solve them. The West Asian crisis and especially the 1967 war was, according to Mrs. Gandhi, a conflict between Arab nationalism and imperialist backed Zionist claims on Arab territory. At the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, Mrs. Gandhi was outspoken in her support for the Arab cause and

---

<sup>6</sup>She signed a communique in Moscow in July 1966 which contained a reference to 'Imperialists in Southeast Asia' (16 July 1966)

condemned the western countries' commitment to and support of Israeli expansionism.

*On the basis of information available there can be no doubt that Israel has escalated the situation into an armed conflict, which has now acquired the proportions of a full scale war (6 June 1967).*

The African subsystem was perceived as being plagued by imperialist colonization and racialism as well as by power politics.

*Racialism persists, and in alliance with the remnants of entrenched colonialism, notably in the southern part of Africa, is hurling defiance in flagrant violation of world opinion and human rights (21 Oct 1966).*

### Conditions for Regional Peace

1. Education, Communication and Negotiation
2. Non-interference

*We believe...that problems must be solved by peaceful means, by discussions and negotiations. We believe in the individuality of nations. Each country must choose its own form of development and progress. It must choose whatever system it thinks is best for its forward march. This means that we live side by side peacefully. How can this happen unless we agree not to interfere in one another's internal matters (27 March 1969).*

Mrs. Gandhi's suggested that all countries use peaceful means such as communication and negotiation in the resolution of conflicts.

*Amid all tensions, disputes and misunderstandings the best policy is to remove misunderstanding and wherever there are disputes try to settle them through discussion and conciliation rather than war (19 June 1966).*

Her conflict resolution model was that better education and information, and better communication between nations and peoples would allay misunderstandings, prevent misperception, lack of trust, irrational hatreds etc. Education and communication would lead to better understanding and appreciation of the fundamental harmony of interests. She prescribed the use of this model to solve the Vietnam crisis.

*There can be no military solution in Vietnam. There is no alternative to a peaceful settlement. The parties must be brought to the negotiating table within the framework of the Geneva agreement (7 July 1966).*

*Conflict has to be taken from the battlefield to the conference table (23 Feb 1968).*

She suggested that Britain and the Soviet Union should immediately convene a meeting of the Geneva conference with an appeal for immediate cessation of hostilities.

She made the same prescriptions for West Asia also. She insisted that state boundaries cannot be redrawn by force or on the basis of permanent hostility. Countries

should talk with each other, she said (14 Oct 1967).

Regarding India's problems with both Pakistan and China, Mrs. Gandhi clearly emphasized on bilateral negotiations as an important means to resolve conflicts. She made attempts to open up communication links with China in order to solve the border issue. As regards Pakistan, she was extremely firm about Kashmir being non-negotiable, but said that all other issues could be settled at the conference table. She upheld the Tashkent declaration, despite her initial lack of enthusiasm for it.

Mrs. Gandhi also had high hopes for the UN and was convinced that it had a major role to play in securing and safeguarding world peace.

*The United Nations is the hope of the world, more especially of the smaller powers and developing nations...and we shall do everything in our power to strengthen the UN and to make it an effective instrument for international peace and cooperation (14 Oct 1968).*

*Its very existence gives a feeling of assurance that the justice of true causes can be brought fearlessly before the world (26 Jan 1967).*

The UN could help restore confidence in a badly divided and conflictual world. Within the UN, the members could communicate with each other, negotiate and find solutions to pressing problems. It was a forum where countries - big and small - could make themselves heard and especially valuable for countries with no access to other means of conflict resolution.

Another major solution to maintaining peace was non-interference. She called upon big powers to desist from interfering in the internal and external affairs of the smaller countries.

*The principle of non-interference by one country in the internal affairs of another constitutes the very basis of peaceful coexistence (21 Aug 1968).*

According to her, international relations should be governed by respect for the sovereignty and independence of nations big and small. Every country should have the right to develop its personality according to its own traditions, aptitude and genius (21 Aug 1968).

*Peace and stability can come only with the tolerance of political and social differences (19 Sept 1967).*

She believed in each nation's right to evolve its own pattern of self government. Here her references were aimed at Vietnam and Czechoslovakia. She also insisted that before

a firm foundation of peace could be laid, there had to be steps towards disarmament.

*It is by restricting reducing and eventually eliminating the growing nuclear menace that firm foundations of peace can be laid (14 Oct 1968).*

But she refused to sign the NPT because of what she considered as the discriminatory nature of the treaty.

*The problems of insecurity cannot be solved by imposing arbitrary restrictions on those who do not possess nuclear weapons, without any corresponding steps to deal with the basic problem of limiting stockpiles in the hands of a few powers (14 Oct 1968).*

She insisted that initial steps should be taken to bring about partial disarmament, later paving way for total disarmament. In order for peace to prevail, all countries in the world had to cooperate.

### **Structure of the International System**

- 1. Bipolar moving towards detente**
- 2. nonalignment as a key feature**

*International relations as a whole are in a particularly fluid state at the present time. The old landmarks, the rigid divisions between rival blocs, appear to be in the process of disintegration although they have by no means disappeared (22 July 1968).*

Interestingly enough, Mrs. Gandhi attributed this disintegration process to the growing importance of the principles of nonalignment.

*In the world of today the great powers appear slightly relaxed in their relationship. It is due in a large measure to the influence exercised by the nonaligned and other third world countries (19 Sept 1967).*

*It is a vindication of the policy of Non alignment that the rigidities of blocs have become somewhat blurred (5 July 1969).*

She perceived the superpowers and their allies as being anxious to establish different kinds of contacts across the old ideological and military forces and welcomed what she saw as the process of detente. More and more nations, according to Mrs. Gandhi, were today subscribing to nonalignment while military alliances are steadily weakening.

*Ten years ago Non alignment did arouse suspicions in certain quarters. Today, it is accepted and respected as an area of peace and disengagement, a bridge between conflicting blocs, an instrument for reducing world tensions (10 July 1966).*

### Stability of the International System Mixed

Despite the move towards detente, Mrs. Gandhi did not see the threat of a clash between the superpowers as receding. She said that reluctance to use the most potent weapons had given occasion for smaller wars fought by proxy all over the world.

Also, the nuclear arms race which created a balance of terror was, according to Mrs. Gandhi, not very stable.

The great leap forward of science has put power in the hands of mankind and has produced weapons of such devastation that they might well destroy foe, friend and user alike. This knowledge as well as the refinements of systems of delivery, detection and instant retaliation have led to what is known as balance of terror. The mighty are finding that the greater the power the more difficult it may be to use it. Such a balance can never be stable. One rash decision can upset it and the result will be disaster (22 March 1966).

### National Role Conception

1. Active Independent / Non aligned
2. Friendly Neighbour

K.J.Holsti's study (1970:233-309) suggests that a leader's national role conception sets the parameters for a country's foreign policy.

Theorists of international politics have for sometime made references to national roles as possible causal variables in the operation of international systems, or in explaining foreign policies of individual nations (Holsti 1970,234).

What a leader perceives to be his/her country's role in a given system determines the kind of policy choices that will be made and how a decision-maker will respond in a particular situation.

Mrs. Gandhi clearly envisioned India as playing two important roles. In the global system or in the domain of international interactions, India would play an active and independent role as a nonaligned nation. In the immediate regional subsystem or in the sphere of South Asia, India would be a friendly neighbour, promote regional cooperation, and help the neighbouring countries in times of need.

**Global Role:**

Nehru as prime minister was an internationalist and aspired for great power status for India in the global system. He believed that India should and would play the role of an international peacemaker, mediate in superpower conflicts, help liberate countries that



were under imperialist colonial domination and attempt to bring about world peace and cooperation. In contrast, Mrs. Gandhi's interpretation of India's role was more pragmatic. She took into consideration India's position in the global power structure, its economic and military weaknesses, and then formulated a more realistic concept of what India's role ought to be. India would play an independent role and stand by its commitment to nonalignment. From the beginning, she kept asserting that Indian independence and freedom of choice both in the domain of internal politics as well as external interactions should not be compromised. Although she did acknowledge that it was an interdependent world and a nation's policies would be to a certain extent influenced by external factors, she believed in the freedom to make decisions based on national interests as opposed to serve the interests of other more powerful actors in the global system. She was born into a family intensely involved in the political struggle for India's independence. The frequency with which she referred to this fact in most of her speeches and articles testifies to the deep impact that that involvement had on the formation of her beliefs regarding India's role.

As already discussed, Mrs. Gandhi was vehemently opposed to the idea of any country imposing its will on another either because it was bigger or stronger. It is this perception of India's independent role which intensified her commitment to nonalignment. Nonalignment, as Mrs. Gandhi kept forcefully asserting, was not to be confused with neutrality. It was something more than the avoidance of entanglement with the superpowers and becoming a "camp follower". It meant preserving independence despite close relations with one or both of the superpowers. It signified independence in decision-making, keeping an open mind and judging each situation, actor, issue on its own merits, most of all keeping national interest in mind. Mrs. Gandhi's opposition to military alliances and spheres of influence did not prevent her from making advances to the U.S. and its allies and developing close economic links with them. But this, she firmly emphasized, should not lead to the unacceptable dilution of independence of approach, and injury to India's vital interests in the international field. Military blocs apart, she believed in the cause of the movement's struggle against imperialism, neo colonialism, racialism; and for peaceful coexistence and the right of

small countries to determine and shape their own future. This belief defined the parameters of India's foreign policy.

The movement for nonalignment extended beyond a general resistance to bloc divisions. Nonalignment, according to her, came to be not just an unprincipled neutral confrontation with blocs, but opposition and resistance to those who wanted to perpetuate domination. It became an active struggle of the emerging countries to achieve full national liberty to develop socially and economically according to their own rights. It came to signify a refusal to be mere political and economic appendages of the centers of military, political and economic power. It became a struggle to protect themselves from external dominance and exploitation.

India's role in the international system as an active independent and nonaligned nation was curtailed during the period 1966 - 1968, which was turbulent due to economic shortages resulting in a severe strain on India's assertiveness and freedom of action. India's dependence on U.S. economic assistance and compromises on Vietnam in exchange for food was a sore factor, which strengthened Mrs. Gandhi's resolve to strive for rapid achievement of self-sufficiency in food production and overcoming the economic crisis. In 1969, there was a process of political consolidation and greater centralization of power, which lent energy and forcefulness to the operation of foreign policy. It was reflected in the end to the temporary silence of the Indian government on Vietnam and indicated the determination of Mrs. Gandhi to remain faithful to independent India's foreign policy parameters. She wanted to acquire as rapidly as possible countervailing levers, despite the desperate dependence at this time on foreign assistance to tide over the economic crisis.

This effort to pressurize India at a crucial moment for a major turning away from her policies left an undoubted mark on subsequent developments, bringing about a resolve in Delhi to urgently strive for self sufficiency in foodgrains, even while courting American assistance to get over the short term shortages. The long-term consequences of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington in 1966 were therefore very different from the immediate effort and need. It led to a new strategy internally and a decision to stiffen up externally as soon as circumstances changed and permitted. Since independence it can

be noticed that every active period of India's foreign policy has coincided with sharp reactions from and sometimes deteriorating relations with the West, while a passive and quiescent period saw an improvement in Indo West relationship. India's assertion of a strong viewpoint always related to issues concerning important interests of India or those of the emerging countries wherein the West was invariably not on the same side. Of course, this demonstration of a strong foreign policy also came during times of considerable internal consolidation and some economic momentum.

Mrs. Gandhi was very much aware of the contradiction of seeking economic assistance from the superpowers on the one hand, while at the same time resisting their pressures to change one or another aspect of policy, and opposing the expansion of their influence. But she attempted to act in a way to minimize this contradiction. In short, she strove to reduce India's dependence on bilateral economic assistance, diversify military supply sources, carefully delimited areas of common interest and adopted a lower international profile than her father.

While it was one of her chief aims to maintain Indo-Soviet friendship, Mrs. Gandhi was firm in her resistance to Soviet pressure that ran counter to India's interests. She avoided committing India to the Brezhnev plan for collective security in Asia, a Russian attempt to counter Chinese and American influence in the region. She also rejected Soviet advice to settle with Pakistan on Kashmir. Although she staunchly resisted attempts to criticize the Soviet Union for its arms supplies to Pakistan, she was not averse to offsetting Russian friendship with Pakistan by improving Sino-Indian relations and she initiated some tentative moves in that direction.

She also absolutely refused to sign the NPT, indicating her independent stance, by resisting pressures from the superpowers to do so. While promising that India would not go nuclear, she refused the NPT on the grounds that it was discriminatory. Given the position India was in - the vital dependence on the superpowers for economic and military assistance, and the hostility of China and Pakistan, it was difficult to assume an independent role in foreign affairs. But Mrs. Gandhi did make a sincere attempt to establish and maintain that independence.

### Regional System:

Despite the fact that India was a large country in the subcontinent, the documents show that Mrs. Gandhi did not aspire for great power status or for regional hegemony. She also did not visualize India as playing the role as a regional leader or protector.

*India does not wish to claim the role of a leader...We have not sought any hegemony....We have absolutely no extra territorial ambitions either of dominion or of control (19 March 1968).*

During this phase, she saw India's role in the immediate regional system as a friendly neighbour. She believed in strengthening existing friendships, building cooperation out of indifference and mitigating past hostility. Her self-image was one of benevolence and friendliness. Her interpretation of Indian civilization - with which India's neighbours were intimately connected - stressed its tolerance, diversity, wide reach and its fundamental unity in a metaphysical sense. On such a base, she believed that all differences of opinion were superficial. She attempted to project the underlying realities of peace, friendship and the soundness of India's path for the subcontinent as a whole. But she was not able to gain acceptance of her stated point of view either from her critics at home or from India's neighbours. Instead, she acquired the image of seeking hegemony, or Indian preponderance in the region, even interference in their internal affairs. The existence of a big state amidst smaller ones would naturally tend to create a certain amount of fear and hostility. The existing Indian presence ensured a certain dominance, direct extension was not necessary. The facts of geography history and economics combined with the imperatives of security in a conflict-ridden world pointed towards India's dominance as inevitable. But Mrs. Gandhi dismissed the fears of a strong India sometimes expressed in the neighbouring states, as a result of the constant propaganda being carried on there (7 July 1968).

Her government accepted the independence of India's smaller neighbours and assisted them in forging wider international ties, even when it resulted in an apparent dilution of their ties with India. This was evident in the case of Nepal and Bhutan.

**TABLE 17**  
**REFERENCES TO OPPONENTS (PHASE I)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<u>Character of Opponents</u>		
- Aggressive	11	84.6%
- Expansionist	2	15.4%
<u>Response to Conciliation</u>		
- Ignore	4	100%
<u>Nature of Region System</u>		
- Conflictual	53	88.3%
- Mixed	5	8.3%
- Harmonious	2	3.3%
<u>Sources Region Conflict</u>		
- Power Politics	26	59.1%
- Imperialism/colonial	18	4.9%
<u>Conditions Region Peace</u>		
- Communicate/Negotiate	31	58.5%
- Non-interference	22	41.5%
<u>Structure Region System</u>		
- Bipolar/ Detente	12	44.5%
- Nonalignment	11	40.7%
- Interdependent	4	14.8%
<u>Stability Region System</u>		
- Mixed	10	66.7%
- Unstable	5	33.3%
<u>National Role</u>		
- Active Independent	99	52.4%
- Friendly Neighbour	69	36.5%
- Mediator	21	11.1%

### **Philosophical Belief # 3**

#### **Prospects for eventual Realization of Goals Optimism Conditional /Long Term Goals and Policies**

Mrs. Gandhi optimistically believed that prospects for the successful realization of fundamental goals were very good if a person worked hard enough to accomplish it. She believed that no problem was insurmountable and that dreams could be turned into reality if one wanted them to happen badly enough and strove towards their attainment.

However difficult a situation may seem it is always possible in the world to find a way out (1 Jan 1969).

She said nothing could be accomplished if one adopted a pessimistic, negative or passive attitude. According to her, no goal was too difficult to reach as long as one maintained hope and faith.

Whatever the odds, we will succeed in our experiment of progress with freedom and social justice (31 May 1966).

But she also stressed that hope and faith by themselves were not enough, and however optimistic, one could not expect things to fall into place by themselves. Optimism had to be accompanied by ceaseless efforts and constant endeavour.

There is no point in sitting back and expecting good things to happen. We have to make them happen (25 Aug 1967).

India very definitely is on the move. But we also know that our own 'great society' must and can rest securely only on the quality and extent of our own effort (28 March 1966).

Mrs. Gandhi was more optimistic about the successful attainment of long-term as opposed to short-term goals. She believed long term goals could be met, given certain conditions. Although there were several constraints to the successful achievement of specific short-term policy undertakings, she did not rule out the possibility of achieving them over a period of time. For example, despite the conflictual nature of the present day international system, peace was on the horizon. World peace could and would be achieved if all the nations worked positively in that direction.

Man has the tools of science and technology. He is reaching out to the stars. So I do not despair. For peace and justice cannot elude the collective will of ordinary people the world over (21 Oct 1966).

She said that peace was conditional on the fact that all nations base their policies

Realistically on friendly cooperation, peaceful relations and non-interference in each other's affairs. Therein lies the key to the future growth of mutual trust and confidence and to the establishment of peace where today conflict reigns (18 Sept 1967).

Conflicts cannot be resolved in a day or even in a decade. Their solution demands patience, understanding, right motivation and above all, a far greater effort and bigger sacrifice than we have so far volunteered (1 Feb 1968).

With regard to the fundamental goals of India, Mrs. Gandhi was very optimistic about their attainment. She believed that despite all the obstacles, long-term goals were not out of reach.

I am confident that the difficulties that confront us at present will be surmounted and that we shall go ahead with the transformation of our society (18 Sept 1967).

We had the vision of a free Asia. The events of the last few years have tended to dim that vision. But we in India remain hopeful. I do believe that we can recreate that vision by determination and earnest endeavour to keep to our path (18 Sept 1967).

India would improve its economy, achieve self-sufficiency in food and become self reliant, eventually moving towards a better society.

We are confident that with the help that we are receiving and even more through our unremitting effort, we shall win notable victories in our struggle against backwardness (25 Jan 1968).

We are confident that we shall have developed a self reliant economy within the next decade (14 July 1966).

With regard to resolution of conflict with Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi believed that even if it could not be accomplished immediately, both countries would resolve all their problems and live in peace in the future.

I am confident that there is no problem between India and Pakistan which cannot be peacefully settled in a manner consistent with the honour and interest of both countries (14 July 1966).

**TABLE 18**  
**REFERENCES TO OPTIMISM (PHASE I)**

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Goal Realization</u>		
- Optimism	74	67.3%
- Mixed	33	30%
- Pessimism	3	2.7%
<u>Optimism and Goals</u>		
- Long Term Goals	86	78.9%
- Policy Undertaking	23	21.1%
<u>Optimism Conditional</u>		
- Conditional	57	71.3%
- Unconditional	23	28.8%

### Philosophical Belief # 4

#### Predictability of Political Life

##### **Predictable / Historical Developments and Long term trends**

Unlike Nehru, Mrs. Gandhi was not a theorist and did not concern herself with the theoretical underpinnings of historical development or the laws of evolution of societies. Her views regarding historical development and change were formulated by observation and experience rather than the influence of and adherence to a particular ideology. Although she did not specifically state that there were clearly discernible and regular patterns and laws in political life, she believed in the possibility to forecast future phases, certain events, and the likely consequence of one's own and other's actions. As she did not have a specific theory or ideological tradition from which she drew this conclusion, her predictions were more in the form of a meteorological forecast, based on observation, experience, faith and sometimes even intuition. Long-term trends, according to her, could be predicted with certainty. For example,



India's social transformation can only be effected by the people of India themselves, in the light of their own history, tradition and experience. It will not be affected by Mao's thoughts and little red books (6 April 1968).

I have every reason to believe that the people of India will always stand together in unity (15 Aug 1969).

We believe that a stable and self reliant India will add to the peace and prosperity of this region (26 May 1968).

The security of South and Southeast Asia will not be more secure by alliances and treaties. we believe that this security will grow out of mutual cooperation and identity of interests (6 April 1968).

She did not make too many predictions regarding short-term policies, adversaries China or Pakistan, or even specific events.

**TABLE 19**

**REFERENCES TO PREDICTABILITY (PHASE I)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<b><u>Politics Predictable?</u></b>		
- Predictable	117	96.7%
- Capricious	4	3.3%
<b><u>What Aspects Predictable?</u></b>		
- Historical Trends	104	83.2%
- Opponents Behaviour	2	1.6%
- Policy Outcomes	15	12%
- Specific Events	4	3.2%
<b><u>Degree of Predictability</u></b>		
- Certainty	106	90.6%
- Probability	6	5.1%
- Uncertainty	5	4.3%

## Philosophical Belief # 5

### Control of Historical Development

#### Full Ability to Control

Mrs. Gandhi believed very strongly in a person's ability to control historical development and in shaping his future. The world was neither good nor bad. It was what we made of it (10 Oct 1966).

Man, who is a mere speck in the vast universe, is capable, if he has the courage and the will of achieving anything that he puts his hand and heart to (21 July 1969).

Each nation must mould its own destiny (15 Feb 1969).

Each hour of the day each one of us is by his actions shaping the future of this country (10 Oct 1966).

She believed that in the vastness of the universe the individual was a mere speck, a tiny creature. But if he/she used his/her imagination and will power and worked hard, he/she could mould the future any way he/she wanted and in so doing could shape his/her destiny. She said that the individual was no longer content to entrust to others the shaping of his/her destiny and that he/she wanted to be the master of his/her fate.

The future does not come on its own. Man wills it and he dares and he builds (24 Sept 1968).

But she conceded that individuals could not control what went on outside their immediate environment. She believed that although one could not control certain events and situations, one could control one's own behaviour, reactions and responses. In that sense, according to Mrs. Gandhi, we shape our destiny. She referred to India's fight for independence to illustrate this point. The goal of independence was achieved because of the collective will and struggle of the Indian people, who did not accept colonial rule as their fate.

Second, she believed in every individual's capacity to break free from economic bondage and poverty.

Man is poignantly aware that the misery and poverty in which his forefathers were engulfed is no longer inevitable. The fatal acceptance of conditions as they were has gone for ever. Out of this has emerged the turbulence which is agitating the hearts and minds of men everywhere. In less than two decades hundreds and millions of human beings have cast off their shackles and are seeking fulfillment of their destiny (19 May 1968).

With this in mind, she propagated the struggle for economic freedom and betterment. She urged all the developing nations to cooperate and work towards improving economic conditions. She believed that with hard work, the people of India were capable of realizing their aspirations.

Also, war was not inevitable. Despite the instability in several parts of the world, individuals could work towards harmony and create an environment of positive peace, friendship and cooperation. It was possible to eliminate completely the causes of conflict if all the nations cooperated. But she believed that one should want it badly enough to make it happen.

This view of an individual's destiny is in direct contrast to the Hindu philosophical emphasis of Karma or fate<sup>7</sup>. She did not subscribe to this fatalistic view of life and termed this concept as a hindrance to progress and development (19 Aug 1967).

### Role of the Leader Active Role

We have already discussed the importance of the leadership variable, especially in certain structural contexts i.e., the Third World. Mrs. Gandhi perceived the leader of a political system as having a very important role to play.

History has many instances where nations have undergone changes of personality under the influence of determined leadership (9 Aug 1968).

The very fact that Mrs. Gandhi constantly referred to Ashoka, Buddha, Gandhi and Nehru and their role in the shaping of Indian history can be taken as an indication that she believed in the importance of leadership in directing and shaping historical developments. She repeatedly spoke of how Gandhi and Nehru mobilized the entire country during the freedom struggle and attributed the success and the achievement of Indian independence to their efforts and guidance. According to her, an individual could shape his/her destiny and control his/her fate, but it was the leader's task to guide the individual in its shaping. It was the leader who had to define common goals, and select the means to achieve them,

---

<sup>7</sup>i.e., man being tied to a predetermined fate

actively intervene in conflicts, and initiate the means for its resolution.

*The government has to create a new sense of national purpose, redefine tasks and priorities, refine programmes and methods (15 March 1967).*

It would take skillful leadership to resolve most problems. An important part of the responsibility rests with the leader (20 June 1968).

*We were fortunate in the difficult days after independence, to be guided by a philosophical framework of policy so wisely fashioned by Gandhiji and Panditji (15 March 1967).*

In almost every speech, she quoted a great leader or philosopher. She believed that the role of the leader was similar to that of a manager in a corporation.

*He has to run his plant efficiently. He has to command the respect of a large number of different types of people. He has to keep a lookout for advances in his field of technology, so that he can meet changes halfway....In a developing society such as ours, management has an even greater contribution to make (13 April 1968).*

According to her, the role of a leader in a developing society would become all the more important.

*When you take the country as a whole, you find that there is...still a great deal of groping. In this, they expect guidance from those who are in authority (24 June 1966).*

It was the duty of the government, to protect and take care of its people and provide an environment in which each person could grow to his/her fullest potential.

*While leaders must be responsive to the voice of the people it is also their responsibility to guide that voice in the larger national interest (22 June 1968).*

She believed in the role of the leader as being a director and manager of social and economic change and development. This impelled her towards more centralization by encouraging state involvement in most sectors of the society.

*The need to bring about planned and accelerated change has compelled government to assume direct responsibility for a large number of productive and distributive functions (13 April 1968).*

This belief was derived from and congruent with her acceptance of Socialism. That was the reason why the state-managed five year plans gained full acceptance in her. The only way the economy could be improved and the goal of development achieved was with the implementation of the plans which meant active involvement by the state in the economic process.

*We have accepted the socialist path because we feel that there is no other way of eradicating poverty. Our greatest duty is to help the nation achieve progress (15 Aug 1966).*

She took it upon herself to work for the upliftment of the poor in India and for the

elimination of social injustices and reduction of economic inequalities.

**TABLE 20**  
**REFERENCES TO ROLE OF LEADER (PHASE I)**

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Control over History</u>		
- Full Control	131	89.1%
- Some Control	15	10.2%
- Inability to Control	1	.7%
<u>Role of Leader</u>		
- Active Role	85	94.4%
- Passive Role	5	5.6%

**C. Instrumental Beliefs:**

**Instrumental Belief # 1**

**Nature of one's Goals**  
**Achievement of National Interest**

This particular belief regarding the nature of one's goals was one of the most frequently articulated of all of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code beliefs. She absolutely believed in the concept of national interest as being of paramount consideration in the formulation of goals and policies and believed that under no circumstances could they be compromised or sacrificed.

Certain values and interests are permanent and set; on these we cannot compromise (6 April 1968).

In foreign policy formulation she said,

We shall be guided entirely by our enlightened self interest and adherence to our values (1 Aug 1968).

One of the most important goals from which other goals were derived was the maintenance of Indian independence. Insistence on autonomy was the unifying theme of

India's foreign policy. Independence did not mean mere territorial sovereignty or political autonomy. For Mrs. Gandhi, it entailed two other facets. Freedom and independence was both an individual and national concept. At the micro or individual level it meant economic and social emancipation as a basis of all human progress. Economic justice is an inseparable part of political freedom. Political emancipation without economic, social, intellectual and cultural emancipation is meaningless. For the materially fortunate, freedom essentially appeals as a freedom of intellect, ideas, and of concepts. But for the economically impoverished sections of society, freedom meant having a loaf of bread and a roof over one's head.

At the national level, Mrs. Gandhi believed that no nation can be really free unless it is self-reliant. A country may not be entirely self-sufficient but at least a base of self-sufficiency and self-reliance must be established.

1. Freedom at the micro level:

She frequently stressed the fact that unless poverty and backwardness was totally ameliorated one could not achieve full freedom. True independence meant improvement in the living standards of the people, eliminating inequalities and social injustices and narrowing the gap between expectations and realizations.

Freedom meant not only political independence but economic and social justice for the people (27 June 1969).

We know that until all the people in India are economically secure, our own freedom would not be secure (13 Nov 1968).

We have achieved political freedom. we are today in the midst of the struggle for development and progress, so that our political freedom has meaning for all our people. Freedom is not a question of who forms the government. It means giving full opportunity to all people ...for education, employment, and the bare necessities of life such as food, housing and so on (13 Nov 1968).

She said that a country cannot be truly free when any section of its people are denied the opportunity to evolve to their fullest potential. The basis for real strength and independence was economic stability (28 June 1969). She believed that India must put in the same energy and the same enthusiasm into development that it put in its struggle for freedom. It is with this goal in mind that she undertook the program of national reconstruction with the help of the five year plans.

**We must therefore ensure that knowledge is applied where it is most needed and that abundance, which is being created, is justly distributed. Concern for the difficulties of the underprivileged must become a part of our thinking (27 June 1969).**

Political independence should not be considered as the end of the road. It is the key which opens the door to opportunity through development. This kind of economic freedom would lay the foundation for independence at the macro level.

## **2. Independence at the Macro Level:**

She believed that until the battle for economic independence was won, the newly emerging and developing nations would be subjected to external pressures, which she said had to be firmly resisted. She looked upon external economic assistance not as an aid to building India's strength and achievement of economic freedom, but as a bond which would increase its dependence on dominant economies. She disliked the colonial pattern of interaction between the advanced industrial nations and the struggling dependent nations which was still continuing to the detriment of the subject economy.

Because of India's dependence on foreign military and economic assistance, it was being pressurized to make concessions and compromise in its foreign policy. Mrs. Gandhi throughout this phase kept asserting that India had to break free of this pattern of dominance and compliance and achieve decision-making independence in both the external realm and in the domestic sphere. This she said could be achieved by self sufficiency and self-reliance. Development must be based on self-reliance. This was an important goal that all developing countries should strive to attain in order to retain freedom and independence. Self-reliance would provide the capability to say NO! under pressure to conform. But on the one hand, Mrs. Gandhi had to bow to the compelling logic of the situation in which India had been placed during this phase - the economic crisis, the vital dependence, the domestic balance, the regional problems etc. On the other hand, very tentatively and guardedly she set about the task of looking for alternative sources of strength, balancing factors, countervailing cards in order to maintain independence in decision-making. There was only a faint glimmer of such an effort in 1966 and did not become manifest until 1967 when the economic crisis was overcome.

Another important goal was to ensure and maintain security. Most important was the belief leading to the perception that the unity and integrity of the country was of prime importance. India's security was paramount and vital security interests would not be compromised. This was the reason why she wanted to solve all outstanding problems with China and Pakistan and fought vehemently against superpower interference in the subcontinent.

*The defence and security of the country will remain our paramount concern (22 July 1968).*

*Our own objective is to devote all available resources to the development of our economy and to assure a better life for our people, but we cannot ignore the threat to our security and we need, therefore, to maintain adequate military preparedness to defend ourselves (30 Sept 1968).*

Although she deeply believed in peace, she was aware of the government's responsibility to preserve the freedom and territorial integrity of the country. Constant vigilance and alertness were necessary. Essentially her motivation was defensive - to protect India's autonomy and maintain a level of stability and peace in the region. She interpreted the Chinese and Pakistani attacks on India as unprovoked aggression on an innocent country. The activities of the great powers in the Indian ocean were perceived as threatening Indian interests and security. At no time did Indira Gandhi accept the argument often propounded by Washington and implicit in Moscow's proposals for Asian collective security, that the security interests of India could be served by an enhanced presence of either great power. She feared changes in the status quo brought about by the external powers, and saw disturbances of the status quo as directed against a self reliant, unified and strong India helping its neighbours. She perceived any action that she might be forced to take to counter such disruption as defensive, not offensive, to protect India's security and vital interests from encroachment. The equally grave danger of instability within a neighbouring country spilling over into India, with deleterious effects on India's stability, was also a constant. She was concerned about the tangible aspects of national power and security. With security as a goal she attempted to strengthen India's power. But at the same time, she explicitly clarified that she did not want India to become a power - major or minor. According to her, India's foreign policy was more motivated to defend autonomy rather than extend power. The contrast between the desire to



enhance India's capabilities and a reluctance to use these capabilities except in a defensive way was evident in the nature of India's goals.

### Best Approach for Goal Selection Mixed

Mrs. Gandhi believed that the best way to select and achieve goals was by adopting a mixed approach. Most of India's foreign policy and domestic goals had been arrived at through consensus over a period of time in Indian history. Concepts such as non-violence and peaceful coexistence were ingrained in the Indian ethic and, according to Mrs. Gandhi, these values along with liberal democratic ideals and Socialism were the basic foundations of India's foreign and domestic policy.

During her first independence day speech as Prime Minister, she summed up the basic approach to India's goals. The framework was as follows - A 'commitment to non-violence', 'truth', 'swadeshi', 'liberal democratic values' and last but not least 'socialism' (15 Aug 1966). Non violence, the way Mrs. Gandhi interpreted it, meant living in peace and amity with respect for one another's views, and for other nations professing different ideologies.

Non violence to Gandhiji did not mean only giving up force; it meant the absence of hatred and the spirit of tolerance and friendship towards all (9 Nov 1968).

She kept insisting time and again that India's policy of nonalignment was derived from this broad based concept of ahimsa<sup>8</sup> and non attachment. It was reflected in her dislike for power politics and military alliances. Similarly, she believed that truth should pervade all actions and fearlessness was an essential part of truth.

We should be as fearless today as we were during the struggle for freedom. We should not be afraid of making mistakes or changes. We should be willing to adopt new paths and to imbibe new ideas. It is very necessary for us to have a complete understanding of the problems facing us. Only then can we find a way out (15 Aug 1966).

Hindu philosophy, which embraced the welfare of mankind and its humanistic ideals of universal brotherhood, love and peace, prompted the gearing of India's foreign policy toward fighting for justice, equality and emancipation of peoples everywhere and was

---

<sup>8</sup>non violence

reflected in Mrs. Gandhi's crusade against imperialism, racialism and oppression, which became official Indian policy. Also, the concept of Swadeshi or reliance on domestic goods, resources and technology, which Gandhi made popular during the freedom struggle was epitomized in India's domestic policy.

The country is faced with economic difficulties. We can improve the economic situation by imbibing the spirit of swadeshi (15 Aug 1966).

She also saw Socialism as a practical solution to India's problems and adopted the Socialist method to achieve the goals of development. Her brand of Socialism was more in the nature of a plan for action than a theoretical exercise. Mrs. Gandhi shared Nehru's belief in the efficacy of Socialism in tackling the problem of India's poverty and backwardness and her goal of economic and social development was built on the pillars of Socialism.

We have accepted the socialist path because we feel that there is no other way of eradicating poverty. Democracy is the base of our socialism (15 Aug 1966).

These she believed were the foundations of India's policies. All goals were natural derivations from these values and ideals.

But on the other hand, one had to take into consideration the immediate situation and the opportunities afforded by the circumstances in the formulation of certain short-term goals and policies. For example, although self-reliance was a long-term goal, the immediate task of the government from 1966 to 1968 was to achieve self-sufficiency in food grains.

In essence, she believed that one could approach the task of selecting and implementing goals both ways - either deriving it from a master plan or from immediate problem at hand or short-term considerations, depending on the situation. Both approaches were equally valid.

### Type of Goals Optimal and Feasible

During this phase, Mrs. Gandhi suggested both types of goals. Optimal in certain cases and feasible goals for others.

**Optimal:** As already discussed some goals or basic principles should absolutely not be compromised. For example, 1. The goal of achieving economic freedom and social justice. 2. India's commitment to nonalignment and opposition to military blocs. 3. The goal of self-reliance 4. Security.

**Feasible:** At the same time, in appropriate circumstances, one should be prepared to strive for goals that advance a country a limited distance towards long term goals. Certain goals can be achieved one step at a time rather than through seeking the ultimate. She said it was permissible to subdivide major goals to a series of lesser ones, to work sequentially towards their achievement. For example, Mrs. Gandhi's attitude toward aid would fall under this category. She said that although foreign aid meant dependence and pressure to conform it was a stepping stone to self-reliance and economic and technological improvement.

No nation, certainly not India, can receive even friendly assistance without paralyzing its will and morale, unless such aid is merely a stepping stone towards eventual self-reliance (31 March 1966).

She believed that foreign aid would ultimately lead to self-generating growth.

This concept of ultimate self-reliance means that aid...need not continue and that our own export earnings should meet our import requirements (30 March 1966).

As a nation we do not wish to depend on foreign assistance for a day longer than is absolutely necessary (31 March 1966).

So depending on the circumstances, issues etc., one may adopt a strategy of pursuing an optimal or feasible goal.

### Path for Achieving Goals Multiple paths

We in India are attuned to the idea that the paths to truth are many and various (14 Oct 1968).

There may be more than one way. One does not know whether those ways will succeed or not (1 Jan 1969).

Just as there is not just one single method to solve a problem, there is not just one single means to achieve goals. For example, the goal of development is broad-based and hence

in the achievement of this goal, one has to follow numerous paths and strategies and without closing off any avenues. The relationship of means to ends should be flexible according to Mrs. Gandhi.

All ways, all methods should be explored (1 Jan 1969).

### Linkage between Goals All Goals are Linked

Larger values and aims must constantly be kept in view. No program or work can succeed in isolation from other programs and work (11 June 1966).

According to Mrs. Gandhi, most of India's goals were interdependent and linked. The achievement of one entailed the achievements of others. Similarly the failure of one could lead to the failure of the other. For example, she said that political freedom is incomplete and would have no real meaning without economic independence (14 July 1966). Likewise, peace like freedom and progress is indivisible.

I think that once we move in the general direction of peace, we would find that some other problems would also be solved since all these problems are closely linked together (13 Nov 1968).

For example, in order to achieve the wider goal of regional stability and peace, all outstanding conflicts with Pakistan and China had to be resolved. Peace and harmony on the subcontinent would be a logical corollary to that. Peace was linked to development and self-reliance. Only under conditions of global and regional peace could the third world countries attain their goal of development and progress. Another example was that she also saw the goal of self-reliance and self-sufficiency as being closely related to independence in decision making. During periods of severe economic crises in India it can be noticed that there was a shift towards greater foreign aid and concessions to solicit it, but when the going was good, there was less concern with concessions to mollify foreign investors or to solicit foreign aid on an urgent and massive scale.

Also, once the nations in the region attained a level of development which would make them relatively self-sufficient, big power interference in their affairs would decrease. Failure to achieve developmental goals would mean loss of independence in decision-making. These goals were all concomitant.

**TABLE 21**  
**REFERENCES TO NATURE OF GOALS (PHASE I)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<b><u>Nature of Goals</u></b> - National Interests - Protect Security	109 79	58% 42%
<b><u>Best Approach for Goals</u></b> - From Master Plan - Immediate Problem - Mixed	30 26 1	52.6% 45.6% 1.8%
<b><u>Type of Goals</u></b> - Optimal - Feasible	20 18	52.6% 47.4%
<b><u>Path Goals</u></b> - Multiple Paths - Single path	23 9	71.9% 28.1%
<b><u>Linkage between Goals</u></b> - All Goals Linked - Tradeoffs Necessary	13 1	92.9% 7.1%

### **Instrumental Belief # 2**

#### **Effective Way to Pursue Goals**

**Do Not Abandon/Substitute/modify Optimal Goals  
Substitute Means if Necessary**

A tree must have roots. Though the roots go deep into the ground, the tree itself grows up into the sky, towards the sun. So must we turn our faces and our steps towards the future though our roots remain in the past (10 Oct 1966).

According to Mrs. Gandhi, basic and fundamental goals of man should not be changed, modified or abandoned. Certain goals are timeless, although the means to achieve them should be flexible in keeping with the changing times.

We should not hesitate to change policies if they are outdated. We should not be inhibited or deterred in changing these policies. All policies have to be examined and re-examined for their relevance to certain situations and for their efficiency in solving certain problems or meeting certain ends. Only then can our policies serve the purpose we have in view (14 Oct 1968).

One should not adhere to methods that do not work or are obsolete. She said that we would stagnate in the process of working towards goal achievement if we adopted an inflexible approach.

All policies are flexible because in a changing situation, you have to meet those changes (1 Jan 1966).

New world demands new thinking, new solutions, new institutions (27 June 1969).

But despite Mrs. Gandhi's assertion of non-compromise on certain essential and optimal goals, such as independence in foreign policy matters, she had to abandon this stance on several occasions, during this phase, most notably in the case of U.S. aid wherein she had to make a tradeoff - India's silence on Vietnam in exchange for food. She faced numerous criticisms in regard to this and was charged with selling Indian interests and independence for a few bushels of wheat. But she replied that securing foreign assistance as a means to tide over the short term crisis was only temporary. She seemed pragmatic on this score.

We are seeking more aid in order to give a strategic push to the economy which will carry it to a stage of self generating growth (12 June 1966).

Once India achieved self-reliance and self-sufficiency, India's interests would no longer be compromised and independence in decision-making would be restored. This was indicated by the fact that as the economic crisis passed and the Indian economy began to pick up by 1968, the brief silence on Vietnam was ended.

### Means of Achieving Goals Mobilization

This involves the commitment of one's total resources and manpower for goal achievement. Mrs. Gandhi believed that every single individual in India had to join forces and pitch in their might to help achieve some of the fundamental goals. She said that, although the role of the government and leader was important in bringing about change in society, it would not succeed if the people were not cooperative or or if they

were apathetic. For example, there should be a total mobilization of resources and manpower in order to wage a relentless war against poverty and backwardness. She said that it was the duty of every individual to cooperate in the great task of development and that no one could absolve themselves of that responsibility. The entire resources of the country had to be committed to fight the economic battle. The public and private sectors, federal and state governments, government officials and private individuals had to work in unison. The government had to mobilize the capital needed for investment in developmental projects while making atleast some provision for social welfare.

Also, the struggle to maintain security meant that it was not just the responsibility of the soldiers to defend the borders but that everyone should join in a collective effort to provide a strong backbone for the nation.

*Our brave Jawans (soldiers) are guarding our frontiers....Let us remember that our defences lie not only on the Himalayas but in every village, every town and every city. The peasant, the labourer, the industrialist, the businessman, the teacher and the employee have all an equally great responsibility in this task. Each one of them should discharge this responsibility faithfully (15 Aug 1966).*

### **Strategy** **Cooperative (International Strategy)** **Conciliation and deterrent (China & Pakistan)**

Mrs. Gandhi advocated two kinds of strategies, depending on the areas of interaction. In the international domain, India should follow a cooperative strategy. In dealings with Pakistan and China, she advocated a mixture of conciliation and deterrence.

The number of references in the documents indicate that during this phase Mrs. Gandhi was more concerned with India's strategy viv-a-vis the international system and was much less concerned with strategy in the regional system.

#### **1. Cooperative Strategy:**

She believed that there was no alternative to peaceful coexistence and this would gain added meaning through active international cooperation.

*Even from the point of view of limited self interest, it is necessary for countries to cooperate for the betterment of humanity. In the past, this might have been regarded as idealistic, but yesterday's morality and idealism is today a matter of practical necessity (19 Sept 1967).*

Friendship and cooperation, she said, were practical means of strengthening ourselves.

### For India, the strategy

Is to seek cooperation in matters where interests converge and to seek adjustment and accommodation wherever there are divergences (6 April 1968).

According to Mrs. Gandhi there were two areas of international cooperation. One was the coming together of the rich and the poor nations, the haves and have nots, in order to work for a more equitable redistribution of resources, technology, capital and terms of trade - i.e., international cooperation for the development of underdeveloped areas. She was a strong proponent for a global strategy for development, and an integrated program of international cooperation.

Second, stressed the need for cooperation amongst the poor and developing countries of the third world. She believed in self help and that one could not depend on assistance from the developed nations in order to achieve national goals. These countries had to make a tremendous effort on their own. This would be better facilitated if the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America could cooperate.

We value regional cooperation because we have common tasks and common dreams...the nonaligned and the developing countries must make a tremendous effort to become self reliant ....Only by mutual cooperation in the economic, political and cultural spheres can this objective be furthered (21 Oct 1966).

Since the developing countries had similar problems, social structures and economic goals, there was much scope for cooperation amongst themselves, especially between neighbouring countries.


There is a vast field for cooperation in the existing task of nation building. We have much to learn from each other and we cannot but gain by cooperating with each other (18 Sept 1967).

She believed in the possibility of the developing countries complementing one another's economies through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Such cooperation would enable them to resist pressures from outside. As one of the founders of the nonaligned movement, India's strategy was to further strengthen, develop and advance relations with the other nonaligned and developing countries. Mrs. Gandhi saw greater strength and leverage in this unity. Even while India faced severe economic difficulties from 1966 to 1968 and was seeking U.S. aid, among the first countries to be visited by Mrs. Gandhi were Yugoslavia and U.A.R. In the subsequent years India's interests and participation in the nonaligned movement remained at a high level of activity. Indian strategy towards



3

PM-1 3½" x 4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET  
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT



PRECISION<sup>SM</sup> RESOLUTION TARGETS

PIONEERS IN METHYLENE BLUE TESTING SINCE 1974



15000 VICTORY ROAD • BURNING WOODS, OHIO 44025 USA  
TEL: 814 438 7887 FAX: 814 438 7887 TLA 510000488

Vertical line of text on the right side of the page, likely a scanning artifact or a reference mark.

neighbouring countries such as Nepal, Burma, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan were also based on cooperation.

It was in interactions with China and Pakistan that Mrs. Gandhi advocated a mixture of conciliation and deterrence. With regard to China, she preferred to resolve the border problem peacefully through communication and negotiation. She adopted a more accommodating position than China did and this strategy was reflected in the fact that India did not shift its position on Tibet or Taiwan, despite continuing Chinese hostility.

With regard to Pakistan, also, Mrs. Gandhi believed in peacefully resolving the problem of Kashmir and adopted a conciliatory strategy in keeping with the Tashkent agreement. Although Mrs. Gandhi was not totally in favour of this agreement, she was prepared to negotiate with Pakistan and implement the agreement fully. She expected that the treaty would help generate an atmosphere of understanding between India and Pakistan. She hoped that the two countries could avoid the recourse to force and violence, and engage in realistic negotiations on mutual problems without seeking foreign intervention. But with increased perceptions of Pakistan's belligerence, Mrs. Gandhi said that, although she believed in peaceful methods and a conciliatory and accommodating strategy, she would also be prepared to defend India's vital security interests if they were threatened militarily. For this she suggested a deterrent strategy which implied a defensive response to any unfriendly or non-cooperative acts of the opponent, and to counter attack when attacked, in self defence. She believed that Kashmir was non-negotiable and any attempts to capture Kashmir by force would be resisted.

*Whether it is Kashmir or Ladakh, every inch of land is the land of India. Not an inch of this land will be given to anybody under any pressure whatsoever (21 June 1967).*

She also threatened reprisals when Pakistan sponsored guerilla activities and uprisings in Kashmir. The modernization and the expansion of the Indian army and air force was undertaken at a modest pace to make up for their neglect during the fifties and to deter China or Pakistan from repeating their respective attacks of 1962 and 1965.

**TABLE 22**  
**REFERENCES TO GOAL PURSUIT (PHASE I)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<u>Goal Pursual</u> - Dont abandon/Modify/ Substitute goals - Abandon	11 2	84.6% 15.4%
<u>Means to Achieve Goals</u> - Mobilization - Incremental	38 8	82.6% 17.4%
<u>Strategy</u> - Conciliatory - Cooperative - Deterrent	1 91 37	.8% 70.5% 28.7%

### **Instrumental Belief # 4**

#### **Action** **Multilateral and Bilateral**

Mrs. Gandhi believed in two kinds of action.

In the international sphere, Mrs. Gandhi expressed a preference for multilateral action in concert with the nonaligned and other developing nations. She even suggested that the process towards detente was facilitated by the nonaligned nations working as a group. She said that working singly, a nation could not make itself heard in international forums, and lacked the power to exercise much weight in international affairs. These nations could wield influence only through collective activity.

It might be asked how nations which are themselves lacking in strength can hope to strengthen the cause of progress and peace....I do believe that the unity and united efforts of the nations of Africa and Asia can help the world (13 Nov 1968).

But in relations with the other neighbouring countries of the subcontinent, Mrs. Gandhi strongly propagated bilateral action and in interacting with them on a one to one basis.

The concern to limit foreign intervention manifested itself in Mrs. Gandhi's increasing advocacy of bilateralism. For example, she repeatedly told Pakistan that a bilateral solution to problems between the two countries was in their best interests. It was only by avoiding internationalization of subcontinental issues could they avoid becoming pawns in a game of superpower politics.

**TABLE 23**  
**REFERENCES TO ACTION (PHASE I)**

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>What Kind Action</u>		
- Unilateral	2	1.9%
- Multilateral	54	51.9%
- Bilateral	48	46.2%

### Instrumental Belief # 5

#### Military Force

#### Avoid Force but Use it as Last Resort

Mrs. Gandhi abhorred the use of force of any kind and believed that force had to be avoided as much as possible in the solving of problems. Other peaceful methods of conflict resolution such as negotiation and mediation had to be employed and one had to strive hard to make them work. But if the opponent was intractable and resorted to military action, force would be used to repel it.

It has always been and continues to be our endeavour that all questions should be solved through peaceful means. But if there is aggression on our borders, we will meet it with all our might (15 Aug 1967).

We have abjured the use of force in the settlement of international differences. But we will resist force (16 July 1967).

Even though one should avoid the use of force, its use can be justified one condition - if there is a threat to India's security and other fundamental goals and interests. In other

words, force could be used in self defence as a last resort and should not be initiated in a conflict situation.

**Military Supremacy**  
**Crucial in some situations**  
**Not crucial in others**

There was an essential contradiction in this particular belief. On the one hand Mrs. Gandhi believed that military supremacy was not at all crucial.

Many people in the world and in India felt that no nation could win independence through non violent means, particularly against a superior armed force. But we said that it was the right way for us; we faced the ridicule, the abuse, the firing, the prisons, everything that came; and in the end it was proved that we were right (12 Oct 1968).

She also quoted the instance of Vietnam, where a militarily weaker power was posing big problems for a giant. She fought for disarmament and abandonment of the arms race and propagated the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

But on the other hand, she took great pains to modernize and develop the Indian army. After the debacle of 1962, she wanted to ensure that the army, navy and air force were equipped with the latest in weapons technology and as a result depended on the Western powers as well as the Soviet Union for supplies. This she insisted was mainly for defensive and not offensive purposes. Also the armed forces were expanded in number and domestic defence production was accelerated.

Hence, there was this contradiction between the idea of national security being broadly based on economic development, social dynamism and political democracy, and the idea of defence as resting on high cost and a modern military machine. The Prime Minister supported the former concept but the claims of the latter could not be ignored.

**Power**  
**Multidimensional**

"In the present day world, real strength is not military strength alone. We have to have a sound industrial base and a united nation (15 Aug 1968).

Mrs. Gandhi's concept of power was based on both tangible and intangible attributes and was multidimensional. Military power was just one of the important aspects in the hierarchy of attributes in the power structure of a state. History has shown a country

small in size and militarily weak could prevail over a stronger, more powerful nation.

*The limitation of power has been dramatically demonstrated....A small country, poor in arms and resources has been able to withstand the might of the giant. The spirit of a free people cannot be scorched or trampled under. power cannot command obedience, let alone friendship and love (15 Feb 1969).*

The capacity of the Indian people to endure hardships and the survival of Indian civilization through conditions which have effaced others was counted by Mrs. Gandhi as intangible attributes of India's power. According to her, the power of the country was in its people - their efforts, pride, courage and determination, capability and will to achieve important goals in the face of adversity. Also, equally important was the economic infrastructure, technological might and industrial base and its military strength.

*In order to be militarily strong, it is necessary to be economically and industrially strong (24 April 1968).*

India's relations with its neighbours and India's military and economic diplomacy illustrate Mrs. Gandhi's policies in these areas were infused with confidence in India's durability. Much before Bangladesh she appeared to aspire not for great power status, but for a significant role for India in world affairs.

*Because of our size and geographical position and resources in materials and men, we cannot but play a fairly large part in international affairs and that role will always be on the side of peace. People recognize us as a power, even as a potential great power (16 March 1968).*

She clearly wished to be noticed and wanted the world to recognize India's potential. India should neither be ignored or equated to lesser powers. She resented American attempts to assert a balance between India and Pakistan. When the Soviets briefly adopted the same policy in 1968, Mrs. Gandhi wrote a pointed letter to Kosygin. In dealings with Pakistan, she was not hesitant to underline India's superiority in resources and military strength.

She consistently viewed strength in terms of independence and vice versa. She also interpreted dependence on foreign assistance as a weakness.

*Our strength should be thought of not only in terms of the ability of our valiant fighting forces. It consists equally in our ability to maintain order and domestic peace, in our devotion to the task of increasing production and improving skills, in our resolve to attain speedy self-reliance (10 Oct 1966).*

But Mrs. Gandhi was not able to resolve during this period the fundamental dilemma of power facing India - how to be strong enough to prevent encroachment on national

interests by outside powers and yet avoid intimidating other small neighbouring states by an increase of power.

**TABLE 24**  
**REFERENCES TO FORCE (PHASE I)**

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Force</u>		
- Avoid Use/Last resort	15	88.2%
- Only Viable Means	1	5.9%
- Use than Surrender	1	5.9%
<u>Military Supremacy</u>		
- Crucial	2	50%
- Not Crucial	2	50%
<u>Power</u>		
- Multidimensional	5	100%

#### **D. Conclusions:**

During this phase, Mrs. Gandhi perceived herself as a nation builder and an international and regional reformer. She saw international relations and the nature of politics as being essentially conflictual but had faith in the fact that this condition was not permanent. According to Mrs. Gandhi, the main sources of conflict during this phase were power politics on the one hand, and economic disparities and inequalities which divided the world into haves and have-nots on the other. Imperialism, colonialism and racism perpetuated these inequalities. Rather than a revolutionary overthrow of the existing system or even a violent transformation, there could be orderly change in the system and a reformation movement toward peace. Peace could be established by the abandonment of power politics and its accompanying arms race, spheres of influence and military blocs. Non-interference was the key. It was also imperative that inequalities

be reduced. She perceived force as being dysfunctional for society and was optimistic enough to predict that better times were ahead, and peace was not an impossible dream if mankind cooperated and worked hard toward achieving it. The role of the leader was to help reform society. Cooperation and resolution of problems between India, China and Pakistan was necessary for regional stability. She was committed to certain optimal goals and believed that they were not subject to compromise. India was to play an independent role and promote the causes of the nonaligned nations.

There were few contradictions in Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs during this period. The philosophical beliefs were clearly articulated and instrumental beliefs were applied more to specific events, situations and actors. There is also an indication of interconnectedness of most of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs.



## **CHAPTER V**

### **MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE PHASE II THE YEARS OF ENDEAVOUR (1970-1972)**

This phase effectively covers the conflict in East Pakistan and India's involvement in the crisis. The second phase was considered as the 'Years of Endeavour' for Mrs. Gandhi. By March 1971, Indira Gandhi found herself in a position of supremacy that seemed to appear to rival that of Nehru at the peak of his career as Prime Minister, and by the end of this phase she emerged as a powerful and capable leader with the entire country's support behind her.

#### **A. Issues:**

##### **DOMESTIC:**

On the domestic front, her major policy initiatives were 1. The abolition of privy purses in January 1970; 2. Re-nationalization of banks by a presidential ordinance; 3. Dissolution of the Lok Sabha and calling for mid-term elections.

A major legislation put an end to the privileges enjoyed by the royal families in various parts of the country, in keeping with the government's Socialist policies. The effects of the green revolution and a good monsoon resulted in a bumper harvest and put an end to the food shortages. After four years of industrial recession and inflation, the economy began picking up. The fourth and fifth five year plans which were postponed for three years were impressively launched.

In February 1970, the Supreme Court struck down the bank nationalization act passed by Mrs. Gandhi's government in 1969. But this act was soon reinstated with a presidential ordinance which circumvented the Supreme Court's objections to the original legislation.

By June 1970, Mrs. Gandhi's position was strong enough to initiate a major

cabinet reshuffle, which demonstrated her supremacy in the government and she brought under her personal control its most crucial departments such as Home, which together with the expansion of the cabinet secretariat gave her full control of all internal security and government intelligence. By the end of 1970, with an accurate sense of political timing, she called for mid-term elections. The most decisive feature of the Congress (R)'s election campaign and its subsequent electoral victory was the impact of Indira Gandhi's personality. The grand alliance<sup>1</sup> had turned the election into a referendum on Mrs. Gandhi's leadership and Mrs. Gandhi took on the challenge. Never before was attention so exclusively focused on an individual leader as it was in the 1971 general elections<sup>2</sup>. The main theme of Congress (R)'s election speeches was Indira Gandhi's 'heroic' struggle against the forces of reaction represented by the syndicate and the old guard, and her 'selfless' commitment to the war on poverty and social injustice. She tried not to alienate the upper and middle classes while using Socialist slogans to win mass support. She reassured the rich and propertied classes that she was committed to peaceful and gradual change. She promised them political stability and conditions for economic growth which only a strong central government could guarantee. At the same time, she kindled new hope among the exploited and underprivileged sections of the masses who had so far been politically apathetic. She tried to convince both the rich and the poor that she would protect them from one another.

The key to Indira Gandhi's popularity and her party's electoral success in 1971 was due to the fact that she had convinced the electorate that she could provide the country with both stability and social change.

Mrs. Gandhi's speeches reflect her awareness that her massive electoral mandate carried with it a heavy responsibility. Henceforth, there could be no alibis or excuses for failure on any policy issue. The Congress split and its aftermath, the elections accompanied by promises of radical changes and Mrs. Gandhi's powerful position had

---

<sup>1</sup>Opposition coalition

<sup>2</sup>Not even in Nehru's time.

all combined to politicize the country to an unprecedented degree and to raise high hopes amongst the people which any government or party would be hard-pressed to satisfy. Under these circumstances, it was fortunate for Mrs. Gandhi's government that public attention was diverted almost immediately from domestic issues by the external crisis in East Pakistan.

#### **FOREIGN:**

The main issue that dominated all others was the civil war in Pakistan which had important repercussions on India's foreign as well as domestic policies during this phase. **Civil War in Pakistan and the Creation of Bangladesh:**

This phase was characterized by the most critical crisis in Indo-Pak relations which came as a result of the upsurge in East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh. The background to the crisis, however, had little to do with India, as vehemently asserted by Mrs. Gandhi, but its escalation and consequences had a tremendous impact on Indo-Pak relations.

The crisis had its origins in other fundamental problems<sup>3</sup> and it picked up momentum when the Awami league, which had secured a majority in the elections, was not allowed to form the government, and its leader Mujibur Rehman was imprisoned. A wave of protests and riots broke out in East Pakistan and the army was sent in to crush the rebellion. The army began a reign of terror and millions of refugees poured into India to avoid the massacre.

#### **Impact of the crisis on India:**

In India, both the government and the public were too preoccupied with the elections and domestic politics to take serious note of the crisis brewing in Pakistan and the news of the revolt in East Pakistan burst upon the Indian scene with explosive suddenness. Initially, Mrs. Gandhi did not react too strongly to the situation as she believed that it was Pakistan's domestic problem. But when the influx of refugees became uncontrollable, she realized the dangers it posed to India's security and regional stability. Mrs. Gandhi summarized the geo-political predicament on the subcontinent in

---

<sup>3</sup>which will be dealt with later

these words.

**What was claimed to be an internal problem in Pakistan has also become an internal problem in India (7 Nov 1971).**

Her efforts to keep India detached from the political turbulence in Pakistan was of no avail. For the sake of India's security, she had to ensure that India obtained and kept some control over events. This crisis had an impact on India in several ways.

**1. The Refugee Problem:**

It was the unexpected arrival of the refugees which forced Indira Gandhi's government into awareness of the multilayered crisis it faced internally - the threat to broadly defined national security interests. A financial crisis was caused by the sheer numbers of more people arriving everyday, with the danger of a deeper economic crisis through inflation and the cessation of developmental effort under the deadweight burden on the economy. There was also fear of political disruption in states bordering East Bengal where existing dissidence might intensify, and there was constant danger of communal riots. The tensions and antagonisms between the Bengalis and the local population in the region were being heightened.

2. Second, the presence of a Bangladesh government in exile on Indian soil made it imperative for Delhi to take cognizance of events in a neighbouring country and formulate a corresponding policy. Although she did not formally recognize Bangladesh, by mid-May Mrs. Gandhi began to refer to East Bengal as Bangladesh and called for a political settlement of the crisis. She then attempted to arouse the conscience of all the Western countries and launched a major diplomatic offensive. Indian diplomacy during the latter half of 1971 was aimed at securing a peaceful political settlement in Bangladesh through international pressure and, failing that, at preparing the ground for a military solution. Mrs. Gandhi played a key role in formulating and implementing the government's international strategy.

**3. Pakistan's portrayal of the crisis as an Indo-Pak problem:**

By end of October 1971, tensions on the eastern border was escalating rapidly. On the eve of the Prime Minister's departure on her diplomatic trip to the West, the press reported a large build up of Pakistan's troops near the border. Mrs. Gandhi

accused Yahya Khan of internationalizing the issue as an Indo-Pak problem, when in fact it was not. By adhering to her foreign schedule despite the danger of actual conflict, Mrs. Gandhi sought to show the world that while she was prepared to defend India's security, she had no intention of initiating a war. In all her speeches she made an explicit distinction between the internal and international aspects of the Bangladesh crisis. She asserted that it was not a dispute between India and Pakistan, but between the Pakistan military government and its own people. As a corollary to this, she rejected categorically any suggestions that she should negotiate directly with Yahya Khan. She did not want to give the impression that India wanted the dismemberment of Pakistan. On the other hand, she stressed that the massive refugee burden foisted on India had internationalized the problem and the refugees could only be repatriated after a democratic political settlement and that it was the duty of the world community to put pressure on Pakistan for such a settlement.

4. Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace Friendship and Cooperation

5. Increasing chill in India's relations with China and the U.S.

These two issues are dealt with in detail in the next few pages.

6. India's military involvement:

In an address to the India League in London Mrs. Gandhi declared

Everybody today is busy telling us that we must show restraint. I do not think that any people or any government could have shown greater restraint than we have in the face of such tremendous provocation and threat to our safety and stability....I feel that I am sitting on top of a volcano and I honestly do not know when it is going to erupt (7 Nov 1971).

Mrs. Gandhi made it clear that she would not be satisfied with assurances of sympathy and admiration for her handling of the refugee problem. In contrast to the mild and non-controversial note she had struck on previous foreign visits, this time her tone was sharp and uncompromising. She spoke from a position of strength which reflected her increased self assurance and her confidence in the political stability and military preparedness of her government. In her speeches, interviews and press conferences, she made clear her dissatisfaction with the apathy and 'do nothing' attitude of the Western countries.

She declared her firm intent to deal with the situation herself if no help was

forthcoming.

We are not dependent upon what other countries think or want us to do. We know what we want for ourselves and we are going to do it, whatever it costs.... We welcome help from any country; but if it does'nt come, well, it's all right by us (6 Nov 1971).

Asked why she refused to have talks with Pakistan, she snapped back:

Talks with whom - and about what? Upto now, President Yayha Khan is telling everybody that the situation in Bangladesh is absolutely normal. Now, either he does'nt know what is happening, or he is telling a deliberate untruth. Either way, where is the foundation for a talk (6 Nov 1971).

By the end of November 1971, all the avenues of personal and governmental diplomacy had been explored, and it stopped short of direct negotiations with Pakistan's military regime which would have compromised India's basic position on Bangladesh.

Indira Gandhi could say with an easy conscience that she had done everything in her power to secure the independence of Bangladesh without a war. If that had proved insufficient, she was now ready for a more drastic solution although she was still unwilling to fire the first shot (Masani 1975, 244).

By December 1971, rather than face a slow erosion of his position and confident that the U.S. and China would come to his aid in the event of a war, President Yayha Khan escalated the conflict with an attack on the western front. It was calculated to internationalize the situation on the eastern front and secure immediate intervention by the superpowers and the U'N, and it would freeze the eastern border and halt guerilla activities.

It was under these circumstances that the Indian army went into Bangladesh. There was perfect coordination between the government and the military. Mrs. Gandhi's sense of perfect timing was displayed in the precise manner in which the army completed its operations in Dacca<sup>4</sup>, and accepted the surrender of the Pakistani forces. With the same sense of timing, she also declared a unilateral ceasefire on the western front in order to show that India did not want Pakistan's territory.

The consequences of this conflict for the subcontinent's power balance and for Indo-Pak relations were far-reaching. Pakistan's loss of the eastern section of its country was both a political and economic blow. The authority and capability of the Pakistan

---

<sup>4</sup>Be. the US, China or the UN could intervene and before the arrival of the US seventh fleet in Chittagong.

military machine was seriously undermined. There was an alteration of the power balance. Although the crisis did not lead to the total collapse of Pakistan, it substantially altered the balance of forces.

Mrs. Gandhi was absolutely certain that there could be no lasting stability on the subcontinent without an Indo-Pak peace settlement. Pakistan was cut down to size, but the Indian government had to deal with the possibility that with American and Chinese assistance a truncated but more cohesive Pakistan might soon regain its pre-war level of military strength. Continuing hostilities would require vast military spending and would be an irritant in India's relations with the superpowers. Also, in order to still the fears of Hindu domination, peace with Pakistan was essential. It was under these circumstances that the Simla summit was held in June 1972 in order to settle the Bangladesh issue, and for the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. A framework was drawn based on peaceful settlement of disputes between the two countries. This summit also dealt with the problems surrounding the repatriation of prisoners of war and other issues relating to Bangladesh and Kashmir.

Relations with the United States:

Indo-U.S. relations sunk to an all time low during this phase, mainly as a result of polarization of the two countries on strategic issues, particularly the crisis in Pakistan. Few episodes of U.S. involvement in the Indian subcontinent have received as much critical attention as President Nixon's 'tilt' towards Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971.

As such, a central and continuing problem plaguing relations between India and the U.S., was U.S. diplomatic support to Pakistan and its assistance in building up a huge military machine in that country. The issue flared up once again as it came to be known that Washington was preparing to resume military supplies to Pakistan.

On 23 Oct 1970, while addressing the UN General Assembly, Mrs. Gandhi referred to the role of imperialism in the Middle East and Vietnam conflicts, while avoiding direct criticism of the U.S.. What was implicit in her speech was made clear

when she pointedly declined a dinner invitation from President Nixon, who had recently renewed U.S. arms to Pakistan.

A new situation was emerging in Asia. A U.S.-Pak-China relationship was beginning to materialize, which left India in a vulnerable position. The Bangladesh crisis came at a time when the American administration was set on a course of developing a new balance of relationships in Asia, with China at the centre of the new strategic concept. Because of this emerging new equation the U.S. turned a blind eye to the developments in Pakistan and to the atrocities being committed by the Pakistani military in East Pakistan. The great event of 1971, from Nixon and Kissinger's point of view, was not the nationalist revolution in Bangladesh but the secret opening to China. A delicate and clandestine move was coming to a climax. The Pakistan channel of communication and its role in bringing about this U.S.-China liaison was very important to Washington and hence the U.S. was unwilling to do anything that would disrupt this new strategic move. U.S. reactions to events in South Asia were considered primarily in light of their effects on this new move in the global strategic competition between the Soviet Union and the U.S.. The State Department is also believed to have made it clear that India could not expect American assistance if India was involved in wars with Pakistan and China.

Also, Nixon and Kissinger's policies were moulded by their antipathy towards India in general and Indira Gandhi in particular. It was evident in the stereotyped imagery used by Kissinger in his references to India (Kissinger 1979, 842). The Nixon-Kissinger policies on South Asia were criticized in the U.S. at the time by some members of the U.S. Congress, the academic community and the American press. The press, in particular, gave full coverage to the brutality of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan.

Initially, Washington attempted to treat the matter of Bangladeshi nationalism as an internal affair of Pakistan and justified Yahya Khan's attempts to suppress a secessionist movement. Later, the U.S. began to interpret it as an Indo-Pak dispute and attempted to bring about a dialogue between India and Pakistan to diffuse the tension and strive for a settlement. India's plea that it was not an Indo-Pak issue went unheard in



Washington. The U.S. was unwilling to put any pressure on Yayha Khan or attempt to get Mujibur Rehman released.

Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington proved a timely and shrewd tactic, carrying the Indo-American diplomatic struggle into Nixon's own territory and enabling her to appeal directly to the American public against the administration's uncooperative attitude. There was a marked personal coolness between the two leaders and a wide cleavage between their views on Bangladesh. Nixon gave a vague assurance to exert pressure on Pakistan for a political solution while Mrs. Gandhi made an equally vague promise to abstain from military action in the meanwhile. The Indo-American summit was widely regarded as having ended in serious disagreement.

Also, the Indo-Soviet treaty widened the rift between the two countries. American economic aid to India was suspended, although military and economic aid to Pakistan continued. To the argument that this open bias might move Mrs. Gandhi closer to the Soviets, Kissinger, according to the Anderson papers, replied

*The lady is cold blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique (Dutt 1987, 104).*

When war broke out, India and the U.S. were aligned in open hostility with each other. The U.S. termed India the aggressor and called upon the UN Security Council to take emergency action to halt the fighting between India and Pakistan. At the same time Washington made military moves, and a part of the U.S. seventh fleet was ordered into the Bay of Bengal to evacuate U.S. citizens. The movement of naval ships was intended to provide political support for Pakistan, whose army in Bangladesh was disorganized (Dutt 1987, 103).

Unable to get around the Soviet veto in the Security Council, the U.S. sponsored a resolution in the General Assembly calling for immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of troops, which was passed by an overwhelming majority.

On 15 December, Mrs. Gandhi appealed to American and world opinion by means of an open letter to President Nixon published in the New York times, in which she countered the charge that she had not given him a chance to bring about a political settlement. Appealing to the principles of the American declaration of independence and

for fundamental human rights, she traced the causes of the nationalist uprising in Bangladesh, pointed to the failure of the international community to effect a just political settlement and reminded the world that it was Pakistan which had begun the war.

War...could have been avoided if the power, influence and authority of all the states, and above all, of the U.S., had got Sheik Mujibur Rehman released....Lip service was paid to the need for a political solution, but not a single worthwhile step was taken to bring this about....We are deeply hurt by the innuendoes and insinuations that it was we who precipitated the crisis and have in any way thwarted the emergence of solutions. Pakistan got away with the impression that they could do what they liked because no one, not even the U.S., would choose to take a public position that while Pakistan's integrity was sacrosanct, human rights and liberty were no less so (15 Dec 1971).

While Mrs. Gandhi certainly considered and prepared for the contingency of military involvement in Pakistan's civil war, we find no evidence of a definite decision being taken in the summer of 1971 to go to war, or of Moscow's backing to do so.

The White House seemed to place a higher priority on dealings with the Soviet Union and China than on coming to terms with India. It probably overestimated its own role in the Bangladesh crisis when it stated that Mrs. Gandhi's declaration of an unconditional ceasefire on 16 December,

Was a reluctant decision resulting from Soviet pressure, which in turn grew out of American insistence (Kissinger 1979, 913).

Such a view is not compatible with the data gathered from Mrs. Gandhi's speeches or with the government's limited war aims or with the sequence of events as they occurred.

Indo-U.S. relations plummeted following the Bangladesh crisis. All the negative attitudes already present towards each other were reinforced and legitimized for the moment.

Mrs. Gandhi did not mince words when she said during an interview,

When we hear of America's leaders talk about how they have gone into Vietnam to defend and develop the Vietnamese, it just sounds like an old version of the white man's burden to us. Therefore, what we in India say is that it would be better for American troops to get out of Asia altogether (13 Aug 1972).

Indo-U.S. relations, despite some marginal improvement, remained for the most part cool and distant after the crisis.

In a later interview (12 August 1973), Mrs. Gandhi interpreted U.S. aims on the subcontinent by emphasizing that Washington did not look kindly upon strong independent countries in Asia, did not wish to see the emergence of a strong India and

strove for a relationship of dependence to suit the requirements of American foreign policy.

#### India and the Soviet Union:

Free from the interference of the former conservative deputy prime minister and the right-wing syndicate, Mrs. Gandhi was now able to shape India's foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union according to her own views. Indo-Soviet relations had shown a marked improvement from the late sixties, coinciding with the new Congress-CPI entente at home, and in October 1970 the Soviet Union terminated its arms aid to Pakistan.

The climatic period in Indo-Soviet relations came in 1971, during the Bangladesh crisis, when there was a period of qualitative change in the nature and recognition of this relationship. Moscow's tilt towards India was as apparent as the U.S. tilt towards Pakistan. Moscow had already abandoned the attempt at simultaneous friendship with India and Pakistan and had decided to support India's standpoint, although with as much caution and care as possible under the circumstances.

Under combined pressures of US and China, India was looking for security. The stage was set for a closer relationship with Moscow. Indian and Soviet interests began to converge as the Soviet Union failed to resolve its disputes with China and India failed to get the support of the Nixon administration. Events on two levels in 1971 forced Delhi and Moscow to acknowledge this convergence and to formalize it with a treaty. One set of events took place openly on the subcontinent, the other quietly in world capitals<sup>5</sup>. These two layers were connected by Pakistan, where the regional triangle of hostility (Pakistan, China, India) met the global triangle of competition and rivalry (China, Soviet Union, U.S.). Civil war in Pakistan provided the occasion for a realignment among the five governments, which resulted in a diplomatic standoff between the U.S., SR and India on the one side and the U.S., China and Pakistan on the other.

Mrs. Gandhi looked both to the U.S. and to the Soviet Union for strategic deterrence against China and subtle pressures on Pakistan. Her government attempted to convince others that its perspective on the Bangladesh crisis was the right one. The

---

<sup>5</sup>Islamabad, Peking, and Washington; New Delhi and Moscow.

Nixon administration thought differently, and continued supplying arms to Pakistan and placed the onus for tensions on the subcontinent entirely on India. Meanwhile, Kissinger made his celebrated secret trip to Peking. The U.S. played its China card in the hope of winning the hand against the Soviet Union. China, similarly motivated, played its American card. Both China and the U.S. were indebted to Yayha Khan; both feared an increase in Soviet influence in South Asia. But Nixon's partiality, enhanced the sense of insecurity and isolation prevailing in India during the summer of 1971.

Indira Gandhi dramatically cut through the general mood of despondency by signing the Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace Friendship and Cooperation on 9 Aug 1971. In effect, with a perfect sense of timing, she publicly summoned a superpower to India's side. This could not be ignored by Washington or Peking, much less by Islamabad. When the treaty was first proposed in 1969 as part of the Brezhnev plan, it was rejected by Mrs. Gandhi, as she did not want to jeopardize relations with both the U.S. and China. But this aspect no longer figured in her calculations of India's interests. Her domestic position was strong, China rejected all offers of friendship and reconciliation made by India, and the U.S. did not end its tilt towards Pakistan. So, despite the fact that this treaty would be interpreted as a move away from India's nonaligned posture, Mrs. Gandhi realized that it was necessary to provide a security blanket in the event of war with Pakistan or China. It was a major turning point in the Bangladesh crisis. India's military needs were being met, and the Soviet Union began to endorse India's position on Bangladesh.

The treaty, with its provisions indicating the determination of the two powers to repel aggression and stipulating immediate mutual consultation in case either country was subjected to attack from outside, inevitably aroused suspicion and dismay in the West and angered Peking, and foiled the possibility of a second front against India by another power in case of a Pakistani attack. The meaning and implications of this treaty for the security of India seemed clear.

Moscow's backing of New Delhi's position on Bangladesh was of critical importance for India, confronted as it was with the combined opposition of the U.S., China and Pakistan. The Soviet Union's support to India constituted a warning signal

to the other big powers to refrain from applying singly or severally, military pressure on India and enable India to handle the crisis in its own way.

When Mrs. Gandhi visited Moscow in September 1971, she was warmly received by the Soviet leadership. In the course of the visit she worked hard to convince the Kremlin that the Bangladesh crisis and the refugee problem presented a threat to India's very existence.

*One cannot but be perturbed when fire breaks out in a neighbour's house (28 Sept 1971).*

The Soviet Premier on his part openly criticized the Pakistan government for its policy of repression.

When war broke out, the Soviet Union assured full support, allegedly with a promise to attack Sinkiang if China came into the war. Also, the Soviet Deputy Premier arrived in Delhi and remained there for the duration of the war, not only to ensure India's safety but also to make sure that India's war aims were limited<sup>6</sup>. To counter the American threat, a Soviet fleet sailed from Vladivostock, following on the heels of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. At the Security Council, the Soviet Union gave India full diplomatic support.

Surprisingly, while the Soviets publicly downplayed the security provisions of the treaty, the lively debate in India, which followed the signing, focused on them. This treaty created new precedents for both countries. India made a twenty year commitment to a superpower which it would have avoided in the 1950's. The Soviet Union made commitments to a nonaligned and non-Socialist state, which heralded a new phase of participation in international politics. One of the main consequences of the war was not just India's military victory but an improvement of the Soviet position in Asia.

#### Indo-Chinese Relations:

During the May Day parade in Peking on 1 May 1970, Mao summoned the Indian charge d'affaires and chatted with him about the traditional friendship between the two countries. From the Chinese point of view it was a major move. The Indian

---

<sup>6</sup>Brezhnev did not want too much controversy which would jeopardize superpower detente.

government anticipated further initiatives by the Chinese and concrete plans for the normalization of relations. But there were no other moves due to the other developments which had important international ramifications. During the crisis in Bangladesh, India and China were not only on opposite sides, but conducted themselves almost like actual adversaries. Chinese commitment to Pakistan was more fundamental and long-term. Peking carried on a vigorous anti-India campaign and was a vocal spokesman for Pakistan at the UN.

China continued to accuse India of expansionism and the Soviet Union as being India's manipulator. But despite its support for Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi did not exclude China from her diplomatic campaign, and every attempt was made to neutralize the Chinese in the event of an Indo-Pak war. During her Western tour, she continued to assert that India would redouble its efforts to normalize relations with China.

But during the December war, China stopped short of actual intervention. Whether it was because of the Indo-Soviet treaty is hard to say with the available evidence.

The above discussion of issues provides a historical background to India's foreign policy during that period. Just as in the first phase there were less references in the documents to domestic (44.9%) as opposed to foreign policy (55.1%) issues, as can be seen in Table 25. This could be due to the Mrs. Gandhi's preoccupation with the crisis in East Pakistan. Foreign issues took precedence over domestic issues.

**TABLE 25**  
**REFERENCES TO ISSUES (PHASE II)**

<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<b>DOMESTIC</b>	349	44.9%
<b>FOREIGN</b>	430	55.1%

## **B. Philosophical Beliefs:**

### **Philosophical Belief # 1**

#### **Nature of Politics Conflictual**

Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code philosophical belief # 1 regarding the nature of politics and conflict remained more or less consistent and stable from phase I to phase II. Just as in the the first phase, Mrs. Gandhi portrayed politics and the political universe as being essentially conflictual.

The world today is facing a crisis or perhaps it always has faced one crisis or another but I think today it is a deeper crisis (25 May 1972).

The present age is a perilous age, not only for our country but for the whole world (15 Aug 1970).

Twenty five years after the last holocaust, the world is not yet on the brink of peace (9 Sept 1970).

Mrs. Gandhi referred to three types of conflict

1. Conflicts in the international system caused by the disparities between nations and due to the system of stratification
2. Superpower conflicts as a result of the drive for power
3. Conflicts within every society caused by societal changes and transformations.

During this period she was most concerned with the third type of conflict. She associated most conflicts with societal change. But just as in the previous phase she made an implicit distinction between conflict and violent conflict. According to Mrs. Gandhi,

Throughout history when one age is ending and another coming into being, there has been great upheaval. Violence is a part of life (12 Jan 1971).

When such great transformations take place it is bound to result in some restlessness, sorrow and suffering. We cannot remain stuck to the old order nor can we wish that there should be no change (29 Oct 1971).

Change is the law of life and the changes taking place in the world today are of entirely different kinds. That is the reason why there is so much turmoil, turmoil not peculiar to our country alone but which is sweeping the whole world (2 feb 1971).

According to Mrs. Gandhi, conflict is reflected in the process of transformation of societies. This conflict would be enhanced more so when the forces which stood for

change clashed with those for the status quo.

**There is conflict. This conflict between the forces of change and forces of status quo is not confined to India but is found in all countries of the world (13 Jan 1970).**

While she accepted conflict as a way of life, especially in societies undergoing transformation, she believed that such conflict need not be violent. She constantly cited Gandhi and the Indian independence movement to illustrate her point. So it was not conflict as such that she opposed, but violent conflict.

But her conflict model was contrary to Marxist theory which addresses the inevitability of the violent overthrow of the exploitative system. According to her,

- a. Violent conflict was not inevitable or necessary to bring about changes or societal transformations. Changes could be brought about peacefully.
- b. The forces bringing about change were manipulable, and peaceful change could be brought about under the guidance of wise leadership.

**Violence is a part of life. But men of goodwill have always attempted to control it (12 Jan 1971).**

Violent conflict could either be avoided, prevented or regulated.

- c. Violence was not permanent, although it might seem so in light of the present crises. Mrs. Gandhi was optimistic on this score. Even if by chance violent conflict arises during social transformations, it would soon disappear, and stability would ensue. One could bring about changes in the system in a peaceful fashion and mould changes in such a way that they would not disrupt peace.

**I want to assure you that all big changes can be brought about through non violence (15 Aug 1970).**

While she believed that changes were inevitable in life, violent conflict was not.

### **Sources of Conflict**

- 1. Imperialism/colonialism/racialism**
- 2. Inequalities**
- 3. Power politics**

**I know that violence has many aspects and emerges from different roots (24 June 1971).**

As in the first phase she maintained that conflict was inherent in the structure of the international system and occurred as a result of inequalities and disparities reinforced by imperialism and neo colonialism, and because of power politics. However, there are two



tiers of conflict in the international system, Vertical and Horizontal.

### 1. Vertical conflicts in the international system:

These are caused by the stratification in the international system - stratification created by disparities in wealth and resources and uneven growth and development. This stratification is reinforced by imperialism, colonialism and racism.

We believe that while there are poor nations and rich nations, there is bound to be tension. There is tension not only between the poor and the rich, there is tension among the the rich because of their desire to control or influence the developing nations. This is how in the past most wars took place and this is the reason for much of the tension today (1 Nov 1971).

In this case, conflict occurs when the forces of change as represented by the dominated and exploited countries clash with the forces of the status quo represented by the rich industrialized and developed countries.

Everywhere the static and the dynamic are in conflict (12 Jan 1971).

She believed that the forces that favoured the status quo in the international system were the rich industrialized nations attempting to forcibly maintain that position in the international power structure and thereby resisting change, unless the change facilitated them in strengthening their position. There would be an inevitable clash with the poor developing and underdeveloped countries which were striving to move upwards in the hierarchy. In other words, by virtue of being more powerful, some states expanded their power at the expense of the weaker state by exploitation, domination and the creation of a dependent relationship, resistance to which created a conflict.

She predicted that the international system could not remain stable if there was a perpetration of the present inequalities.

If the division between the rich and the poor countries become sharper then I think it can only add to general tension in the world, which in the long run will not be good for the richer countries either (1 Nov 1971).

### 2. Horizontal:

Conflicts on the horizontal plane are caused by power politics - superpower rivalry, race for arms and spheres of influence. Regional conflicts are the spin off effects of all of the above factors. The military presence of any one nation or group automatically attracts a counter-presence and therefore adds to the tensions.

Tensions arise because of power politics and notions of superiority. The power of the big stick prevails...to assume the right to interfere in the affairs of others, and to arrogate authority for action which would not normally be allowed. Many of the advanced countries of today have reached their present affluence by their domination over other races and countries, the exploitation of their own masses and their own natural resources. They got a head start through sheer ruthlessness, undisturbed by feelings of compassion or by abstract theories of freedom, equality or justice (14 June 1972).

There is considerable interference in the internal affairs of many countries. The powerful make their presence felt in many ways. They are relentless in their endeavour to enlarge their spheres of influence. The extension of their military commitments to new areas, inevitably attracts counteraction by other powers. The limited wars which we have witnessed in the last twenty five years are the consequence of such policies (23 Oct 1970).

The threat of a nuclear war had not receded. Despite the movement towards detente, the arms race was perceived by Mrs. Gandhi as being intense as ever with each side attempting to gain strategic advantage, resulting in more tensions, mutual suspicion and hostility, and eventually would lead to violence.

#### Vertical Conflict (National):

Just as the system of stratification in the international system causes conflicts, disparities and inequalities were also the prime sources of tensions and violence at the national level.

It is when social disparities increase that we have social tensions, it is when there is social tensions that problems of law and order and instability and insecurity arise (25 Oct 1970).

Social tensions grow because of disparities; because of the sense of injustice felt by many of our people (28 Aug 1970).

One could discern the tensions between the forces of the status quo, represented by the rich industrialists, capitalists and landowners, and the forces for change - the poor and poverty stricken, workers, peasants and slum dwellers. The rich minority with greater privileges and more wealth would understandably not wish for a change in the traditional social and economic relations based on the medieval property system. Mrs. Gandhi warned that there was constant danger that the poverty-stricken exploited masses, fighting for basic necessities and a better standard of living, might violently clash with the rich and the propertied class. Mrs. Gandhi perceived the problem as being more severe in view of the magnitude of India's problems.

**Horizontal:**

**Mrs. Gandhi believed that all societies undergoing transformation had a tendency to generate conflict. For example, transition from a poor underdeveloped colony into a developed modern society.**

**For centuries, vast numbers in the countries under colonial rule were apathetic and resigned. Their awakening is accompanied by expectation and impatience. These have sometimes led to the growth of populism, encouraging fascism on the one hand and the destructive exuberance of the extreme left on the other, seeking short cuts and easy ways. We see this in many countries, including my own (23 Oct 1970).**

**While there was a need for economic and social transformations there would be a number of obstacles on the way.**

**In India, several revolutions - political, economic, social, intellectual and technological - are taking place simultaneously and peacefully, although not always without confrontation and crisis (31 Oct 1970).**

**She believed that a certain amount of conflict was inevitable in a developing society where structures were undergoing rapid changes, and experiments in modernization and developments were underway.**

**Your newspaper and ours will tell you of our great poverty, of our regional rivalries, of our student agitations, of religious riots and so on. All these conflicts are there, as indeed they exist in one form or another in most other countries. Some of them are due to historic causes, some to the tensions unavoidable in a developing and changing society (31 Oct 1969).**

**There would be tension between continuity and change and between high expectations and limited means. She attributed it to the scarcity of resources which creates situations, where even justifiable demands outspan the means to meet them (31 Oct 1970). In India progress was causing new demands and frustrations.**

**Progress itself upsets the status quo. It shakes people from the attitude of numb acceptance.... Education and contact with other countries unleash pent up expectations and give wing to dreams. The gap between one's grasp and one's reach generates greater competition....Every solution creates greater problems (31 Oct 1970).**

**In the process of transformation, when centuries-old traditions are broken, the mind liberated from ancient oppressive and authoritarian attitudes and from conventional morality, and when elements of choice are introduced, there are bound to be conflicts and dislocation of the human personality. This would give rise to inadequacies among the young people and lead to alienation (23 Oct 1970).**

**Also, rapid advances in science and technology had not solved many of the world's problems, and over vast areas of the world, poverty persists. Societies that are affluent are shaken by restlessness;**

Today there is far greater stability and more opportunity, yet never have the young felt more insecure....Young voices continue to be raised in dissent....It seems to arise out of anguish and despair (15 Aug 1971).

At a convocation ceremony at Oxford, England, she told the audience,

Paradoxically, the very forces unleashed by freedom and by technological progress have generated problems of enormous complexity. Man's relationship to man, to nature and to the universe - are under tremendous pressure. The structures of the new technology and the energies unleashed are threatening the survival of man and our earth (2 Nov 1971).

These conflicts have been intensified because change has not been appropriately guided or shaped. The forces of the status quo are deeply entrenched in society. She considered legal institutions as the guardians of the status quo, and said that these institutions need to be flexible in order to meet this constant challenge of change. But a major handicap lay in the fact that those who were in a position to ease the transformation were afraid to question the old order and its structures. Because of the rigidities of the old institutions and structures, the young people have lost their enthusiasm and they interpret the establishment as rigid and unjust.

In almost every country a section of youth employs violent methods to repudiate these static structures and what they stand for (2 Nov 1971).

Traditionally, according to Mrs. Gandhi, the remedy against disorder has been punitive action - counter-violence and war, which in turn lead to further disorder.

Even the developed societies were not free of conflicts. Sheer affluence was leading to a kind of restlessness and loss of spiritual values. Progress did not create happiness.

The unfinished revolution is not confined to the poorer, developing countries. The advanced countries also have their unfinished revolution. We find it in the movement for women's liberation, in the revolution of young people, the ferment in universities and the assertion of Black and Brown power (23 Oct 1970).

Overall, a combination of all of these factors would make the global and regional system anarchic and unstable.

**Conditions of Peace**  
**Eliminate inequalities/Non-interference**  
**Promote Nonalignment**  
**Direct and regulate Change**

We know tensions in society have many origins - cultural, economic, and social. These have to be resolved. We should not allow them to erupt in ugliness and violence (24 June 1971).

Mrs. Gandhi believed that, because one could control historical development and one's life, humankind had the capability to resolve conflicts. If one really aspired to bring about and maintain peace, it was in one's hands to do so. Conflict was not an uncontrollable or a non-manipulable process. Accordingly,

We are convinced that the world can survive and progress not by conflict, but only through cooperation....If this premise is accepted, there is no problem which cannot be solved through peaceful deliberations. On the other hand, if force or compulsion is to be the sanction behind international relations, problems will become more intractable and the maintenance of peace will be increasingly endangered (31 Oct 1970).

Mrs. Gandhi laid down several conditions for peace - steps that were to be taken before a permanent peace could be achieved.

The first was an idealistic view, which had the flavour of Nehruvian philosophy, i.e., that all inequalities in the world had to be eliminated. During this phase, she was more emphatic in blaming the rich and developed countries for the poverty and backwardness of the Third World and believed that it was due to the exploitation and dominance which began during colonial rule and which was continuing in new forms up to the present day. The only way to diffuse tensions in the international system was by ending such exploitation and by levelling the inequalities and disparities. The unfair system of stratification had to end.

Obviously the evils of a stratified society are obstacles and must be removed (2 April 1970).

Not only had the rich countries the responsibility to narrow the gap between themselves and the underdeveloped, but the poor countries also had to make attempts to better their lot. She did not believe that inequality either in the national or international system was permanent. One had to make attempts to change the existing structure and end the dominant dependent relationship peacefully. Violence and conflict due to this cause could be obliterated.

In India, it was not just the inequalities between classes, but also stark poverty which was a main source of tensions and the first step was to ameliorate poverty.

Poverty is a terrible condition which brings frustration to the people and weakens the country. Therefore, our first task is to remove poverty. We have to remove social and economic disparities (15 Aug 1971).

She said that the socio-economic causes of violence could be identified and removed. It was possible to eradicate poverty, and social and economic injustices which led to conflict. According to her, the government's socialist policies were tailored not only to ensure the growth and development of the industrial sector of the country, but were intended to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor; and between expectations and the means to fulfill them.

Secondly, the more powerful countries had to desist from interfering in the affairs of less powerful or weak countries. Power politics had to be abandoned, a move towards disarmament in both nuclear and conventional weapons had to be made. This would ensure stability and peace, and the danger of yet another world war would recede.

She also stated in no uncertain terms the necessity of all nations to recognize the validity of nonalignment and its importance in maintaining world peace. In an interview with Japanese journalists she said,

The policy of Non alignment corresponds to our national interest. We believe that it is also in the interest of the interest of world peace and stability. Recent trends in international affairs have served to emphasize the validity of the assumptions on which the policy of Non alignment is based. The nations of the world today are gradually breaking away from the rigidities imposed by the military alliances and power blocs. So this leads us to believe that Non alignment is not a mere slogan, but a basic necessity for nations which are situated as we are. The broadening of the area of Non alignment and the increasing recognition of the basic principles of coexistence provide hope for a desirable world peace (12 March 1970).

She attributed the weakening of the alliance system to the merits of nonalignment and did not recognize that it was the existing international climate which was conducive to detente and the breakdown of the cold war.

We are deeply convinced that by staying out of military pacts, the nonaligned countries can use their collective wisdom and influence, to tip the balance of power in favour of peace and international cooperation (9 Sept 1970).

In fulfilling all of these conditions, change had to be brought about peacefully. Changes were necessary in order for society to grow and develop. It was absolutely imperative to recognize change when it was bound to occur and guide that change through peaceful

channels.

An addiction to violence has grown seeking by destruction to obliterate all that was and is. The answer is to seek to understand and remove the causes, by initiating the process of peaceful change (23 Oct 1970).

She was a firm proponent of peaceful change, and said that it was not only necessary but also possible to direct change and minimize violence. She warned,

Unless we take note of the aspirations of the people and engineer change peacefully, we shall be overtaken by events and by far greater violence than you see today (25 Oct 1970).

Change, according to her, simply did not mean economic well being but also a move towards a more egalitarian society.

The change we seek is not one of mere quantitative increase in economic prosperity. Change must be accompanied by a perceptible movement towards equality (8 April 1971).

She emphasised that stability was not synonymous with the status quo.

The world has been changing all along. If we hang on the status quo, it will give way and it will break perhaps violently. Whereas if we ask ourselves how to meet the changes, then there is a greater possibility of stability (11 Nov 1971).

Let us try to keep that peace without giving up the changes which are inevitable. Let us try not to mould the peace but to so mould the changes that they do not disrupt the peace (2 Feb 1971).

### **Scope of Conflict** **High Spillover**

We believe that what happens in one part of the world does affect other people and other countries (6 Nov 1971).

One of the main characteristics of conflict, according to Mrs. Gandhi, was its potential for spillover. This spillover took two forms.

1. Spillover from one geographical area to another.

Because of the shrinking of the world and the growing interdependence between countries, there was a tendency for a local war to escalate and spread to other parts of the world. A conflict in one geographical region would have an impact on many number of countries. At a press conference Mrs. Gandhi said:

War is such a terrible thing....There has been a tendency lately of fighting, once it began, to go on and on and involve more people and more countries also (19 Oct 1971).

There was no such thing as limited conflict (20 June 1972). Conflict would have a chain reaction.

*If there is tension in one place, it has a reaction in other places too (29 Jan 1971).*

This particular belief was strongly articulated during the Bangladesh crisis. She frequently warned that the crisis in Pakistan would eventually engulf India and later spread to other countries that were indirectly involved.

*We feel that if anything happens which threatens stability of India it will affect peace in the whole world (5 Nov 1971).*

She predicted that there would be a similar spillover of the conflicts in West Asia and in Vietnam to the rest of the world.

## 2. Spillover from one issue area to another:

Similarly, she believed that conflict in one issue area had the tendency of spilling over into another issue area. For example, social, communal or economic conflicts would have an effect on politics. In a lot of countries, poverty and underdevelopment have seriously undermined political stability. Also, in cases where there has been a severe political crisis or crisis of leadership and legitimacy, it has had adverse effects on the economy of the country. She cited the case of Pakistan to illustrate her point (10 Dec 1971). Because of structural linkages, a crisis in one area would have effects on the other. One of the dangers for India was communal instability and Mrs. Gandhi warned that unless there was communal harmony, governmental stability would be jeopardized. Similarly, between India and Pakistan, the issue of Kashmir, linked to the issue of religion, came in the way of achieving other fundamental goals - such as friendship and cooperation. Every conflict or disagreement between the two countries were linked to these sources.

*Violence breeds violence, whatever be its origin, whether it is communal, regional or economically or politically motivated (2 March 1970).*

### Role of Conflict Undesirable

During this phase, her beliefs regarding violent conflict and its undesirability was very much pronounced. She emphatically and vehemently denounced violence in no uncertain terms and stressed on its dysfunctional nature. She felt strongly against violent methods, because far from solving any problems, violence created many new problems (26 July



1972).

Answers cannot come through violence, because violence is destructive. Violence seeks to change, but in the method, sometimes, we forget the end and the goal (2 Feb 1971).

The number of times that this particular Operational Code belief was articulated could be an indication of her extreme distaste of, and reaction to the events in East Pakistan. She believed that the worst way of solving problems, whether personal, domestic or international was through violent methods (15 Aug 1970).

The most urgent and basic question is that of peace. Nothing is so pointless as modern warfare (14 June 1972).

In the present day world, there was an urgent necessity for peace.

'Peace' is a word used with many meanings, as many other words are today. But we know that peace in the real sense is the foundation of any work that any man wishes to do in any part of the world. It is not only the absence of war but the creation of conditions which will prevent and stop wars, which will enable man to develop his personality and his talents to live in harmony with himself and his environment. Therefore, it means resisting all that comes in the way of this development, all that causes inequality and tension (18 Oct 1970).

Conflict and violence could not solve any problem and was counterproductive.

I think there are examples enough in history to show that ruthlessness or coercion generates its own reaction. This may take time to build up, but in the end there is danger of its exploding and nullifying the gains (14 June 1972).

She believed that social, economic and political changes need not necessarily generate violent conflict. She constantly cited the Indian independence movement to prove her point.

During our independence struggle we had disproved the belief of those who felt that we could not achieve independence through non violence. We proved to the world that it was possible to free our country by means of non-violence....Economic progress and all big changes can be brought about in our country through non violence (15 Aug 1970).

Rather than being functional, violent conflict could unsettle the entire societal structure thereby preventing a change for the better. Violence was highly dysfunctional and it was not conducive for the attainment of one's important goals. Whenever or where ever there was violence, more so in the third world, it resulted in the mobilization of men and resources to serve that purpose, thereby resulting in social stagnation and sometimes even in political and economic decay.

TABLE 26

## REFERENCES TO NATURE OF POLITICS (PHASE II)

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Nature of Politics</u> - Conflictual - Mixed	207 1	99.5% .5%
<u>Sources of Conflict</u> - Nationalism - Power Politics - Imperial/colonial - Inequalities	2 30 51 28	1.8% 27% 45.9% 25.2%
<u>Conditions for Peace</u> - Eliminate inequalities - Non Intervention - Non Alignment - Communicate/Negotiate	42 20 26 16	40.4% 19.2% 25% 15.4%
<u>Scope of Conflict</u> - All Issues Linked - High Spillover	5 51	8.9% 91.8%
<u>Role of Conflict</u> - Undesirable - Dysfunctional	116 1	99.1% .9%

**Philosophical Belief # 2****Character of Political Opponents****Aggressive**

This was the most frequently articulated and central Operational Code belief during this period and it was characterized by its richness and consistency.

**Adversary:**

Mrs. Gandhi referred to Pakistan as India's chief adversary during this period. Out of the total of 225 references that she made to India's adversaries, 87.5% were

direct references to Pakistan, followed by 8.1% to China, and 4.4% to the United States. Although Mrs. Gandhi did not explicitly refer to the U.S. as an adversary, there were a number of veiled references in the documents which left no doubt that she considered the U.S. role during this period as inimical to India's interests.

Pakistan was characterized as hostile, aggressive and obsessed with weakening India's strength and capabilities and undermining its stability. She saw Pakistan's foreign policy as being directed towards one constant goal - to gain advantage over India. Working towards this end, Pakistan from time to time received assistance from other countries which regarded any accretion in India's power potential as inimical to its interests on the subcontinent. Hence, the conflict between India and Pakistan took on the proportions of a zero sum game and coupled with the zero sum game of global rivalries, heightened tensions and led to an arms race and a political stalemate on the subcontinent.

Unfortunately, Pakistan has based its policies on hatred for, and confrontation with India (17 Dec 1971).

Pakistan, according to her, had an obsessive and irrational hatred towards India as depicted by official Pakistani slogans Crush India, Conquer India.

We have no animosity towards Pakistan even though they have campaigns of Crush India, Conquer India (6 Nov 1971).

She also perceived Pakistan's compulsive urge for parity with India as being the chief motivating factor for its hostility and aggressive behaviour. Since the time of partition, Pakistan had been attempting to change the power equation on the subcontinent with outside military support. This was manifest in its attempts to befriend one superpower after another and align them against India. According to Mrs. Gandhi, the western powers have supported Pakistan in order to deflect India from its policies of nonalignment and anti-imperialism.

Mrs. Gandhi believed that Pakistan could not come to terms with India's power and capability and could not accept India's leadership on the subcontinent and in the nonaligned forum. So at every given opportunity, Pakistan attempted to undermine India's position both in the international and in the regional system. Hence, Pakistan was driven into violent confrontation with India, and indulged in subversive activities. According to Mrs. Gandhi, by engaging in war it attempted to weaken and slow down

India's economic growth and development, and force the government to divert valuable resources for defence.

Tensions and hostility came to a climax in Dec 1971. The culmination of the East Pakistan crisis into an actual war between India and Pakistan was entirely Pakistan's fault, according to Mrs. Gandhi. She accused Pakistan of having deliberately engineered the crisis in order to weaken India and attempting to solve its own problems by pushing all those people which it did not like into India, knowing fully well that it would create a threat to India's security and vital national interests.

There is an aggression on our country by the manner in which the refugees are coming (5 Nov 1971).

At one stroke you get rid of your enemies, you get rid of population, and you weaken India which you want to weaken (6 Nov 1971).

She said Pakistan was guilty of escalating and enlarging the aggression against Bangladesh into a full scale war with India. There was a spillover of the conflict into India, just by the influx of refugees, who were attempting to escape the violence in East Pakistan. This created severe problems - political, security and economic - and was detrimental to Indian national interests.

At a press conference after the war she admitted,

We had tremendous financial problems to feed them and give them shelter, and then they created administrative problems, social and political problems, and most dangerous of all, a threat to our security....There is no doubt that Pakistan did commit aggression on us (31 Dec 1971).

She claimed that Pakistan deliberately sent into India some people, disguised as refugees, in order to disrupt law and order.

The Pakistani army may not have massed on our soil, but it was an invasion when we have such a large proportion of the population of another country coming onto our soil. It is a kind of invasion. Now, some of them are some genuine refugees in difficulties...amongst them are people who are not....They are threatening our security and, therefore, it is a kind of aggression (30 Nov 1971).

During an interview on BBC, she stated her ideas on what Pakistani aggression meant. She said that it did not just involve military invasion.

In 1965, thousands of infiltrators were sent and they said that they didn't commit aggression, but after all it was an aggression when they were obviously there to occupy the place and make way for the army (1 Nov 1971).

She said that invasion by refugees was as much aggression as military attack.

**It is a strange and cynical way of getting rid of one's opponents and of deliberately using helpless millions as a weapon against a neighbouring nation....We feel that it is a new kind of aggression (5 Nov 1971).**

**What angered Mrs. Gandhi more than the events in East Pakistan was the attempts of the military junta to project the crisis as an Indo-Pak problem, in order to internationalize the issue, encourage foreign intervention on its side, and receive military assistance.**

**This declaration (of emergency) is climax of his (Yayha Khan) efforts to divert the attention of the world from Bangladesh and to put the blame on us for a situation which he himself has created (24 Nov 1971).<sup>7</sup>**

**Pakistan's armed forces have been shelling our border areas inflicting damage on life and property. Their airforce has wantonly violated our air space several times....However to cover up their incessant violations, Pakistani propaganda media have been putting out the story that we are engaged in an undeclared war and have mounted massive attacks with tanks and troops. This is wholly untrue. Infact it was Pakistan which threatened total war and moved its entire armed strength into operational positions on our borders and launched a massive hate India campaign (24 Nov 1971).**

**She insisted that contrary to popular belief in Pakistan, she was not interested in dismembering Pakistan and did not covet even an inch of Pakistani territory (31 Dec 1971).**

**We are not against Pakistan....India has no designs on any territory of Pakistan...or on any part of East Bengal. We certainly don't want to provoke a war with Pakistan (5 Nov 1971).**

**She also considered Pakistan as destructive, both in terms of its attempts to change the regional system and in its handling of the crisis in Bangladesh - the massacre, repression by the army and the reign of terror.**

**Rarely has human history seen such concentrated cruelty in so short a time (24 April 1972).**

**A massive attack by armed forces, dispatched from West Pakistan, has been unleashed against the entire people of East Bengal by the naked use of force, by bayonets, machine guns, tanks, artillery and aircraft...with a view to suppressing their urges and aspirations (31 March 1971).**

**Despite Pakistan's protests that it was only suppressing a secessionist movement on its territory, Mrs. Gandhi found this destructive and aggressive behaviour of Pakistan as being detrimental not only to India's security but the security of the entire region.**

**The United States:**

**During this period, even though she did not explicitly classify the U.S. as an adversary, her strong reactions towards U.S. policy in the region were such that it**

---

<sup>7</sup>Author's parenthesis

warrants mention in this section.

She accused the U.S. of not putting pressure on Pakistan to end the conflict, even though it carried enough weight in Islamabad. She said in a letter to President Nixon that if the U.S. had taken a public position against the atrocities being committed in East Pakistan, the Pakistani rulers would not have indulged in such a (mis)adventure. She stated that the U.S., which believed so staunchly in human rights, and whose country was built on principles of freedom, liberty, equality and democracy had turned a blind eye when these very same principles were being abused elsewhere, thereby indirectly helping the oppressors perpetuate the forceful suppression of the nationalistic urges of the people. She condemned American hypocrisy.

Those, who professed to be the champions of the poor and claimed that they supported all struggles for freedom, have today forgotten those principles and professions, and they are trying to coerce us (12 Dec 1971).

We are naturally deeply hurt that people who professed to be upholders of democracy remained quiet when the time came to defend it. They were not worried whether a country had a democratic form of government or was under military rule. They talked of big ideals, but when the time came they ignored them completely (10 Dec 1971).

She accused the U.S. of being more concerned with its gateway to China facilitated by Pakistan and its not wanting to do anything to jeopardize that new development. Mrs. Gandhi criticized American military commitments to Pakistan;

A foreign power has threatened us. It has told us that is bound by certain treaty alliances with Pakistan. We are aware of these alliances. There were many pacts and so far as I am aware they were intended to contain communism. The object of these alliances was certainly not to fight democracy, or to suppress justice or the voice of the oppressed (12 Dec 1971).

She believed that the U.S. was not really interested in peace in the subcontinent and that its vital interests would be best served by ensuring instability in the region. A crisis in Asia would facilitate an American presence and the White House had already found a willing partner in Pakistan.

We are not afraid of Pakistan; but, we do realize that the danger is not so much from Pakistan as it is from those forces who envisage confrontation on this subcontinent, or confrontation in Asia, to be in their interest (31 July 1972).

During this phase, although she did not explicitly say so, she saw American and Pakistani objectives in the region as being basically similar.

## Sources of Opponents' Goals

### Religion

#### External Pressures

Mrs. Gandhi attributed the sources of Pakistan's goals during this period to both dispositional and situational factors. Pakistan's goals during this period were based on its religious philosophy and its actions were in response to external pressures.

According to Mrs. Gandhi Pakistan's, domestic and external policies especially vis-a-vis India, were based on religious goals. Religion was the foundation of Pakistan's foreign policy and this foundation itself was wrong.

Pakistan was built up on a wrong foundation, namely, that one religion could form the basis of a nation....The very basis of the formation of Pakistan is wrong (10 Dec 1971).

She disbelieved the claim that Islam provided a cementing force for uniting diverse peoples and nationalities, transcending the pulls of subnationalisms, languages and culture. She said that a state could not exist on the basis of such a narrow ideology.

Religion and language cannot bind any people in the world of today...Religion is good...but you cannot build up a nation and keep the people united on the basis of religion (3 Dec 1971).

She questioned as to whether religion by itself could form the basis of a nation state in the present age, especially when the state machinery was impervious to the ordinary laws of political development and cultural aspirations (29 Oct 1971). According to her, the elite in Pakistan believed in the fusion of state, society and religion and thus saw the main objective of the state as waging a perpetual war with the non-believers and infidels. Hence, Hindu India was perceived as 'the' enemy.

Thus, the perceived threat to Pakistan's security from India was a continuation of a long war between Hinduism and Islam. Mrs. Gandhi said that the Pakistani rulers' claims of threat to Pakistan's security based on religious grounds was an excuse used by the regime for the purpose of national integration and in order to get military aid. Pakistan was constantly urging for a religious war against India.

Pakistan made an extremely bellicose speech asking for a religious war against India. There can be nothing more threatening or provocative (11 Nov 1971).

The 1971 conflict was part of a larger ideological conflict between India and Pakistan, according to Mrs. Gandhi (28 Nov 1971). The emergence of Bangladesh disproved the two nation theory.

The emergence of a sovereign, secular Bangladesh has conclusively proved the falseness of the theory that religion can be a ground for separate nationhood. This theory has done great harm to our subcontinent and prevented the rational solution of the social and economic problems of the people of other regions (28 Jan 1972).

The two nation theory is discredited, but it has not been wiped out. There are still parties and individuals who mix religion with politics and exploit other narrow loyalties for partisan and personal ends (28 Jan 1972).

She said if Pakistan had not based its goals and objectives on religious ideology and differences with India, there could have been peace in the subcontinent and both countries could have focused on the 'real' enemy - poverty and underdevelopment.

Pakistan was formed on the idea that one nation must have one religion and therefore India was not one nation but two nations. But Pakistan could not maintain its unity on this basis. Had they tackled the real problems of their people, their economic and social problems, perhaps these situations would not have arisen (26 July 1972).

#### External Factors:

Secondly, she believed that the formulation of Pakistan's objectives and its successive implementation, especially during this period, were also influenced by external pressures. Pakistan was responding to pressures from its external environment. It was reacting to and constrained by the policies of outside countries - especially the U.S. and China, rather than initiating foreign policy undertakings that reflected its interests.

Unfortunately, all these years, Pakistan has had very strong western support and this is what has encouraged them to continue in this manner and leading to the disruption and the weakness of Pakistan. Otherwise by now, it could have been a strong and unified country such as we are (11 Nov 1971).

She claimed all along that external powers saw benefits in keeping the subcontinent in a constant state of tension and crisis, and hence they encouraged Pakistan's belligerent attitude. Their strategic interests would best be served by perpetuating hostilities between India and Pakistan.

We believe that the reason for this (conflict with India) was that several countries were encouraging Pakistan to do so. If the big powers, which were friendly to Pakistan had advised it from the very beginning not to fight with India, Pakistan would not have taken up the posture of war. Pakistan had neither the strength nor the courage to go to war with us. But they did so because they were getting help and war materials from abroad. Even when they went to war with us, they got all encouragement from their friends. They were not branded as aggressors with the result that they did not change their ways. The result of all this was that despite its friendship with big powers, Pakistan could not become a strong power. It grew weaker (3 Dec 1971).<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> Author's parenthesis



Pakistan did not realize, despite repeated warnings by India, that it was not in its interests to allow big power interference in the affairs of the region. It has grown weak because of its excessive dependence on external assistance, in return for which it has shaped its policies to serve the interests of big powers.

*If Pakistan has become weak, it is not because we wanted it. It has become weak because other nations helped it in pursuing wrong policies, which were probably in their own interests and not in the interest of Pakistan (12 Dec 1971).*

Mrs. Gandhi realized that in Pakistan, the superpowers helped develop only those sectors of the country which served their interests and not the real fabric of Pakistan's society. This led to a false sense of security and power which led Pakistan to engage in confrontation with India.

*Big powers have done all they could to add to the strength of the Pakistani army but they have done little to strengthen its people..The result was that Pakistan got a false sense of strength , its foundations continued to be weak (10 Dec 1971).*

**Generality of Opponents Hostility**  
**Response to conciliatory Moves**  
**Opponents image of one's nation**  
**Opponents view of Conflict**  
**Opponents decision making process**  
**Opponents decision making style**  
**Opponents Strategy**

**Permanent**  
**Ignore**  
**Aggressive and Destructionist**  
**Desirable**  
**Bureaucratic model**  
**Unrealistic, irrational, inflexible**  
**Blitzkrieg**

Because Mrs. Gandhi attributed Pakistan's goals vis-a-vis India mostly to dispositional factors - religion and ideology - it led her to making several observations regarding the nature of the Indo-Pak conflict and on the decision making structure in Pakistan.

1. Mrs. Gandhi saw Pakistan's hostility and belligerence towards India as being permanent, as its goals were too deeply embedded in religion.

*Pakistan seems to find its identity only in conflict with India (15 June 1971).*

Because of this, she believed that Pakistan's goals were not amenable to change quickly (1 Nov 1971, 28 Nov 1971).

2. Pakistan's decision-making structure was monolithic. Until after the Bangladesh crisis and Bhutto's election, the military bureaucracy was in control of the political decision-making apparatus. According to Mrs. Gandhi, they did not enjoy the confidence

of the people and the regimes faced serious problems of legitimacy (1 Nov 1971, 6 Nov 1971).

The autocratic military regime in Islamabad is isolated from its people and is waging war against them (26 Aug 1971).

3. Several conciliatory moves made by India to normalize and establish friendly relations was ignored by the rulers in Pakistan.

Pakistan has attacked us. On our side we have always taken unilateral steps which we thought would lead to a normalization of relations. But there has been no response forthcoming (6 Nov 1971).

Whenever we extended our hand of friendship, we were faced with a closed fist on the other side and also an atmosphere of tension (3 Dec 1971).

4. According to Mrs. Gandhi, Pakistan perceived India as a dominant, aggressive, and expansionist neighbour, who had never reconciled itself to partition and was determined to undo it and dismember Pakistan. The leaders of Pakistan projected the image of Pakistan inextricably linked to the Islamic world and threatened by a Hindu India. Identity problems in Pakistan produced threat perceptions.

Hence, any move made by India on the subcontinent was perceived by Pakistan as a threat to its national interests. In 1971 Pakistan accused India of interfering in its internal affairs by aiding and abetting a rebellion with the alleged intention of wresting territory from Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi said that this theory was put forth as an attempt by the military regime in Pakistan to convert the crisis into an Indo-Pak problem just because they did not know how to handle the crisis in East Bengal.

5. According to Mrs. Gandhi Pakistan's goals and choice of objectives, during this period - to quell the rebellion in East Bengal and involve India in the crisis - were totally irrational, inflexible and unrealistic.

Our feeling is one of regret that Pakistan did not desist from the ultimate folly and sorrow that at a time when the greatest need of this subcontinent is development..the peoples of India and Pakistan have been pushed into war (4 Dec 1971).

She kept referring to the insensate actions of the military rulers (24 March 1971).

6. Pakistan desired conflict with India for two reasons:

a. A perceived threat from Hindu India was the only means to keep Pakistan integrated. For a political system which lacked legitimacy, this conflict could provide the medium

for acceptance. The military regime in Pakistan could gain consensus for its military policies only if they constantly kept the country in a state of tension with India.

b. This was also one of the ways to receive outside military assistance to further its aggressive goals. By making India out to be aggressive and expansionist, intent on destroying Pakistan, the successive regimes in Pakistan managed to gain outside support. So, according to Mrs. Gandhi, it was in Pakistan's national interest to come into conflict with India.

7. The opposition chose a blitzkrieg strategy, according to Mrs. Gandhi. For example, against all humanistic principles, the army was let loose on on the civilians in East Pakistan and its began its 'systematic decimation of the people'. Military terror, genocide, butchery, loot, plunder, destruction were the phrases found in most documents from 27 March 1971 to 2 Aug 1972, to describe Pakistan's actions in Bangladesh. There was a massive use of force.

For over nine months the military regime of West Pakistan has barbarously trampled upon freedom and basic human rights in Bangladesh. The army of occupation has committed heinous crimes unmatched for their vindictive ferocity (4 Dec 1971).

The same strategy was used against India in Dec 1971, when the country was put on a war footing.

Pakistan's armed forces have been shelling our border areas inflicting damage on life and property. Their airforce has wantonly violated our airspace several times (24 Nov 1971).

Overall, the various segments of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs regarding India's major adversary Pakistan, were consistent and interlinked with each other.

**TABLE 27**  
**REFERENCES TO OPPONENTS (PHASE II)**

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Character of Opponents</u>		
- Aggressive	75	57.3%
- Expansionist	2	1.5%
- Destructive	54	41.2%
<u>Opponent's Goals</u>		
- Religion	17	44.7%
- Leader Trait	5	13.2%
- External Pressure	16	42.1%
<u>Response to Conciliation</u>		
- Ignore	18	100%
<u>Opponent's Hostility</u>		
- General/Permanent	33	97.1%
- General/Temporary	1	2.9%
<u>Opponent's Image of one's Nation</u>		
- Aggressive	5	55.6%
- Destructive	4	44.4%
<u>Opponent's View of Conflict</u>		
- Inevitable	1	4.2%
- Desirable	16	66.7%
- Inevitable/Desirable	7	29.2%
<u>Opponent's Decision Making</u>		
- Unitary Model	9	27.3%
- Bureaucratic	24	72.7%
<u>Opponent's Choice of Objectives</u>		
- Optimizing	7	87.5%
- Satisfying	1	12.5%
- Unrealistic	34	91.9%
- Realistic	3	8.1%
- Inflexible	24	100%
<u>Opponent's Strategy</u>		
- Blitzkrieg	52	88.1%
- Try and See	7	11.9%

**Nature of the Regional System**  
**Conflictual**

Just as in the previous phase, she believed that the present regional and international system was conflict-ridden. She referred to three types of conflicts

1. Clash between imperialism and Third World nationalism giving rise to conflicts such as in West Asia and Vietnam;
2. Territorial conflicts in the West Asian subsystem between Israel and the Arabs;
3. Regional conflict in South Asia which took two forms
  - a. Civil war in Pakistan
  - b. Its spillover into India

**Sources of International/Regional Conflict**  
**Power Politics**  
**Imperialism/Colonialism/Racialism**  
**Nationalism**

The war in Europe ended in 1945, but in these twenty seven years, hardly a week has passed without fighting in some part of the Asian continent. Much, if not all, of this fighting has initially been due to the reluctance of imperialism to abandon its hold and lately the resort to new forms of intervention (24 April 1972).

She believed that a universal drive for power was the chief cause for most international and regional conflicts at the present time. In general, superpower involvement in the third world, conflicts over spheres of influence, contradictions between Third World nationalism and the politics of imperialism and neo colonialism were the major sources of regional conflicts. Most local wars and crises were derivatives of this. Mrs. Gandhi constantly quoted the classic case of American imperialism in Vietnam, which was prolonging the crisis in that region. During this phase, she particularly attributed the sources of some of the regional conflicts, to American dominance.

Vietnam is a classic example of the old colonialism yielding place to new intervention (24 April 1972).

While she referred to the West Asian crisis, she did not particularly dwell on the sources of the conflict. Mrs. Gandhi saw the sources of the conflict in East Pakistan as deriving from the blind and desperate drive for power by the Pakistani military elite, who were indirectly supported by the U.S. and China in suppressing the nationalist movement in East Pakistan.

**Conditions for Regional Peace**  
**Education/Communication/Negotiation**  
**Non-interference**

Of course, problems and differences do arise from time to time, but there is no problem which cannot be solved through discussion, consultation and adjustment (24 June 1971).

If there is a dispute between two parties, they should settle it by mutual discussion without taking recourse to force. This is what we have been repeating for years (15 Aug 1970).

Mrs. Gandhi repeatedly said that this was the best means for conflict resolution. According to her, both the West Asian and Vietnam conflicts could come to an end if both parties to the conflict sat at the negotiating table and hammered out a framework.

There can be no military solution to these problems. Solutions must be found by negotiations (25 May 1970).

Communication was effective in breaking down the barriers and paving the way for fruitful negotiations. Mrs. Gandhi strongly recommended communication and negotiations for the resolution of the Bangladesh crisis. She said that the best way to ensure peace on the subcontinent was for Pakistan to abandon the military approach and seek a political solution by discussions by the Awami League leaders. The same approach could be used by India and Pakistan to resolve all outstanding problems. But in order to achieve this she was very emphatic about direct bilateral negotiations such as the one held at Simla in 1972. She did not want superpower intervention in these talks.

We have no cause to feel threatened or be afraid of any of our neighbours. But some powerful forces which are strong are interested in confrontation with India, then that is a source of danger for us. Therefore, it is in our interest to try and get rid of third party intervention in our affairs.... We want that whatever problems may arise between India and Pakistan, they should be solved bilaterally without recourse to any third party interference (26 July 1972).

Also interference in the affairs of the smaller countries had to cease.

Peace and stability can be achieved not by giving a new face to the old discredited theories of balance of power, but when all nations big or small, acknowledge one another's right to exist on a basis of equality and all pursue a policy of non-interference (24 April 1972).

We stand for the unqualified right of nations to choose their own form of government and for total non-interference with this right. We stand for the withdrawal of all outside military forces and we reiterate this not only in relation to the two conflicts which are so obvious today, i.e., in S.E. Asia and in the Middle East, but to all parts of the world (18 Oct 1970).

During this phase she was a little disillusioned by the UN and its role in bringing about peace.

While we respect that august body, we are also aware of its weaknesses (10 Dec 1971).

The UN has been afflicted by the same malady as the League of Nations, i.e., on the attempt by powerful nations to direct and control its activities and to use it as an instrument for national ends (23 Oct 1970).

The UN has not been able to prevent wars or bring about a settlement (10 Dec 1971).

We know that all these years it (UN) has not contributed to more peaceful or normal relations or solution of anything in this area (12 July 1972).<sup>9</sup>

During her address at the third nonaligned summit at Lusaka, she stated with conviction that if all the nonaligned countries stood together, they could work towards achieving global peace (9 Sept 1970). The organization of nonaligned countries became more cohesive during this phase. According to Mrs. Gandhi, the bipolarity in the international system had slowly given way to a system of detente, in which the nonaligned nations were beginning to play an important role both individually and collectively as a group in international forums. Also, the international system was mixed - neither one hundred percent stable nor unstable. There seemed to be some semblance of stability in the international system due to the process of detente.

We are glad that attempts are being made now by the great powers to talk to each other and that the old barriers which had gone up between the different countries and which were expressed in political, ideological or military terms, are gradually coming down and there is an atmosphere of detente (18 Oct 1970).

But despite detente, the dangers of an accidental nuclear war did not disappear. Also, because of conflict spillover, there was a chance that a local conflict might escalate and engulf the entire system.

**National Role Conception**  
**Active Independent/Non Aligned**  
**Friendly Neighbour**

Once again there seemed to be both consistency and stability, from the first phase to the second, in this particular Operational Code belief. There was absolutely no change in what Mrs. Gandhi considered India's roles, except that during this phase, she grew more

---

<sup>9</sup>Author's parenthesis

intense and passionate regarding values such as independence and freedom of choice. Just as in the last phase, she perceived India as playing an active independent role in international affairs. In the regional system, India would continue to play the role of a friendly neighbour despite the existence of serious problems with Pakistan.

#### Global Role:

In the international system, she saw India as playing a strong active independent role as a nonaligned nation. Freedom, independence and the right to self-determination were very important values for Mrs. Gandhi and she insisted that India would not compromise on these principles on any account.

*Independence is not merely having our own government. Independence means that we make our own decisions. They may be wrong decisions, but they must be our decisions, Indian decisions (24 Jan 1970).*

Mrs. Gandhi frequently referred to the Indian freedom struggle and pointed out that India did not fight so desperately for independence just so it could subject its will to the interests of another foreign power.

*We have fought for our independence not so that I would let the merest shadow to be cast on our independence of decision or action for anything in the world. To me that is the most important thing, certainly more important than my life (27 Dec 1971).*

This made her oppose the intervention of a powerful and dominant power into the affairs of a weaker country. She strongly believed in the right of every nation to determine its future in its own way free from pressure or compulsion.

*There are nations which cannot tolerate that India should take independent decisions. They dictate to other nations to behave in a particular manner and they are obeyed. We welcome their friendship....If, however, there are strings attached to this friendship, or the help that is offered, or if it affects our freedom and our ability to take independent decisions, we spurn their offers of help. We shall stand on our own legs. It seems that they have not been able to understand that we shall stick to what we say and that we are determined to implement our independent decisions (10 Dec 1971).*

This was a veiled reference to the U.S.. She was very firm in her commitment to nonalignment and insisted that the spirit and principles of nonalignment was conducive to the maintenance of freedom and independence both in domestic and foreign policy.

*India stands by nonalignment because she believes that that alone can give true independence to a people such as ours, independence to make our own decisions, independence of action in the international sphere (18 Oct 1970).*

She summed up her feelings regarding this aspect at Lusaka;



We determined that decisions involving us, whether concerning war and peace, and the direction and pace of our social, economic and political development, could be made only by us, in our own way, and in our own countries (9 sept 1970).

Mrs. Gandhi's commitment to nonalignment was based on her continuing belief in the philosophy of nonalignment as a 'shield against external pressure and a catalyst of a new world economic order based on equality and justice' (9 Sept 1970). Nonalignment was the path to true independence.

I think it is the only hard headed practical path that is open to any country which wants to keep itself independent (31 Aug 1970).

Solidarity among the developing countries was essential.

The big powers have never accepted the validity of Non alignment. Neither colonialism nor racialism has vanished. The old comes back in new guise. There are subtle intrigues to undermine our self confidence and to sow dissensions and mutual distrust amongst us. Powerful and vested interests, domestic and foreign, are combining to erect new structures of neo colonialism. These dangers can be combatted by our being united in our adherence to the basic tenets of Non alignment (9 Sept 1970).

She believed that the power to question was the basis of all human progress.

We are free because we questioned the right of others to rule over us (9 Sept 1970).

According to Mrs. Gandhi, presently we are rediscovering ourselves and the fact that a country ought to see things in terms of its own geography, history and traditions.

For years we accepted their (colonial powers) values, their image of the world and strangely enough, even of ourselves. Whether we like it or not, we have been pushed into postures of imitation. We have now to break away from borrowed models of development and evolve models of the worthwhile life, which are more relevant to our conditions - not necessarily as a group but as individual countries with distinctive personalities (9 Sept 1970).

Although she did concede that in an interdependent world it was difficult to be totally independent.

But in today's world no country can be absolutely independent of another. It is a world of interdependence. But you can be interdependent only if you are secure in your freedom. If you give up part of your freedom, that relationship changes; then it is not interdependence; it becomes something else; it becomes a form of - well, I won't say slavery, but some form of colonialism comes in (31 Aug 1970).

More fundamentally, a large percentage of statements articulated by her regarding India's foreign policy stressed the concept of independence. She stated that despite being poor, India followed an independent foreign policy.

Let us be very clear that, regardless of what our big newspapers say here, the image of India is very clear....It is not an image of a country which follows any group or country; it is an image of a country standing or trying to stand squarely on its own feet (31 Aug 1970).

In keeping with the centrality of this belief, in late 1971 she asserted that India would act in a manner to protect its interests whether it was going to get the support of other countries or not. She reacted very sharply to Nixon's statements in 1971 taking credit for India's ceasefire decision. She said that it was the most perverse statements that came out of the White House on the crisis (2 Feb 1972). Kissinger described her as a strong personality, relentlessly pursuing India's national interest with single mindedness and finesse (Kissinger 1979, 21).

When Mrs. Gandhi was criticized for moving into the Soviet bloc by signing a treaty with Moscow in 1971, she lashed back at the critics by saying that it was only some of the Western (meaning American) powers that perceived it as a shift in India's nonaligned posture - the very same critics that did not believe in nonalignment in the first place.

So far as the Indo-Soviet treaty is concerned it does not affect our position of being a nonaligned country...and while under the treaty we shall consult with the Soviet Union should any dangerous situation arise, it is entirely a matter for India to decide by herself what decision we take, what steps we take (5 Nov 1971).

Nevertheless, Mrs. Gandhi was far from naive about the Indo-Soviet relationship. In a communication to the diplomats who were negotiating the treaty in 1971, she insisted that the wording be such that it should not emphasize the mutual security commitment and the text of the treaty should not make India appear as a client state of the Soviet Union (Bhatia 1974, 246). Mrs. Gandhi firmly believed that there were no strings attached to that treaty. Soviet participation in the post-war Simla conference were discreetly refused. Also restrictions were placed on the proliferation of Russian 'cultural centers', and Moscow's desire for a naval base in India went unfulfilled.

#### Regional Role:

With the interests of our country uppermost in our minds, our policy has been to maintain friendship with our neighbouring countries and to arrive at agreements with them, by sorting out differences and seeking new ways of cooperation (15 Aug 1970).

Given the crisis in East Pakistan, the emergence of Bangladesh and the changing power structure on the subcontinent to India's benefit, Mrs. Gandhi went to great lengths to explain and prove that India was not interested in being either a regional leader or seeking hegemony in South Asia. She made efforts to convince the world and mainly

the neighbouring countries that she did not seek to dismember Pakistan.

*Our foreign policy has been one of friendship. It remains so. There is no weakness or drift in it.... We ourselves do not seek leadership or domination (29 March 1972).*

Time and again she attempted to portray India as a friendly neighbour, who had problems on her own and whose efforts were mainly focused on tasks of development and economic growth.

She said that she desired friendship with Pakistan and China, two of India's unfriendly neighbours.

*We sincerely desire friendly relations with Pakistan. We have taken a series of initiatives to normalize our relations with them, because we believe that this would be to our mutual benefit. With China also we desire an improvement in relations (12 March 1970).*

When Bangladesh achieved independence, she was quick to reassure its people that despite military, economic and diplomatic support, India was not interested in a dominant dependent relationship with that country.

*It is in India's interest that Bangladesh should be free and strong. If we offer you cooperation, it is not out of any desire to wield influence over you. We want you to stand on your own legs.... Just as we seek a strong and friendly Bangladesh, so also we seek friendship with all of our other neighbours. We want all of them to be strong. We do not want any country to dominate or pressurize other countries (17 March 1972).*

She said that just as India insisted on maintaining its independence and freedom, most of the other newly independent countries would want the same. In her speech on India's foreign policy, she cautioned against giving the impression that India sought a leader's role. She said that would defeat the entire purpose of nonalignment, as it would only create a third bloc, which she wanted to avoid at all costs.

TABLE 28

## REFERENCES TO THE REGIONAL SYSTEM (PHASE II)

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Nature of Region System</u> - Conflictual - Mixed	146 1	99.3% .7%
<u>Sources Region Conflict</u> - Power Politics - Imperialism/colonial - Nationalism	22 5 6	66.7% 15.2% 18.1%
<u>Conditions Region Peace</u> - Communicate/Negotiate - Non-interference	10 8	55.5% 44.5%
<u>Structure Region System</u> - Bipolar/ Detente - Nonalignment - Interdependent	8 11 4	30.7% 34.6% 34.7%
<u>Stability Region System</u> - Mixed - Unstable	4 7	36.4% 63.6%
<u>National Role</u> - Active Independent - Friendly Neighbour	138 97	58.7% 41.3%

**Philosophical Belief # 3****Prospects for Eventual Realization of Goals****Unconditional Optimism/Long and short term goals and policies**

...I am one of those people who are born optimists and therefore I feel that the most insoluble problem has some solution if people are only willing to find it (1 Nov 1971).

While in the last phase Mrs. Gandhi was a little cautious and expressed conditional optimism regarding long-term objectives, during this phase she expressed unconditional

optimism in India's ability to achieve long-term goals and short-term objectives. Perception of the successes of previous goals may have reinforced this belief. For example, the government was largely successful in achieving some of its economic and developmental goals. The five year plans were launched effortlessly and there were signs of economic growth.

*Anyone who views modern Indian history...knows that the country today is economically and politically stronger than it was before, and also more capable of facing the challenges with which it is confronted. In fact, at no time has there been more enthusiasm and greater self confidence in the people of India, a greater expectation of change and also...a greater capacity to bring about this change (2 March 1970).*

Once again she pointed out that hope, effort, patience and determination were necessary qualities in working toward the attainment of one's goals. Even if there were temporary setbacks or difficulties one should not give up because with hard work it was possible to succeed. She believed that one could not fail to achieve one's goals because it was within one's hands to control events.

It was this optimism that carried her through, during the spillover of the Bangladesh crisis into India.

*It is a testing time for our country, but I am confident that we shall succeed (3 Dec 1971).*

*We are confident that India can and will face any emergency with courage and determination. ....This is a time for us not to feel disheartened, however great the crisis. There never was any reason for feeling disappointed. We have proved that we have faith and self confidence and that we shall stand upto any crisis....There is no reason for us to doubt that we have a bright future (15 Aug 1971).*

She also had high hopes for the success of India's political, economic and social goals. She had faith in India's capabilities which had put distant goals well within the reach of the common man (29 March 1972). She predicted that India would scale new heights.

*I am confident that the path we have chosen is bound to accelerate our progress and, by taking new steps, we would be able to forge ahead (15 Aug 1970).*

**TABLE 29**  
**REFERENCES TO OPTIMISM (PHASE II)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<u>Goal Realization</u>		
- Optimism	72	77.4%
- Mixed	15	16.1%
- Pessimism	6	6.5%
<u>Optimism and Goals</u>		
- Long Term Goals	74	78.7%
- Policy Undertaking	20	21.3%
<u>Optimism Conditional</u>		
- Conditional	32	40%
- Unconditional	48	60%

#### **Philosophical Belief # 4**

##### **Predictability of Political Life**

**Predictable with certainty**  
**Historical Developments/ Long term trends**  
**Specific events**

Although political life was predictable, Mrs. Gandhi did not state anywhere that there was a regular, recurrent pattern in history. Despite her commitment to Socialism she was not particularly concerned with historic determinism or the historic laws of Socialist theory, but was only interested in its objectives. Her predictions, which again resembled forecasts, were based more on experience and observation rather than from any apriori historical theory.

In early 1971, she predicted that the nationalistic fervour in East Pakistan would grow stronger and gain momentum and unless the leaders in West Pakistan took note of this and worked towards a political rather than a military solution, it would ultimately result in the split up of Pakistan, following enormous violence.

**We are convinced that there can be no military solution to the problem of East Bengal. A political solution must be brought about by those who have the power to do so (6 Nov 1971).**

While Yayha Khan believed that the army could quell the violence in East Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi knew that the implications of the rebellion would be more profound.

She also warned the world leaders that unless they took note of the developments in the subcontinent and pressurized Pakistan to bring about a peaceful solution, the consequences would be unpleasant. War would break out which would eventually involve a number of other countries and threaten peace and stability in the region. She believed that unless the military regime in Pakistan provided the conditions for the safe return of the refugees, there would be no peace.

**Conditions must be created to stop any further influx of refugees and to ensure their early return under credible guarantees for their future safety and well being. I say with all sense of responsibility that unless this happens, there can be no lasting stability or peace on this subcontinent (24 May 1971).**

Her subsequent actions in 1971 - signing the treaty with the Soviet Union, and the ceasefire declaration - were also based on the prediction that she would have the support of the entire country behind her, including the opposition. The fact that she signed the treaty without prior warning to the country indicates the level of confidence she had regarding the approval by the people of her policy. She had predicted that she would have no opposition. Throughout 1971, she constantly stressed on the fact that she would have the backing of the entire country if India was dragged into a war with Pakistan. Despite the forces - caste, religion, region - which pulled the country in opposite directions, India would not be weakened.

**This is a passing phase and these differences cannot weaken India's fundamental unity or the basic sense of Indianness which is a powerful binding factor (29 Oct 1971).**

Mrs. Gandhi had conviction that her predictions regarding global politics, would turn out to be right.

**The world situation is developing as we had always thought it would one day....We knew that it would happen (2 Aug 1972).**

**TABLE 30**  
**REFERENCES TO PREDICTABILITY (PHASE II)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<u>Politics Predictable?</u>		
- Predictable	122	91%
- Capricious	5	3.7%
- Mixed	7	5.2%
<u>What Aspects Predictable?</u>		
- Historical Trends	90	67.2%
- Opponents Behaviour	7	5.2%
- Policy Outcomes	16	11.9%
- Specific Events	21	15.7%
<u>Degree of Predictability</u>		
- Certainty	117	87.3%
- Probability	8	6%
- Uncertainty	9	6.7%

### Philosophical Belief # 5

#### Control of Historical Development

##### **Full ability to control**

Philosophical beliefs # 3, 4 and 5, i.e., Optimism, Predictability of political life and Control over historical events seem to be highly interconnected in Mrs. Gandhi's system of beliefs.

She asserted that man's control over his life and destiny was complete. Because of the existence of this specific belief, she believed in the predictability of political life and that one could afford to be optimistic. If one had control over history and could shape one's future in any way one wanted, one could be optimistic regarding the achievement of fundamental goals, and also predict long term trends and the outcome of particular policies and events. According to Mrs. Gandhi, it was possible to achieve



anything by hard work and conviction in one's goals and abilities.

The conviction that we can and must shape the future has been the motive force of political revolutions and scientific breakthroughs (29 Sept 1971).

There are many problems which we must solve. We cannot wait passively for their solutions. We ourselves have to shape our future. We want that every Indian should have a hand in shaping our destiny (15 Aug 1972).

It was in the hands of the people to create a better life for themselves. There was no ready made way to achieve it. She said that the obstacles to progress in India was fatalism, superstition, outdated customs and the like.

We must dispel irrational fears and superstitions, fatalism and passive resignation (14 Nov 1970). If the entire country worked tirelessly, it was possible to achieve a high level of prosperity, progress and development.

We should see in what way we can make the people of Asia...once more regain...a status in the world, where they can guide the destinies of the world, they can also mould the future in order to make the world a fit place for man to live in (31 July 1972).

She had this to say for the future and for peace -

It is only by looking towards the future and endeavouring to shape the future that the present can be made livable. And to make it livable we must have peace (2 Aug 1972).

**Role of the Leader**  
**Active Role**  
**Avoid Intervention**

Mrs. Gandhi perceived the leader as playing two kinds of roles depending on the area of interaction. In domestic politics, she envisaged the leader as playing a very important and active role in initiating, directing and regulating societal change. Since there were constant changes in society, the leader's main task was to guide that change in such a way as to mitigate violence.

**Initiator of Change:** The leader had the important task of initiating new reforms and moving society from old-fashioned ideas and dogmas which was causing stagnation, into new paths towards growth, development and progress. In order for a society to grow, change was necessary, and it was the duty of the government to initiate this change and guide it into the right channels.

**Regulator of Change:** When changes occurred by themselves due to environmental circumstances the leader had to regulate the change so it would not prove dysfunctional for society.

Once the motion of change had set in, it was the task of the government to ensure that no violence resulted (25 May 1970).

Also, government acted as a mediator between different groups in society and had to reconcile different interests.

It is only to the extent that the government succeeds in holding the scales even between different groups and reconciling differences among them in a harmonious manner that it can serve as an instrument of orderly peaceful progress (14 March 1970).

Moreover, the government had to constantly keep in touch with the demands made by the new generation and refashion its policies accordingly.

Today there is an atmosphere of restlessness in our country and also in every other country in the world....A new generation is coming up into prominence in all the countries, whose attitudes and beliefs are different from those of the older generation....We must take note of this new development and refashion our policies and programmes so as to respond more readily to the needs of the changing times (25 Oct 1970).

In foreign relations, Mrs. Gandhi tried to avoid intervention, especially in the affairs of smaller neighbouring countries. Just as India wanted to maintain its autonomy, she surmised that every other country would want the same for themselves. Unless a neighbour's policy jeopardized India's security and posed a threat to its vital interests, the Indian government should avoid intervention. During the civil war in Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi for the most part avoided intervention.

I am asked what initiatives India will take. We have taken the biggest possible initiative in remaining so self restrained and in keeping in check the anger within our country. We have endeavoured strenuously to see that this does not become an Indo-Pakistan issue (5 Nov 1971).

She believed that it was Pakistan's internal problem and that the Pakistan government had to resolve it. When asked at a press conference(1 Nov 1971) if she wanted to have talks with Yayha Khan, she categorically refused. She did not perceive it as an Indo-Pak problem.

We cannot decide on a settlement for the people of Bangiadesh. That is a decision which only they themselves have to take (1 Nov 1971).

She did not want to interfere until the conflict spilled over into India. It was then that she believed that she was acting in order to safeguard India's security and vital national interests.

**TABLE 31**  
**REFERENCES TO ROLE OF LEADER (PHASE II)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<u>Control over History</u>		
- Full Control	57	80.3%
- Some Control	10	14.1%
- Inability to Control	4	5.6%
<u>Role of Leader</u>		
- Active Role	89	70%
- Passive Role	38	30%

**C. Instrumental Goals:**

**Instrumental Goal # 1**

**Nature of One's Goals**  
**Protect Security**  
**Achieve National Interest**

We are concerned with one thing and one thing only - our own national interest and security (26 May 1971).

We must be very vigilant to safeguard our integrity and our interests and above all the fundamental beliefs of our existence (16 Dec 1971).

At a seminar on foreign policy, Mrs. Gandhi asked,

Basically, what do we want from our foreign policy? What is the ideal we pursue? Is that ideal divorced from the practical interests of the country, or is it allied with it? As it happens, our ideal and practical interests are the same ( 31 Aug 1971).

We believe that our interests are so closely tied up with our ideals that if we separate them our interests will not be well served (31 Dec 1971).

The main ideals for Mrs. Gandhi were freedom, peace and economic prosperity. According to her, these are the fundamental values on which India's foreign policy is based (31 Aug 1970). She perceived India's policy as reflecting total compatibility between values and ideals on the one hand and goals on the other.

I think nobody will quarrel with the objective of our national policy, which is to eradicate poverty, to remove economic backwardness, to bring about social equality. In the external sphere, our objective is to have an India which stands strongly for its independence and sovereignty, an India which will not bow its head to any power, however big, an India which will keep intact its integrity and keep aloft its national pride (29 March 1972).

Kissinger affirmed that for Mrs. Gandhi, her interests and values were inseparable (1979, 21).

Mrs. Gandhi laid down different kinds of goals for India.

#### 1. Domestic Goals:

During this period she was convinced that India's foreign policy objectives could not be divorced from its domestic goals. There was a functional linkage between the two.

Just as in the last phase she still maintained that India still had to work toward economic self-reliance. She saw a strong link between self-reliance and independence in decision making. Only if a country was economically strong and self sufficient, it could adopt an independent foreign policy stance. If one relied too heavily on external aid and assistance, one would have to succumb to pressure from the dominant power.

We have to see that the relationship is such that it cannot force us into any position which is not in our interest...that is why we want to be self reliant in all the essentials (31 Aug 1970).

So if a developed country gave assistance without strings attached and help India achieve self-reliance, Mrs. Gandhi considered that as true 'friendship'<sup>10</sup>.

Our own national interest compels us to build up our economic and defence strength with the help of whoever is prepared to help us to do so and to help us to stand on our own feet (31 Aug 1970).

One of India's goals was to achieve self sufficiency with or without external assistance.

One had to strive hard to achieve self sustaining growth by oneself.

India has to work towards reducing its dependence on foreign countries. Neo colonialism has no sympathy for our efforts to achieve self-reliance. It seeks to perpetuate our position of disadvantage (31 Dec 1971).

This is one of the reasons why she strove to persuade the developed countries that India would prefer trade to economic aid.

Another important goal was economic and social development leading to economic and social transformation of the society. Mrs. Gandhi aimed to achieve an egalitarian

---

<sup>10</sup>She perceived this in Indo-Soviet relations

society. At the third nonaligned summit at Lusaka, she said that the revolution of our times was unfinished and independence was incomplete (9 Sept 1970). As long as there was no economic freedom and social justice, political freedom for all the peoples in the developing world was meaningless. She stated that her aim was not merely to achieve quantitative increases in production, but to push ahead with structural changes which would establish an egalitarian society (31 Aug 1970). There had to be a transformation of the old economic and social structures established under feudal colonial rule, into a new egalitarian system. This would be facilitated by adopting socialist policies. She said that one of the main goals for India was to eliminate economic and social injustices and inequality, poverty and backwardness and to secure for its people a decent standard of living.

Mrs. Gandhi's developmental goals were to augment production, achieve economic self-reliance, ensure that no section or part of India was ignored, to reallocate effective control over the means of production so that there is no concentration of economic power in private hands, which would distort political democracy, increase modern technology so that there is minimum economic and social dislocation, build a strong infrastructure of a new society in terms of public health, education, vocational training and scientific research (21 Oct 1971). Economic progress and stability, according to Mrs. Gandhi, could be achieved only by

Following a particular economic path - the path of democratic socialism, through which we also give social justice to our people (15 Aug 1970).

Our democracy is dedicated to planned economic development, the peaceful transformation of an old social order and the uplifting of millions of people from conditions of social, economic and technological under development (29 Oct 1971).

An organic world view unites our internal and external policies. Politically we have established institutions which, in the words of our constitution are informed by a passion for political, economic and social justice....Economically, our endeavour is to overcome, as early as possible, our crippling poverty and to lessen the inequalities which were bred by colonialism, feudalism and the delay in adopting modern technology. We are modernizing our agriculture and expanding and diversifying our industrial base so as to become self reliant (25 Oct 1971).

## 2. Global Goals:

Mrs. Gandhi articulated several vague and broad principles - such as world peace, total disarmament, removal of global disparities and inequalities, universal friendship

etc., - objectives which India's foreign policy should aim to serve, these principles were also characteristic of the Nehruvian rhetorical tradition. But the one principle which carried enough conviction was independence in decision making which had to be maintained and strengthened and which should not be compromised at any cost.

*National interest demands that one does not give up one's independence in decision making in domestic and international affairs to foreign dictates (31 Aug 1970).*

*No foreign country can curtail any of our programmes or prevent us from doing what we consider to be in the national interest (19 Oct 1971).*

This drive for independence was exhibited in several decisions taken by Mrs. Gandhi during this period. For example, national interest demanded closer ties with the Soviets which was formalized in the form of a treaty. Mrs. Gandhi proceeded with these developments in the relationship, despite the knowledge that she was opening herself to criticism regarding India's nonalignment. In June 1971, she declared that her government was concerned only with India's interests and could not care less if its decisions alienate others (24 June 1971). Mrs. Gandhi later said that India's independence of judgment and action was vindicated in the Bangladesh war (7 Sept 1972).

*We are not prepared to abdicate our judgment of right or wrong in terms of our own assessment, or to abandon our right of action as a sovereign nation (31 Oct 1972).*

Second, India would do everything in its power to ensure its security, if there was a threat to India's territorial integrity or its vital national interests.

*We are concerned with one thing and one thing only - our own national interests and security (26 May 1971).*

Security of territory and national interest was sacrosanct. During the Bangladesh crisis, Mrs. Gandhi believed that she acted with restraint and calm in the face of threat and provocation, but once the threat to India intensified, she had to act. In the latter half of 1971, Mrs. Gandhi's goals became more precise and her objectives remained consistent - while attempting to win recognition for Bangladesh nationalism as a 'just cause' deserving international support, she made it quite clear to the international community that the continuing threats to India's security posed by the crisis in Pakistan gave India the right to resolve the situation by any means it deemed effective to ensure the safety of India's territorial sovereignty and national interest.

### 3. Regional Goals:

Despite Pakistani and Chinese hostility, she said that one of India's objectives in the subcontinent was to establish and strengthen friendly relations with all the countries - Nepal, Burma, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. It was here that India's vital security interests were involved. Relations with the neighbouring countries had to take a central place in India's foreign policy.

Our policy is to strengthen our friendships, to change indifference into friendship and to lessen the hostility where it exists (31 Aug 1970).

Overall, India's fundamental goals, according to Mrs. Gandhi, were economic growth and modernization, achieving self-reliance, elimination of economic and social disparities and the establishment of an egalitarian society in the domestic arena and in foreign policy, establishing and maintaining total independence, easing India out of a situation of economic and military dependency, working toward peaceful coexistence and disarmament; supporting battles against imperialism, colonialism and racism; creating and maintaining friendship and cooperation with all countries, with nonalignment being the means to achieve the above.

#### **Best approach for Goal Selection** **From Immediate Problems on hand**

During this phase, given the situation in East Pakistan and the threat it posed to India, Mrs. Gandhi recommended intermediate range goals to be derived, of course, from a comprehensive framework or the overall system of optimal goals adopted by the government. While a master plan was necessary to deal with all issues, it was possible to separate issues and deal with each one on its own merits in the process of goal selection i.e., when circumstances demanded the formulation of short term goals. According to Mrs. Gandhi, in some cases it was necessary to deal with and solve current problems rather than seek long term solutions. For example, in foreign policy, India's long-term goal on the subcontinent was regional peace and stability and creating an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation with all countries in the region. The crisis in Bangladesh demanded prompt attention. The immediate goals were as follows:

1. To lobby the international community to put pressure on Pakistan for a peaceful political solution.

2. To ensure conditions in Bangladesh were safe for the return of the refugees.

When this did not materialize:

3. Defend India's security at all costs - even through military intervention.

4. Achieve its limited objectives in Bangladesh.

5. Declare a unilateral ceasefire on the western front.

It can be noticed that these short term goals were derived from India's long term objectives - security, peace and stability on the subcontinent.

Also, in keeping with her election promise, Mrs. Gandhi was concerned with the immediate problem of eradicating poverty. With economic growth and development and achievement of social justice as the ultimate goals, Mrs. Gandhi began economic and social programs to take care of the people's immediate needs.

She believed that within the framework of a master plan or broad-based economic, social, political and foreign policy goals, it was not only possible but also necessary to formulate short term goals in response to particular situations or events.

### Type of Goals

#### **Optimal**

A decision maker ought to select optimal goals when formulating a country's long term policies. While feasible goals were acceptable for short term or immediate problems that needed solutions, Mrs. Gandhi did not believe in compromising on fundamental goals in order to achieve short-term gratification. For example, in all of her speeches during her overseas tour in 1971, she firmly emphasised that India's security and independence would not be compromised. Despite the fact that India was a strong proponent of peace, she would not hesitate to repel a threat to these fundamental values.

**We shall meet any threat to our freedom or our security and ofcourse, we feel that the present threat just is not merely a threat but a threat to the very foundation on which India is built and on which India is surviving (30 Nov 1971).**

**We shall not sit quiet if India's freedom or territorial integrity is in peril (28 Nov 1971).**

She also asserted that she would never give up the goal of total independence, accelerated



economic growth and development, elimination of social injustices and disparities. It was next to impossible to prioritize these goals. Even if the immediate prospects for the realization of goals was dim, one should not hesitate to select optimal goals. She told the nonaligned leaders at Lusaka that their battle against backwardness would be long and hard, as the odds were tremendous, but that should not prevent them from setting their sights toward the future. Even if the short-term consequences of some of the fundamental goals might prove to be disappointing, one should not give up.

We have to persevere with patience and determination and not give up what we consider to be right and moral because of some temporary setback (2 March 1970).

We must not merely be concerned with what will happen this year or next year or in five years. We have to be concerned with the future of the country (26 July 1972).

This particular Operational Code instrumental belief had to be connected with Mrs. Gandhi's philosophical belief regarding control of human affairs, and optimism. It can be hypothesized that only someone who was optimistic and who believed in man's ability to control events could surmise that optimal goals could be achieved despite immediate shortcomings.

### Paths to achieve Goals Multiple

Truth is one but there are several paths to reach it. We have always accepted this fundamental truth (15 Aug 1970).

Mrs. Gandhi believed that one could use any number of different approaches to achieve an objective or goal. According to her, while the ends or goals should be fixed and unchanging, the means to achieve these goals should at all times be flexible.

Let us also seek new paths, new methods and new uses for new purposes (13 Nov 1970).

One must not be afraid to attempt a new method or take a new path, in keeping with the changing times. Several methods to achieve a goal may all work.

This belief that there can be various paths to reality is the basis of our policy of coexistence (19 June 1972).

Just as India has the right to follow its own path, other nations should be allowed the right to follow the truth as they envisage it. For example, development was the ultimate goal, and socialism was the means to achieve this goal, but within the framework of

socialism, the government could follow several paths. If a particular method did not work, one could abandon it and attempt another method. Also, the main goal for India during the Bangladesh crisis was to stop the atrocities being committed by the Pakistani army and ensure safe conditions in East Pakistan so the refugees could return home. Mrs. Gandhi tried several means to achieve that objective:

- a. Attempts to get the international community to put pressure on Pakistan;
- b. Helped the Mukti Bahini<sup>11</sup> operate from behind Indian lines;
- c. Sent in the army as a last resort.

### Linkage between Goals All Goals are linked

I am one of those who believe that no problem can be dealt with in isolation. Each problem, each part of life is linked up with other parts. Each part acts and reacts on the other (21 May 1971).

Just as there is a system of linkages in conflict, most fundamental goals are invariably linked with each other and are compatible. In other words, the goals are functionally linked in such a fashion that the achievement of one will ensure or enhance the prospects for success in others. For example, she was firm in her belief that true progress could not be achieved in any field unless there was social justice. The goal of development could never be achieved unless economic and social disparities were minimized. She said

We have believed - and we do believe now - that freedom is indivisible, that peace is indivisible, that economic prosperity is indivisible (31 Aug 1970).

There was a complementarity between what Mrs. Gandhi considered as values or Indian ideals, and specific policy objectives or goals.

Every country has its own ideals and interests. Our ideals and interests of the country are the same (10 Dec 1971).

Socialism, secularism and democracy were the means to achieve the larger and more important ends.

Somebody said that democracy comes first and socialism comes second....I want to make it very clear that I think that there cannot be true democracy without socialism or secularism. Nor do I think there can be true socialism without democracy. They are all parts of the same thing (2 March 1970).

---

<sup>11</sup>East Pakistan's rebel army

Political independence could only come out of economic independence and social justice. Also, without peace there could be no economic growth, development and modernization. If human beings were to realize their fullest potential, it would only be under conditions of peace. But again in order to establish peace, global disparities and inequalities had to be minimized. So it can be seen that each goal was closely linked with another in an integrated system.

**TABLE 32**  
**REFERENCES TO NATURE OF GOALS (PHASE II)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<b><u>Nature of Goals</u></b>		
- National Interests	108	43.7%
- Protect Security	139	56.3%
<b><u>Best Approach for Goals</u></b>		
- From Master Plan	11	11.7%
- Immediate Problem	82	87.2%
- Mixed	1	1.1%
<b><u>Type of Goals</u></b>		
- Optimal	55	73.3%
- Feasible	20	26.7%
<b><u>Path Goals</u></b>		
- Multiple Paths	27	73%
- Single path	10	27%
<b><u>Linkage between Goals</u></b>		
- All Goals Linked	37	94.9%
- Tradeoffs Necessary	2	5.1%

## **Instrumental Belief # 2**

### **Effective Way to Pursue Goals**

**Do not abandon/substitute/modify optimal goals  
Modify means if necessary**

**We base our policies on certain basic matters, ideas, ideals and so on and there is no cause for us to change our policy (31 Dec 1971).**

**There is no reason for us to fear or to withdraw from the path we have chosen....Therefore, we have to stick to the basic values whether they flow out of our traditions or from our present day policies (15 Aug 1971).**

**During an All India Congress Committee foreign policy seminar she said,**

**We must have a certain amount of flexibility and manoeuvrability, but as I said, it must be consistent with national interest and honour and we cannot manoeuvre or change where basic convictions and basic ideals, aims and objectives are concerned (31 Aug 1970).**

**Mrs. Gandhi believed that under no circumstances should fundamental and optimal goals be changed, modified, substituted or abandoned. The basic ideals which were derived from historical tradition and enunciated by the great men in history and presently incorporated in India's policy should not be compromised. But the means to achieve them had to undergo constant review and modification in keeping with the changing times. Some of the old-fashioned outmoded methods may not work in the present times and would have to change. She constantly criticized the forces of the status quo that obstructed progress by adhering to old-fashioned dogmas and methods. Throughout her career as prime minister, she attempted to fight superstition and outmoded traditions which came in the way of achieving goals - especially modernization and urbanization. What she was mainly attempting to change were the methods.**

**During this period, Mrs. Gandhi was a great proponent of societal transformation and structural changes. She believed that these changes would lead the country toward the ultimate goal of an egalitarian society, where economic and social justice would prevail. While such changes occurred the basic and fundamental goals would remain the same.**

**So long as we pursue these ideals and adhere to our chosen path, nothing can break up our unity and weaken us (10 Dec 1971).**

Mrs. Gandhi did not see a conflict between traditional Indian goals and current values. She perceived them as being complementary.

I am a believer in some of our traditions. I am a believer in our philosophy, but that part of it which is fundamental and which, I think, is equally relevant today and perhaps will be relevant as long as human life exists. And those values do not conflict with any of our modern thought, with any of our modern values, whether it is economic values, whether it is democratic or an egalitarian society, whether it is taking the people forward and giving an equal chance to all (21 May 1970).

In the sphere of foreign policy, the means to achieve fundamental goals could be very flexible depending on the situation and issue area. In keeping with the changing international situation, India had to use different methods in dealing with different issues. This was best expressed in Mrs. Gandhi's decision to sign the treaty with Russia in Aug 1971. In the fifties and sixties, Nehru's vision of nonalignment was equidistance from each of the Superpowers, and he may not have considered formalizing a relationship with either Superpower by means of a treaty. It was not so for Mrs. Gandhi. Times had changed, and in an era of detente, she believed that she could afford to take sides with either superpower depending on the situation. While judging each issue independently, if national interests demanded moving closer to one or another superpower, India should do so. National interest was paramount and in its achievement, the means had to be flexible. But foreign policy goals had to remain constant.

If you follow all that has been happening in India and how we formulate our policies, it is not a pendulum that swings from side to side...we base our policies on certain basic matters, ideas, ideals and so on and there is no cause for us to change our policy (31 Dec 1971).

### Means to achieve Goals

**Mobilization**

**Prepare Ground**

**Incremental approach**

Mrs. Gandhi's approach to the pursuit of goals was threefold, depending on the issue area and the goals themselves. According to her, there were three methods to achieve goals.

1. Mobilization: For economic growth, self-reliance, for industrialization and modernization of agriculture; security etc.

Mrs. Gandhi believed that, despite the fact that it was the government's role to

initiate, direct and guide the process of economic growth and change, it really depended on the people to ensure its success. The entire country, from the extreme rich to the extreme poor should commit themselves to these goals and work towards their achievement. If there was a total mobilization of people, resources and capital, there would be accelerated growth in all areas.

Our problems are like a mountain which we climb. We cannot afford to look back and see how far we have climbed. We have to only think of how much more remains to be climbed. For that purpose we have to rally together (15 Aug 1970).

This method of mobilization would apply not only in working towards developmental goals, but also in the area of security. Mobilization of the entire country was imperative in a crisis situation when there was a threat to security and important values. Mrs. Gandhi stated that it was not just the duty of the soldiers to ensure security of the home territory and vital interests but it was the duty of all the citizens to work together in supporting and reinforcing the efforts of the soldiers. This was particularly recommended for the 1971 situation.

In a modern war it is not only the armed forces but the people as well who have to be prepared for it (28 Nov 1971).

Every citizen of this country has to share this burden (of war), be he young or old, man or woman. We have to share all hardships and meet the danger together (3 Dec 1971).

## 2. Prepare Ground:

This method was very important to achieve intermediate goals. For example in Bangladesh, by October 1971 Mrs. Gandhi had carefully studied the problems in East Pakistan and had decided that India could bear the refugee influx for just a short period of time and if no political solution was achieved, she would enlist the help of the army to facilitate the return of the refugees. She anticipated international pressure on India urging restraint, so to forestall such pressure she made a tour to all Western capitals to explain India's position. Mrs. Gandhi had taken this into consideration as well as the need for military preparation. Her coordination between diplomatic and military activity became closer. Military preparations were begun in earnest and she took into account the adverse effects of the monsoons and the closure of the Himalayan passes in the winter, preventing Chinese attack from the north. Mrs. Gandhi had done her preparatory

work well and it helped in the achievement of immediate goals in 1971.

### 3. Incremental approach:

Some of the goals, the magnitude of which seemed overwhelming, could only be approached on an incremental basis. For example, the removal of poverty. Poverty, which was almost an institution in India, was deeply entrenched and its removal could only be achieved in an step-by-step fashion.

*The problem of poverty is far too deep and wide for it to be removed by magic. I cannot do it, my party cannot do it, nor can anybody else or any other party do it. We can solve it if we go step by step in the right direction and if we have the support of the people in the measures which we take (11 Nov 1971).*

Second, this was the best approach to reduce disparities and inequalities in society. Equitable redistribution of wealth, resources and capital, whether within India or in the global system, could not be achieved overnight. It was going to be a long and laborious process. Therefore, world peace could only be achieved incrementally. If there was peace in different regional systems, it would have a cumulative effect and lead to global peace and stability.

### Strategy Cooperative (Global) Deterrent (Regional)

Just as in the last phase, Mrs. Gandhi recommended two types of strategies for India depending on the area of interaction.

1. Global: In the global system, India's strategy would be cooperation with all the other countries for working toward economic development and for peace.

During this phase, she mostly advocated cooperation amongst all the developing countries. Her strategy was best summed up at Lusaka. Cooperation between the nonaligned and other third world nations would benefit their economies.

*The fallacy that there is no complementarity between our economies, has so far made it difficult to realize the undoubted potential for mutual cooperation. There is greater complementarity amongst our economies than between the economies of developed nations. Yet, advanced nations have been more successful in forming institutions of cooperation and our own effort in this direction has not even begun. The potential of trade and economic cooperation amongst us has been left virtually unexplored (9 Sept 1970).*

She indicated her disappointment at the slow progress in evolving guidelines for

international cooperation. she said,

**This conference should formulate the manner in which we would strengthen one another, and give due priority in our national policies, to positive measures for mutual cooperation. Such cooperation will help each of us to find some solutions to our respective problems, and also give us the capability to induce these changes in the economic system at the global level (9 Sept 1970).**

She said that because the major portion of the world's natural resources were shared by the nonaligned countries, it would be more beneficial to pool those resources, manpower and ingenuity for the production of wealth for their peoples.

Because of the historical circumstances of colonialism and imperialism, economic relations had not developed between the developing countries, but rather between them and the metropolitan powers. But she urged that all the countries should make the first attempts to discover areas of mutual interest and cooperation. Rather than wait endlessly for the developed countries to undergo a change of heart, the nonaligned countries must

**Determine to help ourselves, to sacrifice, to pool our resources of knowledge and initiative. We must work together on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis (9 Sept 1970).**

She identified India's strategy with that of the other developing nations.

## 2. Regional System:

She advocated a deterrent strategy vis-a-vis Pakistan and China during this period. Broadly, India's defence strategy since the early seventies was to meet at par whatever forces China was likely to deploy in the northern borders of India and to maintain enough superiority of striking power over Pakistan so as to deter attack. In the initial stages of the civil war in Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi refused to become involved in what she saw as Pakistan's internal affairs. But during the latter half of 1971, when she perceived a major threat to India's security, she believed that she would have to respond to Pakistan in kind.

**It was Pakistan which threatened total war and moved its entire armed strength into operational positions on our borders.... We had, therefore, to take appropriate measures and move our forces to defensive positions in order to protect the integrity of our country and the lives and properties of our citizens. It never has been our intention to escalate the situation or to start a conflict (24 Nov 1971).**

She also believed that Kashmir was an integral part of India and any attack there would be repulsed and fought with all the strength at India's command (3 Nov 1971).



**TABLE 33**  
**REFERENCES TO GOAL PURSUIT (PHASE II)**

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Goal Pursual</u>		
- Dont abandon/Modify/ Substitute goals	60	84.5%
- Abandon	11	15.5%
<u>Means to Achieve Goals</u>		
- Prepare Ground	19	27.1%
- Incremental	18	25.8%
- Mobilization	33	47.1%
<u>Strategy</u>		
- Conciliatory	5	3.6%
- Cooperative	116	84.1%
- Deterrent	17	12.3%

### Instrumental Belief # 3

#### Circumstances where Bilateral/Multilateral Action is Preferable

Global - Multilateral

Regional - Strictly Bilateral

There is no alternative to a cooperative approach on a global scale to the entire spectrum of our problems (14 June 1972).

At the global level, Mrs. Gandhi strongly propagated multilateral cooperation, acting as a group in global organizations such as the UN and the nonaligned forum. According to her, opinions and decisions would carry more weight when taken as a collective group rather than by acting singly, especially if one was a poor and weak nation. This is the reason why, despite her disappointment with the performance of the UN, she still endorsed its principles.

On the subcontinent, in keeping with her goals of trying to exclude the superpowers from South Asian affairs, she firmly and emphatically insisted on

bilateralism, especially in dealing with Pakistan. The Simla summit is a good example of this thrust in Mrs. Gandhi's foreign policy. She absolutely insisted that any negotiations between India and Pakistan, after the 1971 crisis, had to be strictly bilateral. Given the role played by the U.S. and China during this crisis, she wanted to ensure that both these countries stayed out of any negotiations between India and Pakistan. It was her desire to establish this principle that prompted India's concessions at Simla. The Simla Summit, according to Mrs. Gandhi, represented an important step forward in India's struggle to exclude foreign intervention and interference in the affairs of the subcontinent (26 Oct 1972).

### **Importance of Timing** **Very Important for Short term Goals**

Timing, according to Mrs. Gandhi, was very important and her actions during this period can be taken as an indication of her firm faith in the right timing. Timing was particularly crucial in the implementation of goals and timing spells out the difference between the success and failure of a particular policy. This applied more to short-term and specific goals rather than to long-term and broad-based objectives.

For long-term goals timing was somewhat important, in the sense one could not indefinitely postpone the achievement of those objectives but it was more a matter of managing one's resources prudently and working incrementally towards a goal within a given schedule. Timing in this case was not part of a fundamental strategy. Whereas for short-term goals, timing was significant. For example, Mrs. Gandhi displayed her perfect sense of timing in the signing of the treaty with Moscow. When India perceived a threat from the Pakistan-China-U.S. axis, and given the situation in Bangladesh, her timing to publicly summon a superpower on India's side was accurate. This she calculated would forestall U.S. or Chinese intervention.

Similarly, her decision to impose a unilateral ceasefire on the western front after the Indian army liberated Bangladesh was to show that India did not want the spoils of war or humiliate Pakistan further, and that India kept up its limited war aims - secured safe conditions in Bangladesh for the return of the refugees.

In addition, she made sure that the army was very well prepared to fight a short successful war before either the U.S., China or the UN could intervene.

Finally, she even made sure that the weather conditions were right. The monsoons had to pass and winter had to set in before the Indian army could go into Bangladesh.

In all, for short term objectives, timing was very crucial to ensure its success.

**TABLE 34**  
**REFERENCES TO ACTION (PHASE II)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<u>What Kind Action</u>		
- Unilateral	4	4.9%
- Multilateral	32	39.5%
- Bilateral	45	55.6%
<u>Time/Long Term</u>		
- Very Important	1	16.7%
- Not Very Important	5	83.3%
<u>Time/Short Term</u>		
- Very Important	7	87.5%
- Not Very Important	1	12.5%

#### **Instrumental Belief # 4**

**Risk Calculation**  
**Specific Undertaking**  
**Take Risks if necessary**  
**Minimize Losses**

Mrs. Gandhi assessed risks during this period not in relation to fundamental goals but in light of specific policy undertakings. Risks could be taken, not for the achievement of fundamental goals but in the protection of national interests and security if there was a

sustained threat. High risk policies were permissible only to entail protection of one's goals and vital interests.

However great the danger, however great the pressure, we have to move forward even if we are alone (3 Dec 1971).

Despite a commitment to regional peace and stability, India could go to war if necessary, to defend its freedom and independence. While taking risks it was not necessary to maximize gains but it was essential to minimize losses. Because she propagated high risk policies only as a defensive strategy, the aim should not be to make the most of the gains but every attempt should be made to minimize as much as possible the losses occurring to India, by adopting such a policy.

For example, in 1971, she advocated a high risk policy as a last resort. This policy of military intervention was initiated in response to the increasing threats to India's security.

If any help comes to us, we shall welcome it and accept it. If nobody helps us, even then we shall do what is necessary, however great the risk, however great the burden (7 Nov 1971).

There were several risks associated with such a strategy:

1. The U.S. might use the Seventh Fleet actively in war efforts to support its ally Pakistan
2. China may intervene by attacking from the north
3. The actualization of the above two would mean Soviet involvement (because of the treaty)
4. India would be alienating all of the Arab and Islamic states.

Military intervention was a risk Mrs. Gandhi was prepared to take. But, at the same time, she did not want to maximize her gains in the war. She declared a unilateral ceasefire to end the war on the western front and made sure that the Indian army achieved their limited objectives in Bangladesh and returned home quickly. Also, the concessions made at Simla, according to Mrs. Gandhi, was to indicate the fact that India was not an expansionist power and did not covet the territory of any other nation or seek hegemony in the region.

**TABLE 35**  
**REFERENCES TO RISK (PHASE II)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<b><u>Risk Calculation</u></b> - Comprehensive Framework - Specific Undertaking	3 20	13% 87%
<b><u>Control Risk</u></b> - Assess Means - Assess Opponent's Strategy	15 19	44.1% 55.9%
<b><u>Risk Assessment</u></b> - Take if Necessary - No Risks	25 8	75.8% 24.2%
<b><u>Risk Tradeoff</u></b> - Maximize Gains - Minimize Losses	5 18	21.7% 78.3%
<b><u>Risk Policy</u></b> - High Risk Okay - No High Risk	3 1	75% 25%

### **Instrumental Belief # 5**

#### **Beliefs on Action**

**Assess relevant issues**

**Act when enemy provocation is intolerable**

This Operational Code belief addresses itself to specific actors, issue areas and situations. When is action required in a situation, i.e., what are the circumstances under which one must avoid, temporize, delay, or take action? This also deals with strategy and tactics.

According to Mrs. Gandhi, one should not act without assessing relevant issues. Action could not be initiated unless there was a possibility of a hundred percent success.

Most of the people that were interviewed attested to the fact that any issue, whether important or unimportant, would be carefully assessed by Mrs. Gandhi. She would assiduously collect information, study the various aspects of the issue and then decide on a course of action. The soundness of the Indian strategy in Bangladesh owed much to prior preparations. The Chief of Staff, Gen. Manekshaw was struck by the clarity of the briefing issued to him by his political command: Mrs. Gandhi had taken diplomatic considerations, need for military preparations, and the adverse effect of the monsoon into account (Bhatia 1974, 243-244). However, Mrs. Gandhi believed that prompt and immediate action was mandatory under two circumstances, (1) If the opponent invaded Indian territory with a view to occupation - such as in Kashmir; (2) When Opponent's provocation reaches intolerable limits, such as deliberately engineered border skirmishes, bombing of military airfields etc. In such situations it was absolutely necessary to act in a manner to defend India's interests and security.

**Military Force**  
**Avoid Use Of Force**  
**Use as Last Resort**

Mrs. Gandhi disliked the use of force in achieving objectives. In our discussion of the philosophical belief regarding the role of conflict, we have examined the fact that Mrs. Gandhi considered conflict, especially force and violence, as dysfunctional and undesirable. Her commitment to the ideals of peace made her advocate the avoidance of the use of force, especially in an offensive manner. Indian ideals were peace and peaceful coexistence and the offensive use of force was incompatible with this value. Force could be used only as a last resort and for the purpose of defence and self protection, and only a minimum amount of force necessary to repel aggression or attack must be used.

As far as tactics were concerned, one should not launch the first strike. Once again, she applied this principle to the Bangladesh case. She attempted to secure a peaceful solution to the crisis by exploring several methods. When nothing seemed to work, she resorted to force, and even then Mrs. Gandhi emphatically claimed that the

Indian army's invasion of Bangladesh was in response to Pakistan's military attack of several Indian airfields and aggression into Indian territory. She stated that India attempted to avoid the use of force for as long as possible, but in the end was 'dragged into the war by Pakistan' (3 Dec 1971).

**Military Supremacy**  
**Crucial for Defence**  
**Not crucial for India's Power**

Just as in the last phase there was a contradiction in this particular belief dimension. Mrs. Gandhi just did not seem to be able to come to terms with the notion of military superiority. Once again Mrs. Gandhi was split on the idea of military supremacy. On the one hand she believed that military supremacy was crucial for deterrence and defence and on the other claimed that India did not seek great power status or aim to build up military strength for hegemonistic reasons.

There was an essential contradiction in this belief. For example, for the purposes of defending India from its 'aggressive' neighbours, Mrs. Gandhi attempted to build up India's conventional forces. But on the nuclear front, India advocated nuclear disarmament rather than nuclear deterrence, despite the awareness that China possessed nuclear capability. India continued to uphold the Partial Test Ban treaty of 1963, instead of emulating China's atmospheric testing.

We do not believe that a bomb will afford any real protection. On the contrary, it will add to the tensions of an already complex situation (14 April 1970).

With regards to Pakistan also, Mrs. Gandhi tried to obviate further eruptions of Pakistan's hostility into armed conflict. She did so mainly by demonstrating India's superior force.

**Power**  
**Multidimensional**

Mrs. Gandhi conception of power can be deduced from her occasional remarks and from her actions. She delivered no abstract discourses on the subject. According to Mrs. Gandhi, India's power was not the obvious one of muscle flexing and aggrandizement. It was rooted in something far deeper and in the profundities of Indian traditions. The

capacity of the Indian people to endure hardships and the survival of the Indian civilization through different conditions must be counted as intangible attributes of India's power.

*By strength we do not mean mere military strength. I think that this is a small part of a country's strength. When we talk of strength, we mean the strength of the people (2 Aug 1972).*

She said that real power lay in conviction, courage and national pride. Mrs. Gandhi's policies vis-a-vis India's neighbours were infused with confidence in India's durability.

But on the other hand, she also seemed concerned with the tangible aspects of power. Surjit Mansingh (1983, 32-67) has affirmed that Mrs. Gandhi, unlike her father, was concerned with tangible power as much as with intangible moral influence or the creation of a favourable global political climate. Independence, according to Mrs. Gandhi, required the demonstrable possession of power and its exercise in a limited global role.

In 1970, after India's military victory over Pakistan, there were frequent discussions regarding India's power and its role in the international system - whether India was a small power because of its low per-capita income or a middle power by virtue of its size, capability, the middle position it occupied between competing blocs and its stature in the nonaligned world, or whether it was a regional power because of its strategic location and historic position in South Asia, or was it an emerging great power?

Mrs. Gandhi explicitly denied that India had any intentions of acting the role of a stereotyped power.

*We are not tied to the traditional concepts of a foreign policy, designed to safeguard overseas possessions, investments, the carving out of spheres of influence and the erection of cordon sanitaires (15 Oct 1972).*

However, Mrs. Gandhi never denied that India should have an important place in world councils. She wanted other countries to look up to India and follow its example. In the subcontinent, India's motivation was essentially defensive - to protect its autonomy and maintain a level of stability and peace in the neighbourhood. Mrs. Gandhi identified the source of instability and dissension as mainly being caused by the interference of outside powers, so she made a conscious effort to assert India's superior power position in the region recognized by all other countries concerned. She sought to have control over



activities in the region which she judged as harmful to India's interests.

Third, because the structure of the international system, especially in the domain of economic relationships made it difficult for a developing country to preserve its independence and autonomy, she advocated a revision of that international structure. In order to pursue these goals, Indira Gandhi attempted to enhance India's military and economic capabilities. Mrs. Gandhi's obsession with independence and autonomy may constituted a keen awareness of the mechanics of power.

**TABLE 36**  
**REFERENCES TO FORCE (PHASE II)**

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Act</u>		
- Opponent provocation intolerable	49	56.3%
- Assess Issues	38	43.7%
<u>Force</u>		
- Avoid Use	72	69.9%
- Last Resort	15	14.6%
- Use than Surrender	16	15.5%
<u>Military Supremacy</u>		
- Crucial	2	22.2%
- Not Crucial	7	77.8%
<u>Power</u>		
- Multidimensional	10	100%

#### D. Conclusions:

Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code philosophical and instrumental beliefs during this period reflected consistency, and there seem to have been stability from the first phase to the second. Also, her Operational Code was much richer in this phase than in the first. The number of beliefs articulated was higher. There were more references to

issues in foreign than in domestic policy. She continued to believe that the nature of politics was conflictual and that the sources of conflict lay in the stratified nature of the international system, which was reinforced by the evils of imperialism, colonialism and racialism. Also, change generated conflict and violence ensued when the forces of change clashed with the forces of the status quo. Horizontal conflicts were due to power politics and its subsequent effects, and the interference by the big powers in the affairs of smaller countries. One of the means by which conflict could be eliminated was by changing this exploitative system and by establishing an egalitarian society. Changes were inevitable, and it was better to guide and shape change rather than resist it. The powerful countries must abstain from interfering in the affairs of the weaker countries. Peace could also be brought about by disarmament and positive cooperation between the superpowers. According to Mrs. Gandhi, conflict was extremely dysfunctional especially for the achievement of important goals

India's main opponent during this period was Pakistan, but she also considered the roles played by the U.S. and China as hostile to India's interests. She labeled Pakistan as highly aggressive and destructive and because its goals mainly sprung from religious sources. She considered Pakistan's hostility towards India as permanent. She claimed that the monolithic military bureaucracy, which was not responsive to or have the support of its people and which was waging a war against them, was being unrealistic and inflexible in the pursuit of its goals. Any attempts made by India to establish friendly relations was spurned by Pakistan.

Mrs. Gandhi's role conception remained the same. India would be active, independent and nonaligned, and this belief in India's role may have been intensified by the domestic and foreign policy successes of the last phase. She believed in the possibility of control over historical developments and thereby was optimistic regarding the achievement of one's fundamental goals. This also led her to predict the outcome of several long-term trends and specific events. The role of the leader was extremely important in initiating and directing change in society.

National interest and the security of the home territory were optimal and fundamental goals and were not subject to changes or compromises. One could modify

and alter the methods to achieve ends but the basic principles, values and ideals must not be abandoned. Most of the fundamental goals were linked and there were several paths or means to achieve goals and one should not just adhere to one method, or blind oneself to other possibilities. One must always keep up with the changing times. One of the best methods to achieve long term economic and immediate security goals was by mobilization, and by following an incremental approach. There was also a need for prior preparation. The best method of achieving global goals was by multilateral cooperation. But in the region of South Asia, a deterrent strategy would be best suited to defend India's integrity and independence. A high risk policy was allowed if the threat to India did not abate. Although military supremacy was not necessary to achieve important goals, it was necessary for deterrence and defence. India did not aim to become a big or even a middle power, but on the other hand, it was necessary to be able to control events in the region. Overall, Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs were not too contradictory except for the category military supremacy.

## CHAPTER VI

### MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE PHASE III THE TURBULENT YEARS (1973-1977)

This phase was momentous and turbulent in Mrs. Gandhi's political career. While she emerged as a strong political leader, winning the support of the entire country as well as the opposition in 1971-72 due to her masterful handling of the Bangladesh crisis, this phase brought in its wake severe economic and political problems leading to a crisis of legitimacy for the government. It climaxed with the declaration of emergency in 1975 and culminated with the ouster of Mrs. Gandhi and her government in 1977.

An examination of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs during this phase also reflected remarkable stability and consistency. There were no major changes in the belief dimensions from the first and the second phase to the third, although there was a relatively low frequency of their articulation. Hence, in this chapter each of the philosophical and instrumental belief categories will be combined together and will not be dealt with in great detail.

#### A. Issues:

##### DOMESTIC:

On the domestic front, as a result of the pressures generated by the Bangladesh war, there was a severe economic crisis which was compounded by drought and the world oil crisis. This economic crisis was accompanied by a growing political crisis. The opposition parties, despite their small numerical strength in parliament and state legislatures, were becoming increasingly assertive, impatient and militant as the mounting economic problems widened popular dissatisfaction. They launched a 'total revolution' movement which provided the umbrella under which diverse political groups, factions and parties could join together and pull down what they saw as a failing, incompetent and corrupt government. This movement called for nationwide boycotts, strikes, and non cooperation and urged students not to attend schools and the police not to obey orders.

Mrs. Gandhi perceived this political turmoil, combined with the economic situation, as posing a major threat to the stability of the country. Unable to face the economic challenges or control the political tensions between the government and the opposition, Mrs. Gandhi declared a state of national emergency on 25 June 1975, in order to put 'democracy back on the rails' (26 June 1975).

But parallel to these problems, there were important and significant progress in Indian science - the nuclear explosion in 1974, and the launching of the first indigenously built Indian satellite Aryabhata.

#### India's Nuclear Policy:

One of the most significant events during this period, which gave rise to international criticisms of India's policy, but which also generated a lot of enthusiasm and support at home, was the explosion of a nuclear device at Pokharan in May 1974. This display of nuclear capability generated questions such as 1. Why was a government committed to traditional values such as nonviolence and the avoidance of force, and its insistence on global disarmament sanctioning such a move; 2. Did India seek hegemony in the subcontinent in order to pursue its regional goals, by an augmentation of its power; 3. How could Mrs. Gandhi's image of India's regional role, i.e., as a friendly neighbour, be reconciled with the pursuit of tangible elements of power symbolized by the explosion.

While these questions will be dealt with in Chapter VII, this section will provide the historical background to the explosion.

Even as early as 1948, the government of India had appreciated the importance of developing atomic energy for the country's economic progress. India was one of the first nations to become interested in developing nuclear energy, largely through the efforts of Homi Bhabha, a nuclear physicist. He established a lab for nuclear research in 1947 and then persuaded Nehru that nuclear energy was an area in which India could attain substantial advantages.

By the time China exploded a nuclear device (1964), India possessed one of the world's better nuclear research and power programs (Cohen & Park 1978, 44).

While dependent on the U.S. and Canada for earlier reactor construction and enriched uranium, India had slowly achieved autonomy in some areas of design and construction.

India consistently opposed controls on the development of nuclear technology as well as controls on materials required for developing that technology. Conscious of the strategic potential of nuclear technology, but at the same time given his commitment to nonviolence and disarmament, Nehru went out of his way to affirm that India's nuclear programme would be directed exclusively for peaceful purposes. At the same time he asserted his determination not to be left behind in advances in the use of nuclear energy.

Further, to Indian leaders, there was no incongruity in an economically backward country attempting to master advanced technology. In fact, Indian political and scientific leaders, especially Nehru and Bhabha, were convinced that the only way in which a developing country could overcome its handicaps was to acquire competence at least in selected areas of nuclear technology, in order to achieve rapid economic progress. So every effort had to be made to acquire self reliance in the field of nuclear energy which was another basic objective of the Indian nuclear program.

When Mrs. Gandhi came to power in 1966, the nuclear programme was in full swing. The period 1968-1970 coincided with the superpowers actively canvassing support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The special targets for these powers were the so called 'threshold' powers among whom India was placed at the top. This slowed down even such marginal assistance for the nuclear programme that India was receiving from the Western powers. During the first few years of Mrs. Gandhi's Prime Ministership, she took a hard line at meetings of the eighteen nation disarmament commission in Geneva, and tried to ensure a treaty that would safeguard India's security from the Chinese bomb. India wanted the nuclear powers to commit themselves not only to nontransference of nuclear weapons or weapons technology to others, but also agree not to use nuclear weapons against a country that did not possess them, and safeguard the security of countries threatened by a power which possessed nuclear weapons capability or was about to acquire such capability. When the final version of the NPT emerged, India refused to sign it for three reasons. 1. Imbalance of obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear powers; 2. Inadequate security guarantees; and, most

importantly, 3. The discriminatory nature of the treaty. The treaty would prevent horizontal but not vertical proliferation.

Between 1971 and 1972, the government had a clear programme for developing nuclear energy and space technology, with fixed target dates for accomplishing each phase of the programme. India had already vehemently affirmed at the Lusaka conference of nonaligned nations in 1970 the right of developing nations to take due advantage of advances in nuclear technology, including the conducting of nuclear explosions for hastening their economic development. In particular, India's stand was that the developing countries would fall behind further if they did not take advantage of the technology. In 1970-71, there was also considerable debate in India on the subject in the context of reports from the U.S. and the Soviet Union regarding successful nuclear explosions staged by those countries for recovering natural gas and oil and for other purposes. In addition to the propagation for the economic uses of nuclear energy, there were a number of arguments regarding its political and military utility. The Indian debate on the bomb became more sophisticated in the early seventies. The launching of the first Chinese satellite in 1970 added stridency to the demand for nuclear weapons. This debate was first triggered by the 1964 Chinese detonation and many saw the opportunity to develop a weapon which would establish India's strategic superiority in the region mainly vis-a-vis Pakistan and China. India's military victory in the Bangladesh war produced a paradoxical impact on the nuclear debate. The image of India as a major or dominant power whetted the appetite for a bomb. The Chinese bomb ceased to be the main argument for the Indian bomb, perhaps because of China's reluctance to help Pakistan in tangible terms in 1971. The argument put forth by the bomb lobby was that nuclear capability would become part of a more general campaign to restore India to a position of regional and global influence. In this case 'targets' were neither China nor Pakistan, but the superpowers, and the objective was not military deterrence but political influence. These were the main highlights of the nuclear debate which continued between 1964 and 1974.

The government's response to the debate was the famous Sarabhai profile - a ten year nuclear energy programme which would give the country a balanced nuclear

infrastructure wedded to a modest space programme, which was adopted by the government in 1973. The centrepiece of this programme was one or more nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Mrs. Gandhi repeatedly clarified that underground nuclear explosions were absolutely essential to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and were therefore an integral part of India's development programme. But the political implications of India's test was not lost either in India or abroad. Mrs. Gandhi may have also wanted to demonstrate India's capability to produce nuclear weapons. This was also seen as a demonstration of independent action in international affairs. India's rejection of the NPT, in addition to the explosion, gave rise to additional anxiety amongst the nuclear powers. But, on the other hand, India was the only power to possess nuclear capability without producing nuclear weapons in 1974, even though it possessed the technology to develop a weapons programme.

The explosion had global repercussions. In Pakistan, Bhutto vowed to hasten Pakistan's nuclear research and succeeded in getting successive sessions of the UN General Assembly to adopt his proposal for declaring South Asia as a nuclear-free zone. He stated that matching India's nuclear capability would become Pakistan's national policy. This could lead to a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent.

The reaction of the western powers, especially Canada, was predictably hostile. Canada repudiated its agreement on nuclear energy cooperation with India. An embargo placed on the supply of nuclear components and technology by countries that later constituted the London club, severely constrained India's nuclear programme.

Mrs. Gandhi expressed her government's stand when she said that India would keep the 'option' open. But there is enough evidence to show that Mrs. Gandhi did not embark on a weapons programme during that period, and moreover she was voted out of power in 1977.

Foreign:

Relations with the U.S.:

Indian and American security and strategic interests continued to diverge; U.S. strategic interests focused on continued involvement in the affairs of the subcontinent and expanding its bases in the Indian Ocean, while Indian security interests were concerned



with excluding outside interference in South Asia, especially in the Indian Ocean. Despite the acknowledgment by Nixon of India's importance and supremacy in the region, the U.S. continued to equate India and Pakistan. There continued to be other irritants in the relationship as well.

Relations between the two countries took another turn for the worse when the U.S. lifted its arms embargo to Pakistan, in Feb 1974. While Kissinger was assuring the Indians of a major re-evaluation of U.S. policy towards South Asia, there was a resumption of supply of military hardware to Pakistan, on the plea that the balance with India was very much to the disadvantage of Pakistan, while denying any intention on the part of Washington to spur a new arms race in the region.

Mrs. Gandhi reacted sharply and told the Rajya Sabha that the U.S. action amounted to the reopening of old wounds and hindered the process of healing and normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. She said that it was totally spurious to argue that arms should be supplied to Pakistan because India was developing a self-sufficient defence industry (27 Feb 1975). Mrs. Gandhi declared that the arguments advanced by the U.S. for resuming arms supplies to Pakistan were untenable and invalid and their credibility was not likely to be accepted in India (11 March 1975). She urged the U.S. to leave the countries of the subcontinent alone to settle their problems bilaterally and peacefully.

In the Indian perception, Mrs. Gandhi told the Commonwealth Conference in Kingston (30 April 1975), the U.S. had shown insufficient appreciation of post-colonial nationalism. It was not the amount of arms supplied to Pakistan that mattered, but the fact that the U.S. continued to hold the erroneous belief that such an arms deal contributed to stability in the area. She said that recent world events did not change U.S. perception and its conception of its global responsibilities. Its inclination, she noted, to exert pressure in favour of unacceptable regimes had not diminished. She also criticized American expansion of military bases. The U.S. decision to construct a naval base in the Indian Ocean, on the island of Diego Garcia was made without consulting India or any other littoral states. India vehemently opposed this in keeping with its principles of regarding the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and of keeping the superpowers out of

the region. Mrs. Gandhi's opposition to the Diego Garcia base increased with the participation of the Pakistani navy in American-sponsored naval exercises in the Indian Ocean during 1974.

The official U.S. response to India's nuclear explosion was low key, but the reaction in the U.S. congress and the media was openly and vociferously hostile. Many U.S. legislators wanted aid to India to be cut off or reduced because India, they believed, was diverting its scarce resources into 'non productive' uses (Hindu 25 July 1974).

This relationship was further troubled by the declaration of emergency in India and American reactions to it. U.S. opinion, like that of many Western countries, was sharply hostile and critical. In an unusual comment at a press conference, President Ford said that

It was very sad that 600 million people have lost what they had since mid 1940's...and I think that it is a very sad development and I hope that in time there could be a restoration of democratic process as we know them in the U.S. (Indian Express, 18 Sept 1975).

Furthermore, he cancelled his impending trip to India. The government of India expressed its annoyance and amazement that a U.S. president should have chosen to comment on the internal affairs of a friendly country without due appreciation of the issues involved.

Mrs. Gandhi herself reacted sharply to Western hostility to the emergency. Speaking at an AICC<sup>1</sup> meeting (29 Dec 1975) she accused the Western countries of rank hypocrisy in its concern for the future of democracy after supporting several dictatorships in Asia. Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that U.S. support for democratic India had been less noticeable than its underwriting of military dictatorships, or its courting of Communist China. She warned about the danger of outside interference. It was not only since the emergency that some people abroad were 'against us', she said clearly referring to the U.S.. These were countries which opposed India's gaining its independence. If we were invaded, they were on the side of aggressors, she charged. She accused 'those' countries of not being bothered with the fact India had democracy, that there were no curbs on the press, nor were there any censorship or detentions. But the minute she acted to 'save

---

<sup>1</sup>All India Congress Committee

democracy' or the country from falling into complete anarchy, then these very same countries were labelling her as a dictator (29 Dec 1975). She stated that she was concerned by the deliberate interference and changing and toppling of governments in other countries by outside forces. This was no doubt a veiled reference to the activities of the CIA and especially its role in the ouster of the Allende government in Chile. Her fears were reinforced by the developments in Bangladesh - the coup, murder of its leader Mujibur Rehman, and the fuelling of anti-Indian sentiments, the change from a secular to a religious state and the installation of a government not friendly to India. All this deepened Mrs. Gandhi's suspicions about American intentions and role in the subcontinent.

Despite all these obstacles, Indo-U.S. relations were slowly limping back to some kind of normalcy. Mrs. Gandhi was not too comfortable with or desirous of a one-sided relationship, nor did she wish for a long term estrangement with any major power. The limitations and problems were now being better understood and acknowledged by both countries. Mrs. Gandhi and her government were engaged in the process of mending fences with Washington when they were voted out of power in March 1977.

#### India and the Soviet Union:

The closest point of convergence of interests between the two countries was reached in 1971-72. Moscow's backing of India's position on Bangladesh was of critical importance for India, confronted as it was with the combined opposition of the U.S.A and China who, along with Pakistan, were striving to evolve a new equation in Asia to their benefit. This support from the Soviet Union reinforced a general belief in India about a long term complementarity of interests between the two countries. Lengthy joint statements issued on numerous occasions highlighted their 'proximity' of position and 'broad coincidence of views' on major international questions.

Brezhnev's visit to India in 1973 was significant in two respects. First, because Moscow was once again actively pushing the proposal for an Asian collective security pact and India's reaction was crucial in this respect. Second, there was a move towards invigorating the economic relationship which had remained at status quo since 1966. Moscow gave the nod for food and economic assistance and a new economic plan was

in the offing.

While India's reactions to the proposed economic assistance was enthusiastic, its response to the collective security pact was not too positive. The Indian government did not believe the situation in Asia to be conducive to this kind of a pact and such a proposal would only aggravate tensions rather than alleviate them. It was better, from Mrs. Gandhi's point of view, to emphasize the independence of Asian countries and encourage bilateral and multilateral cooperation amongst them. Mrs. Gandhi was not willing to trade important modifications of foreign policy for economic aid. She indirectly hinted to Brezhnev not to assume India's acquiescence for his security proposals. Early in a speech she said,

Our friendship is not aimed at any other country. There is no reason for our friendship with the U.S.S.R to exclude friendship with other countries.... We too wish to expand our area of friendship (27 Nov 1973).

After thanking the Russians for their food aid she said,

There are some people who try to confuse and misrepresent things. But the fact is that the Soviet Union has not, during so many years of friendship ever put pressure on us or told us what to do and what not to do (27 Nov 1973).

This was an attempt to tell Brezhnev not to tread too heavily in the future. At the end of Brezhnev's visit a joint declaration was signed which emphasized on detente rather than security, and freedom of Asian countries rather than any military arrangements. India could not cooperate with the Soviet Union in South East Asia, for which region the Brezhnev plan was intended, any more than it could cooperate with the U.S.. It was clear that Mrs. Gandhi disagreed with the premise of external military power lending security, and postulated nonalignment and peace zones instead.

In 1973 the Soviet Union tried to lead a campaign against the U.S. proposal to expand the facilities at Diego Garcia. To that end it supported nonaligned declarations on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. India's explosion in 1974 was not condemned in Moscow, despite the Soviet's earlier pressures on India to sign the NPT.

After 1971, in the wake of the Indo-Soviet treaty, there were repeated criticisms from the West, regarding India's shift from its nonaligned position and claims that it moved India into the Soviet camp. India was called a Soviet client state. What gave credence to this criticism was also the fact that India was heavily dependent on the Soviet

Union for arms. Mrs. Gandhi consistently rejected such allegations and called such criticism the product of stereotypical cold war thinking. She reacted vehemently to U.S. or Chinese insinuations of India's subordination to Soviet hegemonistic ambitions as derogatory to her intelligence and India's pride, capability and nationalism. Mrs. Gandhi was convinced that Indian nationalism was too strong to be undermined by Soviet influence. Influence is largely a matter of perception and Indira Gandhi did not perceive herself or India as being influenced by the Soviet Union. Instead, she perceived a commonality of interests with the Soviet Union. While she was not a great admirer of the Soviet political system, she did presume that the Soviet Union and India had similar foreign policy interests and objectives and shared identical values such as anticolonialism, anti imperialism, anti racism etc. The Soviet Union, according to Mrs. Gandhi, was the champion of the underdogs. As far as India was concerned, she did not hesitate to move closer to the Soviet Union when India's interests demanded it, as evidenced by the Indo-Soviet treaty.

It can be seen that the Indo-Soviet relationship has been advantageous to both countries, and there has been tolerance of different paths where their interests did not coincide.

#### Indo-Pak Relations:

The promises made at Simla soured soon and the expected peace and cooperation between the two countries did not materialize. Bhutto returned to Pakistan and slowly began to rebuild his military machine and replenish its 1971 losses and looked to the U.S., U.K., France and China for sophisticated military hardware, for which he received Arab financing. Pakistan's military budget increased by 50% and constituted nearly 50% of the national budget.

Bhutto continued to claim that Pakistan was a victim of unabashed aggression and said that his country would never accept Indian hegemony on the subcontinent. He wanted arms parity with India and expressed the desire to discuss mutual arms reduction with India and stated that any such reduction would have to ensure parity between the two nations (Longer 1988, 237). Mrs. Gandhi categorically rejected the suggestion and underscored the fact that India was a much bigger country with a much larger border

than Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi noted that Pakistan's 'new belligerence' coincided with the start of a fresh flow of arms (27 May 1975).

Pakistan was receiving an enormous amount of military assistance from China, which included sophisticated arsenal. In addition, the U.S. lifted its arms embargo to Pakistan and thus Pakistan had access to the latest in weapons technology.

The process of normalization of relations was erratic for other reasons also. During 1974 and 1975, Pakistan reacted forcefully to India's nuclear explosion and its integration of the protectorate of Sikkim. Pakistan felt threatened by the explosion and Bhutto termed it as a fateful development and said that it had put an end to the possibility of a no-war pact between India and Pakistan. The Indian government did its best to mollify Pakistan and assure it of its peaceful intentions. Mrs. Gandhi told Bhutto that India had no desire to acquire atomic weapons or threaten a neighbour. She reaffirmed India's commitment to developing friendly relations with all neighbouring countries on the principle of sovereign equality and repudiated the suggestion that India had any ambition to dominate or exercise hegemony over another country. Pakistan put off the restoration of normal links between the two countries and for sometime continued to denounce the Indian explosion as the primary reason.

Similarly, Pakistan accused India of being expansionist in annexing Sikkim. In an interview with the New York Times, Bhutto said that India was in an expansionist mood and that there was anxiety among Pakistanis about India's intentions. He cited the nuclear explosion and the 'virtual takeover' of Sikkim by India as evidence in support of his claim (Dutt 1984, 215). This notwithstanding Pakistan's own annexation of the principality of Hunza. India in turn claimed that the annexation of Hunza by Pakistan was illegal as it was a principality of Jammu and Kashmir which was a part of India and therefore Pakistan had no right to annex that area.

Also, India, which was a staunch supporter of the Arab cause, was losing ground in that region as Pakistan was slowly moving towards the Arabs in what was seen as Islamic solidarity. Pakistan was receiving financial assistance from a number of Arab countries for the purchase of arms.

Bangladesh and Pakistan moved closer after the coup in Dacca and Bangladesh

perceived commonality of interests with Islamic Pakistan as opposed to Hindu India. India did not exercise its power to keep Bangladesh secular and away from Pakistan, and this had implications for the power equation on the subcontinent. Overall, relations with Pakistan remained at status quo with each side viewing with suspicion moves made by the other. The Simla agreement did nothing to alleviate the tensions and hostility that existed between the two countries.

#### **Indo-China Relations:**

There was some relaxation of tensions between India and China from 1973. Small but significant moves were made by both countries to reestablish contacts. Nevertheless, India occupied a low rung in China's international priorities, as China was concerned more with the U.S. and Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, Japan. China's main security concern was Indo-Soviet friendship especially after 1971, and it put the brakes on the opening up of ties between China and India. Also, China's commitments to Pakistan were heavy and China continued to supply arms and equipment, much to the consternation of India. Because of the strategic triangle - China, the U.S. and Pakistan, China followed a dual policy towards India: Unofficially it spoke of good relations with the people of India, but officially made no approaches until 1976.

In this phase, there were more references in the documents to domestic (56.7%) than foreign issues (43.3%). Also, when compared with the first and second phase there is a big drop in the level of richness of the code, i.e., the number of articulations to foreign issues dropped. One of the reasons for this could be that Mrs. Gandhi was preoccupied by the domestic crisis that confronted her government.

**TABLE 37**  
**REFERENCES TO ISSUES (PHASE III)**

REFERENCES	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
DOMESTIC	211	56.7%
FOREIGN	161	43.3%

**B. Philosophical Beliefs:**

**Philosophical Belief # 1**

**Nature of politics and the Political Universe**

<b>Nature of Politics</b>	<b>Conflictual</b>
<b>Sources of Conflict</b>	<b>Power/Imp,col,rac/inequalities</b>
<b>Conditions for Peace</b>	<b>Elim ineq/edn,comm,neg/noninterfere</b>
<b>Scope of Conflict</b>	<b>High Spillover</b>
<b>Role of Conflict</b>	<b>Undesirable</b>

The nature of politics and the political universe was essentially conflictual.

In spite of progress, the increasing pace and competitiveness of contemporary living have not enabled man to live in peace with his neighbour or with himself, but compel him still to struggle for survival though in a different way and at different levels (3 Jan 1975).

During the first and second phase she believed that conflict was just a temporary feature of the political universe but now she acknowledged that despite possessing the ability to control and regulate conflict, mankind has not attempted to do so, and she admitted that conflict may remain a permanent part of day to day living.

Let us not expect miracles and an immediate total ending of tension. Much as we all desire this, life is a series of problems. And solutions give rise to new difficulties of one kind or another (4 March 1975).

She attributed the sources of conflict once again to inequalities in the international system reinforced by imperialism, colonialism, racialism and the desire to dominate leading to power politics.



The desire to dominate is not diminished but has taken on more subtle forms. It is one of the major causes of global tension and conflict, the other being stockpiling of armaments which itch to be used, and glaring economic inequalities (3 Jan 1975).

Conflict of interests was inherent in all societies, according to Mrs. Gandhi, but were sharper in societies where inequalities were greater, such as in the developing countries (31 March 1973). She said peace could not become a reality unless inequalities were eliminated, the desire to dominate and the practice of power politics given up.

The world of today cannot fit neatly into a pattern set by the powerful nations and a structure of peace is more likely to result from a genuinely cooperative effort based on the frank recognition of the limitations of power (23 April 1973).

The acceptance of the right of other countries to live as they choose is the first essential of peace. Hence, the close inter relationship between peace and co-existence (8 June 1976).

Peace was all the more a necessity because of the nature of conflict. Conflicts had structural linkages and a tendency to spill over.

Isolated bases of tranquility cannot by themselves ensure stability when there are other areas where confrontation prevails and threatens a breakdown of peace (3 Nov 1973).

She believed in the indivisibility of peace and declared that as long as there were conflicts or dissensions in any one part of the world, overall peace would be jeopardized (15 Oct 1973).

She continued to believe that conflict was dysfunctional for the achievement of important goals and

Because we are not moving together and because quite often we let tensions arise, the world is not able to progress the way it ought to, and science and new discoveries are not able to benefit millions and millions of people who must benefit from them (15 Aug 1975).

According to her, war destroys human values, while peace enhances life (8 June 1976).

TABLE 38

## REFERENCES TO NATURE OF POLITICS (PHASE III)

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Nature of Politics</u>		
- Conflictual	33	76.7%
- Mixed	7	16.3%
- Harmonious	3	7%
<u>Sources of Conflict</u>		
- Power Politics	22	29.3%
- Imperial/colonial	21	28%
- Inequalities	32	42.7%
<u>Conditions for Peace</u>		
- Eliminate inequalities	11	42.3%
- Non Intervention	8	30.8%
- Communicate/Negotiate	7	26.9%
<u>Scope of Conflict</u>		
- All Issues Linked	1	14.3%
- High Spillover	6	85.7%
<u>Role of Conflict</u>		
- Undesirable	54	100%


Philosophical Belief # 2Character of Political Opponent (Pakistan)

Character of Opponent	Aggressive
Sources of Opp goals	Religion/external pressures
Opps reaction to concil moves	Ignore/take advantage
Opp hostility	General/permanent
Opp's decision making structure	Unitary actor
Opps pursuit of objectives	Unrealistic/inflexible

There was a relatively low number of references to foreign adversaries during this phase 18 references to Pakistan, and 4 references to China.

# 4

**PM-1 3 1/2"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET  
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT**



**PRECISION<sup>SM</sup> RESOLUTION TARGETS**

PHIONEERS IN METHYLENE BLUE TESTING SINCE 1974



11801 COUNTY ROAD 8, BURBANK, OH 43007 USA  
TEL: 614 439 7800 FAX: 614 439 7801 1-800-333-8888

**Pakistan:**

Mrs. Gandhi continued to regard Pakistan as aggressive. Pakistan's move to rearm itself heavily with sophisticated weapons after 1971 made Mrs. Gandhi suspect Bhutto's motives. Pakistan had no reason to fear Russia, and China was its close ally. Rearming reflected Pakistan's ulterior motive which was aggression against India. Such a move by Pakistan meant that it did not honour the Simla agreement to settle issues between the two countries peacefully. Mrs. Gandhi's threat perception did not abate as Bhutto made several threatening remarks regarding Kashmir at the UN in 1973, despite his promises at Simla not to take the Kashmir issue to a multilateral forum.

Pakistan used its hatred of and enmity towards India to divert its people's attention from its internal problems. Hindu India was branded as an aggressor. Moves made by India to improve relations with Pakistan were ignored.

We have also tried to have normal relations with Pakistan. Yet, successive governments of Pakistan based the survival and unity of their country on the idea of confrontation with India. This has stood in the way of cooperation which would have been to our mutual benefit (13 Oct 1973).

India does not intend to recapture this territory (Kashmir) by force; on several occasions we have given this assurance to Pakistan and have offered to conclude a 'no war' pact. Pakistan has rejected this offer repeatedly, trying to invoke third party intervention in our affairs (13 Oct 1973)

Many of these gestures have been unilateral and some of the initiatives which we have taken have not brought forth any response from the other side, such as our offers of non aggression, disengagement, mutually accepted safeguards and so on; (30 April 1975).

Mrs. Gandhi concluded that Pakistan's hostility towards India was general and permanent. She recognized that totalitarian rule by the military junta had given way to an autocratic regime by one man - Bhutto, which made it even more difficult to change Pakistan's policies or its attitudes towards India. She still maintained that Pakistan's goals and policies vis-a-vis India were unrealistic. She recognized the inflexibility of Bhutto's approach in matters relating to Kashmir, despite his promises at Simla.

**China:**

The references made to China during this phase were few and far between and did not relate to any specific belief category to warrant mention. Most of the articulations were in the nature of hope for a thaw in relations between India and China,

establish friendly relations etc. Hence it was not possible to categorize these references.

Most of her references to adversaries during this period were regarding domestic opponents.

**TABLE 39**  
**REFERENCES TO OPPONENTS (PHASE III)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<u>Character of Opponents</u>		
- Aggressive	9	81.8%
- Expansionist	1	9.1%
- Destructive	1	9.1%
<u>Response to Conciliation</u>		
- Ignore	4	100%
<u>Opponent's Hostility</u>		
- General/Permanent	4	100%
<u>Opponent's Image of one's Nation</u>		
- Aggressive	1	100%
<u>Opponent's View of Conflict</u>		
- Inevitable	1	50%
- Desirable	1	50%
<u>Opponent's Decision Making</u>		
- Unitary Model	4	80%
- Bureaucratic	1	20%
<u>Opponent's Choice of Objectives</u>		
- Impulsive	1	100%
- Unrealistic	3	100%
- Inflexible	1	100%
<u>Opponent's Strategy</u>		
- Blitzkrieg	2	100%

### Nature of the International/Regional System

<b>Nature of the Inter/Regional System</b>	<b>Conflictual</b>
<b>Sources of Conflict</b>	<b>Power Politics</b>
<b>Conditions for Peace</b>	<b>Non interference</b>
<b>Structure of the International sy</b>	<b>Detente/nonalign/interdep</b>
<b>Stability of the system</b>	<b>Mixed</b>
<b>National Role Conception</b>	<b>Active Indep/NA, Friendly neigh</b>

Despite the establishment of detente between the superpowers, conflict and tensions still prevailed over large areas of the world (1 March 1974).

There continue to exist areas of instability and conflict, of repression and injustice, of domination and discrimination. Attempts to order the world in the interests of a few countries have not been wholly abandoned....External interference, coercion and the occupation of the land of others continue (6 Sept 1973).

Although the old empires have receded, Asia remains an arena for the contest of world powers. Most of the conflicts since World War II have erupted on our continent. Many have been the outcome of the interference of outsiders....Many concepts are sought to be tested with Asian blood. And so, the world's largest continent...has not been able to shake itself free from exploitation (3 Nov 1973).

The era of intervention is not over. Threats, sometimes crude sometimes subtle, continue (12 Oct 1976).

Power politics was the source of most conflicts, and the failure to take note of the importance of nationalism (15 Oct 1973), the deliberate induction of armaments in the name of promoting regional balances, and the arming of small nations beyond the limits that could be sustained by their own socio-economic structure were some of the main reasons for local conflicts (6 Sept 1973). The developing nations have been the victims of superpower rivalries, according to Mrs. Gandhi. Conflicts have now shifted from Europe to the third world arena.

Competitiveness and strategic rivalries have spread to other areas and have taken new forms. Although open confrontation has often been avoided, local conflicts and tensions have been intensified with outside support...arms supplies to various nations is fuelling tensions (1 March 1974).

The policies of many nations are still dominated by deterrence and the compulsions of a balance of terror. Methods of annihilation have become more varied and more subtle. Hundreds of nuclear weapons have been added to the stockpiles of nuclear powers since the NPT was signed. Regional arms races are encouraged by transferring huge amounts of non nuclear arms to various developing countries....This is particularly disquieting when we recall that practically all wars since 1945 have been fought on the soil of the developing countries. Behind the cover of detente, many powers continue attempts to extend their influence in the developing countries and to prevent others from doing likewise (14 Jan 1976).

Also, the existence of colonialism and neo-imperialism have intensified such conflicts.

The cold war has ended, but has its legacy? Colonial rule has almost gone, but have its consequences? Many of our nations remain politically vulnerable to external pressures. The effort to undermine the power of nationalism and political cohesion, to discredit and remove leaders and governments who symbolize independent thinking and self reliance, and to install more pliable individuals and parties is unabated. Economic exploitation persists in old and new garbs. So do the technological disparities and psychological complexes bred by colonialism. Instead of diminishing, military presences is being extended and theories of imagined power vacuums are mooted to justify such action (17 Aug 1976).

Peace could only be obtained if power politics was abandoned and outdated theories of spheres of influence were given up. Also, the realities of existing international politics had to be acknowledged and the importance of third world nationalism had to be accepted.

It seems to us that any approach to peace and stability in the world and any concept of a world order of the future must be based on an understanding of the complex realities of the contemporary world, rather than a nostalgic preference for the kind of stability which Europe enjoyed a century ago (30 April 1975).

Another essential precondition for peace was disarmament.

Moves towards the limitation of nuclear armaments and other weapons of mass destruction are important to the relaxation of tensions. But they do not take us far enough. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and complete disarmament alone can lead to genuine peace (6 Sept 1973).

She perceived the international system as having several characteristics. There was a process of detente between the superpowers.

In the last couple of years, important changes have taken place in the world. Rigid attitudes are being softened and this change is reflected in a number of instances where confrontation is gradually being replaced by conciliation; animosity by understanding and conflict by a search for cooperation (9 Feb 1973).

She attributed this to the continuing validity of nonalignment.

Now that members of each power bloc are building bridges with their rivals as well as with the nonaligned nations, one might say that the period of bipolarity and cold war attitude of the post war world has come to an end. And in the process, the policy of nonalignment stands vindicated (9 Feb 1973).

Recent events have shown a new trend towards detente and peaceful resolution of old conflicts, proving the correctness of the policy of nonalignment (28 April 1973).

Non alignment has not lost any of its relevance even though the rigid attitudes of the cold war have softened (6 Sept 1973).

Third, Mrs. Gandhi recognized the growing interdependence between countries which was beneficial to the third world in some respects but at the same time intensified the

relationship of dependence in others.

*Today the world is not divided and isolated into separate islands. It is one world....Each country has its own policies, difficulties, problems and viewpoints. Yet it is one world, and every country is affected by what happens in other countries (9 May 1975).*

The international system was neither totally stable nor unstable. While there were increased economic and scientific exchanges and cooperation between the different blocs, the fear of a nuclear conflict was still a distinct possibility. Despite the lessening of tensions and growing contacts between the superpowers, the arms race was still not a thing of the past.

Mrs. Gandhi continued to perceive India's role in the international system as that of an active independent nonaligned country. She still firmly held the belief that no country had the right to rule over another country, or enforce its will over another, or mould others in its own image or according to what it considered to be right (11 June 1973).

*We in India set great store by our independence, not only political, but in the matter of taking our decisions and shaping our policies according to the interests of our nation (3 April 1975).*

*There are many forces in the world which do not want India to succeed....India can only follow an independent foreign policy and our successive actions have proved this (27 Feb 1973).*

*We go ahead keeping in view only the interest of India. I want to make it clear that we have never allowed any other country to interfere in our affairs. We are not letting it happen now and we will never let it happen ever (15 Aug 1975).*

In the regional system and in the subcontinent Mrs. Gandhi strove to play the role of a friendly neighbour.

*We want friendship with all, particularly with our neighbours, with whom it is necessary to have friendship and cooperation (15 Aug 1975).*

She took pains to assure Pakistan and Bangladesh of India's friendly intentions and denied that India sought hegemony or a leadership role in the region (19 Jan 1976).

*We have no illusions of grandeur or hankering for big power status (30 April 1975).*

*I should like to assure that India has neither the desire nor the inclination to be a power - big, small or of any kind, nor to interfere with the neighbours in any way (9 Feb 1973).*

Despite India's superior power and capabilities, she could not conceive of using it to India's advantage. This is the reason why Mrs. Gandhi chose to remain silent when a friendly Bangladesh changed its attitude towards India after the coup in 1975.



TABLE 40

## REFERENCES TO THE REGIONAL SYSTEM (PHASE III)

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Nature of Region System</u> - Conflictual - Mixed	25 1	96.2% 3.8%
<u>Sources Region Conflict</u> - Power Politics - Nationalism	8 1	88.9% 11.1%
<u>Conditions Region Peace</u> - Communicate/Negotiate - Non Interference	1 5	16.7% 83.3%
<u>Structure Region System</u> - Bipolar/ Detente - Nonalignment - Interdependent	25 10 18	47.1% 18.9% 34%
<u>Stability Region System</u> - Mixed	2	100%
<u>National Role</u> - Active Independent - Friendly Neighbour	82 94	46.6% 53.4%

**Philosophical Belief # 3****Prospects for Goal Realization  
Conditional Optimism, Long term goals**

Mrs. Gandhi's optimism did not seem to wane in the face of tremendous difficulties and problems that she faced.

I am aware that when there are dark clouds, people forget what sunshine is and what light is, but this does not mean that there is no sunshine and that light has disappeared . Sunshine is there and one who has the eyes to see and also the strength of soul and mind, can progress himself and help his country to progress in that direction (15 Aug 1974).

There is sorrow, there are anxieties and burdens. But, along with these, I can also see a bright future, not a distant one but a near future (15 Aug 1974).

In our world view, all turbulence ends in order, all conflict ends in resolution, all travail ends in tranquility (28 Oct 1975).

She was still optimistic about the achievement of long-term goals and policies and was determined to make it happen.

The government has no intention of failing. The government is going to succeed in what it has set before itself (27 Feb 1973).

She was also tremendously optimistic about the capabilities of the people of India.

I personally do not think that there is any danger or difficulty which the Indian people cannot face with courage (1 March 1974).

I only have to tell you not to be disheartened and have courage and faith in the country's future and in India's people (15 Aug 1974).

As long as one had hope and conviction, nothing was impossible.

The most dangerous thing would be to give up hope and to feel that nothing has been done or can be done (15 Aug 1974).

Cynicism is the greatest enemy of man just as hope and endeavour are his best friends (27 Feb 1976).

She believed that India had a bright future.

No one would be able to stop India from marching ahead. No one, within or without, who is opposed to India becoming strong can prevent it from marching ahead (15 Aug 1975).

But she said that in order to fulfill dreams one had to work hard and travel through the rough path. The road to success was never easy.

We are gradually developing our resources, but our greatest assets are courage, morale and self confidence. I ask you all to have confidence in yourself and in the future of the country. Ours is not an easy path. It is full of difficulties, bristling with thorns. It is not a path of rest and respite, but of hard work. But if you move on this path you will be able to find a new world, you will achieve a new contentment, because you will realize that you are building a new India and creating history (15 Aug 1975).

With hope, conviction and hard work, one could achieve success.

**TABLE 41**  
**REFERENCES TO OPTIMISM (PHASE III)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<u>Goal Realization</u> - Optimism - Mixed	48 7	87.3% 12.7%
<u>Optimism and Goals</u> - Long Term Goals - Policy Undertaking	51 1	98.2% 1.8%
<u>Optimism Conditional</u> - Conditional - Unconditional	32 18	64% 36%

### **Philosophical Belief # 4**

#### **Predictability of Political Life** **Long term predictable/certainty**

Mrs. Gandhi continued to believe in the predictability of political life, especially historical developments and long term trends.

TABLE 42

## REFERENCES TO PREDICTABILITY (PHASE III)

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Politics Predictable?</u>		
- Predictable	49	94.2%
- Capricious	1	1.9%
- Mixed	2	3.8%
<u>What Aspects Predictable?</u>		
- Historical Trends	45	86.5%
- Policy Outcomes	4	7.7%
- Specific Events	3	5.8%
<u>Degree of Predictability</u>		
- Certainty	49	94.2%
- Uncertainty	3	5.8%

**Philosophical Belief # 5****Control Of Historical Development****Full ability to Control****Role of leader important**

This was probably the only time that Mrs. Gandhi spoke in abstract theoretical terms about historical change, evolution and control, when during a speech at the Institute of Social and Economic Change she said,

All history can, perhaps be interpreted as a constant interaction of the forces of change and the forces of continuity. These forces are not impersonal nor mechanistic forces. Politics will act upon them, alter, change and accelerate them (11 July 1974).

She said that every man and woman had a role to play in shaping one's destiny and the history of the nation (13 Nov 1975), and a part to play in the remaking of the world (6 Sept 1973).

It is only by involving ourselves in something which is bigger than ourselves in facing gigantic problems, one helps in writing his history, in giving shape to society (31 Dec 1973).

In most of her speeches, she urged the people to shed off their apathy and the belief that

poverty and backwardness was their fate.

*We must mobilize our people to a more conscious feeling of involvement and responsibility in moulding their future (1 May 1974).*

She immensely disliked the Indian concept of Karma which she believed came in the way of governmental efforts to mobilize the people to participate in programmes for development.

During this phase, Mrs. Gandhi's belief in a strong leadership was widely articulated. Given the conditions within the country, especially the state of national anarchy, Mrs. Gandhi firmly believed in the right of the government to curb the rebellion and restore law and order even if it meant taking extraordinary steps to do so. She believed that it was the governments duty to ascertain that democracy was not imperiled and a strong central government was necessary to maintain unity, peace, stability within the country.

*Any situation, which weakens the capacity of the national government to act decisively inside the country, is bound to encourage dangers from outside. It is our paramount duty to safeguard unity and stability (26 June 1976).*

The position of the prime minister grew in importance during this phase and the powers associated with that position increased tremendously. In a broadcast to the nation after the declaration of emergency, she said,

*The institution of the prime minister is important and the deliberate political attempts to denigrate it, is not in the interests of democracy or of the nation (26 June 1975).*

She reaffirmed that it was the duty of the government to ensure that there was discipline in the country in order to proceed with the task of development.

*It is necessary today not only to increase production but to improve distribution and to go ahead with our socialist program and even more important, to hold our country together. the government must be strong and the government must have the ability to make the people work and prevent any particular group or small sections from doing harm. Strength and discipline are inseparable (22 feb 1976).*

Active state intervention was necessary to bring about economic growth.

*No country in today's world can progress or even effectively retain its freedom without a strong industrial base. And such a base cannot be built in a newly freed country without state initiative (13 April 1976).*

Mrs. Gandhi also identified the leadership role as being responsive to public opinion and as political educator and interest aggregator.

In our country, leadership has more than an executive role. It has to concern itself more dynamically with ideas and values and with educating the public. The public also expect a great deal from leadership in India than they do in any other country (27 Dec 1973).

**TABLE 43**

**REFERENCES TO ROLE OF LEADER (PHASE III)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<u>Control over History</u>		
- Full Control	13	86.7%
- Some Control	1	6.7%
- Inability to Control	1	6.7%
<u>Role of Leader</u>		
- Active Role	6	42.9%
- Avoid Intervention	3	21.4%
- Discern Trends	5	35.7%

**C. Instrumental Beliefs:**

**Instrumental Beliefs # 1**

**Goal Pursuit**

<b>Nature of One's Goals</b>	<b>Achieve National Interest/Protect Security</b>
<b>Best Approach</b>	<b>From Master Plan</b>
<b>Type of Goals</b>	<b>Optimal</b>
<b>Path Goals</b>	<b>Multiple Paths</b>
<b>Linkage</b>	<b>All Goals Linked</b>

National interest was paramount in the making of foreign policy. One of India's foremost goals was to achieve self-reliance and self-sufficiency, which would enable India to play an independent role in foreign affairs.

To satisfy our people and safeguard our security and to preserve our individuality in the international community, the only viable resource strategy is one aimed at maximum self reliance in general, and self sufficiency in the critical areas of food and energy (3 Jan 1977).

Self reliance has been an important component of India's development strategy (14 Jan 1976).

The choice of option to conduct the nuclear test may be related to this belief. Another

related goal was the elimination of poverty. Mrs. Gandhi launched the twenty point programme, representing a major stage in the battle for the alleviation of poverty.

She emphasized the fact that India's foreign policy goals were based both on traditional values and on a realistic assessment of present day requirements.

India's foreign policy is a projection of values which we have cherished through the centuries as well as our current concerns....Our first concern has been to prevent any erosion of our independence. Therefore, we could not be camp followers of any power, however rich or strong (13 Oct 1973).

Another major concern was security. It was absolutely necessary to maintain territorial integrity and protect India's fundamental interests, by strengthening the country.

But life is such that no matter how much our internal difficulties, we cannot afford to neglect the external dangers. We have to remain ever vigilant (15 Aug 1974).

We don't want to fight wars; we are a peace-loving people. But when we are attacked, we have to repulse the attack....When arms are being collected at such a rate in all our neighbouring countries, when the Indian Ocean itself is becoming an area of tension, it does mean that we have to be doubly vigilant and careful; that we have to renew our efforts at strengthening this country in every way (20 April 1975).

National goals, according to Mrs. Gandhi, had to originate from a broad framework, guidelines or a master plan. Although in some cases, depending on the immediate problem on hand, one could set out temporary or contingency goals. A country's fundamental goals and policies had to be based on traditions and values evolved over centuries. In India's case, the leaders who fought for freedom had clearly laid down the framework, soon after independence.

Under Mahatma Gandhi's inspiration, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress movement formulated a set of principles which have served as our guidelines and which are still valid for us. These are democracy, socialism and secularism so far as our internal affairs are concerned and nonalignment in our external relations (13 Oct 1973).

Our state policy has four major premises: Democracy, socialism, secularism and a nonaligned independent foreign policy. They are not unconnected objectives, but have an organic interrelationship and they are consistent with our traditions (20 June 1973).

She also believed that important fundamental and optimal goals should under no condition be compromised or abandoned.

What is important is to ensure that temporary difficulties and setbacks do not distract us from our main tasks (31 March 1973).

Mrs. Gandhi maintained that just as there were several paths to the truth, there were several means to the achievement of goals.

The ancient sages of our country said that there are many paths to truth. It is time that we realized that the paths to progress can also be varied....The universality of science need not result in the homogenization of man. Diversity...is essential to survival (30 Oct 1973).

What works in one type of situation may not apply in another, some of the means may be more useful in a particular context but totally inapplicable in another.

We are determined to evolve our own pattern of living and not to imitate other cultures. We believe that there are different roads to a destination (14 Jan 1976).

Also, India's fundamental goals were functionally linked. The achievement of one would entail the achievement of another. Political freedom, insisted Mrs. Gandhi, was not complete unless there was economic freedom.

(Political) freedom would not be complete without economic freedom, which in turn depended upon technological self reliance (8 Nov 1974).<sup>2</sup>

All problems are linked together. We cannot separate the problems of discrimination and inequality from the problem of production and economic growth. And we cannot separate either of these from the problem of the security of the country. In a way, security comes first, because if our freedom is threatened, then everything we have is threatened (20 April 1975).

A people's political freedom can be secure only when their economy is stable and strong....It has been our experience that there are limits to economic progress if it is not accompanied by social justice (3 Nov 1973).

---

<sup>2</sup>Author's parenthesis



TABLE 44

## REFERENCES TO NATURE OF GOALS (PHASE III)

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Nature of Goals</u>		
- National Interests	42	42.9%
- Protect Security	44	44.9%
- Peaceful Coexistence	12	12.2%
<u>Best Approach for Goals</u>		
- From Master Plan	6	100%
<u>Type of Goals</u>		
- Optimal	16	88.9%
- Feasible	2	11.1%
<u>Path Goals</u>		
- Multiple Paths	4	80%
- Single path	1	20%
<u>Linkage between Goals</u>		
- All Goals Linked	2	100%

**Instrumental Belief # 2**

**Effective way to Goal Pursuit**  
**Means to achieve Goals**  
**Strategy**

**Do not Change/abandon/modify**  
**Incremental/Mobilization**  
**Cooperative**

Once a goal was established, one should not modify, abandon or substitute it despite all the pitfalls and hurdles that come in the way of its attainment.

In natural and in human affairs, the law of change works inexorably. But there is a basic core, certain fundamental values which remain constant and unchanging (12 Oct 1976).

If in pursuing a policy we do not succeed, it still does not mean that we give up policies which we consider to be right and which we feel have been vindicated by every event that has taken place (27 Feb 1973).

She was firm in her stand that the government would follow through on its programmes.

The government is not going to be diverted from its declared, accepted policy or its programmes (27 Feb 1973).

I shall not give up the policies or the ideals which I consider right, for which I must continue fighting regardless of position or lack of it, of people's praise or misunderstanding (1 March 1974).

As a nation, India has often had to act in a manner not approved by others ....Our nation must pursue our chosen and determined path....What path we are following is the only one which can help this country towards the goal which has long ago been outlined by our great leaders (22 Feb 1976).

One had to work towards one's goals in an incremental or step-by-step fashion. Also it was the duty of the government to mobilize the people as well as resources.

It is obvious that nothing at all can be done, no project implemented or even initiated unless we have this mobilization of men and resources (20 Jan 1973).

We have to mobilize our resources and use them judiciously. In this context, the main responsibility is that of the government but in this the public is equally involved (15 Aug 1973).

During this phase, Mrs. Gandhi emphasized on a cooperative approach in dealings with Pakistan as opposed to the earlier phases, where she advocated a deterrent strategy. She believed that it was in the best interests of both countries to cooperate. Most problems could be solved in a climate of trust, friendship and cooperation.

There is no doubt that the Simla agreement demonstrated to the world over our conciliatory approach, our serious desire to settle problems peacefully and improve relations with Pakistan (13 March 1975).

We have always tried to adopt a conciliatory approach through discussions. There is no reason to assume that the government will give up this policy in relation to any particular job, provided that the others concerned also adopt a conciliatory approach (13 March 1975).

She also believed that with international problems such as pollution, depletion of world resources, nuclear dangers etc. all countries would benefit by mutual cooperation. Solutions to pressing issues would be found if all nations cast aside their differences. In an interdependent world no nation could be unaffected by happenings elsewhere. Hence all governments, according to Mrs. Gandhi, have to realize the importance of cooperative endeavour.

There must be a determined and persistent effort for the evolution of an international design of cooperative endeavour. The challenge of the coming decade is to take a global view, to cast aside all narrowness in thinking and in action, to search and to discover, to pool knowledge and experience, putting it to best use to wherever it may be needed most (12 Dec 1975).

Similarly, all developing countries had to cooperate in the common task of development and betterment of their societies. Since all developing nations had similar problems which needed similar solutions they would all benefit by cooperation.

Asia should set aside its differences and unite, not in opposition to other continents and regions, not in any spirit of pan Asian chauvinism, but solely for the welfare of its peoples, who have so long been harried and impoverished and who so desperately need peace and the wherewithal to live in decency and honour (3 Nov 1975).

TABLE 45

## REFERENCES TO GOAL PURSUIT (PHASE III)

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Goal Pursual</u>		
- Dont abandon/Modify/ Substitute Goals	11	91.7%
- Substitute Goals	1	8.3%
<u>Means to Achieve Goals</u>		
- Prepare Ground	1	16.7%
- Incremental	4	66.7%
- Mobilization	1	16.7%
<u>Strategy</u>		
- Conciliatory	1	.9%
- Cooperative	110	98.2%
- Deterrent	1	.9%

**Instrumental Belief # 3****Circumstances where Bilateral/Multilateral Preferable**

**Global - Multilateral**

**Regional - Bilateral**

Mrs. Gandhi firmly believed in bilateral dealings with neighbours. Her efforts to keep big powers out of the region intensified during this period. She emphasized on bilateral negotiations especially with Pakistan because she did not want U.S. or Chinese interference.

In our own area and with neighbours, we favour a bilateral approach for resolving issues (19 June 1973).

But for the developing countries, she advocated multiateral action especially in the nonaligned forums.

**TABLE 46**  
**REFERENCES TO ACTION (PHASE III)**

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>What Kind Action</u>		
- Unilateral	3	9.4%
- Multilateral	10	31.3%
- Bilateral	19	59.4%

**Instrumental Belief # 4**

**Risk Calculation**  
**Take risks if necessary**

Risks had to be taken if necessary.

Anybody facing a challenge of lifting a country almost from one age to another must chart many new courses. Therefore, at this time there has to be a certain amount of experimentation and some risk taken (28 Feb 1973).

**TABLE 47**  
**REFERENCES TO RISK (PHASE III)**

BELIEFS	# OF CODED REFERENCES	% OF CODED REFERENCES
<u>Risk Assessment</u>		
- Take if Necessary	1	100%

## **Instrumental Belief # 5**

### **Beliefs on Action**

#### **Assess Relevant Issues**

#### **Military Supremacy - Sometimes crucial, sometimes not Power - Multidimensional**

Before one acts, one has to carefully assess all issues.

There must be calm and rational thinking. There must be discussion on all aspects of the problem (27 Feb 1973).

Once again, Mrs. Gandhi could not reconcile her views and action regarding military supremacy. Just as in the previous phases, she stated that military supremacy was not an important indicator of a country's power, and declared her dislike of the concept of conventional military power.

We in the government of India do not believe in power politics. We do not desire the status or the prerequisites of what is known as conventional power (27 Feb 1973).

But, on the other hand, she sought to equip the Indian military with even more sophisticated weaponry, and looked to France and the Soviet Union for supplies. Despite her repeated assurances that India's nuclear explosion was for peaceful purposes, it nevertheless demonstrated to the world, and more importantly, neighbours Pakistan and China that India possessed nuclear capability. Also, in the process of annexing Sikkim, she instilled fear among India's neighbours.

Since Dec'71, a new theory is being evolved, that of India being a dominant power. I have never regarded this as a compliment....This was a crude attempt to sow suspicion against among our neighbours (27 Feb 1973).

We do not seek conventional military strength. We are not interested in becoming a power major or minor (20 June 1973).

During an interview Dom Moraes, when questioned about the sequence of decisions that led to the holding of elections in 1977, she surprisingly responded,

Why should what Pakistan, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka decide to do have any effect on what India wants to do? India is their largest neighbour. They could be influenced by what we do, what they do can't influence us (Moraes 1980,264).

She repeatedly stated that India did not aspire for great power status, and it was not India's fault that the neighbours found India intimidating. India sought military strength for deterrent purposes. She was concerned with both the tangible and intangible elements of power.

**TABLE 48**  
**REFERENCES TO FORCE (PHASE III)**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b># OF CODED REFERENCES</b>	<b>% OF CODED REFERENCES</b>
<u>Act</u>		
- Opponent provocation intolerable	3	37.5%
- Assess Issues	5	62.5%
<u>Force</u>		
- Avoid Use	13	81.3%
- Use than Surrender	3	18.8%
<u>Military Supremacy</u>		
- Crucial	1	11.1%
- Not Crucial	8	88.9%
<u>Power</u>		
- Multidimensional	19	100%

**D. Conclusions:**

Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs exhibited a high degree of stability and consistency. The nature of politics and the political universe, according to Mrs. Gandhi, was essentially conflictual. Although conflict was inevitable in societies undergoing a tremendous amount of change, it was not a permanent or a non-manipulable feature.

Most conflicts arose because of inequalities which divided society into rich and poor, haves and have-nots, technologically backward vs advanced, developed, underdeveloped, etc. This inequality was being reinforced by notions of superiority, and exploitation and domination by the strong over the weak. Conflict would erupt when the forces which stood for change came into contact with the forces of the status quo.

To eliminate conflict, Mrs. Gandhi did not suggest the revolutionary overthrow of the existing system. Hers was more of a reformist stance and she argued that the elimination of inequalities and the establishment of a more equitable world order would

pave way for positive peace. She perceived conflict as having the potential for spillover from one issue or geographical area into another. Contrary to the Marxist view, she regarded conflict as being undesirable and extremely dysfunctional for the achievement of important goals. Efforts had to be made by societies to establish a positive peace and not just the avoidance of war and conflict. It was only under conditions of peace that society could realize its fullest potential.

Mrs. Gandhi saw the sources of international and regional conflict in the race for arms, carving of spheres of influence, politics of neo-colonialism, and neo-imperialism which had a tendency to suppress nationalism and nationalistic aspirations in the third world, the widening gap not just between the developed and developing countries, but between expectations and aspirations on the one hand and limited means and resources to fulfill them on the other. She stated that a durable peace could only ensue through total disarmament, decolonization, non-interference and recognition of the right of individual societies to run their affairs according to their wishes, and through attempts by both developed and underdeveloped countries to narrow the gap and reduce inequalities. She urged the strong nations to abandon power politics as it stood in the way of peace.

Mrs. Gandhi was an optimist and believed that nothing was impossible and all goals could eventually be attained, despite short-term hurdles and pitfalls, if one worked hard and sincerely. Mrs. Gandhi's optimism was also conditioned by the fact that she believed that individuals were in control of their destiny, controlled their fate and had the ability to shape history.

Her predictions were more in the nature of meteorological forecasts. She believed that the leader had a very important role to play, and was like a manager in a corporation - had to define goals and the means to achieve them. He/she had the task of mobilizing men and resources in the larger interest, regulate and direct change in society and had to play the role of mediator, interest aggregator and public educator.

Mrs. Gandhi envisaged India as playing an independent nonaligned role in world affairs. This was one of the most frequently articulated beliefs. To this end, she

absolutely insisted on India becoming self reliant in order not to succumb to pressure from the superpowers. In the regional system, she saw India as playing the role of a friendly neighbour. India did not aspire for big power status and did not seek hegemony. She was strongly committed to India's development and economic growth and saw in democratic socialism the means to attain this end. Her fundamental domestic goal was economic and social justice and the establishment of an egalitarian society. These were optimal goals and were not to be given up under any circumstances. She constantly pointed out to the convergences between fundamental and traditional Indian values and governmental goals and policies.

Means to achieve goals could be varied and could be substituted or modified in keeping with the changing times. Goals had to be approached incrementally, as they were broad based and long-term. The government by itself could not achieve the goals, and needed to mobilize men and resources. In the international sphere, India had to adopt a cooperative strategy and urged all nations to adopt the same and work towards common goals. On the subcontinent she strongly believed in bilateral dealings with the neighbouring countries in order to keep out big power interference.

One of the belief categories which seemed contradictory was regarding military supremacy. Mrs. Gandhi claimed that it was not an important indicator of a country's power and that power was multidimensional, but her actions in certain instances seemed to indicate that she was concerned with the military aspect of power. Also, she did not want India to be called a 'power' either big, small or middle, but at the same time, she did want to assert India's leadership role in international affairs especially in the nonaligned forums.

Overall, it can be said that Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs did not undergo any radical changes over time, although centrality of some beliefs varied during the three phases, depending on the issue areas.



## **CHAPTER VII**

### **MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS**

This segment deals with a qualitative assessment of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code belief system as presented in Chapters IV, V and VI.<sup>1</sup>

In this chapter we will first examine Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code as derived from Database 2 and compare it with the code extracted from the content analyzed documents (Database 1), in order to find similarities and differences.

The second section deals with the seemingly logical contradictions in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code in some of the philosophical and instrumental belief categories. We will attempt to seek inconsistencies in general belief categories and between beliefs and policy preferences, with respect to India's foreign policy in general.

In the third section there will be an examination of the three specific foreign policy cases and its congruence with Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code; were Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code congruent or incongruent with the policy alternatives that were chosen in all the three situations.

#### **1. Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code: Database 2**

Was Mrs. Gandhi Operational Code extracted from database 1 (documents) similar or different from the one derived from database 2 (interviews)?

A comparison of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs as described in the previous chapters, with the interpretations of people who knew her and worked closely with her show a remarkable similarity. The philosophical and instrumental beliefs extracted from the content analyzed documents seem to coincide with what the

---

<sup>1</sup>These chapters presented the main components of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code in the context of India's foreign policy without critically assessing in detail some of the main points.

interviewees considered were Mrs. Gandhi's views and outlook on politics and foreign policy.

Responses to all the ten belief dimensions during the interview were varied and ranged from 'don't know' to 'absolutely certain'. Some of the interviewees refused to respond directly to some of the categories, such as nature of politics, predictability, strategy, tactics etc., on the basis of having limited knowledge of Mrs. Gandhi's actual beliefs.

To sum up the interviews, most of the people seemed to agree that Mrs. Gandhi did view politics as being problematic, tension-filled and even traumatic, especially in the international arena. Mrs. Gandhi seemed to have attributed it to many causes - the major ones being neo-imperialism and colonialism; the division of the world into rich and poor, haves and have nots; interference by the rich and powerful in the affairs of the weaker countries; and power politics.

*She looked at the world as being divided into imperialist and dominant powers and the poor developing third world and attributed conflict to super power exploitation and domination (Bhambri, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

While they did not all seem to agree on what Mrs. Gandhi considered as being the prime condition for peace - education, communication, elimination of inequalities, promotion of nonalignment, non interference etc., they agreed that her stance was more that of a reformer than a rebel. She certainly did not advocate the violent overthrow of the existing anarchic system.

All of them concurred that Mrs. Gandhi saw Pakistan and China as India's main opponents, and when asked if she considered the U.S. as an opponent, they had mixed responses. Former Ambassador Damodaran emphatically denied that Mrs. Gandhi ever considered the U.S. as an opponent or adversary, even during the height of the Bangladesh crisis. He said that it was

*An absolute inferential mistake to think that Mrs. Gandhi considered the U.S. as an opponent (Damodaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

Although the U.S. opposed some of India's policies and vice versa, and both countries had diverging strategic perceptions, Mrs. Gandhi never considered the U.S. as India's enemy in the same way that she classified Pakistan or China (Damodaran). Another

former Ambassador I.K.Gujral also agreed that Mrs. Gandhi was not really against the U.S. or its people.

I don't think Mrs. Gandhi was antipathic (sic) towards America. The Americans were antipathic towards India (Gujral, author's interview, New Delhi, 21 Dec 1988).

Mrs. Gandhi's private assistant, Mr. Seshan, said that

As far as the U.S. was concerned she tried to evolve a broader policy but there was no reciprocation from their side. They were only interested in supplying Pakistan with arms and keeping the continent unstable (Seshan, author's interview, New Delhi, 12 Dec 1988).

Mr. L.K.Advani stated that Mrs. Gandhi's policies vis-a-vis the U.S. was more reactive rather than based on any long-term strategy. He said

It is also true that she reacted to persons very strongly and that had an impact on policies also. The kind of allergy she developed about Nixon, or vice versa could have had an impact on Indo-U.S. relations during her period (Advani, author's interview, New Delhi, 23 Dec 1988).

One of her closest advisors (confidential interview, New Delhi, 22 Dec 1988) said that Mrs. Gandhi did not have permanent hostility towards the U.S. Despite several problems Mrs. Gandhi made efforts to pick up the broken pieces and move for better understanding and friendship with the U.S. One of the reasons why she wanted to mend fences with the U.S. was because she strongly believed in not leaning closer to any one superpower for any length of time and wanted to show that she did not belong to any one camp or the other. Prof. V.P. Dutt argues that Mrs. Gandhi,

Did make serious attempts to mend relations with the U.S. but her experience with the U.S. turned her off (Dutt, author's interview, New Delhi, 19 Dec 1988).

According to Bhambri,

Her views regarding the U.S. were based on her father's and Shastri's assessments of the super powers. The U.S. never really reciprocated or respected Indian interests. They did not accept Non alignment and everyone that was not pro-U.S. was considered by them to be fully in the Soviet camp. Mrs. Gandhi did not like the fact that the U.S. tried to dictate terms and pressure India on numerous issues, tied their aid and assistance with dictations as to what India should do in return (Bhambri, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).

Mrs. Gandhi was never anti-American, although they have been ebbs, tides in Indo-American friendship (Rajan, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).

Mr. Girilal Jain said that Mrs. Gandhi was not really hostile towards the U.S. but was intent on keeping the superpowers outside South Asia. When asked if she was hostile towards the U.S., Mr. R.K. Hegde said,

Personally no, she could take any other stance when the U.S. openly supported Pakistan (Hegde, author's interview, Bangalore, 20 Jan 1989).

According to Mr. S. Prasad, she resented American manipulation and pressure.

*She was fiercely independent and did not want to give in to American pressure and trade independence for special favours (S.Prasad, author's interview, New Delhi, 8 Dec 1988).*

It was generally agreed that although she did not consider the U.S. as an adversary, she reacted strongly to any kind of domination or interference. She disliked the American tendency to push smaller nations around and resented American attempts to establish a sphere of influence in South Asia. Her disenchantment, they said, arose from American support of Pakistan from 1947, and its approach to aid and economic assistance. American pressure on Mrs. Gandhi to devalue the rupee was another factor which made Mrs. Gandhi more resolute to retain freedom from pressure and establish independence in foreign policy decision making. That was why she fervently worked towards achieving self-sufficiency and self-reliance.

Despite Mrs. Gandhi's antipathy towards some of U.S. policies, she did make serious attempts to improve Indo-U.S. relationship. The worst phase was during the Nixon period, as both personalities clashed with each other. But they all agreed that in keeping with the world view, Mrs. Gandhi did not believe in permanent antagonism with or hostility towards any country and did want to mend fences with the U.S.

With regard to Pakistan, they all concurred that Mrs. Gandhi sought friendship and cooperation with that country and attempted to solve the Kashmir issue amicably.

*She tried her best during her tenure to have long term good relations with Pakistan and the Simla Agreement shows the generous and positive terms she gave them because Mrs. Gandhi was thinking long term (Confidential interview with Mrs. Gandhi's closest foreign policy advisor, New Delhi, 22 Dec 1988).*

She perceived Pakistan as hostile and saw its goals and behaviour as being guided by religious ideology and Islamic tradition. She was also said to have blamed Pakistan's belligerence being instigated by outside sources and believed that external factors were the major cause for Pakistan's hostility towards India and tension within the region.

*She made sincere and deep efforts to normalise relations with both China and Pakistan (Girilal Jain, author's interview, New Delhi, 20 Dec 1988).*

Most interviewees agreed that Mrs. Gandhi sought to evolve a long term policy vis a vis Pakistan. But it was Pakistan's intransigent and hostile attitude which came in the way

of its implementation. Even Mrs. Gandhi's critics - Hegde, Advani, K. Subrahmanyam, Era Sezhan - spoke of Mrs. Gandhi's good intentions when it came to dealings with Pakistan. They too agreed that she never sought dominance or control over that country and throughout her tenure attempted to convince Pakistan that it was in the best interests of both countries to solve all problems through bilateral negotiations, and live in peace.

Former ambassador Mr. Damodaran said

India's long term policy towards Pakistan was reactive as their internal situation was full of crisis and turbulence and also because they are so difficult to deal with (Damodaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).

He stated that India failed to evolve a broader policy because of Pakistan's non-cooperative and hostile attitude.

On the contrary, Mr. S. Prasad acknowledged that Mrs. Gandhi made attempts to formulate a long term policy vis-a-vis Pakistan.

Simla Agreement did project a long term policy with Pakistan. She did believe in the existence of Pakistan as a separate entity and its right to survive as a nation. In the Simla Agreement was the outline of a real long term policy. She ultimately wanted good relations with Pakistan and did not want desire its dismemberment (S. Prasad, author's interview, New Delhi, 8 Dec 1988).

All of those interviewed agreed that Mrs. Gandhi did not intend to dismember Pakistan in 1971. When questioned at length on the 1971 crisis, they were unanimous in stating that it was not Mrs. Gandhi's intention to separate East Pakistan from West Pakistan. She was forced to intervene in the crisis and take action in order to safeguard India's security. Indian national interests were threatened, and Mrs. Gandhi responded to the crisis only after exploring several avenues. She did try to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis in East Pakistan (Mishra). In fact, one of India's leading defence strategist Mr. K. Subramanyam explained that had Mrs. Gandhi wanted to keep Pakistan weak and internally divided she would not have intervened in Bangladesh because a unified Pakistan with problems between eastern and western wings would have been more advantageous to India than a truncated and more cohesive West Pakistan. Mr. K. Subramanyam stated that it was not her intention to stir trouble in East Pakistan or even aid in its separation from West Pakistan.

She envisaged India as playing the role of a friendly neighbour and even her critics attested to the fact that she seriously tried to frame India's policies vis a vis the

subcontinent based on that particular role conception, and made efforts to improve Indo-Pakistan relations on a bilateral basis. Once again there was unanimous agreement on Mrs. Gandhi's personal preference for bilateral relations.

*She had utmost faith in the policy of coexistence - live and let live. She was strongly in favour of bilateralism (Sharada Prasad, author's interview, New Delhi, 8 Dec 1988).*

*She was absolutely in favour of bilateralism because multilateralism meant super power influence indirectly. She was absolutely against super power involvement (Prof. Bhambri, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

Mrs. Gandhi was cautiously optimistic. Some of the interviewees (Dutt, Seshan, Rajan) attributed this optimism to her faith in God,

*Most of her optimistic predictions arose out of her faith in the divine (Dutt, author's interview, New Delhi, 19 Dec 1988).*

She believed that hard work and hope were necessary ingredients to achieve goals. Temporary setbacks or failures never stopped her from going after her goals, according to Mr. Sharada Prasad. In that sense, she did not believe in allowing faith or destiny to rule or shape her life. Mrs. Gandhi believed individuals have control over their destiny and throughout her career fought against what she called obscurantist forces -superstition, outdated traditions and passive acceptance of the fatalistic theory among the people. According to her, these factors prevented the country from progressing and obstructed the government's efforts to institute reforms or execute programs. If one worked hard enough, one could have a certain amount of control over one's own life. It was reported by many that Mrs. Gandhi was never afraid of challenges. She faced them head on. Even in the international arena,

*Mrs. Gandhi was aware of the power configurations, the given structural factors and limited options. But all the same she felt that we should not just react but take initiative (Dutt, author's interview, New Delhi, 19 Dec 1988).*

Also Mrs. Gandhi believed in strong leadership and in the government's role of being a mediator, initiator of reforms and in guiding changes in society. This Operational Code belief extracted from the documents was absolutely similar to what was reiterated by those interviewed. Her critics (Subramanyam, Hegde, Advani, Era sezhian, Mishra, Rajan etc.) cited the declaration of emergency in 1975 to validate their point.

Another of the belief categories on which there was total unanimity was regarding

Mrs. Gandhi's perception of India's role. They all stated that Mrs. Gandhi did not want India to play the role of a big or even a middle power, and did not seek great power status for India among the nonaligned.

*She was intensely conscious of India's role in world politics. Unlike Nehru she never boasted about India's 'major' role in world politics (Rajan, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

She was totally committed to the idea of India playing an independent non-aligned role.

*The role she envisaged India playing was one of an independent non-aligned state influencing world politics; playing an independent role in the non-aligned movement and fighting for liberation movements against racism, colonialism and imperialism. She did translate broad policy with practical reality (Bhambri, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

She sought independence for India in both domestic and foreign policy decision making. In the pursuit of this role, Mrs. Gandhi became almost obsessive.

*Perceiving independence is one thing but building it and translating it into foreign policy has been our great success and Mrs. Gandhi's role has been very significant (Gujral, author's interview, New Delhi, 21 Dec 1988).*

*She was never reconciled to the view of India playing a satellite role. India, according to Mrs. Gandhi, was a big country with a great historical tradition and would play an independent role in world affairs (C. Subramaniam, author's interview, Madras, 2 Jan 1989).*

*She wasn't prepared to let India be taken for granted. Most of her foreign policy was directed toward promoting India's position in the world. For her third world causes and Indian causes could not be separated (Dutt, author's interview, New Delhi, 19 Dec 1988).*

*She believed that we should be absolutely autonomous and self sufficient so that we could assert our independence and thereby be faithful to the tenets of Non alignment (Bhambri author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

Prof. Bhambri spoke at length regarding this aspect and said that for Mrs. Gandhi this belief remained consistent throughout Mrs. Gandhi's career.

*Indian independence was essential and that it has to be deepened and strengthened, and India should be economically, technologically and militarily strong and a strong India could face any pressure or challenges (Bhambri, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

According to Ambassador Damodaran, Mrs. Gandhi linked India's role in world affairs to domestic economic and social conditions. He too pointed out to the fact that Mrs. Gandhi realized that independence could ensue only by making India self sufficient and self reliant.

*She was extremely sensitive to the fact that economic factors played a very very important role in influencing international relations. That is the reason why she insisted on becoming economically strong and economically self sufficient (Damodaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

When asked if Mrs. Gandhi turned a broad pronouncement such as independence into practical policy, the answers were mostly in the affirmative. Some of the interviewees claimed that Mrs. Gandhi strove to act in a manner so as to reduce pressures from, and dependence on both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. She strove hard to make India self sufficient and after the experience with food aid from Washington in 1966 formulated her agricultural policies in such a manner which did make India self-sufficient in food. This was firmly emphasised by Mr. C. Subramaniam who was minister of agriculture and was actively involved in dealings with Washington during that period. Mr. C. Subramaniam recounted Mrs. Gandhi's position on issues such as Vietnam and said that despite India's heavy dependence on American aid, she was courageous enough to explicitly state India's position on the Vietnam issue, and demonstrate her independence.

Mrs. Gandhi did not want to endorse the American position on Vietnam just because India was dependent on American wheat (C.Subramaniam, author's interview, Madras, 2 Jan 1989).

Also some of Mrs. Gandhi's closest associates (S. Prasad, confidential interview, Seshan) stated that Mrs. Gandhi reacted very very (emphasis in original) strongly when it was reported that Nixon claimed responsibility for India's ceasefire decision in 1971 and to statements that the U.S. and Soviet Union pressurized Mrs. Gandhi into making that decision. They absolutely denied any such pressure on Mrs. Gandhi and said that the particular decision was entirely her own. She made it after assessing the entire situation. She is reported to have told Mr. S. Prasad

If I don't do it today, I won't be able to do it tomorrow. We will be caught up in the euphoria and it will be very very difficult to withdraw (Mrs. Gandhi to S. Prasad, author's interview, New Delhi, 8 Dec 1988).

Mr. S. Prasad said that independence was one value that Mrs. Gandhi would not compromise on any account and independence in decision making was what she strove for during her tenure in office.

When questioned about India's relation with the Soviet Union most interviewees (Gujral, Sharada Prasad, Seshan, Rajan, Mishra, Damodaran, Hegde, Gopal, C. Subramaniam, K. Subramaniam, Rao) were of the opinion that India's policies were guided by enlightened self-interest. They were asked as to whether India played a subservient role and did not assert its independence too much when it came to dealings



with Russia, due to dependence on Soviet support, arms, economic assistance etc., and the cases that were cited were: 1. Indian reaction to the Czechoslovakian crisis; 2. Soviet arms supply to Pakistan; 3. The Indo-Soviet treaty and whether it indicated a move away from India's traditional nonaligned posture, and if it placed India in the Soviet camp.

Prof. Rajan said that on the Soviet issue Mrs. Gandhi was for a long time misinterpreted. With regards to India's reactions to Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia they all agreed that Mrs. Gandhi acted independently in the sense that while not assuming a judgemental or condemning posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in public, Mrs. Gandhi firmly emphasized her displeasure and concerns in private to Russia. This was attested to by the very person who took part in the negotiations (confidential interview). Former ambassadors Gujral and Damodaran also expressed the same view. One does not criticize or condemn one's friends in public was the statement articulated by a number of interviewees. It was this consideration and not fear of Soviet reprisal that made India use the word 'deplore' and not 'condemn' in its statement in the UN General Assembly in 1968.

*She was absolutely anti-colonialist. She deplored Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. In both instances India was quite harsh with the Soviet Union, 'as harsh as a friend can be'. Privately, the Soviets were strongly told to withdraw from both these places in the interest of world peace (Damodaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

Second, regarding the Soviet arms sale to Pakistan in 1968, there were diverse interpretations of Mrs. Gandhi's perceptions, and her failure to openly oppose the Soviet decision. Once again, ambassadors Gujral and Damodaran stated that Mrs. Gandhi expressed her fears to leaders in Moscow in private. Damodaran was a foreign service officer in Moscow at that time. But there were other opinions.

*The reasons for not criticizing Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan in 1968 was because Mrs. Gandhi liked the idea (Bhambri, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

Prof. Bhambri was of the opinion that Mrs. Gandhi concluded that such a move by the Soviets would serve a dual purpose. First, it would delink Pakistan from the US. Second, it would show that India alone was not moving into the Soviet camp (Bhambri).

Others (Seshan, C. Subramaniam, Confidential interview) said that, because the Soviets supplied arms in limited quantities, India did not consider it threatening enough

to lodge a formal complaint.

She believed that India's relations with the Soviet Union was too strong to be adversely affected by the arms sale to Pakistan (Mishra, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).

It was generally agreed that failure to react adversely to the arms sale to Pakistan was not out of fear of the Soviet Union or in deference to its wishes.

Third, regarding the Indo - Soviet treaty, there once again was unanimous agreement, even amongst Mrs. Gandhi's worst critics, that the signing of such a treaty was not a move away from India's nonaligned posture, and that Mrs. Gandhi did not perceive it as such. Clause 4<sup>2</sup> of the treaty was cited as a case in point. It was also pointed out that it was only the Western press that claimed India was no longer nonaligned when it had not believed in the validity of nonalignment in the first place. The other nonaligned nations themselves accepted the Indo - Soviet treaty and did not accuse India of moving into the Soviet camp. Mr. Damodaran pointed out that this treaty in no way resembled the former Brezhnev plan.

Mrs. Gandhi was very clear that this did not move India away from Non alignment. Mrs. Gandhi was nobody's slave and would not let anyone dictate to her (Rajan, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).

In the seventeen years of the treaty can you cite one instance of the infringement of Non alignment? (S. Prasad, author's interview, New Delhi, 8 Dec 1988).

There was general agreement that Mrs. Gandhi believed that she was acting independently in issues where the Soviet Union was involved. Her closest aides admitted that in most important foreign policy issues there were no pressures from the Soviet Union to conform.

Also, another foreign policy initiative was taken by Mrs. Gandhi in her attempts to keep the superpowers out of the region, especially in the Indian Ocean and to make it a zone of peace. She did not want either the US or the Soviet Union to set up bases in the region.

As regards India's role in the subcontinent, it was generally agreed that Mrs. Gandhi did not want to establish regional hegemony. She wanted India to play the role of a friendly neighbour, helping other countries in need.

---

<sup>2</sup>Which cites Russia's respect for India's nonaligned posture

**She was extremely considerate of India's neighbours and wanted to have the best of relations with them (Damodaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).**

**Mrs. Gandhi did attempt to help all the smaller countries in the region (Jain, author's interview, New Delhi, 20 Dec 1988).**

**She was not interested in dominance or hegemony (Venkateswaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 21 Dec 1988).**

**She did not consciously strive for leadership in the subcontinent. It was only natural that a country of India's size, stature and capability could not help but play an important role and that the smaller nations should feel intimidated.**

**The Simla summit was commonly cited to show the validity of Mrs. Gandhi's perception of India's regional role. Would a prime minister with a big victory in her hands be willing to cede so much to the adversary if she was not really consistent in her beliefs regarding friendship with Pakistan was the kind of question that was frequently put to the author. Mrs. Gandhi was perceived as genuinely wanting improved relations with China and Pakistan.**

**When asked about what they thought India's goals were according to Mrs. Gandhi, the answer was near-unanimous. Mrs. Gandhi had a clear conception of India's strategic and national interests and translated those interests into concrete foreign policy objectives.**

**Prof. Bhambri said that Mrs. Gandhi had a deep commitment to Indian nationalism and nationalism dictated national interests.**

**For her national interest was derived from nationalism and nationalism set the parameters within which she set down our interests (Bhambri, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).**

**National interest was paramount in Mrs. Gandhi's consideration of India's foreign policy (Confidential interview, New Delhi, 28 Dec 1988).**

**She did have a clear conception of national interest and security (Gopal, author's interview, Madras, 3 Jan 1989).**

**Mrs. Gandhi's perception of India's role as an independent nonaligned nation led her to believe that unless India became self-sufficient and self-reliant, it could not have decision-making autonomy. India would be susceptible to outside interference and pressures. So her main objective was to achieve economic growth and development. She saw the linkage between domestic economic forces and latitude in foreign policy**

decision-making. Second, she sought exclusion of India and its neighbourhood in S.Asia and the Indian Ocean from either the American or Soviet sphere of influence. Third, another important objective was maintaining security and fending off threats to strategic and vital national interests.

Economic development and self sufficiency and national autonomy from outside influences and pressures is the framework from which one should view India's foreign policy, and national interest should be viewed from this framework (Bhambri, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).

For Mrs. Gandhi, India's goals were self reliance, economic independence, influence in the region (Confidential Interview, New Delhi, 28 Dec 1988).

Economic independence, security of home territory, self reliance etc. (Venkateswaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 21 Dec 1988).

She was extremely sensitive to the fact that economic factors played a very very important role in influencing international relations. That is the reason why she insisted on becoming economically strong and economically self sufficient (Damodaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).

Security, to be economically strong and self sufficient and self reliant were what she considered to be in the national self interest (Seshan, author's interview, New Delhi, 12 Dec 1988).

Keeping the Chinese out of the Indian subcontinent was part of India's national interest. Also, keeping the US out of the Indian subcontinent, maintaining the support of the Soviet Union to countervail Chinese and US interests in the area, but more importantly she also wanted to keep them out from actively interfering in the affairs of the subcontinent. Non alignment was in our national interest. She was genuinely nonaligned (Subrahmanyam, author's interview, New Delhi, 19 Dec 1988).

Self interest dictated her approach towards Indo - Soviet relations (Rao, author's interview, Bangalore, 21 Jan 1989).

India's policy vis a vis the Soviet Union was based on India's national interest. During the late 60's America and China could not be wooed. India needed to strengthen herself militarily and the Soviet Union supplied arms (Gujral, author's interview, New Delhi, 21 Dec 1988).

She was not really an admirer of Soviet values and mainly allied with the Soviets for national interest (Subrahmanyam, author's interview, New Delhi, 20 Dec 1988).

With regard to the Soviet Union she was being very realistic. She did not identify her interests with the Soviet Union, but because it was politically feasible to secure their help. She did not hesitate to woo the Soviet Union as long as it gave her an edge over China and Pakistan. It was sheer practicality that made her move closer to the Soviet Union (S.Prasad, author's interview, New Delhi, 8 Dec 1988).

It was generally agreed that while Mrs. Gandhi did not admire the Soviet political system or its values, she did admit to a commonality of interests, especially in foreign policy

between the two countries. U.S. and Indian interests diverged too much and no common ground could be found with the Chinese. Mrs. Gandhi believed that the Soviet Union was India's true ally but all the same she maintained caution in dealing with that country, according to her foreign policy aides. The Indo-Soviet treaty was cited as a classic example of using the Soviets to serve India's national interests.

Overall it can be concluded, from all the interviews and from our analysis, that Mrs. Gandhi did not believe India to be in the Soviet camp.

*I think Mrs. Gandhi was basically speaking the truth when she said we were not leaning towards this side or that, we stand upright. Friendship is also a reciprocal process (Venkateswaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 21 Dec 1988).*

India's security was also considered paramount by Mrs. Gandhi and Indian territory sacrosanct.

*It was after 1962 that she learnt a big lesson especially in realpolitik. She saw the importance of building India as a strong nation both economically and militarily (Mishra, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

Ambassador Damodaran also agreed that the building of India's strength was Mrs. Gandhi's top priority.

*The humiliation after 1962 made her resolute that we should be stronger militarily and economically (Damodaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).*

She also had a strong preference for bilateralism, especially in dealings with other countries in the subcontinent. What was stated by these observers coincides with the results derived from the documents. Mrs. Gandhi did not believe that optimal goals should change, but the interviewees did agree that the means had changed from Nehru's time to Mrs. Gandhi's. Mrs. Gandhi applied the same values in foreign policy but for different reasons and adopting different means.

She genuinely believed in a cooperative strategy vis-a-vis other developing countries and strongly believed in the cause and principles of nonalignment. She was of the opinion that it was only through cooperation between the developing countries that they could improve economic conditions in their respective countries and she genuinely worked towards this end. Regarding India's strategy vis-a-vis Pakistan, there was mixed opinion and the answers were not clear enough to warrant a definite conclusion by the author. But an average of responses indicated that Mrs. Gandhi believed in a deterrent

strategy.

Regarding Mrs. Gandhi's conception of power and military supremacy, there were mixed opinions. On the one hand, several observers agreed that Mrs. Gandhi had a clear notion of what constituted a nation's power and that she attempted to build India's power both economically and militarily in order that India could play an important role in the region as well as in the nonaligned forum.

Economic power was very important, according to Mrs. Gandhi. She always stressed on the fact that we could have influence in world affairs if we were economically strong and self-reliant without necessarily being a military power (Seshan, author's interview, New Delhi, 12 Dec 1988).

Others said that although she saw the importance of other dimensions of power - economic, social cohesiveness, strength of the people etc., she did not ignore the military aspect.

She was very realistic in her understanding of the concept of power (Gujral, author's interview, New Delhi, 21 Dec 1988).

She was reported as not wanting to be caught in the same position that India was in, in 1962. Hence, she made every effort to strengthen India militarily. While she did not seek hegemony on the subcontinent, she did not want India to be unprepared or weak.

Mrs. Gandhi had more respect for the component of military power, which was influence (Confidential interview, New Delhi, 28 Dec 1988).

She looked at power in larger than military terms, although military was a major component (Jain, author's interview, New Delhi, 20 Dec 1988).

Indira Gandhi understood very well that in international relations power counted more than personal influence.

Overall, Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs were considered to be consistent (Seshan, Mishra, C. Subramaniam, confidential interview, Sharada Prasad, Hegede, Confidential interview, Rajan, Bhambri etc.).

Consistency in her world view can be seen in the fact there was no deviation in her policy towards the Arabs, despite their open support for Pakistan (Damodaran, author's interview, New Delhi, 16 Dec 1988).

They did not see too many changes in Mrs. Gandhi's goals and objectives and policies in India's foreign policy, and this could be attributed to the stability and consistency in Mrs. Gandhi's world view.

Surprisingly enough, we elicited similar responses to most of the Operational Code categories and similar interpretations of India's foreign policy under Mrs. Gandhi from both her supporters as well as her critics.

There could be two reasons for this. 1. Most interviewees may have genuinely perceived consistency in the various belief components in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code and consistency between beliefs and policy choices. 2. Being Indian nationalists, they must have regarded Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs to be exactly what they would have themselves perceived India's foreign policy options to be at that given time.

But the former is probably true. Among the people that were interviewed were strong critics of Mrs. Gandhi, and also some leading scholars of Indian foreign policy. It is assumed that conformity would not be likely in such a diverse group regarding the subject under discussion, even given their feelings of patriotism and a common enemy - Pakistan.

The Operational Code beliefs derived from Measure 1 is similar to that derived from Measure 2. We also find such similarity in work done by other Indian foreign policy scholars. For example, Mansingh in her book on India's power during Mrs. Gandhi's time comments,

*Mrs. Gandhi's personality and disposition, her interpretation of the nation's interests, were as important as the external setting in shaping India's foreign policy (Mansingh 1984, 25).*

According to Prof. Mansingh, Mrs. Gandhi followed pragmatic policies and her relations with other countries were based upon cold calculations. She was successful in protecting India's vital interests without succumbing to the pressures of the superpowers (Mansingh 1988, 132).

*Despite the immense disparities in diplomatic, economic and military resources between India on the one hand and either superpower on the other, studies show that neither the US nor the USSR could 'manage' India, or significantly influence New Delhi's policies for any length of time when one or the other wished to do so (Mansingh 1988, 132).*

Mansingh (1984, 20) says that Mrs. Gandhi began to define her own role very early in life and rejected some roles prescribed for her. She was determined not to be pressurized by anybody or let India be dominated by any other nation.

She had discovered from observation and experience that moral influence is no substitute for tangible power, that a self consistent ideology is not the most potent political force, and that resistance to pressure has to be demonstrated along with a determination not to be hurt by the consequences (Mansingh 1984, 20).

According to Mansingh, these elements in Indira's appraisal of others and herself are strikingly reflected in India's behaviour with other states. Insistence on autonomy was the unifying theme of India's foreign policy. But the pursuit of autonomy without the power to defend it was impossible and hence there was a consistent expansion of defence forces and defence production, throughout Indira Gandhi's term.

Mrs. Gandhi's flexibility and pragmatism in politics, her concern for the tangible over the moral, was her hallmark. This was carried over into India's relations with other states in an effort to improve its own position vis a vis the state it dealt with, rather than sacrifice itself on the altar of universal human rights (Mansingh 1984, 24).

Mansingh says that while Nehru had identified India's national interest with idealistic principles such as world peace and cooperation, Indira stressed security, territory and prestige as integral parts of national interest. This, she says, was reflected in the decisions she took during the Bangladesh crisis as well as in the details of her dealings with other countries. India's foreign policy was motivated to defend autonomy, rather than extend power. Mrs. Gandhi desired to enhance Indian capabilities but was reluctant to use those capabilities except in a defensive way. Mansingh also asserts that Mrs. Gandhi's stance on international affairs was that of a reformer. It has been suggested that Mrs. Gandhi's near obsession with independence constituted really a keen awareness of the mechanics of power (Mansingh 1984).

According to Mansingh, Mrs. Gandhi believed that independence required the demonstrable possession of power and its exercise in a limited global role. According to Shashi Tharoor, Mrs. Gandhi's best-known characteristic was her fierce independence.

Every pronouncement by her on the animating principles of her foreign policy stresses the concept of independence. She defined nonalignment as lending support to independent nationalism against external pressures, claimed it stood for her belief in independently judging all issues, equated freedom with self reliance.... Independence from superpower manipulation constituted the cardinal principles of Indira Gandhi's foreign policy (Tharoor 1983, 66-67).

He discovered her extraordinarily sensitive to pressure and said that she reacted strongly to the use of the word 'compulsion' or 'pressure' in reference to any aspect of her



foreign policy during his interview with her (Tharoor 1983, 65). During that interview she explicitly spelled out her world view and it was as Tharoor states, probably the only occasion that Mrs. Gandhi openly voiced, without notes, the nature of her weltanschauung.

S.T, What was your vision for the world, for India's place in the world?

I.G, We want India to be self reliant and to strengthen its independence so that it cannot be pressurized by anybody, because that is the only kind of independence which I call independence. And we wanted (India) to be able to grow in its own way - to choose its own direction, to choose its own personality. But in order to do this - this cannot be done unless we solve our own problems, and the major problem is poverty and economic backwardness....had we got involved with one bloc or another, I don't think that we could have forged ahead as we have.

S.T, Should India, in your view, become a big power?

I.G, No - why should we? We have no ...desire, you know, to have more territory, or to have more influence, or any of those things. All we want is to be strong enough to solve our own problems (Tharoor 1983, 88).

It can be noticed that four important themes emerge from this discussion. 1. The value of independence and self reliance, 2. Economic growth and development leading to self sufficiency, 3. Rejection of traditional power politics, 4. Rejection of great power status. These are the exact same themes that we have derived from our analysis of the documents.

Mary Carras (1979) in her in depth study of Mrs. Gandhi's personality states that Mrs. Gandhi was optimistic and courageous and believed in control over one's life and shaping one's destiny. She says,

Her rejection of superstition, fatalism, and her notion of luck, - point to a basic view she hold of the world and life in general. Life, she says typically, is one series of problems and mankind has to face these problems with courage, with determination and with the will to succeed....My experience of life has been that as soon as you solve one aspect of a problem, another problem arises in its place. Among the common themes in her speeches and interviews are those of challenge, achievement, hard work and struggle. You can never have achievement unless you have challenge and hard work, she said once, speaking at a press conference shortly after India's victory in the 1971 war with Pakistan. And she added In India we do not want a soft life....We want to have challenges so that we can prove that we can meet them and we can overcome them. Her utterances, public and private are often dominated by this theme (Carras 1979, 44).

Clearly, she has a very strong conviction about her ability to control herself and her environment and to overcome obstacles (Carras 1979, 45).

Carras concludes that Mrs. Gandhi beliefs were generally consistent with her actions.

There have also been opposing viewpoints regarding Mrs. Gandhi's world view. There are some who deny that Mrs. Gandhi had a world view and allege that she simply

reacted to events.

Tharoor in his book *Reasons of State* (1983) also presents arguments regarding Mrs. Gandhi's handling of foreign policy, which contradicts our findings. His main assumption is that Mrs. Gandhi did not have a world view or general theory of politics. According to Tharoor, her decision-making style, especially in the realm of India's foreign policy, was mainly ad-hoc and reactive.

The response to this argument has already been made theoretically in the first two chapters of this thesis, and empirically in the introduction to Section II and in the following chapters.

Second, Tharoor accuses Mrs. Gandhi of not converting goals into actual policy.

She (never) defined the 'national interest' in a broad enough fashion to enable her to judge international issues by its standard. And never was the national interest, when conceived for a limited situation, derived from the interest of the nation. It was a short term calculation by Mrs. Gandhi of the merits and demerits of a particular action at a specific time (Tharoor 1983, 94).<sup>3</sup>

Tharoor argues, for example, Mrs. Gandhi interpreted national interest differently depending on the actors involved and the situations concerned. He points to her inconsistency in dealings with the superpowers, an example being her reactions to the arms sale to Pakistan by both superpowers<sup>4</sup>. Also, her reactions to the Vietnam crisis was different from the Czechoslovakian crisis.

It can be seen in our study that Mrs. Gandhi had a clear perception of India's long term strategic and national interests. In contrast to Nehru, Mrs. Gandhi understood that in global politics, power - whether economic or military - was more important than personal influence, and that strategic and political interests were far more important than moral or idealistic principles. It was generally agreed by her aides that she did have a clear conception of not only India's goals but also what constituted India's vital interests. For example, national interest dictated India's approach to relations with the superpowers. Mrs. Gandhi did not hesitate to move closer to one or the other depending

---

<sup>3</sup>author's parentheses

<sup>4</sup>She vehemently criticized American shipments and attributed that cause to the instability on the subcontinent, while remaining more or less silent regarding the Soviet arms sale to Pakistan in 1968.

on India's interests<sup>5</sup>, and for the achievement of optimal goals. If Mrs. Gandhi publicly criticized the US more than it did the Soviet Union on certain occasions, it was not because of Soviet reprisals or in deference to Soviet pressure, but once again it was in India's interests to do so.

Mrs. Gandhi built India's economic and military strength without actually succumbing to pressures from either superpower. She identified India's national interests with independence in decision-making, economic self-sufficiency leading to self-reliance, economic growth and development, exclusion of India, the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean from either the American or the Soviet sphere of influence.

Tharoor also charges Mrs. Gandhi with not having translated broad-based pronouncements such as universal peace, non use of force, total and complete disarmament, resource diversification, equitable participation of all nations in world affairs, into concrete instances of foreign policy.

*While some of these principles were the subject of Indian diplomatic efforts, they do not appear to have constituted in any meaningful sense the fundamental animating principles of India's relations with the outside world (Tharoor 1983, 90).*

If one carefully scrutinizes the documents, one cannot find a single instance where Mrs. Gandhi has stated that the above mentioned were specifically India's goals. She frequently stressed on those principles, but they were more or less laid out as global goals, goals which all nations ought to strive towards. She did state that by mutual cooperation these goals could really be achieved. Because she was optimistic and believed in man's control over historical development, she had faith that if power politics were abandoned and all the nations committed themselves to the attainment of those ends, it was not an impossible task. But she conceded that given the realities of the current international situation, it was going to be a monumental task. The one most important characteristic of Mrs. Gandhi as decision-maker was that she was pragmatic and realistic. This was echoed by almost everyone who knew her personally.

---

<sup>5</sup>In fact she defined nonalignment as judging each issue on its own merits and separately. Unlike Nehru, she did not perceive it as equidistance from both superpowers.

He also accuses her of having an ambivalent attitude towards power. Tharoor says that Mrs. Gandhi knew that power was important for maintaining autonomy and to play an independent role. But at the same time she was hesitant to use India's capabilities in order to play that role. But our examination of Mrs. Gandhi's national role conception, especially vis-a-vis the subcontinent, indicates that she attempted to build up military capability only for a deterrent purpose. She was not interested in dominance. She strove to make India economically strong in order not to succumb to outside pressures. She knew very well that tangible power was more important than possessing a world image or personal influence.

His other accusation is that she did not evolve long-term subcontinental strategy. Once again, this assumption contradicts our evidence. Mrs. Gandhi's strategies were threefold in the subcontinent - a deterrent strategy in relation to Pakistan and China; a cooperative strategy (as later reflected by the forming of SAARC), and third her attempts to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. She believed that India's objectives would best be served by implementing such a strategy. There have been criticisms that she only reacted to events in Bangladesh, the Maoist insurrection in Sri Lanka, the crisis in Sikkim and that they did not relate with any of India's long-term goals. But our analysis shows that this assessment is not true. Mrs. Gandhi genuinely sought stability on the subcontinent, because any crisis would mean superpower interference, which she wanted to keep out at any cost. So India's strategy towards the other countries, although based on friendship and cooperation, would also be dictated by national interest. Tharoor's analysis is inferential. He has made assumptions regarding Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs and attitudes from her actual behaviour. He has stated himself that his analysis is impressionistic rather than scientific (Tharoor 1983, 65).

Richter (1988) states that the reactive element in Mrs. Gandhi style undermined the notion that India and Indira were out to dominate the region. This claim can once again be disputed. It was not Mrs. Gandhi's reactive style, but her world view which dictated that India not seek the role of a big power in the region, for reasons already explained.

Richter argues that Mrs. Gandhi did not have long-term goals or a long-term strategy for India in the region.

*Mrs. Gandhi mastery of tactics and the relative absence of a long term strategy for the region left India's relations with its neighbours buffeted by changing conditions (Richter 1988, 130).*

But this allegation is once again not true. First, it was one of Mrs. Gandhi's main goals to completely eliminate superpower influence in the region. She attempted to minimize intervention and make the world community accept the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. With regards to relations with the neighbours, she strove hard both in the nonaligned forum and later in the SAARC to allay their fears regarding India's strength and power. She genuinely believed in a cooperative strategy and tried to evolve a policy framework based on economic and cultural cooperation with Bhutan, Nepal, Burma, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Our analysis shows that Mrs. Gandhi did not believe in an offensive strategy. Military power would be used only for defensive purposes and force had to be avoided at all costs or used only as a last resort. This concept of strategy led her to building up of India's military power only for defensive purposes.

Some of the above-mentioned authors have made their assessments without taking into consideration Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code, or without consideration for the linkages in the various elements of her belief system; for example, goals, roles, strategy, tactics, unchangeability of goals, optimism, control, long-term vs short-term undertakings, etc. Her paradigm of politics, although not too sophisticated or 'perfect', did set the guidelines for policy. A failure to understand the linkage between the various elements of her belief system, for example, her beliefs regarding India's role and the nature of goals and strategy, her belief in the unchangeability of India's fundamental and optimal goals, the connection between optimism, control and the nature of goals, has led these authors to come to dubious conclusions.

The following section deals with the consistency problem in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code. The people who knew her closely said that there was consistency between her beliefs/images and between that and India's foreign policy choices. But we have undertaken the task of critically examining some of the accusations frequently heard

regarding Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs about India's role in global and regional affairs and its linkage to specific stand on international events and modes of conduct.

## **2. Beliefs and Foreign Policy Preferences - The Consistency Question:**

One of the main task of an Operational Code study is to examine the consistency and inconsistency in the belief system under review. In this study we have made a distinction between two types of consistencies.

a. **Logical Consistency:** This means that a particular stand on one belief dimension would be matched by a corresponding stand on another belief component. For example, if an individual believed in nonviolence or the non use of force (Belief A), either in dealings with others or in the achievement of fundamental goals, it is logically assumed that he/she would not believe in the importance of military power (Belief B).

b. **Psychological Consistency:** This is also referred to as 'subjective rationality'. This term implies two different departures from objective rationality: The use of reasoning capacity upon a personally distorted picture of reality; or alternatively, the application of predictable mental processing rules which does not happen to correspond to the rules of formal logic (Abelson 1968, 112). This work concerns itself with psychological consistency as opposed to logical consistency. For example, even though Belief A (non use of force) is strong in an individual's belief system, the association between the belief components regarding military superiority (Belief B) and beliefs regarding the nature of fundamental goals like security of important interests (Belief C), or beliefs regarding national role (Belief D), may have a strong psychological relationship, and also could depend on whether Belief C and Belief D occupy a central place in the hierarchy of beliefs, in which case despite the existence of Belief A, Belief B could be valid and perceived as being consistent by the individual. Psycho-logic consistency, as Abelson defines it, depends on the various psychological linkages in a person's belief system, and what might seem to an observer as logical inconsistency may be perceived by the individual as being psychologically consistent.

We have already stated in Chapter II that it is not correct to establish direct linkages between beliefs and behaviour. Beliefs, according to our framework, predisposes an actor to make a choice from several options. Even though some beliefs may exhibit psychological consistency, they may seem to be inconsistent when interpreted in the context of actual foreign policy behaviour. In other words, beliefs are related to policy preferences and not actual outcomes, which may be influenced by a host of other factors.

In this section we will focus on some of the philosophical and instrumental belief categories. Mrs. Gandhi was criticized for some of her policies, and most criticisms focused on obvious discrepancies between beliefs, images, values on the one hand, and foreign policy decisions on the other. To repeat, while we are not concerned with policy outcomes, we can conduct a systematic analysis of the linkages in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code in the context of India's foreign policy.

#### A. National Role Conception:

Mrs. Gandhi's national role conception was of India playing an independent and nonaligned role in international affairs. This conception of India's global role came under attack several times as being contradictory to actual policy. One of the main criticisms is that India's aspiration to play an independent role has not been matched by the exercise of its capability and power to influence decision outcomes.

In our analysis of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code, there seemed to be logical contradictions in instrumental belief number five regarding action, military supremacy, and power. India increased its power in tangible terms after 1962, but it was unwilling to use it except in a defensive way. Mansingh (1984, 32) found that India's manoeuvrability of action did not increase in direct proportion to the expansion of its tangible resources. Its capability appeared to be less than its presumed strength, leading to doubts about India's role. But the main theme of Mansingh's book is that if Indira Gandhi was an expert at realpolitik, neither she nor the country ever accepted the logic of machtpolitik. Mansingh argues that India's foreign policy under Mrs. Gandhi was motivated more to defend autonomy, rather than extend power. This is what we have discovered in our study of Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs. In foreign relations, India would play

the role of an independent nation and the build up of power was to defend that independence rather than use it to extend influence. The contradiction lay in the fact that while India refused to play a subordinate role in international affairs, it seemed reluctant to use its capabilities to play a dominant role. India's motivation was defensive - to protect its autonomy and maintain peace and stability in South Asia. Because the source of instability was attributed by Mrs. Gandhi to the interference of outside powers, India made efforts to have its position recognised by the superpowers and the countries in the region. The contrast between the desire to enhance India's capabilities and a reluctance to use these except for defensive purposes was evident in the conduct of foreign affairs, especially in dealing with the superpowers and the neighbouring countries. But the one thing that Mrs. Gandhi did not seem to be able to resolve was the fundamental dilemma of power facing India, i.e., how to be strong enough to prevent encroachment on national interests by outside powers and yet at the same time avoid intimidating the neighbouring countries by an increase in power.

These logical contradictions do not correspond to similar inconsistencies in Mrs. Gandhi's belief system. Her image of India as playing an independent role occupied a central place in her belief system. But on the other hand, she was also committed to non-interference and was averse to the use of tangible sources of power for offensive purposes. She appeared to believe in an essentially defensive strategy and did not want India to display an belligerent stance either in dealings with the superpowers or the smaller countries in the subcontinent. Unlike Nehru, she made it clear that India was not interested in 'influencing' world events. She was aware of India's limitations in terms of capabilities and consciously disliked the implication of power politics. Independence from big power manipulation<sup>6</sup> was one of the fundamental principles in Mrs. Gandhi's national role conception.

Mrs. Gandhi abhorred the feudal system of interaction on the global scale between the rich industrialized countries of the West and the poor, underdeveloped and developing nations. These interactions resulted in the less powerful nations being in a subordinate

---

<sup>6</sup>At the same time India would not use its power to manipulate or dominate over smaller countries.



and dependent position with serious curbs on independence and autonomy. That is one of the reasons why Mrs. Gandhi sought to change the current world order and was a strong proponent for the elimination of the system of stratification which put the smaller countries at a disadvantage. In Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs regarding national role was connected with India's goals, strategy and action. A stand on one of the beliefs presupposed a similar stand on another belief not in logical but psychological terms.

## 2. Regional Role:

India has been accused by its neighbours of hegemonistic ambitions and of seeking dominant power status on the subcontinent. Mrs. Gandhi has been criticized on the grounds that, even though she sought friendship and urged regional cooperation, she did not apply those principles in dealings with Pakistan, but instead sought to enhance India's power.

The above arguments do not have much force when one looks at the realities of the strategic situation in South Asia. First, the existence of a power which is superior in terms of size, geographic location, economic and technological resources, domestic growth factors etc., was bound to create the impression of a dominant power seeking to influence the smaller countries in the region. Chari (1987, 50) maintains that it is fashionable to suggest that South Asia's security problems derive basically from India's expansionist and hegemonistic spectre looming over the region, since the main component of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Nepali and Srilankan threat perceptions focus upon India. According to Chari, there are two major difficulties in sustaining the Indian hegemonism thesis. First, the superpower role in exacerbating existing subcontinental tensions evident from the inclusion of Pakistan in military security arrangements would have to be ignored and second, conflicts arising from sociocultural differences and political dissidence within some South Asian countries would also have to be ignored.

The sum of the subcontinent's regional security problems, however, comprises interactions between extraregional, intraregional and subregional asymmetries (Chari 1987, 51).

The image of India as a powerful and dominant force in the region has also been reinforced by attempts by successive Pakistani governments to project India as a vengeful

neighbour, which has not reconciled itself to partition or the existence of Pakistan as a separate entity. Mrs. Gandhi claimed that this was an attempt by Pakistan to gain outside support of its subcontinental policies and augment its power by means of outside military and economic assistance. Despite being a less powerful state in terms of size, resources and capabilities, Pakistan has attempted to gain parity with India and establish a balance of power in the region. The injection of external military weapons which has been out of proportion to Pakistan's size and defence requirements, accompanied by outside interference, has internationalized tensions in the region.

But despite tensions and open hostility between the two countries, Mrs. Gandhi seems to have held a benevolent view of Pakistan and genuinely attempted to strengthen relations with that country. Although she believed that the nature of politics was conflictual and force seems to be the order of the day, she genuinely appears to have perceived India's regional role as a friendly neighbour. She stated that in the subcontinent, India's objective was not the exercise of power but to seek peace. She desired to keep the great powers out of the region and hence any moves to use India's power was to reduce the opportunities for great power interference. Independence from such interference and not the authoritative wielding of power was the primary consideration of Mrs. Gandhi's subcontinental policy. Some scholars like Tharoor (1983, 97) and Mansingh (1984) in fact claim that Mrs. Gandhi did not effectively assert her hegemony in the region by using India's power. India did increase its own power but not to play a preponderant role. India's motives were essentially defensive.

Kissinger's analysis of India's role and objectives in the subcontinent, especially in 1971 conform to the power theory. There is no evidence in our study which confirms Kissinger's allegations. Our findings contradict Kissinger's assessment of Mrs. Gandhi beliefs and motivation, and his conceptualization of the crisis is in direct contrast to Mrs. Gandhi's interpretation. For example,

*There was no doubt in my mind that India had escalated its demands continually and deliberately to prevent a settlement....It was India's determination to use the crisis to establish its preeminence on the subcontinent (Kissinger 1979, 885).*

*We strove to preserve West Pakistan as an independent state, since we judged India's real aim was to encompass its disintegration (Kissinger 1979, 886).*

The White House viewed the conflict as a ruthless power play by which India, encouraged by the Soviets, used the ineptitude of the Pakistani government and the fragility of the Pakistani political structure to force a solution of the East Pakistan crisis by military means when a political alternative seemed clearly available (Kissinger 1979, 897-98).

Mrs. Gandhi was determined to reduce even West Pakistan to impotence.... West Pakistan was to be dismembered and rendered defenceless (Kissinger 1979, 901).

I remain convinced to this day that Mrs. Gandhi was not motivated primarily by conditions in East Pakistan.... Rather, encouraged by the isolation of Pakistan, the diplomatic and military support of the Soviet Union, the domestic strains in China, and the divisions in the US, the Indian Prime Minister decided in the spring or summer of 1971 to use the opportunity to settle accounts with Pakistan once and for all and assert India's preeminence on the subcontinent (Kissinger 1979, 914).

Signs began to appear that India's proposed solution to the undoubted burden of millions of Bengali refugees was not so much to enable them to return as to accelerate the disintegration of Pakistan (Kissinger 1979, 855).

Kissinger's conclusions are based on a misunderstanding of Mrs. Gandhi beliefs and motives. Mrs. Gandhi certainly did not perceive herself as an aggressive leader who wanted to initiate war with Pakistan, or escalate the tensions already existing in that country, or even bring about its dismemberment. Kissinger's analysis is contradictory to what we have evidenced as her beliefs, discussed in the previous chapters.

Kissinger's views seemed to have been formed based on the one meeting he had with Mrs. Gandhi in 1971, enroute to China; and his understanding of Mrs. Gandhi's image of the enemy. Based on that knowledge, he has logically deduced the nature of Mrs. Gandhi's goals and strategies. It has already been confirmed from both data sets that Mrs. Gandhi's negative image of Pakistan did not prompt her to advocate a negative approach to goals or strategy in relation to that country, although one could easily come to this conclusion by logical deduction. Mrs. Gandhi's image of Pakistan as hostile and aggressive was not translated into reciprocal policies or strategy. She certainly did not, as evidenced in our study, advocate a punitive strategy towards Pakistan or take advantage of Pakistan's internal weakness.

Mrs. Gandhi could not have envisaged the destruction of Pakistan for several reasons. First, she believed in the existence of Pakistan as a separate entity. There is no evidence in our study which supports the claim that Mrs. Gandhi was never reconciled to partition. Kissinger accuses her of being a cold-blooded practitioner of power politics,

but Mrs. Gandhi absolutely rejected the conventional notion of power and traditional theory of power politics. She reacted with distaste to allegations that India sought to be a major power in the region. Mrs. Gandhi did not use India's power to dominate over Pakistan. Instead, despite what she saw as Pakistan's intransigence, she attempted to convince the successive regimes of Pakistan of India's friendly intentions and repeatedly offered to sign a no-war pact with Pakistan. She made genuine efforts to improve Indo-Pak relations and her ultimate goal was to settle the issue of Kashmir and establish friendly ties with that country based on mutual trust, friendship and cooperation. Her approach to goal selection was at best conservative and India's optimal goal was to establish peace on the subcontinent. She believed very strongly that despite temporary setbacks these goals should not be abandoned or changed. One had to work towards optimal goals in an incremental fashion.

Second, this goal was based on Mrs. Gandhi's national role conception and one has only to look at what Mrs. Gandhi perceived was India's role in the subcontinent to disconfirm Kissinger's allegations. She genuinely wanted India to play the role of a friendly neighbour and wanted all countries in the region to peacefully coexist and cooperate to achieve economic growth and development. This was also confirmed by the people who worked closely with her. Mrs. Gandhi did not want to play a hegemonistic role. On the contrary, Mrs. Gandhi has been accused of not using India's power and capability in a manner befitting a country of its size and potential in the subcontinent (Tharoor 1983, K.Subrahmaniam 1987). Indeed, if India did exercise hegemony, the coup in Bangladesh would never have occurred and Bangladesh would have become excessively dependent on India.

Third, the strategy that she proposed vis-a-vis Pakistan was a deterrent strategy which basically advocated a defensive posture. India would not take offensive action, but would be prepared to defend itself if there was an actual threat to its national interest and security. Similarly, she advocated the avoidance of force, or the use of military force as a last resort.

Fourth, Mrs. Gandhi believed in the importance of long-term goals as opposed to short-term policy undertakings. Clearly, India's long-term goal was to establish peace

on the subcontinent and ensure the best of relations with Pakistan, and this goal was not to be abandoned, modified or substituted. In other words, it was an unchangeable goal. There is no evidence to support the assumption that Mrs. Gandhi sought the dismemberment or destruction of Pakistan as a short term policy undertaking.

Fifth, she disliked interference in the internal affairs of one country by another. Just as she did not want India to be pressured or dominated by an outside power, she could not have wanted to interfere in what she saw as Pakistan's internal affairs in 1971. It was only when the crisis spilled over into India and threatened India's vital interests and security that Mrs. Gandhi saw the need to intervene. And even then she hesitated to take military action without first attempting to find a political or diplomatic solution. There is enough empirical evidence to show that a political solution to the East Bengal crisis was not in sight by mid-1971, and the possibility of finding such a solution becoming more and more remote day after day. But despite that, there is no evidence of a decision being made to intervene militarily in East Pakistan in the summer of 1971. Kissinger's allegations cannot be confirmed by any of the documents - whether public or private, or even speeches made before different audiences. None of the political elites or Indian academics agreed with Kissinger's theory. Also, India did not escalate its demands for a settlement. From the beginning of the crisis, Mrs. Gandhi kept insisting that the crisis was an internal problem of Pakistan and Pakistan had to deal with the leaders of the Awami league and not with India. It also meant that conditions had to be created in east Pakistan, which would ensure the safe return of the refugees. When the military leaders in Pakistan could not create such a situation, and when the refugee problem became insurmountable, Mrs. Gandhi had to take action. She genuinely believed that she was forced to act in a manner to defend India's interests and security. Rather than prevent a settlement, India tried very hard to find one - as indicated by Mrs. Gandhi's trips abroad to convince world leaders to find a speedy political solution. Mrs. Gandhi used the military as a last resort when other means failed. There is no basis for Kissinger's allegations that Mrs. Gandhi was not motivated by conditions in East Pakistan, but rather wanted to settle scores with Pakistan once and for all.

Sixth, apart from Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs, her subsequent actions also disprove Kissinger's assumptions. India made a limited incursion into East Pakistan and withdrew as quickly as possible. India also announced a unilateral ceasefire and returned the territories occupied in the west. She also did not attempt to take over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, although militarily she was in a position to do so. Also if, as Kissinger says, Mrs. Gandhi sought the dismemberment of West Pakistan, she could have occupied more territory in the West, could have totally crippled or annihilated the entire Pakistani airforce in a lightning Israeli type attack, before the rest of the world could react; repossessed Pakistan-occupied Kashmir once and for all; and would not have arranged for the Simla summit. It was her repeated invitations to a reluctant Bhutto for bilateral negotiations which led to the Simla summit. Also, the generous terms that India gave Pakistan at Simla show that Mrs. Gandhi did not believe in permanent estrangement or hostility and sought to sincerely improve Indo - Pak relations.

Seventh, if, as Kissinger says, India genuinely wanted to keep Pakistan weak and in a state of turmoil, Mrs. Gandhi would not have intervened in the crisis in 1971. As Subrahmanyam (author's interview, New Delhi, 19 Dec 1988) says, it would have been more beneficial for India to seal off the borders, prevent the influx of refugees and thereby keep Pakistan intact with tensions between both wings. In such a case, Pakistan would have enough internal problems to deal with and would not have posed too much of a threat to India. Kissinger's theory can be disproved on these grounds. His analysis based on logical deduction cannot be confirmed by our empirical study.

Also, Kissinger claims that the U.S. pressured India via the Soviet Union to impose the ceasefire, is not backed by empirical evidence. Mrs. Gandhi's fierce streak of independence would not allow her to succumb to pressure especially from the U.S. in 1971. All officials denied Kissinger's allegation.

Kissinger's interpretations have been challenged by one of his top aides. Christopher Van Hollen argues with factual evidence that many of Kissinger's assumptions and conclusions which he has presented regarding India are incorrect. According to Van Hollen, India did not have a grand design to dismember West Pakistan

and nor was the Soviet Union urging Indira Gandhi's government in that direction (Van Hollen 1980, 340). He argues that Nixon's reactions to South Asia were influenced by his "longstanding dislike for India and the Indians and his warm feelings towards Pakistan" (Van Hollen 1980, 341).

Also, the view that India was out to dismember Pakistan originated from Nixon and Kissinger's conversations with Pakistani leaders who had always questioned India's acceptance of the creation of Pakistan; from Kissinger's discussion with China; and from Mrs. Gandhi's remarks at the White House in November about the fragility and artificiality of the Pakistani state. According to Van Hollen, whatever the origin, the 'dismemberment' thesis became an 'idee fixe' for both Nixon and Kissinger (1980, 351).

*There is no evidence for Kissinger's claim that India had a definite war aim to dismember Pakistan ... Persistent suspicions of Indian and Soviet intentions, the belief that the US was somehow formally committed to Pakistan, and the ultrasensitivity towards China, set the stage for the most dramatic and disturbing episode described in Kissinger's memoirs (Van Hollen 1980, 352).*

He argues that the Nixon-Kissinger geopolitical approach to South Asia was flawed both in conception and implementation. By attempting to resolve an essentially regional dispute through global geopolitics, the president and his national security advisor deemphasized or misinterpreted the political dynamics in the subcontinent and exaggerated the role and influence of the major external powers. According to Van Hollen, there were several limitations to Kissinger's theory:

1. There was a failure to perceive the unique features in the South Asian situation, including the failure to fully comprehend the political economic impact of the millions of refugees in India; the essential requirements for a political settlement in east Bengal; the nuances of the Kashmir issue and the nature of U.S. commitment to Pakistan.
  2. There was a failure to perceive the balanced character of Indo-Soviet relationship.
- He also states that claim of responsibility by the White House for the ceasefire has no basis or no evidence.

Mrs. Gandhi beliefs regarding Pakistan have already been presented in the previous chapters. But it should be emphasized here that two beliefs regarding strategy vis-a-vis Pakistan, i.e., cooperative and deterrent, were balanced in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code. She attempted to cooperate with Pakistan to find mutual solutions to

problems through bilateral negotiations, which she constantly stated were ignored by Pakistan. She did not fail to underline the fact that India would also adopt a deterrent strategy. The seeming lack of interest in bilateral negotiations in Pakistan, and the constant military assistance that it was receiving from outside made a deterrent strategy vitally essential. Her perceptions of threat prompted her to advocate deterrence which led to the buildup of India's tangible sources of power.

Second, there is no support in the documents for the view that Mrs. Gandhi considered the existence of the Islamic state of Pakistan as illegitimate and that India had the obligation to reunite the two countries. It appears that Mrs. Gandhi was reconciled to partition and believed in the existence of Pakistan as a separate entity. Even though she opposed the view that religious ideology could form the basis of a state, she neither recommended that Pakistan should become a secular state nor attempted to forcibly convince its leaders of her view.

Such contradictions do not appear as inconsistencies when Mrs. Gandhi's belief system is analyzed in its entirety and the structural linkages between beliefs are analyzed. For example, as indicated by the results of the content analysis, Mrs. Gandhi believed that India would play the role of a friendly neighbour. This view has really been substantiated in several sections of this project. There was an increase in India's traditional power, but it was to be used only as a deterrent. While peace and cooperation were important long-term objectives, India's strategy vis-a-vis Pakistan was deterrence in order to protect vital security interests. So, for this strategy to be effective India had to make efforts to enhance its capability. Although this may seem logically incompatible, the existence of both beliefs - peace and cooperation, and the build-up of power, appears to be psychologically consistent in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code.

### 3. Concept of Power:

Tharoor (1983, 71) and Subrahmanyam (1983, 126) argue that there was considerable ambiguity in Mrs. Gandhi's conceptualization of power.

The evidence suggests that what passed for Mrs. Gandhi's sense of power in foreign policy was only a limited manifestation of her obsession with independence, and that it possessed no positive conceptual attributes (Tharoor 1983, 71).

For example, on the one hand she believed that real power lay in the people and in the



economic strength of a state, but on the other hand she attempted to increase India's military capabilities. Also, it seems difficult to reconcile Mrs. Gandhi's views on world peace and disarmament with her government's policy to explode a nuclear device. Of course, it can be argued that Mrs. Gandhi emphasized that it was for peaceful purposes, but its implications in terms of an enhancement of India's power cannot be ignored.

Although Mrs. Gandhi was a vocal critic of the nuclear arms race and a proponent of disarmament, she did not entirely ignore the realities of the political world. She was a realist who understood the importance of military capability. The universe was conflictual with threats to important political values and national interests. Hence, it was necessary to maintain enough power to deflect the threat, but not to initiate it. Military power could only be used for deterrence. Its use could only be justified as a last resort and in a limited sense, for defensive and not offensive purposes.

It is no wonder that such images of military power held by Mrs. Gandhi would prompt Subrahmanyam to declare that India did not behave in a manner befitting a nuclear power. Subrahmanyam, a leading defence analyst and a foremost member of the Indian nuclear lobby and an advocate of the bomb, asserts that Mrs. Gandhi was totally ignorant in the aspects of power, and especially military strategy. His main criticism is that India under Indira Gandhi was not willing to assert itself and play the role a nation of its size and resources is expected to play (1987, 388). K. Subrahmaniam (1987, Authors interview, New Delhi, 20 Dec 1988) asserts that Mrs. Gandhi was totally ignorant in the aspects of power and strategy, especially military and security. On the one hand, India became a military power of consequence in the period under review. On the other hand, when the demands of the security environment were juxtaposed with the actual military capability, India's power seemed inadequate and the nuclear dimension of power remained vague and ambiguous. According to Subrahmanyam, in India there is considerable confusion on the relationship between power and foreign policy implementation. For those who fail to take into account the power dynamics underlying international relations, foreign policy making is reduced to a series of ad hoc responses or ad hoc initiatives largely influenced by the current perceptions of the situational contexts by the government (Subrahmanyam 1983, 126).

Mrs. Gandhi did not have a clear conception of power. If she had understood power in international politics, she should have continued with the nuclear blasts, which she did not (Subrahmanyam, author's interview, New Delhi, 20 Dec 1988).

He argued that the best method of demonstrating India's power was to go nuclear, which Mrs. Gandhi failed to do. He said that she was not willing to assert herself in the subcontinent or use India's power to its advantage. It was no wonder that the U.S., and the Soviet Union (for some time), equated India with Pakistan. India possessed power, but was unwilling to use it.

He led a vociferous lobby to convince the government to commence a nuclear weapons programme. The other nuclear powers launched a massive effort to develop nuclear technology mainly with a view to equip themselves with deterrent weapon systems and whatever development benefits flowed out of the programme were only spin offs. On the other hand, India deliberately started a nuclear technological developmental programme with emphasis on peaceful benefits. He accused the government of being unrealistic regarding power politics by ignoring the demands of India's security environment.

But in his analysis, he has failed to take into consideration what Mrs. Gandhi perceived were India's goals and strategies. This has already been discussed at length and will not be repeated here. His accusations that Mrs. Gandhi was not capable of making decisions regarding strategy has been disproven by her performance in 1971.

Overall, it can be said that the beliefs in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code displayed consistency in most areas. But there were some contradictions regarding India's role and power. She had an ambivalent attitude towards power, prompting the criticism that she could not resolve the basic dilemma (a) how to use power to establish independence and at the same time increase power in order to maintain that independence; (b) how to increase power without intimidating the smaller countries in the region.

### **3. Mrs. Gandhi and the Three Options - The Congruence Procedure:**

In this section we will assess the three options in order to see if they were congruent with Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs. By applying the congruency procedure, we can determine as to whether Mrs. Gandhi's belief system was instrumental in the decision process and whether it had an impact on policy preferences in the three key foreign policy cases chosen: 1. The decision to militarily intervene in Bangladesh in 1971; 2. The decision to sign the treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1971; 3. The nuclear explosion of 1974.

As George (1979, 111) states, the congruence procedure, to a very large extent, can give us confidence that a particular decision has been arrived at because of the existence of a specific set of beliefs. If in a decision situation there are several policy alternatives/options, and some of which are not congruent with a decision maker's beliefs and which are not chosen, then the explanatory power of the belief system is enhanced (George 1979, 110-113).

In this chapter we will examine each decision setting, Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code, the available options, and the decision process, and attempt to conclude whether Mrs. Gandhi choice of options were consistent with her beliefs. If Mrs. Gandhi chose options which were either not congruent with her belief system or did not choose options which were congruent with her belief system, then it can be said the explanatory power of the Operational Code is limited in this case.

#### **A. The Decision to Militarily Intervene in Bangladesh**

##### **a. Preiude to the Crisis.**

The background to the crisis can be found in the civil war in Pakistan. The establishment of the independent state of Pakistan had created a curious situation. Although the majority of the population lived in the eastern half of Pakistan, which was divided from West Pakistan by thousands of miles of Indian territory, leadership had come to be located in West Pakistan. There was also the emotional and intellectual

divide of distinctly different language and cultural traditions. By the late sixties, Pakistan came increasingly under the dominance of the bureaucratic military complex, and this intensified the alienation of the eastern half of the country. Although the Bengalis constituted a majority, they were regarded as second-class citizens by the dominant Punjabi elite of West Pakistan and were treated with considerable disdain, and constantly accused of not being real Muslims, their loyalty to Pakistan dubious, their language and culture too close to Hindu Bengal<sup>7</sup>.

Increasingly, in the eyes of the East Pakistanis, the relationship took on the dimensions of colonial interaction. East Pakistan contributed to roughly 60% of the total foreign exchange earnings of Pakistan, but its share of the total imports of Pakistan was less than 30%. The per capita income in West Pakistan was higher and concentration of wealth and economic growth came to be largely centered in West Pakistan. There were very few reforms or changes in East Pakistan. It was a combination of all these and other factors that created the situation in East Pakistan and to top it all was the refusal of the military establishment with the support of Bhutto to recognize the democratically elected Awami League which had won a clear majority in the national elections.

After a long period of military dictatorship, national elections were held in December 1970 in Pakistan. The Awami League, under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, swept the polls in East Bengal and secured a clear majority, capturing 167 out of 313 seats in Pakistan's National Assembly, 298 out of 310 seats in the East Pakistan assembly. Unwilling to come to terms with Bengali nationalism and transfer power to the Awami League, Yahya Khan refused to convene the newly elected assembly and imprisoned Mujibur Rehman. The Awami League launched a civil disobedience movement and there were violent outbreaks in East Pakistan. The period between 26 March 1971, to 3 Dec 1971, was very crucial in East Bengal's move to obtain autonomy which ultimately meant complete independence. It was during this period that President Yahya Khan announced the imposition of martial law in Pakistan. On 25 March 1971,

---

<sup>7</sup>See Ayub Khan's book Friends Not Masters 274-76

the Pakistan army was unleashed in East Pakistan to curb the protests and riots, and there began military repressions on a scale that approached genocide. Millions of refugees streamed across the border into India. The West Pakistan military forces moved to every part of East Bengal and took over all strategic positions. The vicious and brutal attacks on unarmed civilians confirmed the secessionist argument that the differences between East and West Pakistan were irreconcilable. On 26 March, Radio Bangladesh, in a broadcast, announced the independence of Bangladesh.

Owing to its geographical contiguity with East Bengal, the events there threatened the Indian socio-economic and political fabric. Millions of refugees were forced to enter India and for humanitarian reasons, India felt obligated to assist the refugees. This imposed severe economic and financial burdens with dangers of inflation and the cessation of developmental effort. Second, there was fear of political disruptions in the bordering states - West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura - where already-existing tensions might escalate. Third, there was the ever present fear of communal riots beginning in that region and eventually engulfing the entire country.

Pakistan accused India of escalating the crisis, blamed India for the agitation and secessionist activities of the East Bengalis, and hastening the disintegration of Pakistan. The military leaders projected the crisis as an Indo-Pakistan problem. The Indian government totally rejected the allegations. At the same time, it announced its moral support for East Bengal because it was essentially a fight for social justice. The Indian Parliament passed a unanimous resolution, moved by Mrs. Gandhi, to that effect.

*This house expresses its profound sympathy for and solidarity with the people of East Bengal in their struggle for a democratic way of life. Bearing in mind the permanent interests that India has in peace, and committed as we are to uphold and defend human rights, this house demands immediate cessation of the use of force and massacre of defenceless people. This house calls upon the peoples and governments of the world to take urgent and constructive steps to prevail upon the government of Pakistan to put an end immediately to the systematic decimation of people which amounts to genocide. This house records its profound conviction that the historic upsurge of the 75 million people of East Bengal will triumph. The house wishes to assure them that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the whole hearted sympathy and support of the people of India (31 March 1971).*

The resolution carefully avoided committing India to an active role in the bringing about a settlement in East Pakistan. Instead it asked for international pressure to achieve that end. It reflected the possibility of India's physical support, but stopped short of

advocating military intervention. Mrs. Gandhi explained that the crisis was an international problem and that the pressure of states friendly to Pakistan should be brought to bear on Yayha Khan to find a peaceful political solution to the crisis.

With respect to the U.S., Pakistan's traditional ally, India's main objective was to persuade the American government to halt arms shipments to Pakistan. The government of India attempted to convince the U.S. that any military assistance to Pakistan would have the effect of encouraging and sustaining the leaders of Pakistan in their anti-people activity, and economic assistance would be tantamount to condoning their deplorable actions in East Bengal. But Indian efforts failed and U.S. arms continued to flow directly and indirectly through third countries.

What also added to the existing problems was American political and diplomatic support for Pakistan and its unwillingness to put pressure on Yayha Khan to come to some sort of peaceful settlement with the leaders of East Bengal. Yayha Khan was susceptible to American pressure and would have desisted from his ruthless action if the US had forcefully insisted on his doing so. The U.S. administration under Nixon and Kissinger was simply not interested in the Indian predicament but only concerned with the new opening to China facilitated by Pakistan. The Indian government spent a lot of time during most of 1971 in publicizing the cause of East Bengal's search for a democratic political system. India also asked the UN Human Rights commission to persuade the government of Pakistan to restore human rights, and assist in the relief of the refugees. But the result of these efforts reflected a gap between moral outrage and an official unwillingness to act by individual countries. While most governments were prepared to financially and morally help the refugees, they were very reluctant to put pressure on Pakistan or apply sanctions.

When Mrs. Gandhi's pleas did not evoke a response, American and Chinese support - political, diplomatic and military - for Pakistan did not abate, and a political solution to the crisis was not forthcoming, Mrs. Gandhi had to take action. It was in this context that the Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Aug 1971.

By the latter half of 1971, the crisis was no longer considered Pakistan's internal problem. It was having deep repercussions on India's security. As the crisis escalated, India appeared to sway under the burden. The political and military situation in East Bengal had reached a point where it was apparent that the refugees would return only if there was an independent government in East Bengal run by the Awami League. But Mrs. Gandhi, in a last ditch attempt, made a tour of all the Western capitals and told Western leaders that India would be constrained to take all measures as may be necessary in order to ensure India's security (4 Nov 1971). By this time, Mrs. Gandhi had become more receptive to the idea of a lightning liberation of Bangladesh, as a last resort. Preparations to that end had begun.

By late November, Mrs. Gandhi's objectives and goals and her coordination of military and diplomatic efforts became more precise. Also border incidents which had already become regular occurrences since April, 1971, increased from the end of October, 1971. The entire month of November was the most disturbed period from the point of view of border skirmishes, which ultimately turned into an open war between India and Pakistan in December, 1971. Pakistan launched a well planned offensive on 3 December, 1971, in what it hoped to be a preemptive surprise attack on several Indian airfields. Formal hostilities did not erupt until this time and the Indian troops struck back on both eastern and western fronts. The Indian military went into Bangladesh in a lightning campaign in an attempt to achieve its limited objectives. On December, 6, India recognized Bangladesh as an independent and sovereign country. The U.S. sent its seventh fleet into the Bay of Bengal in what was considered by the Indian government as a modern version of Gunboat diplomacy. China made threatening noises and Mrs. Gandhi ignored UN resolutions against India. The Pakistan army surrendered to joint Indian and Bangladesh forces on 16 December. On the same day, Mrs. Gandhi announced a unilateral ceasefire on the western front. With her political acumen and acute sense of timing she decided not to continue the war on the western front or recapture Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

The questions which put the government of India in a dilemma in mid 1971 were

1. Should India recognize Bangladesh and the legitimacy of the government-in-exile?
2. Should India intervene militarily in Pakistan's civil war?

#### b. Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code

1. Source of Conflict	Outside interference and intervention/ Neo-impsm/neo colonialism
Conditions of Peace	Non Interference
Role of Conflict	Extremely Dysfunctional/undesirable
2. Character of Opponent	Aggressive/destructive
Opp's goals	External influences
Opp's response to concil	Ignore
Opp's hostility	General/permanent
3. National Role Conception	Friendly Neighbour
4. Nature of Goals	Protect security at all costs
Best approach for goals	From immediate problem
5. Strategy	Deterrent
6. Action	Act when enemy provocation intolerable
7. Force	Avoid force/use as last resort/ resor than lose/surrender/use on small scale
8. Risk	Take risks if necessary for specific undertaking/ minimize losses

Seven sets of Operational Code beliefs were central and particularly salient in the decision making process during the twelve months preceding the intervention in Bangladesh. Detailed discussions of these beliefs and their relation to this specific case have already been made in Chapter V of this thesis. Hence, in this section, we will only briefly enumerate the main points.

First, she believed that the main source of conflict, especially in the developing countries of Asia and Africa, was Western imperialism and neo-colonialism. She



perceived conflicts in South Asia as arising and being sustained by outside - mainly American - interference in the region, and American attempts to prop up and bolster unpopular dictatorial regimes such as the military bureaucracy in Pakistan, in order to serve its own interests. Pumping in outside arms altered the balance of forces and disrupted stability in the region. American military assistance to Pakistan intensified the existing tensions and prevented a lasting peace settlement and friendly cooperation between India and Pakistan. Outside military assistance gave the regimes in Pakistan a false sense of strength and security and encouraged them to undertake rash, unrealistic and adventurous courses of action which endangered peace and stability. The U.S. saw the strategic advantages in such a situation because it would facilitate an American presence. Mrs. Gandhi believed that peace in the region could ensue only when outside powers ceased their efforts to establish a sphere of influence and stopped military assistance to all the countries concerned; and when there was no outside interference in the affairs of the subcontinent.

Second, Mrs. Gandhi's image of the enemy - in this case Pakistan - caused her to perceive every move made by Pakistan as posing a threat to India's interests and security. She perceived Pakistan as hostile, aggressive and a destructive nation run by an unpopular military bureaucracy, which sought popular support for its policies by exaggerating a threat to Pakistan from what it saw as a vengeful and destructive India.

She also believed that Pakistan was acting not just in accordance with its religious tradition but was also encouraged by Western (mainly American) endorsement of its policies. She believed that Pakistan could have been restrained by the U.S. from carrying out and continuing its rash and destructive policies in East Pakistan. It was U.S. and Chinese diplomatic and military support which intensified Pakistan's belligerence.

This support also served to encourage Pakistan to ignore conciliatory attempts made by India. Mrs. Gandhi perceived Pakistan's hostility towards India as being general and permanent.

Mrs. Gandhi's perception of conflict as extremely dysfunctional and undesirable prompted her into advocating the avoidance of force in seeking a solution to any crisis.

Non-military means had to be utilized and a political or diplomatic solution had to be found, and violence would only hamper the achievement of important goals and objectives.

Mrs. Gandhi genuinely believed in the validity of India's subcontinental goal as that of a friendly neighbour. India's main goal on the subcontinent was to blunt hostility, avert confrontation, build up areas of cooperation and friendship. India would also assist other countries in times of need and cooperate with them in order to secure social and economic justice for their peoples.

In the international arena, India would continue to play an independent/nonaligned role. This meant assessing international events, situations, issues independently and acting in a manner which would serve Indian interests and not bow down to pressures from outside. National interest would determine India's action in international affairs.

One of India's paramount objectives was to ensure security of not just territory but to vital national and strategic interests. India would play a friendly role, but if there was a threat to India's security and national interests, the government would take appropriate action to defend it.

Long-term subcontinental peace and stability were unchangeable optimal objectives for India. But in the event of a crisis, this objective could best be served if one dealt with and solved current problems. India had to choose short-term goals to face immediate problems.

In the achievement of short-term goals it was acceptable to take risks. High risky means could be adopted as long as they did not jeopardize long term or optimal goals. But in the taking of risks one had to focus on minimizing losses, and not on maximizing gains. This was a conservative strategy. Mrs. Gandhi did not advocate an adventurous policy.

India had to adopt a deterrent strategy in regard to Pakistan. What was important in this case was Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding action and the use of force. She strongly emphasized that only if the opponent's provocation or hostility became intolerable, action had to be taken to protect India's interests and security. Even then, one had to try other peaceful methods to resolve the problem and only if they did not work, then limited force

could be used for defensive purposes. Force could be used as a last resort to avoid the risks of losing or surrendering Indian interests. She also emphasized that India should not make the first move.

### c. Available Options

What were the alternatives available to Mrs. Gandhi in 1971? There were eight options open, some of which were put forth by opposition members, by public opinion, by other members in Mrs. Gandhi's government and by her aides.

**Option A, Non interference**

**Option B, Recognize Bangladesh immediately/military action to liberate it**

**Option C, Seal borders/ send back refugees**

**Option D, Negotiate directly with Yayha Khan**

**Option E, Attack West Pakistan, recapture Kashmir**

**Option F, Undertake nuclear weapons programme**

**Option G, Mobilize world opinion/exercise restraint/avoid war/urge pol.solution**

**Option H, Intervene militarily as last resort**

Defence minister Jagjivan Ram, and Finance minister Chavan, saw the advantages for India from an immediate recognition of Bangladesh, backed by military action to install an Awami League government. This was echoed by several other Ministers and West Bengal politicians. This approach was debated outside government circles as well. It was argued that a prolonged crisis in Pakistan would threaten India's security, and so would an indefinite occupation of East Pakistan by the West Pakistan army or the emergence of a revolutionary force hostile to India. Samar Guha, M.P., pressed the government for the immediate recognition of Bangladesh and criticized the government's

Attitude of hesitation to vacillation, from vacillation to indecision, from indecision to prevarication, from prevarication to quandry and then...complete emasculation (Lok Sabha debates, 2 July 1971).

He argued that India had to act before Pakistan got a chance to equip itself with the latest in weapons technology supplied by the U.S., China and the NATO market; replace Bengali personnel in the army with Punjabis; build up their land and water communication; raise armed militia and paramilitary forces; pump in more men and material from West Pakistan; mobilize puppets from within East Pakistan and obtain money to finance their operations from the oil-rich Islamic countries in West Asia.

H.M. Patel, M.P., suggested that the government should undertake a nuclear weapons program immediately, based on his perception that in the undeclared war between Pakistan and India, Pakistan was winning. He did not believe that the enormous cost of production of nuclear weapons would cripple India.

The Americans and Chinese also took the side of Pakistan that the crisis in East Pakistan was deliberately engineered by India and that it was an Indo-Pakistan problem. There was a suggestion by both these governments that Indira Gandhi directly negotiate with Yayha Khan and come to an agreement.

U Thant suggested that the refugees could return home under UN supervision. According to the proposal, 150 UN representatives were to be stationed at collecting points on the Indian side, at border-crossing points on both the sides, and in reception centres on the East Pakistan side. The job of the observers would be to reassure the refugees and prevail upon them to return to their country. The return of the refugees would ensure a solution to the conflict within the framework of a single, united Pakistan.

Some of the opposition members wanted Mrs. Gandhi to take action immediately. It was suggested that using India's superior military strength and given the chaotic conditions in Pakistan, territory in West Pakistan could be captured and India could repossess Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. With the existing tensions and problems between both wings, Pakistan would not be able to retaliate effectively. The crisis in Pakistan could be used to India's advantage (Lok Sabha debates, 2 July 1971).

These above-mentioned objectives were inconsistent with Mrs. Gandhi beliefs and her choice of action was more congruent with her Operational Code. This will be discussed in the following section.




Fig. 7. Congruence between Beliefs and Choice of Action

#### d. Congruence between Beliefs and Choice of Action

##### Option A. Non-interference Congruent

Mrs. Gandhi, being a staunch proponent of non interference, advocated a policy of self restraint. Just as she disliked outside interference in Indian affairs and in the affairs of the subcontinent, she did not want to interfere in any external crisis unless it directly impinged on India's security and posed a threat to India's vital interests.

In the initial stage of the crisis, Mrs. Gandhi perceived the civil war in Pakistan as purely an internal problem of Pakistan and did not want to say or do anything that would be construed as Indian intervention in Pakistan's internal affairs. In an address to the Indian Parliament, she commented that in 23 years and more, India has never tried to interfere with the internal affairs of Pakistan (24 May 1971). Mrs. Gandhi's reactions were at best low key, to the postponement of the convening of the National Assembly in Pakistan, to the arrest of Sheik Mujibur Rehman on 25 March, the imposition of martial law on 26 March and the subsequent genocide. She genuinely perceived this as Pakistan's domestic crisis and as such did not want to actively intervene in order to find a solution. When the first flood of refugees arrived in India in mid-March, she

expressed in the Lok Sabha her sorrow and regret that Pakistan had lost an opportunity to strengthen itself, but added that as a government they could not say very much more (27 March 1971). She advocated India's non-interference and reportedly told the press that the rulers in West Pakistan had to bring about a peaceful solution which was most importantly acceptable to the people in East Pakistan. In all of the speeches that she made through most of 1971, she firmly stated that Pakistan had to settle its own problems with the representatives of East Pakistan and ensure safe conditions for the return of the refugees. But until then India would have no choice but to provide relief and sanctuary for the refugees on moral and humanitarian grounds.

The declaration of independence on 26 March by Radio Bangladesh operating clandestinely did not evoke much of a response from Mrs. Gandhi's government. Also, several pleas from the rebel leaders to recognize Bangladesh went unheeded.

By May 1971, Pakistan could not resolve the crisis and Mrs. Gandhi began to believe that Pakistan's internal problem had become a problem for India and posed a threat to India's security. But even then she did not advocate intervention. She said that a political solution must be brought about in East Bengal by those who could do so. She urged the military leaders to stop the demographic aggression on India and halt the brutal massacre of its people. Even on 29 June, Mrs. Gandhi warned her party colleagues and the opposition members not to press the government into belligerence against Pakistan.

Option B, Recognize Bangladesh, followed by military action to liberate it Incongruent

Thousands of refugees, reaching an average of 30,000 per day, poured into India everyday and the daily costs of maintaining the refugee camps rose to astronomical figures, and despite assistance, the main burden had to be borne by the Indian government. As time went by, the government's attitude began to appear as a timid, do-nothing policy that would take the country to economic ruin. Public pressure mounted for military intervention and the liberation of East Bengal, and it was argued that a war would be less expensive than keeping the refugees indefinitely.

This option was incongruent and directly clashed with Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding non-interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Second, her perception of

conflict as extremely dysfunctional and undesirable, prompted her into advocating the avoidance of the use of force in seeking a solution to the crisis. Force could only be used defensively and military counterattack launched only if attacked first. Moreover, by May 1971, the crisis had not reached serious enough proportions for India to justify such action. Diplomatic approaches and political solutions had to be sincerely attempted before resorting to military intervention. So India would not immediately recognize Bangladesh as an independent country. Its leaders would first have to demonstrate their capacity to retain mass support and either negotiate or fight the West Pakistan army out of East Bengal without relying too much on India's military assistance. It was only on December, 6, that India granted formal recognition to Bangladesh. Mrs. Gandhi refused to be hustled into precipitate action and replied to her critics in the Lok Sabha,

Now, this government may have many faults; but it does not lack courage, nor is it afraid of taking a risk if it is a necessary risk....We are not merely concerned with the legal aspect of this situation....We are concerned with one thing and one thing only - our own national interest and security and that of the heroic people of Bangladesh. This is why it is important to act calmly (25 May 1971).

Speaking at a public meeting in August 1971, Mrs. Gandhi refused to concede to the demand for recognition of the Bangladesh government in exile. She warned;

There are some in this country who are attempting to make political capital out of the Bangladesh issue....This is no occasion for such irresponsible action. We have full sympathy with the demand for the recognition of Bangladesh. We have never said that we shall not recognize Bangladesh. But the government will take any such step only after careful consideration of all aspects of the question (15 Aug 1971).

Contrary to Kissinger's claim, there is no evidence to show that India prepared for war to liberate Bangladesh by the summer of 1971.

#### Option C. Seal Borders/Send back Refugees    Incongruent

Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs, is believed to have favoured non-involvement and the sealing of the border to stop the refugee influx. This was also incongruent with Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs. India was playing the role of a friendly neighbour and providing sanctuary to millions of people who were persecuted on humanitarian grounds. Even as early as 13 November 1970, when there was a devastating cyclone in East Pakistan, India voluntarily sent enormous amounts of

emergency relief aid and medical assistance without waiting for the Pakistan government to formally request it. India's intentions were that of a friendly neighbour and it would accept the refugees and provide them with food and shelter. Moreover, India always had supported the cause of the exploited and the underdogs, and was a supporter of liberation struggles everywhere. India could not seal off the borders on humane grounds, and not to mention the geographic impossibility of such action. Second, India also rejected the suggestions of U Thant<sup>4</sup> to send representatives to both sides of the border to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees in a secure and orderly manner. The Indian government's main objections was that this move would only give the refugees a wrong picture regarding conditions in East Bengal, and a false sense of hope that there would be no more violence. Also the UN could not provide specific and adequate guarantees that safe conditions would be created for their return. U Thant's offer of good offices made on 20 October were also rejected because it was accompanied by a condition for mutual withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces from the borders under UN supervision as it sidetracked the main problem and would portray it as an Indo-Pakistan dispute. Unless the main reasons for the crisis in East Pakistan was eliminated, the refugees could not be allowed to return.

Option D. Negotiate with Yayha Khan Incongruent

This option was incongruent with Mrs. Gandhi's stance on non-intervention. She repeatedly stated that the crisis was not an Indo-Pak problem and, as such, saw no reason why she should be involved in negotiations with the leaders of West Pakistan. She resented Pakistan's efforts to portray the crisis as an Indo-pak problem. Pakistan accused India of escalating the crisis and hastening its disintegration. Speaking at the Lok Sabha on 26, May, Mrs. Gandhi strongly refuted the allegation that India was trying to bring about the dismemberment of Pakistan. She said that at each step India had tried for friendship with Pakistan and, if there was a crisis in Pakistan, it was certainly not of India's making, but that of the rulers of Pakistan (26 May 1971).

---

<sup>4</sup>initially made on 19 July



In turn, Mrs. Gandhi accused Pakistan of deliberately engineering the situation in East Bengal to serve a dual purpose, i.e., not only to stamp out all dissidence but also of purposefully driving millions of people into India knowing that it would disrupt law and order, weaken the country and imperil security.

But despite this, she rejected suggestions from Nixon and Kissinger to have peace talks with Yayha Khan on the grounds that this was not an Indo-Pak issue and as such did not see any point in interfering. She said that the basis of peace lay in negotiations between Yayha Khan and the legitimate leaders of the Awami League.

Option E.      Attack W.Pakistan/Repossess Kashmir      Incongruent

This option contradicted Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs about action, undesirability of conflict, strategy and risk.

During most of 1971, the challenge to Mrs. Gandhi's diplomacy was to avoid war and ensure that the conditions that could lead to war abated. India was unprepared to take military action, and until the end of summer laid stress on diplomacy to end the crisis peacefully. According to Mrs. Gandhi, there could be no military solution to the crisis in East Pakistan.

Second, she proposed deterrence vis-a-vis Pakistan as opposed to an offensive, blitzkrieg strategy. This is also substantiated by her beliefs regarding action. She said that military force should not be used for offensive purposes but could be used as a last resort, on a small scale and its use could be justified only for defence. Also, one had to adopt high risk policies only if necessary, to achieve immediate goals and not to maximize gains, but to minimize losses. India could use force only if actually attacked by Pakistan or if Pakistan's provocation reached intolerable limits. Mrs. Gandhi did not advocate the use of force in order to gain territory or to weaken Pakistan. Although militarily she was in a position to invade West Pakistan and repossess Kashmir, Mrs. Gandhi did not adopt that option.

**Option E. Undertake a nuclear weapons programme Incongruent**

Once again Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding action prevailed in rejecting this option. It was not necessary, according to Mrs. Gandhi, to have a nuclear weapons in order to employ limited force for defensive purposes.

**Option G. Mobilize world opinion/exercise restraint/avoid war/urge for political solution Congruent**

Mrs. Gandhi's attempts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis was reflected in her efforts to mobilize world opinion to bring pressure on Pakistan. The problem with the refugees was not just an Indian problem, but an international one as this crisis would have repercussions throughout the world. Mrs. Gandhi launched a major diplomatic offensive to secure the support of a large number of big and middle powers. On 10 August, Mrs. Gandhi wrote personally to 24 heads of government, drawing their attention to the crisis, explaining its finer points and appealing to them to use their influence to restrain the military leaders in Pakistan. On 24 October, she set out on a three week official tour which took her to the capitals of the Western world, enabling her to appeal to Western public opinion, and use her diplomatic skills at the summit level. It was not enough for the countries of the world to offer financial and moral support for the refugees. They had to actively work to bring about a just solution to the fundamental problem. A combined effort by all countries of the world might help bring about a political solution. In an interview with Z. Masani after the crisis, she said,

A large section of opinion in this country was that we should have marched in our troops straight away and it was very few of us who were strongly against anything like this. We thought we should give full opportunity for international opinion, and even the better sense of the Pakistani government to prevail (Masani 1974, 237).

**Option H. Intervene militarily as a last resort Congruent**

It was only by the second half of 1971 that Mrs. Gandhi decided that a deterrent strategy vis-a-vis Pakistan was not working and that limited force should be used as a last resort and in a defensive fashion. Up until now she kept insisting that there could be no military solution to the crisis. But because it was becoming impossible to resist Pakistani

belligerence and threats to India's security, and unable to stem the increasing tide of refugees, she decided that limited force had to be applied. Pakistan's provocation was becoming intolerable. She warned the government of Pakistan that if war was imposed on India, Pakistan would find India ready for the same. She also told world leaders (4 Nov 1971) that India would take whatever action it deemed necessary to safeguard its security and protect its interests.

Unable to solve its problems, the military leaders in West Pakistan were, according to Mrs. Gandhi, deliberately provoking border incidents with India with air attacks on Indian territory, just in order to break the stalemate, and provoke India and implicate India in the Bangladesh crisis.

By the end of Nov 1971, the East Bengal crisis had reached a climax and the two countries were on the verge of war. On the afternoon of 3 Dec 1971, Mrs. Gandhi told a public rally in Calcutta,

I want to reiterate that I do not want war. I earnestly desire peace. I know what war means in terms of human suffering. I will be the last person to start a war. But if a war is thrust on upon us, we are prepared to fight in defence of our freedom and our ideals (3 Dec 1971).

The very next morning she was in New Delhi announcing to the Parliament

Pakistan has now declared a full scale war against India and the war in Bangladesh has become a war on India....A war has been forced upon us, a war we did not seek and did our utmost to prevent (4 Dec 1971).

She added that the aggression will be repelled decisively and that India was prepared for all eventualities.

On 15 Dec, Mrs. Gandhi told President Nixon in a letter,

We seek nothing for ourselves. We do not want any territory of what was East Pakistan and now constitutes Bangladesh. We do not want any territory of West Pakistan. We want lasting peace with Pakistan. We are deeply hurt by innuendoes and insinuations that it was we who precipitated the crisis and have in any way threatened the emergence of solutions (15 Dec 1971).

One of India's paramount objectives was to ensure security of not just territory, but to vital national and strategic interests. If there was a threat to such interests, then one had to take action to defend it. The refugees posed a serious threat to stability and created a grave economic, administrative and political crisis for India. The goal in this case was to ensure safe conditions in East Pakistan for the return of the refugees. Since the West Pakistan leaders could not provide such a guarantee, by November 1971, India had to

undertake a limited operation to liberate East Pakistan and facilitate the safe return of the refugees to their homeland<sup>9</sup>.

In the achievement of short-term goals, it was acceptable to take risks. High risk means could be taken in this case for the achievement of goals. For example, India had to contend with the possibility of U.S. and Chinese intervention despite the Indo-Soviet treaty and also risk being totally isolated in the UN. But, at the same time, one had to minimize losses.

It can also be said that Mrs. Gandhi's attempts to organize a summit at Simla, and subsequently bring about an agreement testifies to the fact that she genuinely believed in India's subcontinental role as that of a friendly neighbour. She attempted to convince Pakistan to put aside past differences and to build a new relationship based on friendship and cooperation.

#### e. The Decision Process

The option to militarily intervene in the Bangladesh crisis was chosen by Mrs. Gandhi in the second part of 1971. The reasons for it were several:

1. There did not seem to be a peaceful political solution to the crisis,
2. World leaders were either unwilling or unable to put pressure on Yayha Khan to resolve the crisis and left the burden of the refugees for India to bear alone,
3. The crisis spillover impinged on India's security and posed a threat to India's vital interests,
4. Yayha Khan increased belligerent and aggressive actions in both the western and eastern sections,
5. The political and military situation in East Bengal had reached such a point that only under the rule of the Awami League could an East Bengal government be expected to lure back the refugees from India, and no solution other than independence for Bangladesh would be acceptable to the Awami League, increased Mrs. Gandhi's

---

<sup>9</sup>By Nov 1971, it was accepted fact that the rebel leaders in East Bengal could not but accept total independence from West Pakistan.

preference for limited force in order to achieve India's objectives.

### Objectives.

1. To protect India's security and defend its interests,
2. Ensure safe condition in East Bengal for the return of the refugees, and secure for them a just settlement.

### Means

1. Make a limited incursion into East Bengal, liberate Dacca and ensure the surrender of the Pakistani forces, while responding to attacks by Pakistan on the western sector.
2. Withdrawal of all Indian forces from Bangladesh after surrender of the Pakistani army.
3. Impose a unilateral ceasefire on the western front.

Keeping these objectives in mind, Mrs. Gandhi, along with her advisors and the leaders of the armed forces, planned India's course of action and assessed the risks of each of these means. Preparations were thorough. Mrs. Gandhi and her aides seemed to have looked at all relevant issues. First, India built up a new corps with effective force levels in the East, secured frontiers of the west and north by reinforcing existing defences and stepped up recruitment, training, and deployment of the Mukti Bahini. The timing of the proposed plan of action was deliberated with an eye to factors which determine the success of military intervention. Timing for this operation was absolutely crucial. The heads of armed forces are believed to have advised against any military action until they had had time to make adequate preparations. They also pointed out that the impending monsoon would make large scale operations in East Bengal difficult and that the right moment for military operations would be in the winter, when Chinese intervention across the Himalayas would be difficult.

Based on these assessments, Mrs. Gandhi refused to force a military confrontation before December, or impose a naval blockade to prevent the transfer of troops from West Pakistan to Bangladesh, for fear that might escalate into war.

Third, Mrs. Gandhi had to make an assessment of the international implications of resorting to such a course of action. The risk of Chinese or U.S. intervention had to be taken into account. The recent and unexpected detente between Pakistan, China and

the U.S. had left India in an vulnerable and isolated position. Despite Indian protests, U.S. shipment of arms to Pakistan continued unabated. The U.S. government was fully in support of Pakistan and it stated in no uncertain terms that if India was involved in war on two fronts against Pakistan and China, it could not expect U.S. assistance and warned India of an imminent Chinese attack on India. Public statements of support to Pakistan was made by Chinese leaders. The government of Pakistan claimed total success of Bhutto's visit to China on 5 November and President Yayha Khan believed that China would help Pakistan in case of war with India.

But Mrs. Gandhi's government interpreted Chinese signals and actions as not too hostile vis-a-vis India. Despite Chinese verbal threats, it was reported on the BBC that China had asked Pakistan to seek a reasonable settlement on the question of East Bengal. A dialogue between Indian and Pakistani leaders was also suggested by China to ease the tensions (Times of India 8 Nov 1971). The Times of India reported about the failure of Bhutto's mission to extract any firm commitment from Peking. Also, earlier, Indian and Chinese ambassadors to Poland had exchanged cordial visits, and in August messages were received in Delhi via BBC and the New York Times to the effect that Chou en Lai was anxious to improve relations with India (Times of India 8 Nov 1971). Moreover, Mrs. Gandhi figured that China was more interested in joining the UN rather than undertaking a military adventure. Intelligence reports indicated no major troop deployments in Tibet. Based on these signals, Mrs. Gandhi and her closest advisors gambled on the fact that China would not take military action, but would confine itself to verbal threats. Nevertheless, Mrs. Gandhi prepared for the contingency of Chinese intervention. Also belated U.S. attempts to negotiate with the underground second rank leadership as opposed to the real leader Sheik Mujibur Rehman was discredited in New Delhi. Mrs. Gandhi was unable to convince Nixon or Kissinger that India did not seek to destabilize or dismember Pakistan. Nixon also failed to persuade Mrs. Gandhi to show more restraint or be more patient. He tried to convince her that he would persuade Yayha Khan to implement some political solutions which would alleviate India's refugee and security problem, but without success.

Earlier in the crisis, Mrs. Gandhi had come to the conclusion that while the Soviet Union was sympathetic to India, it was by no means certain that Russia would support India in the event of a war with Pakistan. It was against this background that Mrs. Gandhi signed the Indo-Soviet treaty in Aug 1971. The Russians endorsed India's position in the crisis. In late November the Soviet Union promised diversionary action in Sinkiang should China attack India. Soviet arms shipments to India were augmented in the latter quarter of 1971. The Soviet Union backed Mrs. Gandhi's limited aims, i.e., to liberate Bangladesh and secure India's western frontiers. This aspect figured in Mrs. Gandhi's risk assessments.

Also, Mrs. Gandhi urged a quick and decisive victory in Bangladesh before the UN could actively intervene. A fifteen day plan for the liberation of Bangladesh was to be put into operation. But most importantly, India had to fight an essentially defensive war in the west, giving full priority to the eastern campaign.

The soundness of this strategy and tactics were vindicated by their dramatic and rapid results. Mrs. Gandhi had clearly planned to meet the situation politically, militarily and internationally.

Pakistan attacked India on 3 December and India struck back on the 4th. The Indian military made a lightning incursion into Pakistan and the Pakistani army surrendered on 16 December. Mrs. Gandhi was determined not to let the Indian army stay in Bangladesh for a day longer than was necessary. The surrender came before the UN could condemn India or call for sanctions against it and Mrs. Gandhi announced an unilateral ceasefire on the western front.

The decision to declare an unilateral ceasefire after the liberation of Bangladesh formed part of India's original strategy and the actual announcement is believed to have been prepared four days before the surrender.

While Mrs. Gandhi did not interfere with the military operations, and allowed the armed forces a certain amount of decision latitude in the military sphere, she kept close control over all decisions with political implications. She was determined to achieve India's objectives, one of which was to defend Indian interests and protect security, and limited force could be used as a last resort for defensive purposes. Events in Dec 1971

showed that Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs were instrumental in shaping India's response to the crisis.

#### f. Summary and Conclusions

Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis.

1. The decision to militarily intervene in Bangladesh was made as a last resort after exploring other avenues; a. lobbying the world community to urge Pakistan to bring about a peaceful political solution; b. after practicing restraint and avoiding war as much as possible for the first eight months of the crisis, despite the threat it posed to India's security and stability and given the economic implications; c. as a response to increasing Pakistani hostility and belligerence. 2. This decision was basically consistent with Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code. In fact during the entire crisis Mrs. Gandhi analyzed the unfolding of events and behaved in a manner that was highly congruent with her Operational Code.

The most important beliefs that were activated were regarding strategy and action and the use of military force. Given these beliefs, it was impossible that Mrs. Gandhi would contemplate the use of offensive force to take advantage of the internal crisis in Pakistan and dismember the country.

Also, despite knowing that she would incur the displeasure of a number of countries<sup>10</sup>, she believed that she had to act independently in a manner which would serve India's interests. She was not deterred from her choice of action even in the face of direct US and indirect Chinese pressure. Although India did use force ultimately in the achievement of objectives, the choice of action and strategy advocated by Mrs. Gandhi from the beginning until the end of the crisis was essentially conservative.

---

<sup>10</sup>as indicated later on by the vote in the UN



## **B. The Decision to sign a Treaty with the Soviet Union**

### **a. Prelude to the Treaty**

In June, 1969, when Brezhnev announced that the Soviet Union intended to promote the creation of a new collective security system in Asia, there was no doubt that one of the major Soviet objectives was to erect barriers to the future expansionist aims of communist China. But the Soviets argued that the Brezhnev project was a means for advancing peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems rather than a military pact aimed at any specific country. The main advantages of the proposal according to them were 1. Its universal nature, i.e., participation and cooperation between countries with different social and political systems; 2. Mutual obligations of non-aggression; 3. Observing integrity and sovereignty of one another as against measures of military nature; 4. Encouragement of disarmament and regional commitments of denuclearization; 5. Encouragement of economic cooperation (H. Ray 1973, 262-63).

Most Asian countries, however, received the Soviet proposal for a collective Asian security system with great caution. Mrs. Gandhi described an alliance of Asian countries as useless, since an alliance of one group would cause an immediate reaction by another, with a consequent increase of tensions (22 Oct 1969). She voiced India's opposition to any alliance that would appear to be a ganging up of nations against Communist China. She also expressed the confidence that Communist China would pose no real threat to India in spite of the border issue. If a vacuum was created in Asia by the British pullout of forces, she suggested it could be filled by the countries of the region without foreign intervention. India in 1969 did not take any interest in supporting the Soviet Union to realize the Brezhnev plan and, during the course of 1969, the Soviets seemed to have abandoned the prospects of the early realization of the project for Asian collective security.

Another reason for the Soviet failure to win Indian support for the Brezhnev plan was due to New Delhi's disillusionment with Soviet arms assistance to Pakistan. The re-establishment of amicable relations with India now became the focal point of Soviet diplomacy in South Asia. The Soviet Union hoped to eventually remove all

misunderstanding created by their arms aid to Pakistan. In pursuit of this policy, the Soviet press expressed unqualified praise for Mrs. Gandhi's economic, industrial and foreign policies. The Soviet leaders also minimized differences with India and emphasized the similarities in their respective positions on international political issues. They also tried to play up the Chinese danger to India's security in an attempt to persuade New Delhi to endorse the Brezhnev plan. Simultaneously, the Soviet leaders began to urge New Delhi to sign a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in return for Soviet promise to help India defend itself against foreign hostility and aggression, and for more economic and military assistance. Proceeding with some caution, the Indian government welcomed the change in Soviet attitude, but opposed the Soviet proposal to sign such a treaty.

The Soviet overtures conveniently coincided with the uprising in East Bengal, the continued flow of American arms to Pakistan, American endorsement of Pakistan's policies in the region, and American overtures to China facilitated by Pakistan.

When the crisis erupted, Mrs. Gandhi primary concern was to seek a political settlement to the problem and prevent the East Pakistan crisis from developing into an Indo-Pak conflict. She urged the U.S. government to put pressure on Yayha Khan and also to suspend arms assistance to Pakistan. But the U.S. under the Nixon administration, saw the rising tension in the subcontinent as an opportunity to reestablish its presence in Pakistan, which it had been attempting to do since the Tashkent conference in 1966, in order to reinforce U.S. influence in South Asia. In this context, President Nixon saw that American interests would best be served by a pro-Pakistan policy. In contrast, the Soviet Union appreciated India's stand on the crisis and extended its support to Mrs. Gandhi's policies in regard to a peaceful settlement of the problem in East Pakistan, and Moscow assured Delhi that it would definitely not supply arms to Pakistan.

China also endorsed Pakistan's policy in East Bengal and warned India not to intervene in Pakistan's internal affairs. During the July meeting with Kissinger, Chou en Lai stated that in the event of an Indo-Pak war over East Pakistan, China would militarily intervene on behalf of Pakistan. China also got a promise from Kissinger that

the U.S. would not support India if such a situation arose. The formation of a Sino-Pak-U.S. axis created an ominous scenario. Mrs. Gandhi was probably convinced that only a strong Soviet support backed by a treaty between the two countries would be effective in discouraging Pakistan and its allies from plunging the subcontinent into a major war and would guarantee India's security. The treaty was bound to be interpreted as a deviation from India's traditional nonalignment, but Mrs. Gandhi had decided that this was a small price to pay for Soviet backing in the current crisis.

Mrs. Gandhi had always insisted that national interest would determine the country's choice of action of any foreign policy objectives. Therefore, it was acceptable to move closer to one superpower or another if India's broad-based national interest demanded it. Mrs. Gandhi defined her brand of nonalignment as judging each issue independently on its own merits. It certainly did not mean neutrality or equidistance from the superpowers. Hence, short term goals and objectives were determined by what Mrs. Gandhi considered to be in India's interests. If she continued to reject the Brezhnev plan through 1968 and 1969, she saw the benefits in signing a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. At the same time, she ensured that India's decision latitude would not be curtailed and instructed her negotiators in Moscow to ensure that the treaty made specific references to India's nonalignment and the wording such that it should not make India look like a Soviet client state.

The treaty in its final form is believed to have differed from the original Soviet draft both in its inclusion of a statement of Russia's respect for India's nonalignment and in its vagueness on the question of military aid. Its operative clauses ruled out any assistance, direct or indirect, by the two countries to any third party which engaged in armed conflict with either of the two signatories, and provided for immediate mutual consultation and appropriate effective measures to counter any military threat to either country (Masani 1974, 238).

The manner in which the Indo-Soviet treaty was negotiated and presented to the country was typical of Mrs. Gandhi's political style. The negotiations were conducted in Moscow in complete secrecy by D.P.Dhar, Mrs. Gandhi's personal emissary and close confidant. The political affairs committee of the Cabinet was not told of the

government's move until the final draft was prepared and the cabinet was not informed until the day on which the treaty was signed. With her strong sense of timing, Mrs. Gandhi publicly announced the treaty at a mass rally.

**b. Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code**

The highly stressful situation in 1971 may have activated Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code. Four sets of beliefs which were particularly relevant in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code probably had an impact on the decision to sign the treaty with Russia in Aug 1971.

1. Mrs. Gandhi's image of Pakistan as the main opponent along with the U.S. and China which encouraged and abetted Pakistan in its hostile actions in the subcontinent; and her expectations of their potential responses to events in South Asia, led her to believe that India had to protect its security and act in a manner demanded by its national interest.
2. Mrs. Gandhi estimated that the adversaries would not respond to India's conciliatory policies. She predicted that their potential response would be inflexible. India could not continue to advocate a conciliatory strategy in face of the combined strength of Pakistan, China and the U.S.

Protection of India's security continued to be India's optimal goal. But the more immediate goal was to augment India's strength to face the U.S., Chinese and Pakistani challenge to India.

3. She believed that in the achievement of feasible goals, one had to choose an option which would minimize losses for India.

One had to augment strength but not at the loss of national independence. India needed support - both political and military - but this could not be undertaken at the risk of losing its capacity to act independently.

4. Her approach to risk taking - which suggested that for a specific undertaking and in the achievement of feasible immediate goals, a certain amount of risk could be taken.

Even if a particular action or strategy that was adopted by India alienated others, it was a risk that one had to take.

c. Available Options

Mrs. Gandhi had four alternatives available to her in 1971.

**Option A, Sign Treaty with the Soviet Union.**

**Option B, Expect Russian assistance without formal treaty.**

**Option C, Work harder to win US support for India's policies.**

**Option D, Stand alone.**




Fig. 8. Congruence between Beliefs and Action (Treaty 1971)

d. Congruence between Beliefs and Choice of Action

**Option A.** Sign Treaty with Soviet Union **Congruent**

Mrs. Gandhi's perception of the regional and international situation which had implications for India's security and her assessments of India's adversaries and their likely responses may have had an impact on the decision process in late July and early August, and may have resulted in the signing of the treaty.

Mrs. Gandhi's perception of U.S. and Chinese hostility and the role they played in the affairs of the subcontinent, especially in the Bangladesh crisis, probably led her to choose this option. The fact that Pakistan could always count on American support in pursuit of its objectives may have entered her calculations. The U.S. had never approved of India's nonaligned policy and ridiculed it as neutrality, and whenever India made overtures to the Soviet Union or vice versa, the U.S. proclaimed that India was moving into the Soviet camp. Mrs. Gandhi also very strongly believed that the U.S. resented India's independent stance in international affairs and disliked the fact that it could not effectively pressurize India to endorse its policies vis-a-vis the developing

countries. The U.S. saw a willing ally in Pakistan which acquiesced to American wishes, and it would see no reason to come to India's support in a crisis even if India's opponent Pakistan was perpetrating violence and destruction of its own people.

Since 1962, China's relations with India was at best hostile and there was not even a remote chance that China would heed India's pleas. China was Pakistan's staunchest ally and supplied arms. It resented the growing rapprochement between India and the Soviet Union. Now there was also the growing entente between China and the U.S., with Pakistan being the intermediary. In 1971, there was a growing fear that the U.S. and China would most certainly intervene on behalf of Pakistan if war broke out between India and Pakistan over Bangladesh. India felt isolated and helpless in the face of this configuration of forces.

The U.S. maintained an inflexible posture in regard to India, and China seemed unapproachable. India needed international support even if only to act as a morale booster. In light of the predicament that India was in, Mrs. Gandhi may have opted to sign the Treaty of Peace Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in Aug 1971. This would publicly summon a superpower to India's side, and Mrs. Gandhi predicted that it would discourage Pakistan, China and the U.S. from taking incalculable risks against India. It would deter Pakistan and its allies from embarking on a course of military adventurism in S.Asia.

In this case, optimal goals such as security and independence of action was important. India's immediate goals demanded an augmentation of India's strength and choosing this option would provide the means to achieve India's limited objectives in 1971.

**Option B. Russian Assistance without Treaty Also Congruent but not adopted**

Mrs. Gandhi was subtly pressurized for a long time by the Soviet Union to support the Brezhnev plan, but which she politely declined to do. Mrs. Gandhi in 1968-69 did not see a reason to form a pact which she thought was aimed at another country - China, as she was attempting to normalize Sino-Indian relations and therefore did not want to undertake any action which would jeopardize such a move. But the regional

conditions in 1971 made it vital to get Russia to endorse India's position on the Bangladesh issue. National interests demanded that India get a firm commitment of support even at the cost of having to sign a formal treaty<sup>11</sup>.

Only a formal treaty rather than an unspoken understanding or a verbal assurance of support, was considered as binding as it would provide solid evidence of the relationship between the two countries.

So, even though Mrs. Gandhi disapproved the Brezhnev plan, she strongly emphasized that this treaty was not a military pact or a formal military alliance between India and the Soviet Union and she believed that it was in India's national interest to undertake such a commitment<sup>12</sup>.

#### Option C.      Appeal to U.S. for help      Incongruent

This option was not consistent with Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding American hostility vis-a-vis India and its ignoring of India's predicament. The U.S. had totally rejected India's explanation of the crisis and began to treat it as an Indo-Pak issue. Moreover, the U.S. was more interested in the opening to China facilitated by Pakistan. The U.S. administration under Nixon treated the crisis as a bone of contention between India and Pakistan and accused India of escalating tensions and of not allowing Pakistan to find a political solution. The U.S. according to Mrs. Gandhi, wore blinders and did not want to acknowledge the threat to India's security. The U.S. had stated in unequivocal terms that it would definitely not support India's stance in the crisis either politically, diplomatically or militarily.

Mrs. Gandhi believed that the U.S. would continue its hostility and would also continue to ignore India's problems because its interests would best be served by imposing its presence on the subcontinent. It could continue to do that by ignoring the

---

<sup>11</sup>Mrs. Gandhi emphatically declared that the Indo-Soviet treaty was different from the former Brezhnev plan, in that it acknowledged India's nonaligned policy and did not make direct references to overt military support. But it was clear that the treaty was directed against Pakistan and its allies in 1971.

<sup>12</sup>which was actually on the Russian side

massacre by the West Pakistan army of civilians in East Pakistan.

Also, Mrs. Gandhi believed that the American administration wanted to keep Pakistan intact and ignore the existing reality of the situation. They chose to discredit the demand for autonomy and independence by the entire population of East Pakistan and took desperate measures to keep Pakistan united. Hence, she did not believe that the U.S. would abandon its posture and come to India's support or even stay neutral in the crisis.

**Option D. Stand Alone Incongruent**

This option was inconsistent with Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs. India needed to seek support and augment its political and military strength in order to safeguard security and maintain stability. Even if it meant taking some risks, India had to defend its interests. Mrs. Gandhi's analysis of the situation made her realize that India standing alone without tangible evidence of support would be in greater danger.

**e. The Decision Process**

The negotiations for the treaty were conducted in absolute secrecy and was presented to the nation as a fait accompli. In the context of the East Pakistan crisis, the Indian foreign minister Swaran Singh was in Moscow in June 1971 for important high level talks. The joint communique issued by the foreign ministers of the two countries at the end of the visit significantly stated the decision of the two sides to remain in touch with each other in view of the seriousness of the situation (National Herald 10 June 1971).

The decision to sign the treaty with Russia received careful consideration by the Prime Minister. She had to take several factors into her calculations:

1. Joint American, Chinese and Pakistani hostility and eventual military action would have to be repealed at all costs.
2. India was at a disadvantage in face of this entente.
3. To defend itself India needed to get outside support - political, diplomatic and military.



4. The only friendly country that would be effective in acting as a deterrent was the Soviet Union.
5. The Soviet Union had already expressed a willingness to support India.
6. India had to show tangible evidence of that support which would be in the form of a treaty.

But in choosing this option, Mrs. Gandhi could not but take into consideration the risk factors, and risk tradeoffs. All aspects of the likely political fallout of the treaty had to be carefully examined.

1. Involving the Soviet Union physically in the crisis might lead to a global conflict between the superpowers;
2. The risk of being accused of violating India's nonaligned policy and of moving into the Soviet camp;
3. The risk of increasing Indian dependence on the Soviet Union and inviting more Soviet involvement in the subcontinent;
4. The treaty could not only create adverse reactions in Washington but also lead to either cutting down or withdrawal of U.S. economic aid, which in turn would mean a virtual stoppage of trade between India and the US;
5. She also did not rule out a flight of American capital investments from India;
6. Political moves might be made to embarrass India at international forums;
7. China might react with acute hostility.

Mrs. Gandhi may have believed that the merits of signing the treaty far outweighed the disadvantages. In the larger national interest and for peace and stability in the region, she probably figured that the risks were worth the gains which Indo-Soviet relations, raised to a higher level, was sure to bring with the signing of the treaty. Mrs. Gandhi carefully supervised the wording of the treaty (Confidential interview). She believed in protecting India's freedom of action and well known positions on international affairs from compromise, while gaining useful commitments from Moscow.

The Indo-Soviet treaty with its provisions indicating the determination of the two powers to repel aggression and stipulating immediate mutual consultations in case of attack would foil the possibility of a second front against India by any other power in

case of a Pakistan attack on India. The meaning and implications for the security of India during the grim crisis was clear. Mrs. Gandhi perceived Soviet friendship as having a bearing on the fundamental national interests of India.

Mrs. Gandhi did not believe that, in the signing of the treaty, India would abandon its nonaligned posture. It was not a military pact but a political treaty. A main feature of the negotiations was the reluctance of both governments to commit themselves in advance, to specific actions of a military nature (Mansingh 1984, 144).

The immediate context and the security angle were evident from the comment made by Mrs. Gandhi immediately after the conclusion of the treaty. In an interview with Mr. R. Chandra of the World Peace Council, Mrs. Gandhi expressed a hope that this would have a restraining impact on Pakistan and its friends. She said that the treaty would discourage such adventurism on the part of countries which have shown a pathological hostility towards India (26 Aug 1971). This treaty marked a major turning point in the development of the Bangladesh crisis. The implications of the treaty could not be ignored by Washington or Peking, much less by Islamabad. Predictably, the treaty evoked strong adverse reactions in the U.S., China and Pakistan. The fact that the U.S. Seventh Fleet was restrained from going beyond its tilt in favour of military action and that China had to remain content with verbal threats in the aftermath of the treaty are evidence of its immediate political and diplomatic credibility.

#### f. Summary and Conclusions

Two conclusions can be drawn. 1. The Indo-Soviet treaty was signed when the Indian government under Mrs. Gandhi perceived a threat to Indian values and certainly not because India saw the merits of the Brezhnev plan. India needed political and military support in light of the U.S., China and Pakistan entente, and knew that appeals to the US and China to put pressure on Pakistan would go unheeded. The two countries tilted strongly in favour of Pakistan in the crisis and indicated that in the event of an Indo-Pak war, they would intervene on behalf of Pakistan. It was this challenge to India's security and national interests which activated the response and the choice of option A. Other options C and D would not have served India's objectives.

2. This option was congruent with Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code. a. It would entail the protection of India's security which was an optimal goal. b. This option would also be the best means to achieve immediate goals, i.e., augmentation of India's strength. c. Even though the choice of this option entailed risks, the merits of choosing this option far exceeded the disadvantages.

### **C. The Decision to Conduct a Nuclear Explosion**

#### **a. Prelude to the explosion**

India's nuclear policy underwent several changes since the time of Nehru. That India will not undertake a nuclear weapons programme has, at least in rhetoric, been maintained by all the successive governments in New Delhi, and has been a constant theme in the policies of all the leaders. However, the specifics have been continually changing. Nehru's commitment to this was unequivocal, and there is no evidence to suggest that Nehru contemplated a change in this policy even after the Indian security environment changed radically after 1962. He regarded nuclear weapons as a symbol of evil and was committed to the cause of nuclear disarmament and arms control. India would support measures that might inhibit or control the race for nuclear arms.

India's support for nuclear disarmament was as consistent as its policy of not wanting to acquire nuclear weapons during Nehru's time. However, on the question of implementing Nehru's policies in regard to nuclear arms control, the changes in the approach of successive governments became apparent.

Shastri, unlike Nehru, could not and did not want to speak for future leadership and did not want to bind future generations to his policy. He stated that the government's policy was not static or rigid and it would change according to the circumstances. This was said in the light of China's 1964 explosion, as public opinion in India was demanding a change in the government's policy.

In enunciating her policy, Mrs. Gandhi brought in the security issue as early as 1967. She maintained that the country's defence and security would be the paramount consideration in the formulation of the government's nuclear policy which, she said, was under constant review. She later reinforced this statement by asserting that India would

keep the option open. Mrs. Gandhi's opposition to the NPT was in conformity with the stance of keeping the nuclear option open.

In the first half of 1965, when the sixteen nation disarmament commission presented its draft proposal, India gave up its support on nuclear arms control to a certain extent. The final decision not to subscribe to the NPT was made in April-May 1967. The NPT, which sought to check the spread of nuclear weapons and the issue which India supported since the mid-fifties, was branded as discriminatory because it would openly prevent horizontal proliferation, while vertical proliferation among the nuclear signatories, of which China was one, would continue. This treaty was rejected by Mrs. Gandhi despite pressures by the superpowers, and such pressure only strengthened her resolve not to sign the NPT. Second, security was an important consideration in rejecting the NPT. The nuclear powers could not provide credible guarantees against nuclear threats and blackmail or even actual attack. Third, China which was India's adversary after 1962, possessed nuclear weapons and India did not want to block its own options for defence. In refusing to give into pressure to sign the NPT, Mrs. Gandhi changed India's policies regarding nuclear arms control. The Indian perspective under Mrs. Gandhi sought to redefine the concept of nuclear proliferation. She insisted that there should be both vertical as well as horizontal control and as long as vertical proliferation continued, India would constantly review its stand on the nuclear option. Furthermore, the NPT also placed restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, which met with opposition in a development-conscious India. Mrs. Gandhi, like Nehru, believed that science and technology had to be harnessed in order to bring about economic growth and development. Nuclear technology was one of the most important areas of modern science and technology, which could enable a developing country to close the gap between itself and the advanced countries.

Mrs. Gandhi consistently opposed controls on the development of nuclear and other advanced technology, as well as controls on the resources required for developing them, and welcomed efforts at cooperation among all countries of the world in the exchange of information on the peaceful uses of nuclear power. Conscious of the strategic potential of nuclear technology, Mrs. Gandhi affirmed that India's nuclear

programme was directed exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Despite its capability to conduct a nuclear explosion in 1968 India did not do so. It was at the time of the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, probably about the time India was seeking external assurance against possible US and Chinese intervention that Mrs. Gandhi decided in favour of strengthening India's nuclear option by allowing the atomic energy establishment to prepare for an underground nuclear test.

The decision to explode an atomic device was taken, in all probability, during the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty, following Kissinger's visit to China. According to Subrahmanyam;

During that period two aspects got highlighted - how exposed India was to manipulations of the big power game and how much political importance was attached to nuclear capability by big powers....Nixon-Kissinger policy towards China underlining that a nation of 800 millions with nuclear weapons could not be ignored, was a moment of truth for India (Subrahmanyam 1974, 257).

According to Mr. Subrahmanyam, it was not China's actual nuclear weapon potential that counted for much. China was in turmoil, but the mystique surrounding nuclear capability which made the U.S. ignore India's interests to please China could not be ignored by Mrs. Gandhi.

Mrs. Gandhi's displeasure of the US tilt towards Pakistan in 1971, and the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet could have strengthened Mrs. Gandhi's resolve to demonstrate India's power.

But it will be argued here that the decision to explode the bomb in 1974 was not just a reaction to the situation but was a part of Mrs. Gandhi's long term strategy, not just in security terms but also for the cause of economic development which was embedded in her Operational Code from the time she came to power. Only the timing of the explosion was contingent on the circumstances.

#### b. Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code

Five sets of beliefs were salient in the decision process and may have influenced Mrs. Gandhi's selection of the option to explode a nuclear device in Pokharan on 18 May 1974. 1. India would play the role of an independent nation in the international system

and would determinedly resist superpower pressures in decision making. India would undertake any policy which would best serve its national interest and not the interests of external powers. 2. One of India's paramount objectives was security and the government could do anything in order to prevent or defend itself from outside threats. Second, economic growth and development leading eventually to self-reliance was a major official objective and the government could undertake any option which would ensure its achievement, and self-reliance would strengthen India's independent role in world affairs. 3. These were optimal goals and could not be changed, abandoned or modified. 4. In the pursuit of these objectives, risks could be taken if necessary. 5. A deterrent posture had to be maintained vis-a-vis adversaries and one could augment strength or demonstrate power in order to adopt this strategy.

#### c. Congruence between Beliefs and Choice of Action

Mrs. Gandhi's national role conception remained clear and consistent from the time she assumed power in 1966 and until she was voted out of office. India would play an independent role and any attempts to dominate or pressurize India only served to harden Mrs. Gandhi's stand on international or domestic issues which had a direct bearing on India's national interest.

Even as early as 1967, the nuclear powers attempted to establish an anti-proliferation regime. The discriminatory nature of the NPT was a sore point with Mrs. Gandhi. By signing the NPT, a non-nuclear nation would distance itself even more from the nuclear states, with the latter having the freedom to build on existing stockpiles. But what hardened Mrs. Gandhi's resolve not to sign the NPT was the pressure from the superpowers. The U.S. and Soviet Union accurately judged India's capability and its potential for becoming a nuclear state and they pressed the government into becoming a signatory, but she was unwilling to abide by the nuclear rules of the superpowers. The explosion itself, according to Mansingh (1974, 59), was a gesture of independence.

Second, Mrs. Gandhi realized the importance of having enough defence capability to sustain threat and not having to depend on a superpower for support, especially after the 1971 crisis. While in 1971 she saw the advantages in getting the Soviets to endorse

India's policies on Bangladesh, she may have wanted to wean India slowly away from that kind of relationship. Having independent nuclear capability would ensure that<sup>13</sup>. Also, her strong emphasis on India's security meant upgrading India's power - not just military power but also making the country economically strong and self-reliant. Having nuclear capability would entail the achievement of both.

The 1962 debacle showed the weakness of India's conventional power and, ever since China exploded its atomic bomb in Oct 1964, India felt at an even bigger disadvantage. China was not receptive to India's friendly overtures or to Indian efforts aimed at settling all outstanding issues between the two countries and normalizing relations. Moreover, China became Pakistan's biggest ally and adopted an openly hostile posture vis-a-vis India. China's possession of nuclear capability changed India's security environment after 1964.

Secondly, Pakistan's belligerence and what Mrs. Gandhi perceived as a pathological hostility towards India necessitated an effective defence system, which would deter Pakistan from pursuing another irrational and adventerous course of action such as the one in 1971. Pakistan acting by itself would not pose too much of a problem, but Mrs. Gandhi was more concerned about the material assistance it was receiving from western countries and financial backing from other Islamic states, especially Libya, for its nuclear programme. Pakistan began to intensify its nuclear research under Bhutto. Also the emergence of the U.S. as a major interventionist power was perceived as a threat by Mrs. Gandhi, for example, the arrival of the seventh Fleet during the Bangladesh crisis and its building of maritime bases in the Indian Ocean.

India's assessment of nuclear power and nuclear control had undergone a shift by 1971. What was seen as an evil by Nehru in the fifties was now perceived as a necessity by Mrs. Gandhi in the late sixties.

But despite possessing nuclear capability from 1964 onwards, India did not proceed with a nuclear weapons programme either clandestinely like Israel and South

---

<sup>13</sup>India did possess enough nuclear capability to explode a nuclear device by 1971, but there were certain technical constraints.

Africa, or openly like the other nuclear powers. It was probably during the 1971 crisis that Mrs. Gandhi may have decided on the right timing to demonstrate India's nuclear capability. This explosion would act as a deterrent to both China and Pakistan, and the U.S. from encouraging or supporting future Pakistani military action against India. Despite India's assertion of the peaceful nature of the explosion, it subtly demonstrated the increase in India's power. Mrs. Gandhi, unlike Nehru, clearly stated that the security and defence of India would be the main consideration in the formulation of the government's nuclear policy. She stated in no uncertain terms that India would keep the option open. Another important goal for Mrs. Gandhi was to achieve national self-reliance which would enable India to play an independent role in world politics. From the beginning, India's nuclear programme was aimed toward the independent production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and India's quest for economic independence meant the production of energy at low cost. Self-reliance was the goal of India's nuclear programme. Mrs. Gandhi believed that economic growth leading to self sufficiency was an important attribute of a country's power and nuclear technology had to be utilized to achieve that goal.

#### d. The Decision Process

Several risks had to be calculated in the choosing of this option. 1. It would serve notice on the world powers of India's ability to produce nuclear weapons. 2. It might alienate the suppliers and technical collaborators - France and Canada. 3. The smaller countries in the neighbourhood might perceive it as a major threat to their security. 4. The Soviet Union, which had earlier put pressure to sign the NPT, might react adversely. 5. It might encourage Pakistan into making nuclear weapons. 6. It would tempt pre-emptive strikes against Indian nuclear installations.

But again Mrs. Gandhi may have perceived that the advantages of the explosion for the achievement of important national goals far outweighed the risks. It would demonstrate India's power and capability. Although India declared that this explosion was for peaceful purposes, it could not help but show that India had the capability to produce a nuclear weapons system.



Mrs. Gandhi had already indicated the government's decision to explode the bomb well before 18 May 1974. On 15 Nov 1972, she had stated in the Lok Sabha that

The Atomic Energy Commission is studying conditions under which peaceful nuclear explosions carried out underground would be of economic benefit to India without causing environmental hazards (15 Nov 1972).

Exactly a year later, in reply to a question in the Rajya Sabha, she stated that the Department of Atomic Energy was

Constantly reviewing the progress in the technology of underground nuclear explosions both from theoretical and experimental angles (15 Nov 1973).

She informed the members of the continuing interest of the Atomic Energy Commission in this field and said that after satisfactory answers had been found to the possible effects on the environmental and ecological conditions, the question of actual underground nuclear tests for peaceful purposes was being considered. The scientists had to ensure, according to strict instructions from Mrs. Gandhi, that there would be no radioactive contaminations of the atmosphere. She also believed that the best time to explode the bomb was when India could indigenously supply material, equipment and personnel for the project without direct outside assistance. Also, in conducting the explosion, India should not violate any international law or obligation or any commitment to any country. So the explosion was carried out in Pokharan on 18 May 1974 and in unofficial circles and in the world at large it was regarded as an enhancement of India's power. But in not following up the Pokharan explosion with a series of explosions and in not commencing on a nuclear weapons programme, India acted as if it were a signatory to the NPT.

While India could maintain that Pokharan was a peaceful nuclear explosion, the overall significance of the test could not be lost on the big powers. Part of the objective was to leave the future intentions of India ambiguous and thereby enlarge the country's options.

#### e. Summary and Conclusions

After a detailed analysis of this decision, its precedents and antecedents, one can conclude the following. 1. Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code may have played an

would have an adverse impact on the NPT as it had been conceived. Consequently, the Indian move would be interpreted as an assertion of India's independence of the two superpowers in decision-making. Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code beliefs regarding India's role may have been activated during this period. 2. Second, it was also the beliefs regarding the importance of India's goals, i.e., security and economic growth and development leading towards self-sufficiency. The nuclear explosion would serve both these objectives. 3. The implementation of this option may entail risks but which had to be taken, since the payoffs in choosing the option was much higher than if it was rejected. 4. Despite possession of nuclear power, Mrs. Gandhi insisted that it was for peaceful purposes only. India would not proceed on a weapons programme, although it would certainly keep its options open.

#### **4. Conclusions:**

In this chapter we made a comparison of Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs as extracted from the content analyzed documents with those derived from interviews, and observed that they were, in fact, similar. The group of people interviewed consisted of close associates and advisors of Mrs. Gandhi as well as members of the opposition, political critics, journalists and academics. There was considerable unanimity among them in terms of the interpretation of Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs. The general opinion was that Mrs. Gandhi's image of politics and the political world and her interpretation of national interests, India's role, goals and strategies had implications for India's external behaviour. This was also confirmed by several studies conducted in the area of Indian foreign policy.

Second, we examined some of the belief components for contradictions and for inconsistencies between beliefs and policy preferences. After establishing that logical consistency was different from psychological consistency, we found that a number of beliefs that seemed to appear contradictory were, in fact, consistent in Mrs. Gandhi's belief system. Contradictions between two beliefs were resolved psychologically by activating other belief components. Chapter II contains a detailed discussion regarding this. But despite psychological consistency, Mrs. Gandhi was unable to resolve certain

dilemmas connected with India's power.

The third section dealt with congruence between beliefs and policy preferences. The congruence procedure was applied to study each of the three decisions in the context of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code. There was an assessment of the options open in each situation and the decision process, and the results showed that the Operational Code, to a considerable extent, had an impact on the decisional choices in all three cases.

This chapter has qualitatively assessed consistency in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code and between beliefs and policy preferences. The following chapter will undertake a quantitative analysis of the same.

## **CHAPTER VIII**

### **MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS**

This chapter focuses on testing the hypotheses which have been derived from the general literature on cognitive theory as reviewed in Chapter II, and also the fourteen operational code assumptions. As already discussed in Chapter II, when one speaks of the Operational Code, one is really referring to a system of beliefs. The operational code assumes that the belief system has certain structural properties such as richness, differentiation, centrality, stability, consistency etc.; and functional relevance, i.e., diagnostic and choice propensities. In other words, an analysis of the operational code is not just a discussion of the content of the specific beliefs but also an examination of its structural characteristics and functional significance.


According to Rokeach, it is helpful to have some notion of the overall structure of the belief system. He argues that it is inconceivable that the countless beliefs that we possess can be retained in an "unorganized chaotic state within our minds". Instead, like the geneticist's "chromosomes and genes", they must somehow become organized into architectural systems, have describable and measurable structural properties which, in turn, have observable behavioural consequences (Rokeach 1970, 1).

The operational code assumes that beliefs are not scattered at random but linked in the cognitive structure of a political leader with a certain amount of order and stability.

Here there will be an assessment of 1A. Richness, 1B. Differentiation, 1C. Centrality, 1D. Stability, 1E. Interdependence, both static and dynamic. 2A. Issue area variability, 2B. Situational variability, 2C. Diagnostic and choice propensities.

# 5

PM-1 3 1/2"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET  
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT



PRECISION<sup>SM</sup> RESOLUTION TARGETS

PIONEERS IN METHYLENE BLUE TESTING SINCE 1974



1300 COUNTY ROAD 6, ANNAPOLIS, MD 21403 USA  
TEL: 410-261-7077 FAX: 410-261-7887 TLR: 800-828-8888

## **1. Structural Characteristics:**

### **1A. Richness:**

#### **Definition:**

An operational code is rich if it consists of a large percentage of the possible belief categories, or poor when it has only a small percentage.

#### **Questions:**

- a. Was Mrs. Gandhi's belief system richer in the philosophical or instrumental subsystem i.e., was she more action oriented or theory oriented?
- b. Which time period was it the richest?
- c. Was richness contingent on situational factors i.e., crisis, non-crisis situations; and issue areas i.e., domestic and foreign etc.
- d. Were there changes in richness in the philosophical or in the instrumental subsystem between the three time periods?

#### **Methodology:**

The coding scheme for this project consisted of a total of 164 categories for the philosophical beliefs and 84 for instrumental beliefs. In order to get a broader overview, the three phases in Mrs. Gandhi's political life were studied separately. The first phase (1966 - 1969) when Mrs. Gandhi first came to power were the years of challenge. She came into the political spotlight as a prime minister with no official experience of holding public office. She experienced a power struggle with other senior members of her political party while the country was undergoing severe economic problems. This period was of political learning and experimenting. The second phase (1970-1972) marked the ascendancy of confident leadership and displayed Mrs. Gandhi's ability to face challenges head on and steer the country through a major crisis. The third phase found Mrs. Gandhi in the throes of an economic and political upheaval, which culminated in the declaration of emergency followed by her electoral defeat in 1977. We conducted a frequency analysis and came up with the following results presented in Table 49.

TABLE 49

**MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE  
AN ANALYSIS OF RICHNESS**

BELIEFS	# OF CATEGORIES	PERIOD 1	PERIOD 2	PERIOD 3	TOTAL
Nature of Politics	48	39	34	24	97
Character of Opponents	50	14	43	14	71
International/ Regional System	37	33	27	18	78
Optimism	9	8	8	6	32
Predictability	10	9	10	8	27
Control	10	8	10	6	24
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>317</b>
<b>PERCENTAGE</b>		<b>67%</b>	<b>81%</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>65%</b>
Goals	7	4	4	4	12
Approaches	20	14	16	11	41
Strategy	16	11	11	9	31
Risk	13	11	11	4	26
Timing	4	3	3	0	6
Action	8	4	6	2	12
Force	16	6	9	5	20
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>148</b>
<b>PERCENTAGE</b>		<b>63%</b>	<b>71%</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>59%</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>465</b>
<b>PERCENTAGE</b>		<b>65%</b>	<b>78%</b>	<b>45%</b>	

### Results:

A general observation of the table shows that out of the 248 main operational code categories - both philosophical and instrumental - Mrs. Gandhi articulated no more than 192 or 78% of the total beliefs. It was expected at the outset that no political leader could articulate all of the master belief categories during their political career. But 78% is a fairly reasonable figure with which to justify our observations and conclusions.

Second, from a comparison of the philosophical subsystem with the instrumental subsystem, it can be observed that Mrs. Gandhi's belief system was richer in all of the three periods in the philosophical subsystem as opposed to the instrumental subsystem. But the differences in percentages between the philosophical and instrumental subsystems in each of the three time periods - 64% philosophical and 59% instrumental - is not too great to warrant a definite conclusion that Mrs. Gandhi was more of a theorist rather than action-oriented or that she was not too concerned with strategic or tactical issues. It does not lend too much support to the hypothesis 1,

#### **HP 1: The operational code of the decision maker is richer in its instrumental subsystem than its philosophical subsystem**

Third, we notice that it was richer during phase II (78% of the possible beliefs) and poorest during phase III (45% of the total articulated beliefs). If we examine the philosophical subsystem the difference in richness is all the more striking (67% for the first; 81% for the second; and 46% for the third). This substantiates Selim's (1979, 355) observation that the more active and confident an individual in his role of leadership, the richer is his operational code. Phase II was the highlight in Mrs. Gandhi's political career. Her successful handling of the Bangladesh crisis and her confident responses to the combined Pakistani, American and Chinese challenge can be associated with an increase in the richness of her operational code, and domestic preoccupations in the third phase, saw a decline in the same.

Fourth, one can also notice that the percentage of change in the level of richness between the three periods is relatively greater in the philosophical subsystem than in the instrumental subsystem. The average change in the philosophical subsystem is 23%, while the average change in the instrumental subsystem is 19%. Because the difference



in the rate of change is not great enough, it can be said that the level of richness of the philosophical as well as the instrumental subsystem is affected by the political fortunes of the individual.

### **1B. Differentiation:**

#### **Definition:**

Differentiation refers to the distribution of beliefs among the belief categories. Richness of an operational code does not automatically imply differentiation. Two samples of the operational code may be equally rich, in that it may have the same number of articulated beliefs, but may have different levels of differentiation. If all the articulated beliefs are not well spread over all the belief categories, but concentrated over one or two master belief categories, the operational code is said to have a low level of differentiation. There will be a high level of differentiation if there is a proportional distribution of beliefs over all categories.

#### **Questions:**

- a. Does Mrs. Gandhi's operational code have a high or low level of differentiation? - which time periods were the highest and lowest?
- b. Does the philosophical subsystem or the instrumental subsystem have a high degree of differentiation?
- c. Does the leader's political career have an impact on differentiation?

#### **Methodology:**

Once again the articulated beliefs were studied across three time periods. Firstly, the Chi Square values for all of the categories in the three time periods were calculated.  $Y_i$  is the maximum number of belief categories in the  $i$ th master belief,  $y_i$  is the actual number of articulated beliefs in the  $i$ th category.

$$N = Y_i \text{ and } n = y_i.$$

The expected number of articulated beliefs in the  $i$ th category is

$E_i = n \frac{(Y_i)}{N}$ . The Chi Square  $X^2$  is computed from  $E_i$  and  $y_i$  based on the formula

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}$$

$O_i$  is the number of beliefs observed in one category.  $E_i$  is the expected number of beliefs expected in the same category. A coefficient of dispersion was created as a measure of differentiation.

The coefficient of dispersion  $(CD) = 1 - \frac{\sum(X^2)}{n}$

The CD has a range from 1 (maximum differentiation) to zero (minimum differentiation). The coefficient of dispersion in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code calculated for the three periods is illustrated in Table 50.

**TABLE 50**

**MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE  
AN ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENTIATION**

	PERIOD 1	PERIOD 2	PERIOD 3
Philosophical Beliefs	.84	.98	.90
Instrumental Beliefs	.94	.98	.86
<b>AVERAGE CD</b>	.89	.98	.88
<b>AVERAGE CD = .92</b>			

**Results:**

First, Mrs. Gandhi's operational code appears to be highly differentiated. The average CD for the three periods is .92. The differentiation increased from the first period to the second, and decreased a little from the second to the third. The average CD from the first period to the second jumped from .89 to .98 and then reduced to .88.

Second, both the philosophical as well as the instrumental subsystem were more or less equally differentiated. This does not confirm the hypothesis

**HP 2: The operational code is more differentiated in its instrumental subsystem than its philosophical subsystem.**

According to our findings, Mrs. Gandhi's operational code is richer in the philosophical

subsystem than the instrumental subsystem and the two parts are equally differentiated.

Third, differentiation like richness, also depends on the situation and the leader's handling of the situation. The second phase exhibited the highest level of differentiation. It can be said that political gains and successes increases the richness and differentiation of a political leader's operational code, while political turmoil leads to decreased levels of the same.

### **1C. Centrality:**

#### **Definition:**

The concept of centrality refers to the relative position of a belief in a more comprehensive set of beliefs which are contained in a system. The basic assumption of the operational code is that the content of certain central or master beliefs have a strong resemblance to certain kinds of approaches to political action. Heradstveit (1981: 18) identifies centrality with stability and consistency.

Since cognitive theory proposes that stable beliefs are at the same time the most central beliefs, an assessment of stability is therefore an assessment of centrality (Heradstveit 1981, 18).

According to him, central beliefs are those that remain stable over time and has the most number of interlinkages with the other beliefs in the system.

But our study will have independent assessments of stability centrality and interdependence, followed by an examination of whether central beliefs were indeed more stable and interdependent.

The most frequently articulated belief will be taken as a measure of centrality. This is based on the argument that if a belief is more relevant to a leader, the more number of times he/she will articulate it. The frequency of articulation is assumed to be a reliable indicator of the importance and centrality of a particular belief.

A belief is defined as central if its frequency score is above the median of the frequencies of all the master beliefs. Similarly, a belief is considered peripheral if its frequency score is below the median.

Centrality may vary from one situation to another or from one time period to the next. A decision maker may activate one set of central beliefs to respond to a situation

and another set for dealing with a different situation. For example, the centrality of 'the image of the opponent' may be more relevant in a conflict situation as opposed to a cooperative situation.

A typology of situations which identifies the central beliefs would be a useful tool to study the types of beliefs most relevant in particular situations.

CRISIS	NON CRISIS
Image of Opponent Predictability Role of Leader Strategy Risk Action Force	National Role Conception Goals Role of Conflict Optimism/Pessimism Predictability Approaches Role of Leader

Fig. 9. Typology of Centrality of Beliefs

It is assumed that in a crisis situation, especially in international affairs where one has to deal with an adversary, the image of the opponent would be a central belief. It has been well documented that a political leader frames a response based on his/her assessment of the opponents.

Also, in the absence of adequate information, one would have to rely on one's beliefs and make predictions regarding the opponent's move. Strategy, action and military force is assumed to be other central beliefs which influence a leader's actual response in a crisis situation.

In a non-crisis situation, one would assume that a leader's national role conception and his/her prioritization of national goals would be central in a leader's belief system and would have an impact on his/her evaluation of international events and response to particular situations. The role variable is an important concept which has an impact on other beliefs in the belief system. Also, beliefs regarding approach to goal selection, the role of the leader and optimism about the achievement of fundamental goals are assumed to be central in a peaceful or non-crisis situation.

Central beliefs are generally used as an organizing tool in the decision process. In this section we will attempt to determine which were the central beliefs in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code.

**Questions:**

- a. What beliefs were the most central in each of the three time periods?
- b. Is there a difference between philosophical and instrumental beliefs in terms of centrality?
- c. Was there a change in centrality from one time period to the next?
- d. Do situational factors have an impact on centrality?

**Methodology:**

In order to assess centrality we have chosen twelve master beliefs from the original typology developed by George (1969). These twelve beliefs are representative of all the belief categories and adequately represent each category. They are as follows.

**PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS:**

1. Role of Conflict
2. Character of Opponents
3. National Role
4. Optimism/Pessimism
5. Predictability
6. Role of Leader

**INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS:**

7. Goals
8. Approaches
9. Strategy
10. Risk
11. Action
12. Military Force.

The frequency of articulations in each belief category was chosen as a measure of centrality for each time period and the beliefs were rank ordered from 1-12. Ranks 1-6 were chosen as central beliefs and those that fell from 7-12 were considered peripheral. The frequencies in all time periods were then totalled and ranked in order to determine what were Mrs. Gandhi's overall central and peripheral beliefs.

Next, using the ranks in each time period, the Spearman rank correlation procedure was used, to determine the rate of change in centrality from one time period to the next. Then the rank in each time period was correlated with the total rank in order to determine whether the rate of change in centrality was of greater magnitude than between each time period.

$$R_s = \frac{1 - 6\sum D^2}{N(N^2 - 1)}$$

N is the number of pairs of ranks; D is the difference between a pair of ranks.

**Results:**

The results of the frequency analysis and the Spearman rank correlation are presented in Table 51;

TABLE 51

**MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE  
AN ANALYSIS OF CENTRALITY**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b>PERIOD 1</b>	<b>PERIOD 2</b>	<b>PERIOD 3</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
Role of Conflict	113 (5)*	117 (7)	54 (5)*	284 (5)*
Character of Opponents	13 (10)	130 (4)*	11 (10)	154 (8)
National Role	189 (1)*	235 (2)*	176 (1)*	600 (1)*
Optimism	108 (6)*	93 (9)	55 (4)*	256 (6)*
Predictability	120 (4)*	130 (4)*	52 (6)*	302 (4)*
Leader Role	90 (7)	127 (6)*	14 (9)	231 (7)
Goals	188 (2)*	247 (1)*	98 (3)*	533 (2)*
Approaches	38 (8)	75 (11)	18 (7)	131 (10)
Strategy	129 (3)*	133 (3)*	112 (2)*	374 (3)*
Risk	11 (11)	33 (12)	1 (12)	45 (12)
Action	7 (12)	87 (10)	8 (11)	102 (11)
Force	17 (9)	103 (8)	16 (8)	136 (9)
<b>SPEARMANN CORR</b>	.97	.88	.90	

**SPEARMANN CORR**    PERIOD 1 and PERIOD 2 = .77  
                                  PERIOD 2 and PERIOD 3 = .65  
                                  PERIOD 3 and PERIOD 1 = .94

\* CENTRALITY

First, it can be observed that in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code, beliefs regarding India's role and the nature of India's goals remained central in all of the three time periods with high rankings, 1 and 2 in the first period; 2 and 1 in the second period; and 1 and 3 in the third period respectively. Beliefs regarding strategy received equally high rankings, followed by predictability in political life. Role of conflict was classified as a central belief in periods one and three, while character of opponents dominated during period two. Beliefs regarding optimism were ranked as central in periods one and three, and role of leader ranked 6 as a central belief in period two.

It can be noticed that beliefs regarding risk, action and military force remained peripheral in all the three time periods.

Second, there is not much difference between philosophical or instrumental beliefs in terms of centrality. The central and peripheral ranks of the two subsystems in each of the three time periods are more or less equal.

Third, the Spearman rank correlation showed very little change between the three periods. The  $R_s$  was .77 between the first and second periods; .65 between the second and third; and .94 between third and first.

One can observe a slight difference in the philosophical subsystem in the second period which coincides with the Bangladesh crisis. It can be noticed that the Image of the opponent, which was not ranked as a central belief dimension in the first and third phase, became a central belief in the second phase (moved from rank 10 to 4 from the first to the second phase and moved back to 10 in the third). While Role of Conflict which ranked 5 as a central belief in periods one and three, was moved to rank 7 as a peripheral belief in the second phase. The role of leader which had peripheral rankings in the first and third phase got a ranking of 6 in the second and was classified as a central belief.

Also the belief regarding India's role which occupied a central place in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code was ranked 2 after the Nature of Goals in the second period.

An important observation which can be made is that the centrality of beliefs vary according to the situational context. Periods one and three can be classified as non-



crisis periods in Indian foreign affairs, while period two was a period of crisis and conflict. So, if we apply our typology of situations to centrality in belief structure it can be observed that image of opponent, predictability, role of leader and strategy were central beliefs with rankings of 4,4,6 and 3 respectively. But our case does not fit the typology because risk and action were not ranked as central beliefs and role and action continued to maintain their central position in the rankings.

The central beliefs in periods 1 and 3 generally seem to fall into the typology with one exception. Approaches to goals remain as a peripheral belief.

This confirms with the operational code hypothesis that,

**HP 3: The operational code is generally characterized by the dominance of a specific subset.**

The central beliefs which were aggregated over all three time periods appear to be similar to the central beliefs in the first and third periods and to a lesser extent in the second. They not only persisted in their centrality but also in the relative magnitude of centrality. The  $R_s$  between the aggregated beliefs and those in periods one two and three are .97, .88 and .90 respectively.

Based on our findings it can be said that Mrs. Gandhi maintained a specific subset of central beliefs in her operational code, which did not vary too much over time, although different central beliefs were activated in different situational contexts.

#### **1D. Stability:**

The usefulness of the operational code construct relies on the stability of beliefs. If beliefs were to change from one situation to the next or from one time period to another, the operational code would lose its explanatory value. Cognitive theory suggests that an inherent mechanism in the individual works against change, so very little change in the content of specific beliefs was expected in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code.

#### **Definition:**

Stability is not necessarily the same thing as centrality. While centrality may vary according to the situation, stability is a temporal persistence of a specific answer to the belief. Centrality refers to what belief categories were activated most in framing a

response, whereas stability refers to a specific belief value within the belief category. For example, goals may occupy a central place in the operational code of a decision maker, but the specific type of goals advocated may change temporarily. The main concern here is not regarding the place of goals in the overall framework of beliefs but on whether a specific goal(s) has persisted or changed over time.

**Questions:**

- a. Did Mrs. Gandhi's operational code exhibit stability and offer resistance to change?
- b. Which subsystem was more stable?
- c. Which subset of beliefs were more stable - central or peripheral?

**Methodology:**

Each belief was again treated as an interval variable by taking the year and the annual average frequency score of each belief variable which would represent Mrs. Gandhi's position on that particular belief during that year. The coefficient of variation was used to assess the stability and change in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code. The assumption was that the higher the deviation of scores from the mean of a particular belief variable, the more Mrs. Gandhi changed her position on that variable. The coefficient of variation was calculated by dividing the standard deviation from the mean.

$$\text{Coefficient of Variation} = \frac{S_x}{\bar{X}}$$

The coefficient varies from 0.000, which indicates stability to 1.000 which denotes change in Mrs. Gandhi's position vis-a-vis that belief. The median will be used to assess stability. The results were as follows;

TABLE 52

**MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE  
AN ANALYSIS OF STABILITY**

BELIEFS	VARIATION COEFFICIENT	STABILITY CHANGE	CENTRAL PERIPHERAL
Role of Conflict	.21	Stable	Central
Character of Opponents	.28	Changed	Peripheral
National Role	.14	Stable	Central
Optimism	.22	Stable	Central
Predictability	.20	Stable	Central
Leader Role	.23	Changed	Peripheral
Goals	.15	Stable	Central
Approaches	.30	Changed	Peripheral
Strategy	.18	Stable	Central
Risk	.52	Changed	Peripheral
Action	.34	Changed	Peripheral
Force	.30	Changed	Peripheral

Average of Philosophical Beliefs = .21

Average of Instrumental Beliefs = .30

Average of Central Beliefs = .18

Average of Peripheral Beliefs = .33

1. Our analysis shows that beliefs regarding role of conflict, national role conception, optimism, predictability, goal selection and strategy were the most stable in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code.

Mrs. Gandhi did not change her beliefs regarding India's global role as an independent nonaligned nation. Despite several economic and political crises, when she

had to rely upon the superpowers - for instance in 1966-67 on the U.S. for food and economic assistance and in 1971 on the Soviet Union for support on the Bangladesh issue - she always maintained that India would not play a dependent role or allow itself to be dominated or pressurized by other bigger powers. She was fiercely independent and it is not surprising that this belief remained stable from 1966 to 1977.

She always considered conflict as being highly undesirable and dysfunctional for the achievement of important goals. This belief did not change even at the height of the Bangladesh crisis. The .21 coefficient of variation indicates a stable pattern of articulation of this belief.

Similarly, she remained optimistic through the ups and downs in her political career and her belief in the predictability of political life did not change. She was convinced that India's fundamental and optimal goals could be achieved in the long run.

She believed in short-term goals for the fulfillment of immediate needs, but she constantly stressed on the importance of fundamental and optimal goals and said fundamental goals could not be abandoned or modified, although the means to achieve them could vary according to circumstances. Her preference for a cooperative strategy in the international arena remained absolutely stable throughout her political career.

The results of our calculations show that Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding character of the opponent i.e., Pakistan seem to have changed. Mrs. Gandhi appears to have changed her image of Pakistan as an aggressive nation over time. But one could attribute this not to instability, but more to the fact that the number of references to Pakistan increased and decreased dramatically. The magnitude of references were greater between 1970-1972 (84.52%), and the rest of the responses were dispersed through 1966-1977. So this could be the reason why the deviation from the mean in the periods other than 1970-1972 is greater, wrongly denoting instability. From a qualitative analysis, it can be said that her beliefs regarding Pakistan as aggressive, and the nature of its goals as expansionist did not vary too much over time. She continued to believe that Pakistan was driven both by its philosophical and religious needs as much as being influenced by external, mainly American, pressure. She also did not modify her stand that the best strategy towards Pakistan was a combination of a deterrent and cooperative posture. Her

long-term approach to goal selection vis-a-vis Pakistan was to choose optimal goals - get superpower intervention out of the Indo-Pak scenario and deal with problems on a strictly bilateral basis, and establish a basis for long term economic and political cooperation. The blueprint for such a settlement was produced by Mrs. Gandhi at Simla. Beliefs regarding Pakistan remained stable, but only a qualitative analysis of the data can substantiate this point.

Beliefs regarding approaches to goals varied. In certain instances depending on the situational context, Mrs. Gandhi advocated an incremental strategy in the achievement of India's long term subcontinental goals. This was indicated by her approach vis a vis Pakistan. But for the achievement of domestic economic, social and political goals she advocated a mobilization approach. Despite the leader playing an important role, there had to be a major mobilization of men and resources which could be applied to the achievement of long term goals. The role of the leader was important in certain areas, for example in foreign policy, in guiding change in society, and in aggregating interests, but in other areas goal fulfillment could only arise by a combined effort.

The last three peripheral beliefs - risk, action, and force, were the least stable in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code. Firstly, Mrs. Gandhi could never reconcile the notion of power as resting on the military dimension as well as with other intangible attributes. She believed that economic, social and moral attributes were better indicators of a nation's power but on the other hand she sought to build up India's conventional power and modernize the military.

Second, she believed that under no circumstances should force be used, but during period two she advocated its use as a last resort, and in the third period went back to advocating the non use of force. Similarly, Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding risk-acceptance and avoidance varied from a belief in taking limited risks in the achievement of feasible goals to an absolute injunction against taking risks to achieve long term fundamental goals.

On an average Mrs. Gandhi's operational code maintained a noticeable degree of stability. The mean coefficient of stability is .26 which indicates that Mrs. Gandhi activated more or less the same answers to belief categories over time.

2. Our findings lend strength to the hypotheses;

**HP 4: The most stable beliefs are also the most central ones.**

**HP 5: The beliefs most likely to change are the less central ones in the system.**

It appears that in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code stability is associated with centrality. According to Heradstveit (1981: 18) a measure of stability is a measure of centrality. **The beliefs which are most resistant to change are the central ones in the belief structure.** This hypothesis has been confirmed by our study. All of the six central beliefs - role of conflict, national role, optimism, predictability, goals and strategy - are also the most stable beliefs in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code. The average coefficient of all central beliefs is .18 as opposed to .33 for peripheral beliefs. Stability seems to depend on centrality.

Third, the philosophical subsystem of beliefs appear to be more stable than the instrumental subsystem, although the variance between the two subsystems is not great, .21 for the philosophical subsystem and .30 for the instrumental subsystem. But it does lend moderate support for our hypothesis that

**HP 6: The philosophical part of the operational code tends to be more stable than the instrumental part.**

This can be justified by the fact that while a political philosophy tends to be more stable, the approaches to action and strategy may differ from one context to another but, of course, within parameters defined by the philosophical subsystem. Also, this does not preclude the possibility of drastic changes occurring within a belief structure after a traumatic crisis experience.

### **1E. Interdependence:**

As already discussed, the operational code is an interlinked system of philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Knowledge of a decision maker's central beliefs will help us predict that he/she holds other interlinked operational code beliefs. A study of the structural interdependence is necessary to understand a leader's operational code.

**Definition:**

Interdependence examines which beliefs go together. Logical interconnections in the belief system are easier to trace than the psychological linkages. But in this analysis we are concerned with the latter. To deal with our assumptions on interdependence, we will draw on consistency theory. According to cognitive consistency theory, a person's belief system is interlinked in a consistent fashion because it represents the most efficient way of processing information.

The main focus of our study here is to determine which beliefs seem to constitute a unit or system, and which clusters of beliefs are linked together. Answers to these questions would determine to a high degree the predictive power of consistency. If there is a high degree of relatedness of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code, it will enhance their predictive value, assuming the general notion of consistency deriving from cognitive theory (Zajonc 1968, Abelson 1968, Festinger 1957). Converse states that the need for consistency becomes more operational when beliefs in the given problem area are frequently activated. Converse deals with consistency both in a static and dynamic sense. Statically,

The success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge, that an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes (Converse 1964, 207).

In other words, static interdependence refers to the likelihood that an individual will hold a certain set of beliefs, given that he holds a particular belief.

In a dynamic case as,

The probability that a change in the perceived status...of one idea element would psychologically require from the point of view of the actor, some compensating change(s) in the status of idea elements elsewhere in the configuration (Converse 1964, 207).

If there is a change in one element of the belief structure it will lead to corresponding changes.

**Static Interdependence:****Logical Consistency:**

Our study will attempt to show that logical consistency is very different from psychological consistency. A person's belief system could exhibit absolute psychological consistency but at the same time not be very consistent logically. As Abelson and

Rosenberg (1958) have demonstrated, linkages between beliefs may not necessarily be logical. Interconnections may depend more on 'psycho-logic' than pure logic, and Cognitive consistency theory (Converse 1964) states that an individual may perceive the beliefs to be logically linked.

Nevertheless we will first investigate the logical interconnectedness in Mrs. Gandhi's belief system and see how much the results vary from the psychological consistency tests.

Questions:

- a. Was there logical consistency in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code?
- b. Was consistency stronger in the philosophical subsystem or instrumental subsystem?
- c. Was consistency stronger in the central or peripheral beliefs?

Methodology:

In this project, static consistency will be studied by doing a response-response contingency analysis. First, consistency will be examined within each separate belief category. The assumption here is that Mrs. Gandhi's responses to various beliefs at a certain point in time tend to go in the same direction<sup>1</sup>.

We borrowed Heradstveit's (1978) classification of beliefs into a Hawkish and Dovish typology. Based on the specific values in each belief category, the master beliefs were recoded along the 'hawkish' 'dovish' dimension. It was expected that if Mrs. Gandhi took a hawkish stand on one belief she would also take a hawkish stand on other beliefs in order to maintain logical consistency.

---

<sup>1</sup>This does not mean that Mrs. Gandhi would articulate the same responses over time



<b>CONSISTENT HAWKISH OPERATIONAL CODE</b>	<b>CONSISTENT DOVISH OPERATIONAL CODE</b>
Conflict Desirable Opponent Aggressive Active National Role Optimistic Predictable Leader Active Role Optimal Goals Blitzkrieg Approach Aggressive Strategy High Risk Options Quick Action Use Force	Conflict Undesirable Opponent Defensive Passive National Role Pessimistic Unpredictable Leader Passive Role Feasible Goals Incremental Approach Accomodative Strategy Low Risk Options Slow Action Avoid Force

Fig. 10. Hawkish Dovish Typology

Each master belief was recoded into two interval variables, the value of 1 to designate a hawkish position on the belief and 2 to represent the dovish pole. The mean of all the articulated beliefs in a category were taken to represent the decision-maker's belief in each of the three time periods.

If the average scores are consistent on all of the twelve master beliefs, i.e., if the mean score is closer to 1 or 2, then there is consistency. But if the average is closer to 1.5, then it means that Mrs. Gandhi held a dovish stand on some beliefs and hawkish on others. The simple deviation from 1 or 2 was taken as a measure of inconsistency. The issue area that was chosen was the Indo-Pak conflict, in order to eliminate cross situational variability. The results are presented in Table 53.

**TABLE 53**  
**RESPONSE-RESPONSE CONSISTENCY**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b>PERIOD 1</b>	<b>PERIOD 2</b>	<b>PERIOD 3</b>
Role of Conflict	2.000	1.750	2.000
Character of Opponents	1.000	1.000	1.000
National Role	1.000	1.000	1.000
Optimism	1.429	1.400	1.000
Predictability	1.200	1.200	1.200
Leader Role	1.333	1.400	1.250
Goals	1.500	1.500	1.400
Approaches	2.000	2.000	2.000
Strategy	1.800	2.000	2.000
Risk	1.500	1.500	1.000
Action	1.750	1.750	2.000
Force	1.800	1.600	1.800
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>1.526</b>	<b>1.509</b>	<b>1.471</b>
Philosophical	1.327	1.292	1.242
Instrumental	1.725	1.725	1.700
Central	1.488	1.475	1.433
Peripheral	1.564	1.542	1.508

**Results:**

The results show that Mrs. Gandhi's overall operational code was relatively inconsistent. The average consistency score for each period was around 1.5, which means that Mrs. Gandhi took a hawkish position on some beliefs and dovish on others.

While Mrs. Gandhi took a hawkish view of the opponent, it was not matched by a hawkish stand on the role of conflict and goals. Rather, she advocated an incremental approach, slow action and the non-use of military force. Her negative image of the opponent was not congruent with her instrumental beliefs, which were closer to the dovish pole. The scores on all three periods indicate that Mrs. Gandhi was not logically consistent in her beliefs.

But if one looks at the philosophical and instrumental beliefs separately, both subsystems exhibit little more internal consistency than if they were taken together. Yet the consistency percentage is not much higher than the average of both the subsets taken together. Also, the central and peripheral beliefs do not seem to be any more consistent than the philosophical and instrumental subsystems. The average consistency score for the central belief is 1.465, and 1.538 for peripheral beliefs.

The main problem with this method of logical consistency analysis is that raw frequency scores are not computed, but rather a final score of 1 or 2 is given to each of the two belief categories. For example, even though the raw frequency score may be 115 for category one, and 3 on category two, it just takes 1 or 2 as the final score, just by virtue of that belief category being articulated. In other words, it does not consider the intensity of articulation, as a mean of 1 and 2 will be 1.5 which may not represent true consistency while actual scores such as 115 (98%) hawkish vs 3 (2%) dovish articulations would be a better measure of consistency - inconsistency. So we attempted another method by using actual raw frequency scores for each of the two variables and calculated the percentages. The average percentage score on all twelve belief dimensions would be taken as a measure of consistency - inconsistency. Extreme polarized scores on each of the two variables in each time period would denote consistency. But if the differences in percentage was not too great then it meant inconsistency on all of the twelve beliefs. Each variable was subdivided into hawkish dovish and the percentage of each was calculated as evidenced in Table 54.

TABLE 54

## ANALYSIS OF CONSISTENCY - PERCENTAGE METHOD

BELIEFS	PERIOD 1		PERIOD 2		PERIOD 3	
	HAWK	DOVE	HAWK	DOVE	HAWK	DOVE
Role of Conflict	-	100%	1%	99%	-	100%
Character of Opponents	100%	-	100%	-	100%	-
National Role	64%	36%	77%	23%	71%	29%
Optimism	83%	17%	92%	8%	100%	-
Predictability	97%	3%	96%	4%	98%	2%
Leader Role	97%	3%	84%	16%	79%	21%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>74%</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>25%</b>
Goals	47%	53%	73%	27%	89%	11%
Approaches	-	100%	-	100%	-	100%
Strategy	1%	99%	9%	91%	-	100%
Risk	36%	64%	76%	24%	-	100%
Action	14%	86%	36%	64%	-	100%
Force	6%	94%	30%	70%	19%	81%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>83%</b>	<b>37%</b>	<b>63%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>82%</b>
Central	49%	51%	58%	42%	60%	40%
Peripheral	42%	58%	54%	46%	33%	67%

## Results:

Just as in the previous analysis, these results show that there was not much logical consistency in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code if we use Heradstveit's typology and the hawkish dovish dimensions. Mrs. Gandhi's approach to some beliefs were hardline and towards others, softline.

But it is interesting to note that she took a more or less hawkish position on philosophical beliefs and dovish on instrumental beliefs. In all of the three periods under examination, there is an average of 75% consistency in her philosophical beliefs and about 76% in the instrumental subsystem. Also, there was not too much consistency within both central and peripheral beliefs.

But the important thing that should be remembered here is that logical consistency is not the same as psychological consistency. Sometimes when beliefs appear logically inconsistent, the individual may have his/her own rules to connect them psychologically. Cognitive consistency theory states that individuals strive for consistency between beliefs, and attempt to create a balance in their operational code. Mrs. Gandhi's operational code demonstrates this. Although Mrs. Gandhi held a negative image of the opponent, she did not advocate a hawkish course of action. The reason for this is because Mrs. Gandhi held another dominant belief dimension which was the Role of conflict, and she believed that conflict was extremely dysfunctional and undesirable. This led her to advocate a softline approach to strategy, action, risk and force vis-a-vis the opponent. Because of the existence of this belief, Mrs. Gandhi could not adopt an aggressive strategy, a blitzkrieg approach or recommend the use of force in the achievement of goals. Unless this essential linkage is understood, it can lead to a misinterpretation of Mrs. Gandhi's actions. Second, Mrs. Gandhi was an optimist and believed that despite the opponent's aggressiveness and hostility, it was possible to adopt a cooperative strategy and avoid the use of force to settle disputes. She predicted that such a settlement was bound to occur if one worked incrementally towards that goal. If one studies it from this psychological perspective, then it can be said that Mrs. Gandhi's operational code was consistent, although it would seem inconsistent logically. This confirms the hypothesis

**HP 7: Logical and psychological inconsistencies of the operational code are separate phenomena**

It is hypothesized here that cultural variables could be an intervening factor in applying this typology effectively. The fact that Mrs. Gandhi did not possess a hawkish operational code could be attributed to the fact that she was a staunch supporter of non violence and believed in peaceful coexistence, which is imbedded in Hindu philosophy

and Indian cultural traditions. That is another reason why her negative image of the opponent did not lead her to advocate negative actions. So we cannot apply a typology on the hawkish dovish dimensions, based on the belief in the nature of politics and character of the opponent, very effectively in Mrs. Gandhi's case. She subscribes to the view expressed in the Maitri Upanishad that the mind is the source of all action, and at a Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference said,

We conceive of a society that is in harmony with itself and environs, of a world that is rid of conflict and busied in the great arts of peace. In our world view all turbulence ends in order, all conflicts end in resolution, all travail ends in tranquility. And man emerges and lives on for larger purposes. That is our unceasing quest (13 Oct 1975).

Mrs. Gandhi abhorred the use of force under any circumstances and said that as a political weapon it was neither good for the weak nor for the strong.

So if we look for logical consistency of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code using the hawkish dovish dimensions, she appears to be a hawk in her philosophical beliefs and a dove in her instrumental beliefs. While it looks logically inconsistent from a western perspective, it can be interpreted differently if we take the cultural variables into consideration. The importance of the cultural factor has largely been ignored by Holsti and George.

In the following section we will test for psychological consistency in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code.

#### Psychological Consistency:

##### Measures of Association:

Here we will not seek consistency by using a typology but instead we will look for association between two sets of beliefs, by testing for co-occurrence of beliefs within the documents. If two beliefs are associated then they said to be consistent. But this test does not tell us about direction, either positive or negative, of the relationship because all variables are nominal and do not have a meaningful order. So we will only test for strength of association.

##### Questions:

- a. Overall what was the percentage of beliefs that were consistent?
- b. What was the index of association among all belief categories? conversely, what was

the index of inconsistency?

- c. Are philosophical beliefs more consistent than instrumental beliefs?
- d. Which specific beliefs were more significantly cohesive than others?
- e. Was there a pattern of association i.e., a subset of beliefs that were highly inter-related?

#### Methodology:

To test for psychological (static) consistency we decided to use the contingency ratio<sup>2</sup>. This is intended for use with nominal data recorded in bivariate frequency tables.

#### Contingency Ratio:

This is another variation of the contingency coefficient. In this analysis we typically hypothesize  $H_0$ , independent classification, i.e., no association. Under this premise we compute expected cell frequencies, as if the two belief variables are not related. A strong association is indicated when the observed counts differ substantially from the cell expectations. The greater the difference the stronger the association as measured by CR. The contingency ratio formula is as follows;

$$CR = \frac{2 \times \# \text{ of units in which belief 1 and 2 are contingent}}{\text{Total \# of Units in which belief 1 appears} + \text{Total \# of Units in which belief 2 appears}}$$

The findings can be interpreted as 1. when there is no association, the ratio should become 0; 2. When the relationship between both variables is strong, then the ratio approaches 1, although it can never get as high as 1, even for a table showing what seems to be a perfect relationship.

---

<sup>2</sup>Initially we had decided on the contingency coefficient C, which would have determined, to a high degree, association between two belief variables. But the evaluation of C is an extension of the Chi square calculations. If  $X^2$  is the calculated Chi square value from an r by c contingency table, then

$$C = \sqrt{\frac{X^2}{N + X^2}}$$

where n = total sample size.

But the problem in applying this formula for our project is that the Chi square demands a large sample size and full cells, and if the N is small and if there are a number of empty cells, then the Chi square will not accurately represent association. Our data set is limited, in the sense, N for each crosstabs could vary from 0 - 600. So for a crosstabs table when N = 400 or above the Chi square is larger, whereas if N = 10, although there could be significant relationship, the Chi square value will be small. Hence we decided not to adopt this procedure based on the chi square.

All ratios above .5 will be taken as significant. If the two variables are associated, the occurrence of one means the simultaneous occurrence of the other. We can assume that the higher the ratio indicating strong association between two beliefs, the greater the chances that the presence of one facilitates the presence of the other. The overall index of association is the arithmetic mean of the contingency ratios. The results are illustrated in Table 56.



**TABLE 55**

**MRS.GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE  
CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS**

<b>Beliefs</b>	<b>Rolcon</b>	<b>Charop</b>	<b>Natrole</b>	<b>Optimism</b>	<b>Predict</b>	<b>Leadrole</b>	<b>Goals</b>	<b>Approach</b>	<b>Strategy</b>	<b>Risk</b>	<b>Action</b>
<b>Rolcon</b>											
<b>Charopp</b>	.75										
<b>Natrole</b>	.77	.61									
<b>Optimism</b>	.74	.74	.66								
<b>Predict</b>	.96	.77	.63	.86							
<b>Leadrole</b>	.68	.50	.54	.71	.82						
<b>Goals</b>	.79	.63	.46	.78	.78	.77					
<b>Approach</b>	.64	.86	.35	.54	.45	.26	.43				
<b>Strategy</b>	.98	.76	.77	.55	.96	.74	.76	.36			
<b>Risk</b>	.71	.84	.57	.77	.69	.77	.63	.40	.94		
<b>Action</b>	.67	.70	.67	.67	.61	.29	.67	.10	.86	.37	
<b>Force</b>	.94	.51	.68	.78	.84	.44	.50	.25	.95	.50	.47

**TOTAL AVERAGE = .65**

**Results:**

The results were as follows;

1. Almost 88% of the intercontingency ratios were .5 or above.
2. The overall index of association between beliefs was approximately .65, which indicates a relatively consistent operational code. The results presented in the table indicates that Mrs. Gandhi's belief system tended to be basically interdependent. It shows that she did not articulate random beliefs but that the existence of some beliefs were in fact contingent on the existence of others.
3. It can also be noticed that in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code, the philosophical subsystem of beliefs tend to be more interdependent and cohesive (.71) than the instrumental subsystem (.55). Also, the intercontingency between the philosophical subsystem and the instrumental subsystem is relatively high (.67) denoting consistency.
4. Another significant finding emerges when one examines the range of contingencies. The range extends from .10, which means little or no relationship, to .98 which indicates an almost perfect association between two belief variables. The other ratios are spread in between. This indicates that the intensity of relationship varies greatly depending on the variables.
5. The following table shows that most of Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs were contingent on other beliefs in her operational code.

Role of Conflict	11
Character of Opponent	11
Optimism	11
Strategy	11
Predictability	10
Risk	10
National Role	9
Role of Leader	9
Goals	9
Action	7
Approach	3

Beliefs in role of conflict, character of opponents, optimism and strategy were contingent on the existence of 11 other beliefs, while approach to political action were contingent on only 3. The philosophical subsystem of beliefs were more contingent on other beliefs than the instrumental set. The philosophical subsystem was contingent on 61 other beliefs, whereas the instrumental subsystem was contingent with 40 beliefs.

Overall, it can be said that in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code the philosophical subsystem of beliefs were more internally cohesive and consistent and externally interrelated with other beliefs in the system.

6. By looking at Table 57 we can find a definite pattern of association. Three subsets of beliefs which are consistent and interdependent cluster together.

**TABLE 56**  
**MRS.GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE**  
**BELIEF CLUSTERS**

Beliefs	Rolcon	Charopp	Natrole	Optimis	Predict	Leadrole	Goals
Rolcon							
Charopp	.75						
Natrole	.77	.61					
Optimism	.74	.74	.66				
Predict	.96	.77	.63	.86			
Leadrole	.68	.50	.54	.71	.82		
Goals	.79	.63					
Approach	.64	.86					
Strategy	.98	.76	.77	.55	.96	.74	.76
Risk	.71	.84	.57	.77	.69	.77	.63
Action	.67	.70	.67	.67	.61		
Force	.94	.51	.68	.78	.84		

A = .71

B = .74

C = .73

D = .75

The results indicate that there were four major clusters of beliefs in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code. A cluster is a number of belief dimensions which occur together with a certain degree of magnitude. The table indicates that there were four major clusters of beliefs in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code. These beliefs occurred together and were interdependent.

A. Cluster A of beliefs belong to the philosophical subsystem. This shows that the occurrence of one philosophical belief tends to co-occur with others. The role of conflict and character of opponents tend to be interlinked with optimism, national role, predictability and role of leader. The contingency ratio of cluster A is .71. It can be assumed that the philosophical belief subsystem tends to be highly interrelated and consistent in the decision maker's operational code, and cluster together in an integrated subsystem.

B. Cluster B combines the six instrumental beliefs regarding approaches to political action, approaches, goals, strategy, risk and force with philosophical beliefs regarding role of conflict and character of opponents. This indicates that references to beliefs regarding the role of conflict and the character of opponents tend to facilitate references to approaches to goal selection and implementation and acceptance or rejection of risk. The contingency ratio of this cluster is .74.

C. Cluster C is a subset of philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Articulations regarding the role of conflict, character of opponents, national role, optimism and predictability are related to instrumental beliefs regarding strategy, risk, action and the use of military force. Once again we see a high contingency ratio .73. This supports the main operational code hypothesis that certain kinds of philosophical beliefs are related to certain types of political action.

The surprising thing about this cluster is that while philosophical belief - national role is related to other instrumental beliefs, it is poorly correlated with goals and approaches to action.

D. Cluster D is a combination of specific beliefs from the instrumental subsystem - strategy and risk. These beliefs co-occur with all six philosophical beliefs and another instrumental belief - goals. The CR is .75.

These four subsets of beliefs seem to be internally cohesive and consistent and externally interdependent and can be located in tight clusters. The interlinkages between the four clusters are as follows:




Fig. 11. Mrs. Gandhi's operational code; Interlinked System of Beliefs

#### Interdependence, Centrality and stability:

A comparison of our centrality and stability tables with our interdependence tables show that four of the central and stable beliefs were interdependent and consistent. Beliefs regarding role of conflict, strategy, optimism and predictability were central as measured by their frequency, stable as determined by the coefficient of variation, as well as highly interdependent as measured by contingency analysis. This gives more than moderate support for our hypotheses that

**HP 8: The most consistent beliefs are also the most central ones.**

**HP 9: The more interdependent the beliefs, the more stable they will be.**

#### Dynamic Interdependence:

##### Definition:

Dynamic interdependence refers to a situation where a change in one set of beliefs will be accompanied by changes in others. If the magnitude of one belief increased, we would have to examine as to whether the magnitude or intensity of the other interrelated beliefs increase or decrease also.

**Questions:**

1. Which beliefs were dynamically interdependent?
2. Was there more dynamic interdependence between beliefs in the philosophical subsystem or instrumental subsystem, or in both?
3. Were central/stable beliefs more dynamically interdependent than peripheral beliefs?

**Methodology:**

For this test each of our twelve master beliefs were recoded into two categories and treated as interval variables with values of 1 and 2 denoting opposite poles. Each belief thus possessed a numerical value which stood for the average position of Mrs. Gandhi on the different beliefs for each year. We then used simple correlation techniques in order to discover which variables tend to vary together - when one is larger, whether the other tends to be larger or smaller. The correlation coefficient will tell us if the variables were positively or negatively related.

The test will yield a correlation coefficient somewhere between 0 and plus or minus 1. But it will be emphasized that we will not make any absolute interpretation of the correlation coefficient, nor will we make any assumptions regarding causality because correlation does not denote cause-effects in a relationship. The observed correlation between two variables is sometimes due to a cause-effect relationship, but a significant correlation is not by itself sufficient evidence to establish a causal relationship. Because of our small sample sizes which affect the computation of the correlation coefficient, we will treat any coefficient above .35 as significant. The results are presented in Table 57.

**TABLE 57**

**MRS.GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE  
A SIMPLE CORRELATION**

<b>Beliefs</b>	<b>Rolcon</b>	<b>Charopp</b>	<b>Natrole</b>	<b>Optimis</b>	<b>Predict</b>	<b>Leadrole</b>	<b>Goals</b>	<b>Approac</b>	<b>Strategy</b>	<b>Risk</b>	<b>Action</b>
<b>Rolcon</b>											
<b>Charopp</b>	.150										
<b>Natrole</b>		.297									
<b>Optimism</b>		.213	.055								
<b>Predict</b>	.030	.152	.096	.122							
<b>Leadrole</b>	.128	.108	.130	.057	-.092						
<b>Goals</b>	.304	.068	.095	.513	.077	.302					
<b>Approach</b>	.366	.359	.146	-.105	-.531	-.505	-.501				
<b>Strategy</b>		.080	.057	-.139	.028	.196	.266	.275			
<b>Risk</b>	.302		-.398	-.356	.243	-.358		-.148	-.527		
<b>Action</b>	.122	.409	.204	.066	.071	.194	.026	-.469	.498	.399	
<b>Force</b>		.200	-.131	-.022	.050	-.278	-.209	.273	-.477	.548	.152



**Results:**

The results of the simple correlation show that

1. Both the philosophical and instrumental subsystems of beliefs showed significant relationships. Five sets of philosophical beliefs - role of conflict, character of opponents, optimism, predictability and role of leader were interlinked with instrumental beliefs such as goals, approaches, risk acceptance, beliefs on action and use of military force. Some of these belief variables were positively correlated and some negatively.

In addition, some of the belief variables in the instrumental subsystem were dynamically interdependent. Goals were negatively related to approaches to political action. Risk showed a negative relationship with strategy and so did beliefs on action when correlated with approach to goal selection. Similarly, strategy and the use of military force were negatively correlated.

2. Not all central beliefs were dynamically interdependent. Out of those beliefs which were significantly related, only 32% were central beliefs.

Based on the correlation coefficients, a few assumptions can be made regarding dynamic interdependence in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code.

- i. The more Mrs. Gandhi saw conflict as dysfunctional, the more she emphasized adopting an incremental approach.
- ii. The more she saw the opponent as aggressive and intractable, the more Mrs. Gandhi saw benefits in adopting an incremental approach rather than a blitzkrieg approach.

Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding the role of conflict and its dysfunctional aspects were closely related to her beliefs regarding approach to goal achievement. As conflict was undesirable and dysfunctional, one had to work towards eradicating it on an incremental basis. Even with regards to Pakistan and China, peace was desirable and if the countries worked together, conflictual interactions could be replaced by harmonious relations, but this could be achieved only step by step.

- iii. Mrs. Gandhi's perception of enemy hostility was accompanied by a prescription to act slowly after assessing relevant issues.

Escalation of conflict and tensions on the subcontinent was undesirable for Mrs. Gandhi, and so it was unthinkable that she would advocate a blitzkrieg approach vis-a-

vis-Pakistan, even though she perceived it as aggressive and intractable.

iv. The more optimistic Mrs. Gandhi was the more she tended to choose optimal goals.

Mrs. Gandhi was an optimist who believed that all goals could be achieved if one worked hard enough and had faith in one's capability. Nothing was impossible for her and no goal too hard to reach. This was the reason why she constantly "set her sights high" (C.Subramaniam, author's interview), and chose optimal goals not only on a personal, but also on the national level. She believed, for instance, that India could achieve economic growth and self-reliance, thereby lessening dependence on major powers. She had faith in India's capabilities and was optimistic that India's fundamental goals could be achieved.

v. The more optimistic Mrs. Gandhi was, the less she advocated low risk options.

This belief was amply demonstrated in 1971. Mrs. Gandhi was certain that India could achieve its objectives in Bangladesh and believed that certain risks had to be taken.

vi. The more Mrs. Gandhi perceived India as playing an independent role, the less she advocated low-risk options.

Mrs. Gandhi's national role conception was accompanied by her belief in using high risk options if necessary. Even if India's actions or stance on world issues offended any of the major powers, especially the the U.S. and China, it should not deter India from acting independently. For example, India's position on Vietnam in 1968 despite its heavy dependence on the U.S. for food and economic assistance. Mrs. Gandhi believed that the U.S. did not want India to play an independent or what they termed a 'neutral' role. But even at the risk of alienating the U.S. or forcing it into an even closer strategic alliance with Pakistan, India should not abandon its independent posture.

vii. Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding predictability was not accompanied by the advocacy of a blitzkrieg approach.

Mrs. Gandhi believed in the predictability of political life and implicitly assumed that a blitzkrieg approach was really not necessary to achieve goals. She predicted that in relations with Pakistan, that the issues between the two countries could not be solved if India adopted such a hostile approach.

viii. The more important the role of a leader the less effective would be a blitzkrieg approach.

ix. The more important the role of the leader the less effective a high risk option.

Her belief in the importance of the role of a leader in managing and resolving conflicts was more associated with her belief in an incremental rather than a blitzkrieg approach, or choosing high risk options. The leader had an important role to play in society and had to discern historical trends, analyze issues and solve problems in an incremental fashion.

x. The selection of optimal goals was accompanied by an injunction against the choice of a blitzkrieg approach.

Optimal goals, in either domestic or foreign policy, could never be achieved, according to Mrs. Gandhi, by using a blitzkrieg approach. Optimal goals could only be achieved in an incremental step-by-step fashion and in the long run.

xi. The more Mrs. Gandhi advocated slow action the less she advocated a blitzkrieg approach.

xii. Mrs. Gandhi's choice of a cooperative strategy was negatively correlated with high risk options.

xiii. Mrs. Gandhi's advocacy of a cooperative strategy was accompanied by a belief in slow action.

xiv. The more Mrs. Gandhi advocated a cooperative strategy, the less she recommended military action.

xv. The more she recommended slow action, the more she advocated the avoidance of risk.

xvi. The more she believed in the avoidance of force, the more she recommended low risk options.

These dynamic interrelationships in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code can be illustrated as follows;




Fig. 12. Dynamic Interdependence

It can be concluded that Mrs. Gandhi's operational code beliefs constituted a system of both statically consistent and dynamically interdependent set of beliefs. It confirms the hypothesis;

**HP 10: Elements of the operational code tend to be basically interdependent.**

## **2. Functional Relevance:**

In the previous section we analyzed the structural characteristics of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code and discovered that Mrs. Gandhi's belief system exhibited a considerable degree of stability and centrality and was statically and dynamically interdependent. In this section we will examine the functional characteristics of the operational code.

### **2A. Issue Area Variability:**

As we have seen in chapters IV, V and VI, Mrs. Gandhi activated different sets of beliefs depending on the issue areas. There was a functional adjustment of the operational code depending on the specific characteristics of the issue. It is evident that Mrs. Gandhi activated a different set of beliefs when dealing with domestic issues, or in general foreign policy matters and yet another set of beliefs when dealing with Indo-Pak or Sino-Indian relations. Therefore, some beliefs were more relevant in some issue areas than others.

#### **Questions:**

1. What beliefs were most salient in what issue areas? Was there much variability?

#### **Methodology:**

The twelve master beliefs were recoded into two categories and cross-tabulated with eight issue areas - Domestic military security; domestic political; domestic economic developmental; domestic status; foreign military security; foreign status; regional military security; regional status. The highest percentage in each set would be taken to denote Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding that issue area. Because of the large number of categories, the Cramer's V was used to calculate the level of association. The value of this measure is from 0 to 1, with values closer to 0 showing little association and values closer to 1 denoting a strong relationship.

**Results:****1. Role Of Conflict:**

- |                              |   |
|------------------------------|---|
| a. Domestic Status issues    | Conflict Undesirable and dysfunctional  |
| b. Domestic political issues | Conflict undesirable                    |
| c. Foreign status issues     | Conflict should be avoided at all costs |
| d. Regional status issues    | Conflict undesirable and dysfunctional  |

**2. National Role Conception:**

- |                             |  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| a. Foreign status           | Global role as active independent nonaligned |
| b. Regional status          | Regional role as friendly neighbour          |
| c. Domestic economic issues | Internal developer                           |

**3. Optimism/Pessimism**

- |                      |   |
|----------------------|---|
| a. Domestic economic | Optimistic  |
| b. Domestic status   | Conditional optimism  |
| c. Foreign status    | Conditional optimism  |
| d. Regional status   | Conditional optimism regarding settlement of problems with Pakistan and normalization of relations. |

**4. Predictability**

- |                                |  |
|--------------------------------|--|
| a. Domestic Status             | Predictable/historical developments/long term trends |
| b. Regional status             | Predictable/opponent's behaviour                     |
| c. Domestic economic/political | Predictable/long term trends                         |
| d. Foreign political           | Predictable historical trends/specific events        |

**5. Role of Leader**

- |                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| a. Domestic Status             | Active role/discern historical trends/direct change |
| b. Foreign and regional issues | Leader important role/mediator                      |

**6. Goal Selection**

- |                            |                            |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| a. Domestic status         | Optimal goals              |
| b. Domestic economic       | Optimal goals              |
| c. Foreign/regional status | Optimal and feasible goals |

**7. Means to achieve goals**

- |                      |   |
|----------------------|---|
| a. Domestic status   | Prepare ground, incremental approach    |
| b. Domestic economic | Total mobilization of men and resources |
| c. Foreign status    | Mobilization/incremental approach       |
| d. Regional status   | Incremental approach                    |

**8. Strategy**

- |                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| a. Domestic issues | Cooperative strategy                            |
| b. Foreign issues  | Strategy of mutual accomodation and cooperation |
| c. Regional status | Deterrent                                       |

**9. Risk Acceptance and Avoidance**

- |                       |                         |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| a. Domestic Status    | Take no risks           |
| b. Domestic military  | Take risks if necessary |
| c. Domestic political | Take no risks           |
| d. Foreign political  | Take risks if necessary |
| e. Foreign status     | Take risks if necessary |

**10. Beliefs on action**

- |                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| a. Regional issues | Slow action. Act only when enemy provocation is intolerable, avoid premature action, dont act without assessing relevant issues and dont yield to enemy provocation. |
|--------------------|--|

**11. Military Force**

- |                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| a. Domestic status | Avoid resort to force unless absolutely necessary  |
| b. Regional issues | Avoid use of force; force can only be used as a deterrent, but can be used if other methods do not work; or use force rather than lose or surrender. |

It can be noticed that Mrs. Gandhi activated different beliefs and different responses to various situations depending on the issue area.

For example, in her articulations of India's role, she believed in the idea of India playing an independent nonaligned role in the global context, but in the regional subsystem, India would play the role of a friendly neighbour.

Similarly, she advocated the use of risky options only for foreign or regional issues as opposed to domestic issues.

Mrs. Gandhi basically operated on three levels. 1.Domestic economic, political, status and military issues; 2.General foreign economic, political, status issues; 3.Regional status and military.

These findings confirm

**HP 11: Decision makers answer the operational code beliefs differently depending on the issue areas**

Certain types of beliefs clustered around certain types of issue areas and were activated

depending on the issues concerned. But it can be observed that it was not the variation among clusters alone that made her operational code complex but it was also the intensity of articulations over different issue areas.

At the domestic economic, political, status and military level, she believed that conflict in any form - overt or covert, actual violence or societal tensions - were dysfunctional and undesirable. There was very little reference in her operational code to domestic opponents. She was cautiously optimistic about the achievement of important domestic goals which she considered as optimal, i.e., economic growth and development leading to self-sufficiency and self-reliance, and the establishment of an egalitarian society with social and economic justice. On the other hand, eradication of poverty was a short-term goal.

She predicted that, given India's enormous capabilities in terms of manpower, brainpower and resources, it was possible to achieve these goals, and the leader had a very important role to play - just like the manager of a large corporation - in selecting options and strategies, in bringing about change, in guiding development, and in the achievement of goals. She believed that in domestic economic and political issues, mobilization of men and resources was the best approach to goal achievement. Also, optimal goals could only be achieved incrementally. As far as optimal goals were concerned, one had to use caution in using high-risk methods but it was alright to take risks in working towards short term feasible goals. She also advocated strongly the non use of force to achieve ends, unless it was absolutely necessary to do so and other methods of resolving a domestic crisis or conflict was not effective.

In dealing with global issues, Mrs. Gandhi used a different cluster of beliefs. She considered conflict at the global level extremely dangerous and dysfunctional, with potential for spillover from one geographical and issue area into others. India would play an independent nonaligned role in global affairs and judge issues independently on their own merits. She did not want India to move closer to either bloc. Independence could only be maintained if India became strong economically and became self sufficient and self reliant. This would mean that it could resist outside pressures. She believed in a cooperative strategy in global affairs. She affirmed that if all countries cooperated



most problems could be solved. Cooperation could occur at two levels. The developed countries could assist in the developmental efforts of the poor countries. Also the developing countries could cooperate amongst themselves in sharing resources, technology and knowhow. If there was cooperation between the two blocs, the arms race could come to an end. She was idealistic enough to believe that all countries should renounce the use of force. Her general prescription to resolving conflicts was one of mutual accommodation, conciliation, negotiation and cooperation rather than war.

Mrs. Gandhi activated a different cluster of beliefs in issues where Pakistan was involved. Her perception of Pakistan was negative and she believed that Pakistan's hostility towards India was general and permanent. According to her, Pakistan's goals and policies were a result of both situational and dispositional factors. But, despite Pakistan's continued hostility, India would play the role of a friendly neighbour and attempt to convince Pakistan that it would be in the best interests of both countries to resolve all issues between them without superpower involvement. Problems between the two countries could only be resolved one at a time on an incremental basis. In the region of South Asia, especially vis-a-vis Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi advocated feasible goals. In the achievement of regional goals she was prepared to take risks if necessary which was prohibited in domestic politics, especially when dealing with optimal goals. She emphasized that feasible goals could be achieved incrementally, while India's optimal goals - which was establishing peace and harmony in the subcontinent - could be achieved only in the long run. She said that force had to be avoided in dealings with Pakistan and military force could only be used as a deterrent, or as a last resort in a defensive manner, i.e., if other peaceful methods of resolving issues failed. Also she made an injunction against lightning action. Action against Pakistan could not be taken prematurely, without first assessing relevant issues. One had to act only when enemy provocation had become intolerable. In other words she promoted defensive as opposed to offensive action. The results confirm our hypothesis

**HP 12: Decision makers use specific clusters of beliefs when dealing with specific issue areas**



	important role in shaping changes especially in a developing society. Has to define goals, means and strategies and provide direction.	role to play in world affairs.	important for providing direction in the immediate regional subsystem.
<b>Goals</b>	Long term optimal goals most important. Cannot be changed modified or abandoned although means could change. National interests and security cannot be compromised on any account although national interests vary according to different issue areas.		Long term optimal and short term feasible goals.
<b>Approaches</b>	Mobilization of men and resources the best approach to achieve goals. A combined approach would facilitate the attainment of important goals.		Incremental approach. Step by step solving of immediate problems.
<b>Strategy</b>	Cooperative strategy. All people and members of different classes should cooperate with the government and with each other in working towards important goals.	Cooperative strategy	Deterrent strategy
<b>Risk</b>	Do not take risks in working towards optimal goals	Take risks if necessary	Take risks if necessary
<b>Action</b>			Do not act without assessing relevant issues, do not give into enemy provocation, avoid premature action.
<b>Force</b>	Avoid force as much as possible in dealing with domestic crisis.		Avoid use of offensive force, but it can be used defensively as a last resort on a small scale rather than lose or surrender.

## 2B. Contextual Salience:

### 1. Domestic vs Foreign Policy decision making:

The hypothesis that

**HP 13: The decision maker's political beliefs are more likely to be salient in foreign policy decision making than in domestic policy decision making**

has been fully confirmed by empirical evidence. Mrs. Gandhi's operational code belief system was more salient in the foreign policy context. Frequency Table 58 show that Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs were loaded more in favour of the foreign policy decision making context than domestic decision making.

**TABLE 58**

### **CONTEXTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF MRS. GANDHI'S BELIEFS**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b>DOMESTIC</b>	<b>FOREIGN</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
Role of Conflict	26	246	272
Character of Opponent	2	165	167
National Role	70	522	592
Optimism	45	205	250
Predictability	42	257	299
Role of Leader	182	43	225
Goals	14	117	131
Approaches	18	96	114
Strategy	54	316	370
Risk	2	43	45
Action	13	89	102
Force	11	125	136
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>479</b>	<b>2224</b>	<b>2703</b>
<b>PERCENTAGES</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>82%</b>	

The Table shows that Mrs. Gandhi's articulated operational code beliefs in the domestic context was 18%, and in the foreign policy context 82%.

## 2. Crisis Context:

We have already discussed how the operational code of a decision maker will be particularly salient in a crisis context. Holsti has characterized conflict as a highly stressful situation where information is unreliable, unavailable or contradictory. In such a situation a decision maker increasingly relies on his belief system in information processing. Operationally a crisis is defined as the interim period between an initial outbreak of violence or the precipitating event, and the first action taken to resolve the crisis by the decision maker.

Going by this definition, the 1971 Bangladesh crisis can be divided into three phases. The actual crisis period began on March 25, with the military crackdown in east Pakistan, following the declaration of martial law on the 24th, with the first major influx of refugees on Indian territory. The period ended with the surrender of Pakistan's troops to a joint command of Indian and Bangladeshi forces on 16 December. The pre-crisis phase is the preceding one year before the actual crisis period and the post crisis phase is the one year following the crisis period. In order to test the hypothesis that,

**HP 14: A decision maker's belief system is likely to become more salient under foreign policy crisis conditions than under foreign policy non crisis conditions.**

We ran a frequency analysis on the data during each of the three periods; 1970 as the pre crisis, 1971 as the crisis, and 1972 as the post crisis periods, as an indicator of the salience of the operational code beliefs in each phase. This is based on the assumption that a reference to specific beliefs is an indicator of their centrality, or importance as an information processing tool, and those beliefs which are not articulated are not very important in that situational context. So if, according to Holsti, there is an increase in belief articulation during this period, then it can be assumed that it was because of crisis conditions, stress etc. The results are presented in Table 59.

TABLE 59

**MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE: CRISIS SITUATIONS**

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>1971</b>	<b>1972</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
Role of Conflict	29(25%)	62(53%)	26(22%)	115
Character of Opponent	6(4%)	116(85%)	15(11%)	137
National Role	53(24%)	107(48%)	65(29%)	225
Optimism	9(10%)	60(65%)	24(26%)	93
Predictability	17(13%)	69(52%)	48(36%)	134
Role of Leader	13(10%)	100(79%)	14(11%)	127
Goals	7(9%)	51(68%)	17(23%)	75
Approaches	4(6%)	56(80%)	10(14%)	70
Strategy	31(23%)	50(38%)	52(39%)	133
Risk	1(3%)	31(94%)	1(3%)	33
Action	2(2%)	81(91%)	6(7%)	89
Force	19(19%)	66(64%)	18(18%)	103
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>191(14%)</b>	<b>849(64%)</b>	<b>2296(22%)</b>	<b>1336</b>

The raw frequency scores and percentages presented in the table show an increase in the salience of the operational code beliefs during the crisis period. There was an overall 50 point increase from the pre crisis to the crisis period, and a 42 point decrease from the crisis to the post crisis period. Even if we examine each belief separately, we can see the percentage of increase/decrease from one period to the next, the highest percentage of increase being 91 points (risk) and the lowest 1 point (strategy). It can be noticed that the frequency of articulation of the belief dimension strategy did not differ too much between the three phases. In fact the frequency of articulation was one higher in the post crisis rather than the pre crisis stage.

But overall our findings confirm Hypothesis 13.

### **2C.Diagnostic Propensities and Choice Propensities:**

This section is based on the expectation that a systematic relationship exists between diagnostic beliefs and choice propensities in Mrs. Gandhi's operational code, as explained

in Chapter II. This expectation is based on the general notion of consistency striving which assumes that an individual will seek consistency between beliefs and behaviour. According to George (1979), there is a close connection between diagnostic propensities and choice propensities. In other words, there is a systematic linkage between a decision maker's beliefs and his choice of action. George (1979: 103) cautions us from assuming that choice propensities are the actual choices or behavioural outcomes, because they are sensitive to other variables as well. Rather these lead him/her to favour certain types of action alternatives over others, i.e., this analysis would tell us if the belief in question is likely to be more weighty in determining a decision maker's policy preferences - the options he/she prefers, than in determining the option he/she finally chooses.

We will test our hypotheses one at a time. Because we are dealing with nominal variables with several categories, we decided to use Cramer's V to examine for association.

**HP 15: A decision maker's perception of threat is mediated by his/her beliefs about the nature of politics**

If a decision-maker viewed politics as conflictual, it was very likely that he/she would perceive a major threat from the opponent. In order to test this hypothesis we equated perception of threat with image of opponent. It was assumed that if a decision-maker saw the opponent as expansionist, aggressive and destructive, threat perception would increase. So we tested for association between the nature of politics and the image of the opponent. Our hypothesis is confirmed by a V of .63.

**HP 16: Beliefs about the nature of politics influences calculations of national goals and choice of strategy.**

This hypothesis is based on the assumption that there is a relationship between how the decision-maker defines the nature of politics - whether conflictual or harmonious, and on his/her calculations of national interests, goals and strategies. We tested for association between belief dimension nature of politics and nature of goals and found that the relationship was moderate with a Cramer's V of .361 which could mean a chance occurrence.

Next we tested the relationship between the nature of politics and strategy and

found that there was no relationship, Cramer's  $V = .13006$ . These findings disconfirm HP 14.

**HP 17: Beliefs about the nature of politics influences perceptions of the leadership role in shaping history.**

This hypothesis was not very well supported with a  $V$  of .38.

HYPOTHESES	VARIABLES	CRAMER'S V	RESULTS
HP15	Nature of Politics and Character of Opponent	.63	Supported
HP16	Nature of Politics and Goals	.36	Not Supported
HP16	Nature of Politics and Strategy	.13	Not Supported
HP17	Nature of Politics and Role of Leader	.38	Not Supported

**HP 18: A decision maker who attributes dispositional explanation to the opponent is likely to recommend unconciliatory policies**

Heradstveit (1981, 113) distinguishes between two policy choices - compromising and uncompromising vis-a-vis the opponents. He uses attribution theory to justify this hypothesis. A decision maker's attribution of the opponent's behaviour is characterized in terms of internal/external or dispositional/ situational dichotomy, with internal factors being abilities, traits, motives, ideology etc., and external factors - environmental pressures and constraints. Jones and Nisbett (1971, 80) claim that in making inferences about one's behaviour there is a tendency to make situational attributions; and when observing an opponent's behaviour there is a tendency to emphasize on dispositional variables. So Heradstveit hypothesizes that the decision-maker's choice of policy is related to his beliefs regarding the opponent's behaviour. Hypothesis 19 could not be quantitatively tested due to the large number of empty cells. But it can be argued that Mrs. Gandhi attributed Pakistan's behaviour to both dispositional and situational factors, and moreover there is no evidence in the documents to show that Mrs. Gandhi recommended unconciliatory policies vis-a-vis Pakistan. In fact, throughout her career



as Prime Minister, she attempted to normalize Pakistan and made numerous conciliatory gestures, as she did not desire continued conflict and hostility with Pakistan. The Simla summit and the terms that were hammered out were strongly biased in favour of Pakistan, despite India's position of strength, indicates that she did not advocate an unconciliatory approach towards that country.

**HP 19: The decision maker who holds a pluralistic view of the opponent is more likely to favour compromising policies than one who holds a unitary image of the opponent.**

This hypothesis suggests that those holding an unitary (dogmatic) image of the opponent will consistently stick to hawkish policy positions. Those having a pluralistic image of the opponent have more leeway for their actions. We tested this hypothesis and found that the V was .67 which denotes a strong relationship between image of the opponent as unitary/pluralistic, and choice propensities.

Mrs. Gandhi perceived the decision-making apparatus in Pakistan as being run by a pluralistic military bureaucracy which was totally alienated from the rest of the society. Her perception led her to believe that some kind of compromise was possible and hence she continued to prefer conciliatory policies.

HYPOTHESES	VARIABLES	CRAMER'S V	RESULTS
HP18	Character of Opponent/ Attribute and Conciliation	-	Not Tested
HP19	Opponent's Decision Making and Conciliation	.67	Supported

**HP 20: If one believes that the political future is predictable, one is more likely to engage in extensive analysis of possible consequences of various policy options**

This hypothesis was confirmed by a high  $V = .77$ .

**HP 21: Belief in predictability of future events will produce a policy option based on calculations of long term optimal interests**

The high  $V = .78$  confirms this hypothesis.

HYPOTHESES	VARIABLES	CRAMER'S V	RESULTS
HP20	Predict and Search	.77	Supported
HP21	Predict and Goals	.78	Supported

**HP 22: Belief in the ability to control events will give rise to extensive search**

This is based on the assumption that a decision-maker who believes that chance and unforeseeable circumstances govern human affairs and historical development, he/she is less likely to assess relevant issues before acting. The hypothesis was moderately supported by our data,  $V = .47$ .

**HP 23: Beliefs in the opponent's hostility will lead to the choosing of optimal goals**

This hypothesis was not confirmed by our study. The  $V$  was only .21651. Mrs. Gandhi preferred feasible as opposed to optimal goals in dealings with Pakistan and, according to her, these goals could only be attained on an incremental basis. India and Pakistan had to work together on contending issues, one problem at a time and the immediate goals would be resolve each issue one by one.

**HP 24: Belief about opponent's hostile intentions produces shifts from earlier passive policies**

To test this hypothesis, we chose the period 1970-1971 and the relationship between the two belief variables was .47 which indicates a moderate relationship. Before Dec 1971, Mrs. Gandhi attempted several conciliatory methods to resolve problems with Pakistan. But with increased threat perception after mid 1971, one can see a shift from her earlier conciliatory policies, and after August 1971 she began advocating a deterrent strategy vis-a-vis Pakistan and the use of force if necessary in the defence of national interests and security.

HYPOTHESES	VARIABLES	CRAMER'S V	RESULTS
HP22	Control and Search	.47	Supported
HP23	Character of Opponent and Optimal Goals	.21	Not Supported
HP24	Character of Opponent and Approach	.47	Moderately Supported

**HP 25: The decision maker who is optimistic will recommend compromising policies and a pessimist will recommend uncompromising policies (Heradstveit 1981:113).**

This hypothesis was very strongly supported with a V of .86. Mrs. Gandhi was an optimist and believed that with hard work and cooperation, all problems could be solved. This led her to prefer a compromising strategy.

**HP 26: If a decision maker is optimistic about the achievement of fundamental political values, he/she is less likely to choose high risk options.**

This hypothesis also had strong support from our data with a V of .77. Optimism can be defined as a belief in goal achievement in the immediate as well as distant future. So, if one is optimistic regarding the attainment of one's political values and goals one way or another, there is no reason to select high risk options. On the other hand,

**HP 27: If one is optimistic about the ability to achieve fundamental goals one is more likely to use controlled risk options**

Our results indicate high association between both belief dimensions,  $V = .71$ .

For instance, Mrs. Gandhi in Dec 1971 clearly opted for a controlled risk option as opposed to high risk action. Limited military intervention in Bangladesh was preferred in order to achieve limited goals, despite possibility of U.S. and Chinese intervention. Mrs. Gandhi was certain that immediate goals could be achieved and was prepared to take limited risks in order to attain them.

HYPOTHESES	VARIABLES	CRAMER'S V	RESULTS
HP25	Optimism and Compromising Policies	.86	Supported
HP26	Optimism and Risk	.77	Supported
HP27	Optimism and Controlled risk	.71	Supported

**HP 28: Belief in the ability to control events will lead to the choosing of a maximizing strategy**

This was confirmed by a  $V = .58$ .

HYPOTHESIS	VARIABLES	CRAMER'S V	RESULTS
HP28	Predict and Strategy	.58	Supported

Our findings show that while some of these hypotheses received no support or just moderate support, most obtained sizable scores, which would lead us to conclude that diagnostic propensities do have an effect on choice propensities in a leader's operational code.

### 3. Summary and Conclusions:

We have analyzed the structural and functional characteristics of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code in this chapter. Mrs. Gandhi had a rich and differentiated system of beliefs which indicated complexity and the existence of a multi-level operational code.

An analysis of centrality and stability tended to confirm Heradstveit's hypothesis that central beliefs are also the most stable ones. Approaches to goals, national role conception, optimism, predictability of political life and strategy were both central and stable belief dimensions. These covered some of the most important categories in both the philosophical and instrumental subsystems, and by themselves formed a comprehensive subset.

A test of interdependence, both static and dynamic, showed remarkable consistency and interlinkages between the elements of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code. Mrs. Gandhi's operational code constituted a system of both statically consistent and dynamically interdependent set of beliefs.

A functional analysis of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code indicated that Mrs. Gandhi activated different sets of beliefs depending on the issue area. There was a functional rearrangement of the operational code in accordance with the specific characteristics of the issue. There was variability across issues and certain beliefs that were activated for dealing with certain issues were not the same as the ones salient in other issues.

Second, Mrs. Gandhi's operational code was salient in foreign policy decision making. Third, judging by the results, Mrs. Gandhi's operational code was more salient in foreign policy crisis as opposed to foreign policy non crisis situations.

Last, a test of some of the operational code hypotheses showed that there was significant relationship between diagnostic and choice propensities. Most hypotheses received a high degree of confirmation. It was also discovered that attempts to classify Mrs. Gandhi's operational code as hawkish or dovish based on Heradstveit's typology was not very successful, as this typology did not satisfy cultural variables.

In the next chapter, we will attempt to do a comparative analysis of Mrs. Gandhi's operational code with that of other political leaders using Holsti's typology.

## CHAPTER IX

### MRS. GANDHI'S OPERATIONAL CODE A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In this section we will compare Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code with the Operational Codes of other political leaders and attempt to place it in Holsti's typology (1977) and in Selim's (1979) modified version of the Holsti typology.

As Holsti (1977) says, there is a need to develop typologies of Operational Code beliefs in order to facilitate systematic and meaningful comparative studies of various decision-makers and their Operational Codes, as it is a prerequisite to cumulation of findings as well as for theory construction. Unless such comparative studies are made, Holsti says, the study of the Operational Code of an individual decision-maker will end up being just an isolated "intellectual vignette" (1977, 152). Each study would just provide insights into the politically relevant beliefs of a policy-maker, but taken together they may not amount to very much. A valid typology should provide a framework which facilitates focused and meaningful comparisons of isolated research efforts.

The analysis of the Operational Code is greatly facilitated if at least some parts of the comparison can be focused on types of belief systems rather than solely on the many individual beliefs that comprise the Operational Code. According to Holsti (1977, 153), prospects for meaningful comparison are severely restricted if there is a requirement for a separate category for each decision-maker's belief system as the results will simply emphasize the unique attributes of each decision-maker.

Furthermore the questions that constitute the Operational Code construct are multidimensional in nature. Hence a valid typology of Operational Code beliefs could prove useful in distinguishing central from peripheral beliefs and identifying redundancies in the categories.

### 1. Holsti's Typology:

Holsti's typology is based on one basic dimension, i.e., the philosophical belief on the nature of politics and political life. At the heart of this first philosophical belief is a distinction between the view of political life as essentially conflictual as opposed to the belief that it is basically harmonious. Holsti (1977, 156) suggests that this is one of the more prominent candidates for a "master" belief, i.e., one which is likely to constrain, if not dominate, other elements of the decision-maker's belief system. He puts forth two related questions.

1. Is conflict perceived as a permanent part of the political universe or is this condition temporary?

2. Where does one locate the sources of conflict and the conditions of peace?

Answers to these questions give rise to six different types, according to Holsti. Type

SOURCES OF CONFLICT	HARMONIOUS (Temporary)	CONFLICTUAL (Permanent)
Human Nature	A	D
Attributes of Nations	B	E
International System	C	F

Fig. 13. Types of Beliefs about the Nature of Political Life

A includes those who locate the source of conflict in certain aspects of human nature, but they also believe that those conflict-causing qualities are capable of being changed by education, communication, negotiation etc. Examples of Type A Operational Code orientation are Senators Hatfield, Frank Church; Willy Brandt etc.

Persons with Type B orientation believe that sources of conflict are found in the attributes of certain nations and the conditions of peace would entail the elimination of such attributes. The Marxist view of a world without capitalist states and the Wilsonian and Dulles view of a world of democratic states are examples of Type B. Type C

include those who deny that specific states or classes of states are primary sources of conflict. They emphasize that, because of the absence of a world authority which prevents conflict and maintains peace, conflicts are certain to occur even among peaceful nations. Because conflict is inevitable in an anarchical system, peace requires the transformation of the global system, for example, creation of a world government.

The defining characteristics of the other three types is the belief that conflict is a permanent part of the political universe. According to Type D, the sources of conflict are found in certain permanent features of man's nature - greed, selfishness, power seeking etc. It is utopian to believe that these human characteristics can be permanently altered. Efforts to create a "new political man" are doomed to failure. Examples of Type D orientations include Senators Fulbright and Vandenberg. Persons classified as Type E are skeptical about the perfection of human institutions such as the nation state. Aspirations of "war to end all wars" by transforming or eliminating certain states or classes of states, are doomed to failure. At any time one or more nations may violently seek to alter the status quo, but it does not follow that even in an international system composed of either all democratic countries or all socialist nations would be a peaceful one. Kissinger and Acheson are examples of this type. Persons classified as Type F locate the roots of conflict in an anarchical environment in which the search for security and self-preservation requires countries to behave in ways which are certain to bring them into conflict with others. Unlike Type C, these persons are skeptical about the prospects for systematic reform to eradicate sources of conflict.

Holsti also draws support for the second dimension of the typology, i.e., sources of conflict, from attribution theory. For example, persons who regard other nations as reacting to aspects of the international system are likely to prescribe policies that are different from those espoused by persons who believe that the sources of action derive from the actor's dispositions and attributes. He cites the case of America's policy vis a vis the Soviet Union in the months immediately following World War II. Some of the debate in Washington centered on the sources of Soviet policy. Henry Wallace and Joseph.E.Davies argued that Russia was merely acting in a defensive manner against external threats such as the rebirth of German militarism, and advocated a softline policy.



In contrast George Kennan and Harriman emphasized that the sources of Russian behaviour could be traced to certain characteristics of the Soviet regime and advocated a hardline policy.

Holsti acknowledges the limitations of this typology, of reducing complex phenomena into a two by three table of six categories. By treating the two underlying dimensions as discrete rather than continuous variables, one loses the ability to identify the finer differences that may exist among even small samples of decision-makers. This might lead to greater variation within cells of the typology than between them. But despite such possible problems, this typology is a tentative starting point for comparative analysis between decision-makers.

After distinguishing between what he calls the six 'ideal types' of Operational Codes, Holsti proceeds to develop a plausible set of hypotheses linking each of the six types to significantly different clusters of other beliefs. The approach is deductive and the linkages between beliefs are those that seem to hang together logically although not necessarily psychologically.

TABLE 60

## HOLSTI'S OPERATIONAL CODE TYPOLOGY

BELIEFS	TYPE A	TYPE B	TYPE C
Nature of Politics	Conflict temperory	Conflict Temperory	Conflict temperory
Source of Conflict	Human nature	Warlike states	Global system
Conditions for Peace	Education, negotiation	Eliminate offender	Transform system
Nature of Conflict	Non-Zero sum	Zero-sum	Mixed
Scope of Conflict	Issues separable	Issues linked	Mixed
Role of Conflict	Dysfunctional	Functional	Dysfunctional
Nature of Opponent	Limited adversary	Destructionist	Variable
Source of Opponent Goals	Security	Opponent's regime	Variable
Response to Conciliation	Reciprocate	Take advantage	Uncertain
Response to Firmness	Reciprocate	Back down	Uncertain
Optimism	Optimistic	Optimistic	Pessimistic
Predictability	Predictable	Predictable	Capricious
Role of Leader	Active	Active	Control limited
Goal Selection	Shared interests	Optimal goals	
Approach	Incremental/flexible	Vigorous	
Risk	Limit means	Limit means	
Timing	Crucial	Crucial	
Action	Act when chances good	Use force if necessary	
Power	Multidimensional		

TABLE 60 - Continued

<b>BELIEFS</b>	<b>TYPE D</b>	<b>TYPE E</b>	<b>TYPE F</b>
Nature of Politics	Conflict permanent	Conflict permanent	Conflict permanent
Source of Conflict	Human nature	Nation states	Global system
Conditions for Peace	System equilibrium	Reform states	Change system
Nature of Conflict	Zero sum	Zero-sum	Zero-sum
Scope of Conflict	Strong linkages	Variable	Variable
Role of Conflict	Sometimes functional	Maybe	May be functional
Nature of Opponent	Variable	May vary widely	May vary widely
Source of Opponent Goals	Variable	Self interest	May vary widely
Response to Conciliation	Uncertain	Depends	Depends
Response to Firmness	Uncertain	Depends	Depends
Optimism	Pessimistic	Moderate optimism	Pessimistic
Predictability	Variable	Mixed	Mixed
Role of Leader	Active	Leadership crucial	Leadership crucial
Goal Selection	Feasible	National interests	Feasible
Approach	Moderation/caution	Negotiations	Moderation
Risk	Avoid high risk	Avoid high risk	Depends
Timing	Crucial	Crucial	Depends
Action	Force last resort/negotiate	Military force crucial	Depends
Power	Multidimensional		

He then proceeds to empirically test the hypotheses, drawing upon existing Operational Code studies of Senators Hatfield, Church, Vandenberg, and Secretaries of State Acheson and Dulles, and information on the first philosophical belief was used to classify subjects within the typology, and data on the remaining beliefs used to assess the hypotheses. Each belief category was scored with a code representing a rough estimate of the degree to which it was in agreement with the hypothesis;

SCORES
++ Very Substantial Agreement (2)
+ Agreement on Balance (1)
0 Insufficient or Inconclusive (0)
- Disagreement on Balance (-1)
-- Very Substantial Disagreement (-2)

Fig. 14. Scores for Belief Categories

Next, Holsti assessed consistency between the judgments of independent coders and the hypothesized responses with reference to the cases of Church, Hatfield, Vandenberg, Fulbright, Acheson, Byrnes, Dulles, Kissinger, Bolsheviks, Ramsay McDonald, Kurt Schumacher and Willy Brandt.

The results of his empirical tests were not uniform across subjects and were also uneven across beliefs, thus providing only moderate support for his typology. But, nevertheless, Holsti says the results are sufficiently encouraging to warrant a further test of the typology (1977, 199).

We can follow Holsti's method to ascertain the location of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code within this typology by using both the logical and empirical tests.

Logical Test:

Information on the first philosophical belief, i.e., the nature of politics on which the typology is based, will be used to classify Mrs. Gandhi within the typology. Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code can be placed as a type C based on her interpretation of the political universe as being essentially conflictual but conflict as being temporary. She

locates the sources of conflict in the anarchical state of the international system, where there is unequal distribution of resources, technology and capital and this disparity being reinforced by colonialism, imperialism and racism. The roots of conflict are also imbedded in the context of interstate relations - the rivalries between the two blocs, power politics, competition for spheres of influence, the subsequent arms race etc. She believed that peace could ensue by a transformation of the international system - not by a violent overthrow as suggested by the Bolsheviks, but by a peaceful cooperative effort by all states. This position was essentially reformist and conservative. She also perceived the nature of conflict as being mixed - zero sum in some cases and non zero sum in others.

But Mrs. Gandhi did not quite conform with Type C in respect to the scope of conflict. She saw a definite linkage between issues and assumed that conflict had a tendency to spill over from one geographical area, and from one issue area into others. This tendency of conflict to spill over was what made it so undesirable. Conflict was dysfunctional for the achievement of important fundamental goals. Mrs. Gandhi, like other Type C leaders, believed that sources of conflict were many and varied. For example, from catalytic wars to those arising from inequitable distribution of resources.

But there were some major discrepancies between Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code and the Type C orientation. Contrary to this type, Mrs. Gandhi believed that the opponent was aggressive, expansionist and destructive; attributed the source of the opponent's goals to both situational and dispositional factors, and was certain about the opponent's likely response to a conciliatory policy. Mrs. Gandhi also was an optimist, which is contradictory to Type C, and believed in the predictability of historical events, opponent's behaviour and policy outcomes, and absolutely believed in the ability to control historical development.

Holsti has not specified the kinds of instrumental beliefs that a Type C holds and has left the cells empty. Hence it is not possible to do a logical test for goodness of fit in the instrumental belief categories.

### Empirical Test.

To test for goodness of fit between Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code and Holsti's typology, Mrs. Gandhi's responses to each belief category is compared with the hypothesized responses in each of the six types in the typology. Following Holsti's method, each of the belief variable is given a code and a score which represents an approximate estimate of the level of agreement with the hypothesized responses. Because Type C has empty cells in the instrumental subset, the overall percentage of agreement will be taken into account.

The aggregate score for each type represents the degree to which Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code fits that type. The score can vary from + 38 which indicates substantial agreement to - 38 which represents substantial disagreement. The higher the score, the better the fit between Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code and the specific type.

**TABLE 61**  
**GOODNESS OF FIT**  
**MRS. GANDHI AND HOLSTI'S TYPOLOGY**

TYPES	RAW SCORES	PERCENTAGE
A	5	26%
B	1	6%
C	7	54%
D	4	21%
E	0	0
F	0	0

The scores in the table indicate that Mrs. Gandhi moderately fit Type C. The main dimensions in Type C which were contradictory to Mrs. Gandhi's actual Operational Code were optimism, predictability, and control over historical development.

## **2. Selim's Typology:**

As Selim (1979, 431) argues, these discrepancies suggest that the one-dimensional typology may not be sufficient to distinguish among various types of Operational Codes, as there is no significant difference between those who believe in different sources of conflict. He suggests a two-dimensional typology based on the first philosophical belief - Nature of politics, and the first instrumental belief - Types of goals. Type A include those who view the political universe as inherently conflictual and accordingly tend to select optimal goals, and Type B including those who view the political universe as harmonious and accordingly tend to select feasible goals. Extrapolating from the dynamic interdependence of Nasser's Operational Code, Selim proceeds to develop a series of hypotheses regarding the potential responses of each of these two Types to other Operational Code beliefs. According to Selim, leaders who belong to Type A Operational Code are generally more active and idealistic than those who belong to Type B. They tend to perceive fundamental contradictions in the political universe, and irreconcilable adversaries in both domestic and international politics. They are certain that their goals will be achieved regardless of any short-term obstacles. This is because they perceive a predictable pattern of political events which tells them that time is on their side. They also believe that although a leader cannot play a fundamental role in moulding history, a leader can shape most immediate and relevant events. On the contrary, leaders who belong to Type B tend to view a fundamental harmony of interests in political life or a mixture of harmony and reconcilable conflict, and hold a benign image of the opponent. They view opponents as pursuing some legitimate goals stemming from their quest for national security. They are more optimistic than Type A leaders of resolving conflicts with opponents. They tend to view history as an ad-hoc process with no built-in pattern, and judge events as they unfold rather than engage in historical forecasting. They conceptualize the role of the leader as a mere political mediator rather than active moulders of events in society.

Leaders who hold type A Operational Code usually select optimal goals. They are not content to achieve what seems to be realistic goals but always aspire to achieve

ideal goals, even if such goals look unattainable in the near future. Consequently, they refuse to abandon, modify or substitute such goals but the means can be adapted to the changing situation. They prefer to pursue a deterrent strategy towards opponents and are prepared to accept risks. The same rule applies to their belief in the utility of military force for achieving political goals. Use of military force is advocated only for deterrent purposes. On the other hand, Type B are content with the selection of feasible goals and are prepared to modify and even abandon some goals if necessary. They tend to advocate negotiation and compromise with their opponents, prohibit the pursuit of high risk policies or the application of military force. These two Types developed by Selim are also ideal Types.

**TABLE 62**  
**SELIM'S TYPOLOGY**

<b>BELIEF</b>	<b>TYPE A</b>	<b>TYPE B</b>
Nature of Politics	Conflictual/Permanent	Harmonious/Mixed
Nature of Opponent	Aggressive/Expansionist	Conciliatory
Optimism	Optimistic about Goals	Pessimistic/Realistic
Predictability	Predictable	Unpredictable
Leader Role	Active Immediate Events	Leader Mediator/Broker
Goal Selection	Optimal Goals	Feasible Goals
Approach/Strategy	Deterrent	Accommodative
Risk	Some Risk Acceptable	Avoid all Risks
Military Force	Deterrent/use last resort	Avoid Military Force

To test his typology, Selim collected from Holsti's work, data on the Operational Codes of twelve political leaders and compared them with Nasser's Operational Code. The



aggregate scores ranged from 20 representing high agreement to -20, which indicated that the leader's Operational Code does not fit the typology.

His findings indicate that the Bolshevik Operational Code and Kurt Schumacher's Operational Code could be classified as Type A, and so could the Operational Codes of Nasser and Dulles. The Operational Codes of Senators Byrnes and Hatfield were typical examples of Type B, and also were the Operational Codes of Vandenberg, Willy Brandt, Ramsey McDonald, Church, and Kissinger.

Some of these cases experienced incongruence in the level of goodness of fit with both types and Selim attributes it to psychological consistency/ inconsistencies of the decision-makers rather than to logical consistency/ inconsistencies.

Compared to Holsti's typology, Selim's is a more simplified version with fewer number of types as well as belief dimensions. We will attempt to place Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code in Selim's typology and test for goodness of fit by using the same scoring method as in the previous test.

Our test shows that Mrs. Gandhi can be placed as a Type A political leader with a score of 18. There was a slight deviation from Type A on two belief dimensions. The first was regarding the nature of the political universe. She saw politics as being conflictual but did not believe it to be a permanent part of human affairs although it could not be totally ameliorated in the near future. It was possible to eliminate conflict in the long run. Secondly, she believed that a political leader could control and shape historical development and not just immediately relevant situations. Her belief in control over destiny was linked with her perception of the role of the political leader, and the leader had to shape developments in society.

But overall, Mrs. Gandhi tended to fit Selim's Type A much better than Holsti's Type C where her Operational Code was congruent with only the first philosophical belief. Although Holsti's typology is multi-level and more complex, there tends to be more variation within types than between them. In contrast, Selim's simplified version provided a better fit for the Operational Codes of most political leaders under study.

### 3. A Comparative Study:

Mrs. Gandhi believed that the nature of politics was conflictual but that conflict was not permanent. Based on this assessment, she chose optimal goals. Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding the temporal nature of conflict comes closest to Senator Church's beliefs. Frank Church also believed that, although the political universe was conflictual there were ways of ameliorating, if not eliminating, conflict. Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs regarding the sources of conflict and conditions of peace resembled the Bolshevik code in some respects. Just as the Bolsheviks attributed conflict to economic attributes, Mrs. Gandhi also perceived the roots of conflict as imbedded in inequalities and disparities between the countries of the world and which were reinforced by imperialism and colonialism. Both recommended the transformation of the international system. But while the Bolsheviks recommended a violent overthrow of the exploitative system, Mrs. Gandhi's recommendation was that of an idealistic reformer. She believed that the rich and poor nations had to cooperate and eliminate inequalities and the rich nations had the obligation to ensure equitable redistribution of wealth. She also sought peace through non-intervention. The Bolsheviks predicted that once the bourgeois class was eliminated and a classless communist society was established, conflict would end. According to Mrs. Gandhi, peace would ensue with the closing of the gap between the rich and the poor nations and the orderly transformation of the system through communication, negotiation, cooperation etc.

Mrs. Gandhi did not subscribe to the Bolshevik view that conflict was functional for the achievement of important goals. In fact, Mrs. Gandhi considered conflict as extremely dysfunctional and undesirable for the achievement of fundamental goals. Conflict, according to her, came in the way of progress, growth and development of a society. But she did share with the Bolsheviks, Hatfield and Nasser the view that all issues are interrelated. This contradicted Fulbright, Byrnes, Kissinger, Brandt and Church's view which tended to compartmentalize issues and deal with them separately. Mrs. Gandhi like Acheson and Vandenberg also believed that conflict had a tendency to spillover. Contradictory to Bolshevik, Dulles, and Schumacher's view that global

conflict was a zero sum game, she believed that all conflicts - big and small- were non zero sum games i.e., potentially destructive to all actors.

Mrs. Gandhi like the Bolsheviks, Dulles, Schumacher and Vandenberg held an optimistic view regarding the achievement of long-term fundamental goals. According to her, history was predictable out, unlike the Bolsheviks, she did not attribute it to a mechanistic cyclical pattern in history. Her predictions of historical trends and the opponents behaviour were more in the nature of forecasts. Like Dulles, Schumacher and Acheson, she believed that the role of a leader in society was important in shaping and guiding change.

There is not too much variation between the the different Operational Codes with regard to the first dimension, i.e., nature of politics. It is the second dimension, selection of goals, which brings a lot of variation between the different Operational Codes. For the Bolsheviks and Nasser, it was not necessary to approach the task of selecting goals by carefully examining the prospects of success or failure because, according to them, success is inevitable in the logic of historical inevitability. Accordingly, they advocated the pursuit of optimal goals regardless of the immediate difficulties. But for Mrs. Gandhi, the choice of optimal goals was much more related to her beliefs regarding optimism, predictability and control. Mrs. Gandhi was optimistic regarding long term goal-attainment, however remote the possibility of immediate gratification. She believed that despite short-term obstacles and pitfalls, it was possible to achieve goals in the long run, because man eventually controlled his destiny, and if he had faith and was willing to work hard, nothing was impossible. She did not think in terms of failure - especially for optimal foreign policy goals. This is in direct contrast with the Western leaders in whose Operational Codes there is a clear emphasis on the selection of feasible goals in most issue areas. Also, like Nasser, Mrs. Gandhi strictly adhered to her views regarding the unchangeability of goals. She was not prepared to modify, substitute or abandon fundamental goals, unlike Brandt or Dulies, who advocated the substitution and modification of goals when they looked like they were unattainable. This was absolutely taboo for Mrs. Gandhi.

However, Mrs. Gandhi was quite conservative and cautious in goal pursuit unlike the Bolsheviks. While the Bolsheviks advocated a combination of offense and defence, Mrs. Gandhi, like Nasser, believed in an incremental, graduated, step-by-step approach to the achievement of goals. Mrs. Gandhi, like the western leaders and Nasser, believed in a flexible policy and in the avoidance of high-risk options. Unlike the Bolsheviks and Dulles, she wanted to avoid the pursuit of high risk policies and recommended the taking of risks only if absolutely necessary. Also, like most Western leaders, she stressed the avoidance of force but stated that it could be used on a limited scale for deterrent purposes and only as a last resort.

If we do an overall comparison, Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code comes closest to Nasser's Operational Code. This could be attributed to the fact that both leaders were from third world non aligned countries, both shared similar colonial experiences and more or less similar cultural backgrounds.

#### **4. Comparison of Mrs. Gandhi's and Nasser's Operational Codes:**

Like Nasser, Mrs. Gandhi believed that politics was conflictual, but she did not share his views regarding its permanency. Like Nasser she too believed that global conflict arose from the gap between the rich and the poor countries and the exploitative nature of interactions between the dominant and dependent countries. They both believed that there could be a peaceful and systematic restructuring of the international system.

They both viewed the opponent from the perspective of a bad faith model, and perceived the adversary as aggressive, destructive and expansionist. While Nasser attributed the sources of the opponent's goals to dispositional factors, Mrs. Gandhi believed that Pakistan's behaviour was on account of both dispositional and situational factors. Both agreed that the opponent would either ignore or take advantage of one's own conciliatory moves. This was in direct contrast to Church's and Brandt's view which suggested that the opponent was not inherently aggressive and that situational factors were prompting the opponent to act in a hostile manner. Both Nasser and Mrs. Gandhi were basically optimistic regarding goal achievement regardless of short term

obstacles. They agreed that the role of chance in history was minimal. While Nasser attributed predictability to a circular pattern of historical development, Mrs. Gandhi's predictions were in the nature of forecasts.

Both believed in the importance of the leadership variable. But while Nasser emphasized the limited role of the leader in shaping historical developments, Mrs. Gandhi's interpretations were broader. She insisted that the leader could shape history<sup>1</sup>. But both agreed that in shaping historical development, the leader had to get the cooperation of other social forces.

Mrs. Gandhi and Nasser believed in choosing optimal goals, accompanied by incremental action for their achievement. Both were strongly against the adoption of high risk options and the use of force to achieve objectives.

### **5. Summary and Conclusions:**

In this chapter we conducted a comparative study of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code with that of other political leaders. First, we tried to place Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code in one of the six Types suggested by Holsti and discovered that she was partly a Type C leader. Holsti's hypotheses could not be tested further due to the large number of empty cells in the instrumental subset of Type C. Moreover there was more variation within than between types in Holsti's typology.

Next we tested Selim's typology, based on the first philosophical and instrumental beliefs and discovered that Mrs. Gandhi was a Type A leader with a relatively high goodness of fit score of 18 out of 20. A comparative study showed that Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code was very similar to Nasser's Operational Code, and it can be hypothesized that cultural variables could have accounted for the similarity.

---

<sup>1</sup>She constantly cited the role played by the leaders in the Indian independence movement.

# CHAPTER X

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

### **SUMMARY:**

This research project had two main objectives.

1. To systematically construct a model of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code belief system based on George's typology;
2. To establish connections between the Operational Code beliefs and foreign policy preferences.

First, the fundamental components of the Operational Code were established by dividing the periods under study into three time phases 1.1966-1969; 2.1970-1972; 3.1973-1977.

All of the ten master belief categories in each of the three time periods were carefully analyzed and discussed in detail, and a model of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code was established.

The next step was to discuss the relationship between this Operational Code model and foreign policy choices in particular,

1. The signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971;
2. The decision to militarily intervene in Bangladesh in December 1971,
3. Conducting an underground nuclear explosion in May 1974.

In examining these decision choices, we surveyed Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code, the options open in each decision situation, congruence between the Operational Code beliefs and the choice of action, and the decision process. The results indicated a high degree of congruence between Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs and policy preferences in all three cases.

We then conducted a quantitative analysis of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code, and tested hypotheses related to centrality, stability and interdependence - both static and

dynamic. The results showed that Mrs. Gandhi's belief system exhibited a high degree of stability, centrality and psychological consistency, and was functionally interdependent. It confirmed the hypothesis that the most stable beliefs are also the most central and interdependent ones, illustrating a circular pattern of explanation for the concepts of centrality, stability and interdependence in our research project.

The functional characteristics of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code were then examined for issue area and variability and situational salience, and hypotheses related to diagnostic and choice propensities were tested. Mrs. Gandhi articulated different subsets of beliefs depending on the issue area and activated different clusters of beliefs when responding to different issues, actors and situations. Our study shows that she also relied more on her Operational Code beliefs in foreign policy crisis situations as opposed to foreign policy non crisis situations. In Mrs. Gandhi's case, the tests of our hypotheses show that diagnostic propensities did indeed, to a large extent, influence choice propensities.

A comparison of Mrs. Gandhi with other political leaders indicated that her Operational Code beliefs were very similar to Nasser's Operational Code. We attempted to place it in the typology developed by Holsti, but discovered that Selim's simplified version provided a better fit. Mrs. Gandhi proved to be a Type A political leader.

## **2. A Model of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code:**

As already discussed, Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code comprised of central subsets of highly stable and interconnected beliefs. She defined politics as conflictual but a temporary phenomena, and believed that it was highly dysfunctional and undesirable. She held an optimistic view with respect to goal achievement and tended to select optimal goals and this was closely connected to her beliefs regarding predictability of political life and control over historical development.

Another subset of beliefs revolved around the negative image of the opponent coupled with the advocacy of a deterrent strategy and the non-use of force unless

absolutely necessary. Like Nasser, Mrs. Gandhi's selection of optimal goals was negatively associated with goal pursuit. In this sense, Mrs. Gandhi was essentially conservative. This is the reason why her Operational Code cannot exactly fit into the hawkish-dovish typology developed by Heradstveit (1978, 1981).

Mrs. Gandhi's 'hawkish' philosophical beliefs were not matched by corresponding 'hawkish' instrumental goals. This is because of Mrs. Gandhi's stand on the role of conflict, and the linkage between this belief and selection of goals, approaches and strategies. So although she saw the political universe as highly conflictual and the enemy as aggressive and expansionist, she advocated slow and graduated action, a deterrent strategy and the non use of force or its use as a last resort for defensive action. Mrs. Gandhi was not prepared to use offensive force or choose high risk options unless necessary and this was because she viewed conflict as extremely undesirable and dysfunctional<sup>1</sup>. This linkage has to be understood in order to avoid misinterpretation of Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code and her policy preferences.

### 3. The Operational Code Hypotheses:

We tested 28 hypotheses and found that most of them were confirmed by our data. Fourteen hypotheses were derived from cognitive theory and the Operational Code and as such were more or less theoretical assumptions. The rest dealt with diagnostic and choice propensities. Out of fourteen, eleven were confirmed.

**HP 1: The Operational Code of the decision maker is richer in its instrumental subsystem than its philosophical subsystem**

This hypothesis was not confirmed by our study. We found that in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code the philosophical subsystem was richer than the instrumental subsystem.

**HP 2: The Operational Code is more differentiated in its instrumental subsystem than its philosophical subsystem**

This hypothesis was also not confirmed as Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code happened to

---

<sup>1</sup>This was not because Mrs. Gandhi was simply reacting to situations and framing a passive response because she lacked any kind of long term policy or strategy, as her critics allege.



be equally differentiated in both subsystems.

**HP 3: The Operational Code is generally characterized by the dominance of a specific subset**

This was confirmed. We noticed that in all of the three time periods there were specific subsets of beliefs that Mrs. Gandhi activated. National role conception, goals, optimism, role of conflict, strategy and predictability of political life remained central and their centrality did not vary too much from one period to the next. The only exception was that 'character of opponent', which occupied a central place in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code in the second phase<sup>2</sup>, was relegated to a peripheral position in the third.

**HP 4: The most stable beliefs are also the most central ones.**

**HP 5: The beliefs most likely to change are also the less central ones in the system**

Our findings add strength to these hypotheses. In Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code, stability has been associated with centrality. The beliefs most resistant to change are the central ones in the belief system.

**HP 6: The philosophical part of the Operational Code tends to be more stable than the instrumental part**

This was also confirmed. Not surprisingly, a political philosophy tends to be more stable than the approaches to action which may differ from one context to the next.

**HP 7: Logical and psychological inconsistencies of the Operational Code are separate phenomena**

This was supported by our data. As Converse says, a belief system might be totally consistent from a psychological perspective but inconsistent from a logical or deductive viewpoint.

**HP 8: The most consistent beliefs are also the most stable ones**

**HP 9: The more interdependent the beliefs, the more stable they will be.**

**HP 10: Elements of the Operational Code tend to be basically interdependent**

These three hypotheses were strongly supported by our data. We found four clusters of

---

<sup>2</sup>Bangladesh crisis

beliefs. 1. The philosophical subsystem was highly interdependent and tended to vary simultaneously. 2. Beliefs on 'role of conflict' and 'character of opponents' co-occurred with most instrumental beliefs. 3. Most philosophical beliefs were contingent with instrumental beliefs regarding strategy and risk. 4. There was co-occurrence of the first five philosophical beliefs with the last four instrumental beliefs.

**HP 11: Decision-makers answer the Operational Code beliefs differently depending on the issue area.**

**HP 12: Decision-makers use specific clusters of beliefs when dealing with specific issue areas**

These two hypotheses were confirmed. Certain types of beliefs were activated depending on the issues concerned. For example, when dealing with regional military security issues, Mrs. Gandhi activated a different set of beliefs than when dealing with domestic economic or status issues.

**HP 13: The decision-makers' political beliefs are more likely to be salient in foreign policy decision making than in domestic policy decision making**

Our analysis shows that Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code was indeed more salient in foreign policy as opposed to domestic policy decision making.

**HP 14: A decision-makers' belief system is likely to become more salient under foreign policy crisis conditions than under foreign policy non crisis conditions**

This too was confirmed. If we examine the three periods we can notice by the frequency of articulations of most belief categories in 1971, that Mrs. Gandhi tended to rely more on her Operational Code beliefs during this period.

**HP 15: A decision maker's perception of threat is mediated by his/her beliefs about the nature of politics** CONFIRMED

**HP 16: Beliefs about the nature of politics influences calculations of national goals and choice of strategy** NOT CONFIRMED

**HP 17: Beliefs about the nature of politics influences perceptions of the leadership role in shaping history.** CONFIRMED

**HP 18: A decision maker who attributes dispositional explanation to the opponent is likely to recommend unconciliatory policies** NOT TESTED

**HP 19: The decision maker who hold a pluralistic view of the opponent is more likely to favour compromising policies than one who holds a unitary image of the opponent** CONFIRMED

**HP 20: If one believes that the political future is predictable, one is more likely to engage in extensive analysis of possible consequences of various policy options** STRONGLY CONFIRMED

**HP 21: Belief in predictability of future events will produce a policy option based on calculations of long term optimal interests** STRONGLY CONFIRMED

**HP 22: Belief in the ability to control events will give rise to extensive search** CONFIRMED

**HP 23: Beliefs in the opponent's hostility will lead to the choosing of optimal goals** NOT CONFIRMED

**HP 24: Belief about opponent's hostile intentions produces shifts from earlier passive policies** MODERATELY CONFIRMED

**HP 25: The decision maker who is optimistic will recommend compromising policies and a pessimist will recommend uncompromising policies** STRONGLY CONFIRMED

**HP 26: If the decision maker is optimistic about the achievement of fundamental political values, he/she is less likely to choose high risk options** STRONGLY CONFIRMED

**HP 27: If one is optimistic about the ability to achieve fundamental goals one is more likely to use controlled risk options** STRONGLY CONFIRMED

**HP 28: Belief in the ability to control events will lead to the choosing of a maximizing strategy** CONFIRMED

#### **4. Conclusions:**

Overall, it can be said that Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code was both structurally and functionally integrated and differentiated. She possessed a complex and sophisticated code with multiple levels of operation which did in fact, as we have seen, have an impact on information processing in foreign policy decision making. Her Operational Code has

been a particularly effective intervening variable in explaining foreign policy preferences. An examination of India's foreign policy from 1966 to 1977 will not be meaningful unless one takes this dimension into account, and a study of Mrs. Gandhi's belief system will not be complete unless the dynamic interlinkages between the various belief dimensions is properly understood.

Like Nasser, Mrs. Gandhi was the sole arbiter of the country's foreign policy. Given the nature of decision-making under Mrs. Gandhi and the importance of the idiosyncratic variable<sup>3</sup>, the Operational Code's functional effectiveness is all the more enhanced. Our study shows that Mrs. Gandhi relied on her beliefs to a large extent and it influenced her perception of situations, issues, events and actors, and in the framing of policy choices. The three decisions that we have analyzed demonstrate that the Operational Code has had an impact on the entire decision process, and favoured the emergence of certain decisional characteristics.

As George (1979, 109) asks, how much explanatory power can be attributed to the Operational Code beliefs? Presumptive evidence that certain beliefs are a necessary condition for the decisional outcome can easily encourage an exaggerated notion of their causal weight. But to safeguard against this error, we examined the total context of the decision. We looked at other options that existed in the decision-making situation which were not congruent with Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs and were not chosen. Although situational and contextual variables could have been an important input into the decision-making process, nevertheless, one cannot ignore the weight of the Operational Code variable. It can be argued that Mrs. Gandhi's beliefs were idiosyncratic in important respects, especially in the making of those three decisions, and not easily accounted for by situational or role variables alone. In other words, the set of beliefs and the policy choices that were consistent with those beliefs were probably not those that anyone else in that position would have chosen. For example, it can be hypothetically argued that Nehru may not have signed the treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. Also it is doubtful if he would have actually resorted to military action in Bangladesh, or exploded an

---

<sup>3</sup>which has been discussed in chapter IV

atomic device. So it can safely be said that Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code accounted for those decisions. It can also be argued that, in Mrs. Gandhi's case, the Operational Code carries enough weight to be called an explanatory variable.

#### **Future Research:**

There have been a few questions which can be researched into at a later stage.

First, the importance of the cultural variable has to be studied. Our research clearly indicates that a standard typology of beliefs cannot be applied uniformly across decision-makers from different cultural backgrounds. The cultural variable has to be taken into account in the study of the Operational Code of specific Third World leaders.

Second, are there certain subsets of beliefs which become central in a crisis as opposed to a non-crisis situation? Is it possible to establish a typology of central beliefs in a foreign policy crisis vs non-crisis situations? This can explain which subsets of beliefs are activated in a crisis situations. It can be observed in our study of centrality, that central beliefs rankings underwent a slight change from the first (non crisis) to the second period (crisis), and and back in the third phase (non crisis). It would be useful to establish a typology of different sets of central beliefs and situational contexts.

Third, in our analysis of richness and differentiation in Mrs. Gandhi's Operational Code, we saw that these two concepts varied with the ups and downs in the leader's political career. The Operational Code seemed richer and more differentiated during periods of political successes and triumphs and not as rich or differentiated during difficult times. This aspect can be explored further.

#### **5. Evaluating the Operational Code Approach:**

This study shows that research on the Operational Code can be conducted in a systematic fashion and it is possible to place the Operational Code in a theoretical framework. Selim's work on Nasser and this project on Indira Gandhi indicate that one can produce clearly defined and replicable methods of data generation and analysis, and test the same hypotheses using different case studies. The research design and methods

of data collection and analysis have been rigorous and systematic.

Our work clearly demonstrates the possibility of using the Operational Code framework to very effectively study individual decision-makers and their diagnostic and choice propensities. Also, in the area of Indian foreign policy studies, this work provides a whole new dimension, and lays emphasis on a critical variable.

The ten master beliefs upon which the Operational Code is based are crucial to the understanding of the decision maker's processing of information. These ten beliefs guide the researcher into looking for specific conditions which enhance or limit the decision-maker's choices and policy preferences. It points to the crucial links between a decision-maker's analysis of the situation (diagnostic propensities) and his/her choice of goals, strategies and action (choice propensities). This helps explain some aspects of the decision making process which otherwise might be overlooked.

It has now been two decades since George produced his first article on the Operational Code as an approach to the study of political decision making. During the years that followed, several studies have successfully employed the Operational Code to analyze the belief systems of political leaders. As Holsti (1982, 75) says, in an area of research characterized by relatively little or no replication, this in itself is a notable achievement.

Despite several limitations of the Operational Code, it is a useful tool in understanding foreign policy decision making. Of course, as George (1979) and Holsti (1983) argue, the Operational Code is not the final word on foreign policy. Other factors such as systemic, structural and role, may form important inputs in the decision making process and may constitute the independent variables in the causal chain. But the Operational Code, as this study demonstrates, will continue to be a very important intervening variable which cannot be ignored in the study of foreign policy decision making.

## REFERENCES

- Abelson, R., and M. Rosenberg. 1958. "Symbolic Psycho-Logic." *Behavioural Science* 3:1-13.
- Abelson, R., et al. 1968. *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Abelson, R. 1973. "The Structure of Belief Systems." In *Computer Models of Thought and Language*, eds. R. Schank and K. Colby, 287-339. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
- Adorno, T. W., et al. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper.
- Alexander, Jon. 1966. "The Self Fulfilling Prophecy: Path to War." *Change* 2, no. 5.
- Allison, G. 1971. *Essence of a Decision*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Allison, G. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *APSR* 64: 689-718.
- Anckar, D., and V. Ramstedt. 1981. "Relating Preferences to Policy: Three Problem Areas." In *Advances in Content Analysis*, ed. K.E. Rosengren, 89-108, vol. 9. California: Sage Publications.
- Anderson Jr., R. 1974. "The Operational Code Belief System of Senator Arthur Vanderberg: An Application of the George Construct" Ph.d Diss., University of Michigan.
- Andren, Gunnar. 1981. "Reliability and Content Analysis." In *Advances In Content Analysis*, ed. K.E. Rosengren, 43-67, vol. 9. California: Sage Publications.
- Appadorai, A. 1969. *Essays in Politics and International Relations*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1982. *Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations: 1947-1972*. vol I. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

- Aronson, E. 1968. "Dissonance Theory: Progress and Problems." In *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook*, eds. R.P. Abelson et al., 5-27. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Axelrod, R. 1972. *Framework for a General Theory of Cognition and Choice*. Berkeley: University of California: Institute of International Studies and Research, Series 18.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1973. "Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition." *APSR* 67:1248-1266.
- Axelrod, R., et al. 1976. *Structure of Decision*. Princeton NJ: Princeton university Press.
- Balabushevich, V. V., and B. Prasad. eds. 1969. *India and the Soviet Union: A Symposium*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.
- Bem, Daryl. 1970. *Beliefs, Attitudes and Human Affairs*. Belmont CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.
- Ben-zvi, Abraham. 1976. "Misperceiving the Role of Perceptions: A Critique." *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 2:74-93.
- Bhambri, C. P. 1987. *Foreign Policy of India*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1987.
- Bhatia, K. 1974. *Indira: A Biography of Prime Minister Gandhi*. NY: Praeger Publishers.
- Bhattacharya, V. R. 1984. *Indira Gandhi: Her Role in World Peace*. New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co. (pvt) Ltd.
- Binder, L., et al. 1971. *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*. NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Blalock Jr, H.M. 1972. *Social Statistics*. 2d ed. NY: McGraw Hill Book Co.
- Bohrstedt, G. W., and D. Knoke. 1982. *Statistics for Social Data Analysis*. Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock Publishers Inc.
- Bonham, M., and M. Shapiro. 1973. "Simulation in the Development of a Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making." In *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, ed, P. J. McGowen, no. 1. California: Sage Publications.



- Bose, N. M. 1987. *Indira Gandhi on Herself and Her Times*. Calcutta: Ananda Publishers Pvt. Ltd.
- Boulding, K. 1956. *The Image*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1959. "National Images and International Systems" *ICR* 3.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1971. "National Images and International Systems." In *A Multimethod Introduction to International Politics*. eds., W. D. Coplin and C. W. Kegley Jr., 366-380. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co.
- Bourne Jr., L. E., R. L. Dominowski, and F. E. Loftus. 1979. *Cognitive Processes*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Brecher, M. 1968. *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Brecher, M., M. A. Steinberg and J. Stein. 1969. "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour." *ICR* 13:75-101.
- Brecher, M. 1974. *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy*. London: Oxford University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. ed. 1978. *Studies in Crisis Behaviour*. NJ: Transaction Books.
- Brehm, J. W., and A. R. Cohen. 1962. *Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance*. NY: John Wiley and Sons Inc.
- Brodin, K. 1972. "Belief Systems, Doctrines, and Foreign Policy." *Cooperation and Conflict* 7:97-112.
- Bryder, Tom. 1981. "Actor Reliability." In *Advances in Content Analysis*, ed. K. E. Rosengren, 69-88, vol 9. California: Sage Publications.
- Budner, Stanley. 1962. "Intolerance of Ambiguity as a Personality Variable." *Journal of Personality* 30:29-50.
- Burgess, P. M. 1968. *Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
- Burke, S. M. 1974. *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

- Carmines, E., and R. Zeller. 1979. *Reliability and Validity Assessment*. Beverly Hills CA: Sage University Press.
- Carras, M. 1979. *Indira Gandhi in the Crucible of Leadership*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Chari, P. C. 1987. "Security Aspects of Indian Foreign Policy." In *The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives*, ed. S. A. Cohen, 50-60. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Choudhury, G. W. 1975. *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent*. NY: Free Press.
- Christiansen, B. 1965. "Attitudes towards Foreign Affairs a Function of Personality." In *Basic Studies in Social Psychology*, ed. H. Pronshansky and B. Seidenberg, 706-716. NY: Hoit, Rhinehart and Winston.
- Cobb, R. W. 1973. "The Belief System Perspective: An Assessment of a Frawework." Journal of Politics 35: 121-153.
- Cohen, S. A., and R. L. Park. 1978. *India: Emergent Power?* NY: Crane, Ruusak and Co., Inc.
- Cohen, S. A., ed. 1987. *The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Converse, P. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. D. Apter. NY: Free Press.
- Cottam, M.L. 1986. *Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence of Cognition*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
- Crockett, W., and P. Meisel. 1974. "Construct Connectedness, Strength of Disconfirmation and Impression Change." Journal of Personality 42: 290-299.
- Cronbach, L and P. Meehl. 1955 "Construct Validity of Psychological Tests." Psychological Bulletin 52: 281-302.
- Cutler, R. M. 1982. "Unifying the Cognitive Map and Operational Code Approaches: An Integrated Framework with an Illustrative Example." In *Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics*, ed. C. Jonsson, 91-121. London: Frances Pinter Ltd.
- D'Amato, A.A. 1967. "Psychological Constructs in Foreign Policy Prediction." ICR 11: 294-311.

- Das, P.K. 1979. "The Myth of Consensus." In *India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change*, ed. B. Prasad. New Delhi: Vikas Publications.
- De Rivera, J. 1968. *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy*. Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill.
- Deol, D. 1982. *Charisma and Commitment: The Mind and Political Thinking of Indira Gandhi*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt Ltd.
- Dettman, P. R. 1974. "Leaders and Structures in Third World Politics." *Comparative Politics* 6, no. 2:245-269.
- Di Renzo, G. 1974. *Personality and Politics*. NY: Anchor Books.
- Documents of the Seminar on Nonalignment, Self Reliance and Indo-Soviet Cooperation, New Delhi: ISCUS Publication, Jan 1972.
- Dutt, V. P. 1984. *India's Foreign Policy*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.
- Emmert, P., and L. Barker. 1989. *Measurement of Communication Behaviour*. NY: Longman.
- Erickson, E. H. 1948. "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth." In *Personality*, eds. C. Kluckhohn and H. Murray, 485-510. NY: A. Knopf.
- Etheredge, L. 1974. *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy*. (Ph.D Dissertation, Yale University).
- Etzioni, A. 1968. "Social-Psychological Aspects of International Relations." In *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2d ed., eds. G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, 538-601, vol. 5. Menlo Park CA: Addison Wesley Publishing Co.
- Falkowski, L. S. 1979. *Psychological Models in International Politics*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
- Ferguson, A. 1976. *Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education*, 4th ed. NY: McGraw Hill Book Co.
- Festinger, L. 1957. *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Evanston IL: Row, Peterson.
- Fishbein, M., and I. Ajze. 1975. *Belief, Attitudes, Intention, and Behaviour: An Introduction to Theory and Research*. Reading, CA: Addison Wesley Publishers.
- Freud, S., and W. C. Bullitt. 1967. *Thomas Woodrow Wilson*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

- Gandhi, I. 1972. *India and Bangladesh: Selected Speeches and Statements, March - Dec 1971*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1973. *Aspects of our Foreign Policy: From Speeches and Writings*. New Delhi: All India Congress Committee Publications.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1973. *The Years Of Challenge: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, Jan 1966 - Aug 1969*, vol. 1. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1975. *India: The Speeches and Reminiscences of Indira Gandhi*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1975. *Speeches and Writings*. NY: Harper & Row Publishers.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1980. *My Truth*, Presented by Emmanuel Pouchpadass, NY: Grove Press Inc.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1982. *Peoples and Problems*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1983. *The Years of Endeavour: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, Aug 1969-Aug 1972*. vol. 2. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1984. *Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira Gandhi, Sept 1972-March 1977*. vol. 3. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1984. *The Tasks Ahead*. New Delhi: S. Chand & Co. Ltd.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1984. *Letters to an American Friend: 1950-1984*, selected, with commentary, from correspondence with Dorothy Norman. NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers.
- George, A. L., and Juliette George. 1956. *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*. NY: John Day.
- George, A.L. 1969. "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making." *ISQ* 13: 190-222.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1972. "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy." *APSR* 56: 751-785.

- George, A. L., and Smoke. 1974. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. NY: Columbia University Press.
- George, A. L. 1979. "The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision Making Behaviour: The Operational Code Belief System." In *Psychological Models in International Politics*, ed. S. Falkowski, 95-124. Colorado: Westview Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1979b. "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison." In *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy*, ed. P. G. Lauren, 43-68. NY: Free Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1980. *Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Gerard, H. B., E. S. Connolley and R. A. Wilhelmy. 1974. "Compliance, Justification and Cognitive Change." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, ed. L. Berkowitz, 217-246, vol. 7. NY: Academic Press.
- Gerbner, G., O. R. Holsti, K. Krippendorff, W. J. Paisley and P. J. Stone eds. 1969. *The Analysis of Communication Content: Development in Scientific Theories and Computer Techniques*. NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Greenstein, F. 1969. *Personality and Politics*. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co.
- Gupta, B. S. 1983. *Nuclear Weapons Policy Options for India*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Haksar, P. N. et al. 1986. *Studies in Indo-Soviet Relations*. New Delhi: Patriot Publishers.
- Handel, M. I. 1977. "The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise" *ISQ* 21 (Sept): 461-502.
- Hansen, E. G. 1968. "Indian Perceptions of the Chinese Communist Regime and Revolution." *Orbis* 12 (Spring):268-293.
- Hardgrave Jr., R. L. 1984. *India Under Pressure: Prospects for Political Stability*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Hardgrave Jr., R. L., and Stanley Kochanek. 1986. *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation*. 4th ed. NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers.

- Harrison, Selig. 1978. *The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy*. NY: MacMillan Press.
- Hart, David. 1983. *Nuclear Power In India: A Comparative Analysis*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Hart, Henry. 1976. *Indira Gandhi's India: A Political System Reappraised*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1976. "Indira Gandhi: Determined not to be Hurt." In *Indira Gandhi's India: A Political System Reappraised*, ed. H. Hart, 241-274. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
- Harvey, O. J., and H. M. Schroder. 1963. "Cognitive Aspects of Self and Motivation." In *Motivation and Social Interaction*, ed. O.J. Harvey. NY: Ronald Press.
- Heradstveit, D. 1977. *Decision Making in the Middle East: Testing the Operational Code Approach*. Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
- Heradstveit, D., and O. Narvessen. 1978. "Psychological Constraints on Decision Making. A Discussion of Cognitive Approaches: Operational Code and Cognitive Map." *Cooperation and Conflict* 13, no. 2: 77-92.
- Heradstveit, D. 1979. *The Arab Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Hermann, C., Charles Kegley Jr., and James Rosenau. 1987. *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Hermann, M. G. 1974. "Leader Personality and foreign policy Behaviour." In *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods*, ed. James Rosenau, 201-234. NY: Sage - Halsted.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1976. "When Leader Personality will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions." In *In Search of Global Patterns*, ed. James Rosenau, 326-333. NY: Free Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1976. *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders*. NY: Free Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1978. "Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy." In *Why Nations Act*, eds. M. A. East, S.A. Salmore and C. F. Hermann, 49-68. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

- \_\_\_\_\_. 1979. "Indicators of Stress in Policy Makers during Foreign Policy Crises." *Political Psychology* (Spring): 27-46.
- Hermann, M. G., et al. 1987. "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behaviour." In *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, eds Charles Hermann et al., 309-338. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Hoffmann, S.A. 1972. "Anticipation, Disaster, and Victory: India 1962-1979." *Asian Survey* 12: 960-979.
- Hoagland, S.W., and S. G. Walker. 1978. *Operational Code and the Analyses of International Crises: A Comparison of the Berlin Wall and Cuban Missile Crisis*. Tempe AZ: Arizona State University.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1979. "Operational Code and Crisis Outcomes." In *Psychological Models in International Politics*, ed. S. Falkowski, 125-165. Colorado: Westview press.
- Hoel, P. G. 1971. *Elementary Statistics*, 3d ed. NY: John Wiley.
- Holsti, O. R. 1962. "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study." *ICR* 6: 244-252.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1965. "The 1914 Case." *APSR* 59: 365-378.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1967. "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy." *Journal of International Affairs* 21: 16-40.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1969. *Content Analysis for the Social Science and Humanities*. Don Mills, Ont: Addison - Wesley Publishing Co.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1970. "The Operational Code Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: J. F. Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs." *CIPS* 3: 123-157.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1970. "Individual Differences in Definition of the Situation." *ICR* 14:303-310.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1970. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *ISO* 14:233-309.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1971. "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study." In *A Multimethod Introduction to International Politics*, eds. W. Coplin and C. Kegley, 244-252. Chicago: Markham Publishing.

- \_\_\_\_\_. 1972. "Time, Alternatives and Communication: The 1914 and Cuban Missile Crises." In *International Crises: Insights from Behavioural Research*, ed. C. Hermann, 58-80. NY: Free Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1972. *Crisis, Escalation, War*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1975. "Operational Code Belief Systems and Crisis Decision Making." In *Research Tasks for International Crises: Avoidance and Management* (The Advanced Research Projects Agency).
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1976. "Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision Making." *American Behavioural Scientist* 2: 11-33.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1976. "Foreign Policy Formation viewed Cognitively." In *Structure of a Decision*, ed. R. Axelrod, 18-54. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1977. "The Operational Code as an approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems." Final Report to the National Science Foundation. Duke University.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1982. "The Operational Code Approach: Problems and some Solutions." In *Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics*, ed. C. Jonssons, 75-90. London: Frances Pinter Ltd.
- Holsti, O. R., R. A. Brody, and R. C. North. 1964. "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis." *JPR* 3-4: 170-190.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1968. "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis." In *Quantitative International Politics*, ed. J. D. Singer. NY: Free Press.
- Holsti, O. R., and A. George. 1975. "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy Makers." In *Political Science Annual*, ed. C. P. Cotter, 255-319. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Hopple, G. W. 1979. "Elite Values and Foreign Policy Analysis: Preliminary Findings." In *Psychological Models in International Politics*, ed. S. Falkowski, 211-245. Colorado: Westview Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1980. *Political Psychology and Biopolitics: Assessing and Predicting Elite Behaviour in Foreign Policy Crises*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Jackson, R. 1975. *South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. A Political and Historical Analysis of the 1971 war*. NY: Praeger Publishers.



- Jain, H. M. 1974. "Decision Making at the Centre: Role of the Prime Minister of India." *Journal of the Society for the Study of State Governments* 7 (Jan - March): 1-12.
- Jain, R. K., ed. 1981. "China-South Asian Relations: 1947-1980." *Radiant* 2.
- Janis, I. L. 1972. *Victims of Groupthink*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Janis, I. L., and L. Mann. 1977. *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment*. NY: Free Press.
- Jayaramu, P. S. 1987. *India's National Security and Foreign Policy*. New Delhi: ABC Publishing House.
- Jensen, Lloyd. 1982. *Explaining Foreign Policy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Jervis, R. 1968. "Hypotheses on Misperception." *World Politics* 20: 454-479.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1972. *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. NJ: Princeton University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, Loch. 1977. "Operational Codes and the Prediction of Leadership Behaviour: Senator Frank Church at Mid Career." In *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders*, eds. M. G. Hermann and T. Milburn, 82-119. NY: Free Press.
- Jones, E., and R. Nisbett. 1971. *The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perception of the Causes of Behaviour*. NY: General Learning Press.
- Jonsson, Christer. 1982. *Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics*. London: Frances Pinter Ltd.
- Kaplan, A. 1964. *The Conduct of Inquiry*. San Francisco: Chandler Publishers.
- Kapur, A. 1976. *India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making*. NY: Praeger Publishers.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1987. *Pakistan's Nuclear Development*. London: Croom-Helm.
- Kaushik, B. M. 1979. "India's Nuclear Policy." In *India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change*, ed. B. Prasad, 401-410. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing.

- Kelman, H. 1970. "The Role of the Individual in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Considerations." *Journal of International Affairs* 24, no. 4: 1-17.
- Khan, Ayub. 1967. *Friends Not Masters*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Khilnani, N. 1984. *Realities of Indian Foreign Policy*. New Delhi: ABC Publishing House.
- Kirkpatrick, S. A. 1975. "Psychological Views of Decision Making." in *Political Science Annual*, ed. C. P. Cotter, 39-112, vol. 6. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.
- Kissinger, H. 1979. *The White House Years*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
- Knutson, N. J. 1972. *The Human Basis of Policy: A Psychological Study of Political Men*. Chicago: Atherton.
- Kothari, R. 1988. *State Against Democracy: In Search of a Humane World Order*. Delhi: Ajanta Publications.
- Krippendorff, K. 1977. *Validity in Content Analysis*. Philadelphia: Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1980. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*. Newbury Park CA: Sage Publications.
- Kuhn, T. 1962. *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lathrop, R. G. 1969. *Introduction to Psychological Research: Logic, Design, Analysis*. NY: Harper & Row.
- Lasswell, H. D. 1930. *Psychopathology and Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Leites, Nathan. 1951. *The Operational Code of the Politburo*. NY: McGraw-Hill.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1953. *A Study of Bolshevism*. Glenco, IL: Free Press.
- Lentner, H. 1974. *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach*. Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill Publishing Co.

- Levi, A., and P. E. Tetlock. 1980. "A Cognitive Analysis of Japan's 1941 Decision for war." *ICR* 24: 195-211.
- Lewin, K. 1951. "Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers." ed. D. Cartwright. NY: Harper.
- Limaye, M. 1984. *Problems of India's Foreign Policy*. New Delhi: Atma Ram & Sons.
- Little, R. and S. Smith. 1988. *Belief System and International relations*. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
- Longer, V. 1988. *The Defence and Foreign Policies of India*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd.
- Luttbeg, N. 1968. "The Structure of Beliefs among Leaders and the Public." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 32: 308-409.
- McLellan, D. 1970. "The Operational Code Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: Dean Acheson's Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs." *CIPS* 4: 52-75.
- Mankekar, D. R. 1972. *Pakistan Cut to Size*. New Delhi: Indian Book Co.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1986. *Indira Era: A Symposium*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Mansingh, Surjit. 1984. *India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-1982*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1988. "India and the Superpowers: 1966-1984." In *India: The Years of Indira Gandhi*, eds. Y. K. Malik and D. K. Vajpeyi, 132-147. New York: E. J. Brill.
- March, J. G., and H. Simon. 1958. *Organizations*. NY: John Wiley & Sons.
- Masani, Z. 1975. *Indira Gandhi: A Biography*. London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Mehta, V. 1982. *A Family Affair: India under Three Decision Makers*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Menon, K. P. S. 1971. *The Indo-Soviet Treaty: Setting and Meaning*. New Delhi: Vikas Publications.
- Merton, R. K. 1957. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. NY: Free Press.
- Miller, D., and M. Starr. 1967. *The Structure of Human Decisions*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.


- Moraes, D. 1980. *Mrs. Gandhi*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Mueller, J. E. 1969. "The Use of Content Analysis in International Relations." In *The Analysis of Communication Content: Developments in Scientific Theories and Computer techniques*, eds. G. Gerbner et al., 117-146. NY: John Wiley & Sons.
- Mukerjee, D. 1974. "India's Nuclear Test and Pakistan." *India Quarterly* 30, no. 4. (Dec): 262-270.
- Mullik, B. N. 1972. *My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishers.
- Nandy, A. 1980. "Indira Gandhi and the Culture of Indian Politics." In *At the Edge of Psychology*, 112-130. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Nayar, B. R. 1979. "A World Role: The Dialectic of Purpose and Power." In *India a Rising Middle Power*, ed. J. W. Mellor, 117-146. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Neelkant, K. 1972. *Partners in Peace: A Study in Indo-Soviet Relations*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.
- Nehru, J. 1961. *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, Sept 1946 - April 1961*. New Delhi: Publications Divisions, Government of India.
- Noorani, A. G. 1970. *Aspects of India's Foreign Policy*. Bombay: Jaico Publishers.
- Osgood, C. 1960. "Cognitive Dynamics in the Conduct of Human Affairs." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 24 (Summer): 341-365.
- Paige, G. D. 1968. *The Korean Decision: June 24-30*. NY: Free Press.
- Patel, S. R. 1960. *Foreign Policy of India: An Inquiry and Criticism*. Bombay: N. M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd.
- Popper, K. R. 1963. *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*. NY: Harper & Row.
- Powell, C. A., H. Purkitt, and J. Dyson. 1987. "Opening the Black Box: Cognitive Processing and Optimal Choice in Foreign Policy Decision Making." In *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, eds. C. Hermann et al., 203-220. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Prasad, B. 1979. *India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishers.

- Pruitt, D. G. 1965. "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action." In *International Behaviour: A Social Psychological Analysis*, ed. H. C. Kelman, 391-433. NY: Holt Rinehart & Winston.
- Pruitt, D. G., and R. C. Snyder. 1969. *Theory and Research on the Causes of War*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Rao, R. R. 1974. "India's Nuclear Progress - A Balance Sheet." *India Quarterly* 30 (Dec): 239-253.
- Rapoport, A. 1960. *Fights, Games, Debates*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Ray, H. 1973. *Indo-Soviet Relations: 1955-1971*. Bombay: Jaico Publishing House.
- Reynolds, H. T. 1984. *Analysis of Nominal Data*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage University Press.
- Richter, W. L. 1988. "Mrs. Gandhi's Neighbourhood: Indian Foreign Policy toward Neighbouring Countries." In *India: The Years of Indira Gandhi*, eds. Y. K. Malik and D. K. Vajpeyi, 116-131. New York: E. J. Brill.
- Rokeach, M. 1960. *The Open and Closed Mind*. NY: Basic Books.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1968. *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1972. *The Nature of Human Values*. NY: Free Press.
- Roscoe, J. T. 1969. *Fundamental Research Statistics for the Behavioural Sciences*. NY: Holt Rinehart & Winston.
- Rosenau, J. N. 1971. *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*. NY: Nichols Publishing Co.
- Rosengren, K. E., ed. 1981. *Advances in Content Analysis*. CA: Sage Publications.
- Rustow, D. A., ed. 1970. *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership*. NY: Braziller.
- Sahgal, N. 1982. *Indira Gandhi: Her Road to Power*. NY: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.
- Sahota, S. S. 1972. *Indira Gandhi: A Political Biography*. Jullundar, India: New Academic Publishing Co.

- Sarin, L. N. 1974. *Indira Gandhi: A Political Biography*. New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., Pvt. Ltd.
- Sartori, G. 1969. "Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems." *APSR* 63, no. 2: 398-411.
- Sayer, A. 1984. *Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach*. London: Hutchinson.
- Schiebe, K. 1970. *Beliefs and Values*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Schroder, H. M., and P. Suedfeld. 1971. *Personality Theory and Information Processing*. NY: Ronald Press.
- Scott, W. A. 1955. "Reliability of Content Analysis: The Case of Nominal Scale Coding." *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall): 321-325.
- Scott, W. A., and M. Wertheimer. 1962. *Introduction to Psychological Research*. NY: John Wiley & Sons.
- Sears, D. 1967. "Social Anxiety, Opinion Stability and Opinion Change." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 7: 142-151.
- Selim, M. S. 1979. "The Operational Code Belief System and Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Case of Gamal Abdel Nasser" Ph.D diss., Carleton University.
- Shapiro, M. J., and G. M. Bonham. 1973. "Cognitive Processes and Foreign Policy Decision Making." *ISQ* 17: 147-174.
- Sharma, P. K. 1972. *India, Pakistan, China and the Contemporary World*. New Delhi: National Publishing House.
- Sharma, P. L. 1972. *World's Greatest Woman*. New Delhi: ISSD Publication.
- Shaw, M. E., and P. R. Constanzo. 1970. *Theories of Social Psychology*. NY: McGraw Hill Book Co.
- Shourie, A. 1978. *Symptoms of Fascism*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.
- Shweder, R. 1980. *Fallible Judgment in Behavioural Research*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
- Singer, 1968. D. J. "Man and World Politics: The Psychocultural Interface." *Journal of Social Issues* 24: 127-156.

6 | 6  
of/de

PM-1 3 1/2" x 4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET  
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT



PRECISION<sup>SM</sup> RESOLUTION TARGETS

FORMERS IN METHYLENE BLUE TESTING SINCE 1974



LAUREL COUNTY PHOTO & SURVEILLANCE SUPPLY USA  
TEL: 814 438 7887 FAX: 814 438 7887 TLR 348888-88

- Singleton Jr., R., B. Straits, M. Straits, and R. McAllister. 1988. *Approaches to Social Research*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Seshagiri, N. 1975. *The Bomb: Fallout of India's Nuclear Explosion*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.
- Sjoblom, G. 1982. "Some problems of the Operational Code Approach." In *Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics*, ed. C. Jonsson, 37-75. London: Frances Pinter Ltd.
- Snyder, R. C., and J. A. Robinson. 1961. *National and International Decision Making*. NY: Institute for International Order.
- Snyder, R., H. Bruck and B. Sapin. 1962. *Foreign Policy Decision Making*. NY: Free Press, 1962.
- Spiegelman, M., and C. Terwilliger and F. Fearing. 1953. "The Reliability of Agreement in Content Analysis." *Journal of Social Psychology* 37: 175-187.
- Sprout, H. H., and M. E. Sprout. 1965. *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1960. "Geography and International Politics in an Era of Revolutionary Change." *JCR*, 145-161.
- Steinbruner, J. D. 1974. *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stempel, G. H., and B. H. Westley eds. 1981. *Research Methods in Mass Communication*. NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Stempel, G. H. 1981. "Statistical Designs for Content Analysis." In *Research Methods in Mass Communication*, eds. G. H. Stempel et al. NJ: Prentice Hall.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1981. "Content Analysis." In *Research Methods in Mass Communication*, eds. G.H. Stempel et al. NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Strickland, L. et al., eds. 1976. *Social Psychology in Transition*. NY: Plenum.
- Subrahmanyam, K. 1974. "India's Nuclear Explosion and its Impact on Security." *India Quarterly* 30 no. 4 (Dec): 254-261.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1974. "A Weapons Strategy for a Nuclear India." *India Quarterly* 30 no.4 (Dec): 271-275.



- \_\_\_\_\_. 1975. *Self Reliance and National Resilience*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1975. "Significance of the Nuclear Factor in National Strategies - Economic, Political and Military: The Indian Nuclear Policy." In *Self Reliance and National Resilience*, ed. K. Subrahmanyam, 117-130. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1981. "Implications of Nuclear Assymetry." In *Nuclear Myths and Realities*, ed. K. Subrahmanyam. New Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1983. *Indian Security Perspectives*. NJ: Humanities Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1985. *Nuclear Proliferation and International Security*. New Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses.
- Suedfeld, P., and P. E. Tetlock. 1977. "Integrative Complexity of Communication in international Crises." *ICR* 21: 169-184.
- Suedfeld, P., P. E. Tetlock, and C. Ramirez. 1977. "War, Peace and Integrative Complexity." *ICR* 21: 427-442.
- Tanter, R. 1978. "International Crisis Behaviour: An Appraisal of the Literature." *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 3 (Winter-Spring):340-374.
- Tetlock, P. E. 1983. "Policy Makers' Images of International Conflict." *Journal of Social Issues* 39. 67-86.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1983. "Psychological Research on Foreign Policy: A Methodological Overview." In *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, eds. L. Wheeler and P. Shaver, 45-78. Beverly Hills CA: Sage Publications.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1984. "Integrative Complexity of American and Soviet Foreign Policy Rhetoric: A Time Series Analysis." University of California, Berkeley Mimeograph.
- Tharoor, S. 1982. *Reasons of State: Political Development and India's Foreign Policy under Indira Gandhi 1966-1977*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.
- Thomas, R. G. C. 1986. *Indian Security Policy*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Thordarson, B. 1972. *Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision Making*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

- Tolman, E. C. 1951. "A Psychological Model." In *Toward a General Theory of Action*. T. Parsons and E. A. Shils eds., 279-361. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Tufte, E. R. 1974. *Data Analysis for Politics and Policy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Tweraser, K. 1974. *Changing Patterns of Political Beliefs: The Foreign Policy Operational Code of J. William Fulbright*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Van Hollen, C. 1980. "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia." *Asian Survey* 20 no. 4 (April): 339-361.
- Vasudev, U. 1974. *Indira Gandhi: Revolution in Restraint*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.
- Verba, S. 1961. "Assumptions of Rationality and Non Rationality in Models of the International System." In *The International System*, eds. K. Knorr and S. Verba, 217-231. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Vertzberger, Y. 1978. "India's Border Crisis with China." In *Studies in Crisis Behaviour*, ed. M. Brecher, 117-142. NJ: Transaction Books.
- Walker, S. J. 1977. "The Interface between Beliefs and Behaviour: Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War." *ICR* 21: 129-168.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1979. "National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes." In *Psychological Models in International Politics*, ed. S. Falkowski, 169-207. Colorado: Westview Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1983. "The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Reanalysis of the Operational Code Construct." *ISQ* 27, no. 2: 179-201.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1987. "Role Theory and the Origins of Foreign Policy." In *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, eds. C. Hermann et al., 269-284. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Waltz, K. N. 1959. *Man, The State, and War*. NY: Columbia University Press.
- Wilkenfeld, J., G. W. Hoppole, P. J. Rosen and S. J. Andriole. 1980. *Foreign Policy Behaviour*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

- Winter, D. G., and A. J. Stewart. 1977. "Content Analysis as a Technique for Assessing Political Leaders." In *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders*, eds. M. G. Hermann and T. W. Millburn, 27-61. NY: Free Press.
- Wish, N. B. 1980. "Foreign Policy Makers and their National Role Conceptions." *ISQ* 24 no. 4: 532-554.
- Wohlstetter, R. 1962. *Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1965. "Cuba and Pearl Harbour: Hindsight and Foresight." *Foreign Affairs* (July): 691-707.
- Yee, H. S. 1981. "Correlates and Dimensions of the Operational Code Belief Systems: Empirical Findings from a Survey of Canadian Foreign Service Officers." *Journal of Social Science* 20: 27-57.
- Zinnes, D. 1972. "Some Evidence relevant to the Man-Milieu Hypotheses." In *The Analysis of International Politics*, eds. J. Rosenau et al., 209-251. NY: Free Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1976. *Contemporary Research in International Relations*. NY: Free Press.
- Ziring, L., ed. 1982. *The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, its Neighbours and the Great Powers*. NY: Praeger Publishers.

## APPENDIX 1

### THE OPERATIONAL CODE A CODING MANUAL

This codebook provides instructions for identifying and coding materials relating to the operational code beliefs. The instructions that follow divide the coding into four stages in order to limit the # of coding decisions and operations that must be carried out at any one time. Given the large # of questions subsumed under each of the Operational Code beliefs, reliability may suffer unduly if all the coding tasks were to be attempted simultaneously.

#### GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CODING

1. Note that many paragraphs will contain no relevant materials, whereas others may appropriately be coded for more than one belief. However, no sentence, phrase or other unit of text should receive more than a single code. Double coding can create problems of inference at later stages of the analysis. This is not, however, an injunction against the possibility that even a single sentence may in fact be properly coded for two different beliefs. Consider the following example:

Successive governments of Pakistan based the survival and unity of their country on the idea of confrontation with India, but it is my hope that the implementation of the Simla agreement will end the 25 year period of Pakistan's hatred of India and that both countries will become good neighbours.

In this case it would be appropriate to code the first part of the sentence for a belief about the adversary and the second for an expression of optimism. Note that in doing so it has been possible to avoid overlap and the code assigned to the first part of the sentence did not automatically determine how the second was to be coded. The two parts are coded independently.

2. Sometimes the coder may in fact have rather strong preconceptions about what 'X' really meant when he stated 'Y', for example, that he is making a statement that is out of character with the coder's view of his 'real' beliefs. Nevertheless, the materials should be coded as they appear in the text. Use of irony or sarcasm should be literally interpreted.

3. Code only what appears in the text. Answers to the Operational Code questions may appear to form some recurring patterns, for example, one who believes in a high degree of control over historical development, is more likely to accord a lesser role to chance. But here care must be taken to code only what appears in the text and not to assume the existence of unstated beliefs just because they are likely to be associated with others that are found in the material being coded.

4. How much to code? Purely factual, non-judgmental material should not be coded; for example:

On March 23, 1971, Sheik Mujibur Rehaman was arrested.

On December 3, 1971, the president of Pakistan, Gen. Yayha Khan ordered the bombing of major Indian airfields.

Such materials should not be coded because, by themselves, they would appear to be no more than statements of fact upon which there would be little, if any, disagreement. Such a recounting of facts does not appear to tell us very much about the author's beliefs, except in a somewhat indirect way. If, however, a factual statement is presented as part of an evaluation, judgment, or prescription, then it is that latter which is of interest. Examples of the uses which may be made of 'factual' statements about the adversary include the following:

- a. As evidence about the opponent's goals, Operational Code etc.;
- b. As a source of lessons about how to cope with the adversary;
- c. As a part of a judgment about some aspects of the opponents policies.

In some cases it will be difficult to determine what constitutes a judgment and what constitutes a fact. Consider the following statement:

China supported the military regime in Pakistan to quell the rebellion in E. Pakistan.

Any evidence of the Chinese involvement in the Bangladesh crisis is fragmentary, an assertion of this type largely constitutes a judgement on the part of the author. It should therefore be coded.

## **STAGE I**

1. The first step in coding is to assign each document an ID #. Each paragraph in the document is to be numbered consecutively and the number is to be placed in the right hand margin at the top of the paragraph. Indented quotations within a paragraph should not be assigned a seperate number. If coding an interview or conference each answer should be assigned one number. In case of minutes, each uninterrupted passage should be coded as one paragraph. Numbered items within the same paragraph should not be assigned a seperate number.

2. Your task is to determine whether each paragraph contains materials relevant to any of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Read the source materials that you will be coding as a whole. This will give you a general idea of the referent, beliefs, issues, adversaries etc. Return to the beginning of the source material to be coded and begin with the first paragraph. Does this paragraph contain a sentence, or a passage which expresses a descriptive, evaluative or an advocatory belief relevant to any of the operational code beliefs? The instructions for this stage of coding provides a set of questions that, if answered in the affirmative, would indicate that the paragraph should be coded. If the paragraph is judged to contain relevant material, enclose the relevant passage in the text with parentheses. This will help determine which operational code beliefs will be coded. If a paragraph is not relevant to any of the operational code beliefs, it should not be coded.

**STAGE II** (Documentation)

Col.

**1-4 Document Identification Number:**

Each document should be assigned a serial ID # which should also be entered on the first page of the text.

**5-6 Year:**

Enter last two digits of the year. For example; for 1971 enter 71.

**7-8 MONTH:**

(01)Jan, (02)Feb, (03)Mar, (04)Apr, (05)May, (06)June, (07)July, (08)Aug, (09)Sep, (10)Oct, (11)Nov, (12)Dec.

**9 TYPE OF DOCUMENT:**

- |                       |                           |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| (1) Speech            | (6) Minutes               |
| (2) Press conference  | (7) Books/articles        |
| (3) Inaugural address | (8) Broadcasts            |
| (4) Letter            | (9) Private communication |
| (5) Memoirs/diary     |                           |

**10-11 AUDIENCE:**

- (1) Mass rally
- (2) Nationwide TV/Radio
- (3) Parliament
- (4) The UN
- (5) Armed Forces
- (6) Group of intellectuals
- (7) Foreign politicians/diplomats
- (8) Foreign audience/general
- (9) Domestic audience/general
- (10) Friend
- (11) Press
- (12) International/regional conference
- (13) Congress party
- (14) Books/magazines

**12-14 Paragraph #:**

Enter the number of the paragraph being coded; 001,002,003 etc.

**15-16 Issue:**

Enter the issue which is being discussed at the point the material related to the Operational Code belief appears. You may look to preceding or subsequent paragraphs for information, but be sure that there has not been an intervening change of context. For example, to determine whether a specific issue is in fact a domestic or foreign issue area, look for the impact of the interaction involved. If the location of the interaction is located in the domestic domain, it should be coded as domestic.

**(01) Domestic Military Security:**

All issues which focus on domestic violence, domestic order, relations with domestic opponents, security and armament.

**(02) Domestic Political Issues:**

Specific developments in the domestic political structures and processes.

**(03) Domestic Economic Developmental:**

Issues involving acquisition and allocation of resources such as plans for economic reform, development, trade, budget etc.

**(04) Domestic Status:**

Issues related to national independence, integration, national symbols etc.

**(05) Domestic Cultural:**

Cultural Programs, educational issues etc.

**(06) Foreign Status:**

Issues related to the perception of his/her country's role in the global system.

**(07) Foreign Cultural:**

Issues pertaining to cultural and educational exchange with other countries.

**(08) Foreign Economic Developmental:**

Issues related to the acquisition, allocation of resources such as foreign trade, foreign aid, and foreign investment.

**(09) Foreign Military security:(Relations with west)**

Issues related to alliances, weaponry and all issues perceived as constituting military threat.

**(10) Foreign Military Security: (relations with communist countries)****(11) Foreign Military Security: (immediate regional system)**

Relations with the countries of S.Asia or neighbouring countries.

- (12) Foreign Political Diplomatic:(with West)
- (13) Foreign Political Diplomatic:(with Communist)
- (14) Foreign Political Diplomatic:(immediate regional system)
- (15) Regional Economic Developmental: (Asian)
- (16) Regional Political Diplomatic:
- (17) Regional Military Security:
- (18) Regional Cultural:
- (19) Regional Status:

### 17-18 Adversary:

Enter the adversary which is referred to in the paragraph. In some cases it may be necessary to look somewhere else within the document for information. Do not code this category if there is no adversary.

- |                    |                           |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| (01) China         | (11) China, Pakistan      |
| (02) France        | (12) USA, Pakistan, China |
| (03) W. Germany    | (13) UN                   |
| (04) USSR          | (14) Burma                |
| (05) UK            | (15) Nepal                |
| (06) Sri Lanka     | (16) Tibet                |
| (07) USA           | (17) Bangladesh           |
| (08) USA, China    | (18) Imperialist Powers   |
| (09) Pakistan      | (19) Israel               |
| (10) USA, Pakistan |                           |

## STAGE III

### 19 Sources of Knowledge about the Operational Code Philosophical Beliefs:

This question focuses on the author's knowledge - the sources of politically relevant knowledge. The author might indicate he/she is relying upon theory, historical experiences or lessons, specific events etc. This category refers to sources of knowledge as related only to the cited philosophical beliefs.

#### (1) Theory/Ideology:

Author draws upon or cites a body of thought, literature, philosophy, as a guide to support his/her views.



- (2) **Trends:**  
The author extrapolates from a series of events.
- (3) **Experience:**  
Author draws upon his/her personal experiences to substantiate his/her point.
- (4) **History:**  
Lessons of history are cited as evidence of the author's diagnoses or prescription.
- (5) **Faith:**  
The author indicates that the point he/she is making has to be accepted on faith without citing some alternative basis for his/her belief.
- (6) **Specific Events:**  
Generalizes from specific events.

## **20 Nature of the Political Universe (Philosophical Belief# 1)**

This category encompasses basic beliefs about the more or less enduring characteristics of politics, history and social life - the core beliefs about the universe and relationships within it. This is in contrast to diagnoses that are applicable only to specific actors, situations, events or actions. If however, such single examples are cited for the purpose of illustrating some general truths about the nature of politics, the passage should be coded under this category. Here we are referring to a question about the essential nature of the political universe. Is conflict the normal state of affairs, or is it an aberration that occurs from time to time in an essentially harmonious universe? Is the political universe a Hobbesian one - a war of all against all - in which only a thin veneer of civilization or strong social controls stand in the way of constant danger of anarchy, or is there a basic harmony of interests among men and nations? In the latter case the author may believe that the underlying harmony of interests exists even though it may not necessarily be reflected in the contemporary situation, i.e., harmony of interests is latent than manifest. In what respects (for example, for what types of issues, in what kind of circumstances) is political life consensual? conflictual? Does the political universe consist essentially of friends and enemies, or are intermediate positions such as non-involvement or nonalignment recognized and accepted?

Check one of the following:

(1) **Conflictual:**

The author indicates that conflict is the normal state of relations in political life. It is an inherent aspect of politics rather than a temporary aberration.

(2) **Mixed:**

This category is to be used when there is a reference to both conflictual and consensual elements. The potential for both is inherent in the system. For

example, this would be used if the author referred to the basic harmony on some type of issues as well as fundamental conflict on others.

**(3) Harmonius:**

The author regards the political universe as one with many shared interests among individuals, nations etc. The harmony of interests may be latent, imperfectly recognized or temporarily overridden—thus resulting in war or other forms of conflict, but underlying these conditions is a harmony of interests. The barriers to adequate recognition of that harmony are capable of being reduced or eliminated by various types of reforms.

**21 Sources of Conflict (1st reference):**

Is conflict rooted in relatively permanent, non-manipulable features of the political universe? For example, is its source to be found in some aspect of 'human nature'? (for example, "aggressiveness is part of man's biological nature". Alternatively, can conflict be traced to more or less transitory, relatively easily correctible phenomena? Does conflict arise from fundamental and relatively permanent differences of principles (ideology, religion world view etc.) or does it arise from rather specific, concrete issues

Check one of the following;

**(1) Human Nature:**

Reference to the source of conflict in some quality that is seen as widely shared by human beings; for example, selfishness, irrationality, limited ability to cope with complexity etc. If the reference is to the personal attributes of a specific leader (for example, Hitler's madness) or a group of leaders (shiite priests) it should be coded under #3 below i.e., attribute of states. The test is this: Is there reason to believe that the attribute in question is thought to be widely shared, or does the author believe that it is confined to some individual or identifiable subgroup? The former should be coded as human nature and the latter should not.

**(2) Ideological Attributes of nations:**

Conflict is believed to arise from the qualities of a specific philosophy, religion, or world view (aggressiveness of Islam, messianic goals of Marxism, Leninism etc.)

**(3) Political Attributes of Nations:**

The author states that the sources of international conflict can be traced to certain types of political, structures and processes. References to conflict arising from the inherent aggressiveness of totalitarian states, on the unstable foreign policy of democratic states, are examples of this category.

**(4) Economic Attributes of Nations:**

This category should be used when the author cites the quality of a particular system of acquisition, production or distribution of material goods as the basic source of conflict. It should also be used when there is a reference to conflict arising from other economic attributes of the nation, for example, when the motives for expansion or aggression are traced to a nation's lack of sufficient resources, requirements for markets etc.

**(5) Nationalism in the International System:**

This category is used for reference about conflict arising from antipathies between two or more ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious groups.

**(6) Power Politics:**

Here, conflict is seen to arise from the interaction of nations searching for or threatening national security. Reference to conflict stemming from arms races, alliance commitments, the security dilemma, geopolitical manoeuvring etc.. would all be coded under this category, as would statements indicating that conflict is inherent in an international system in which each state is responsible for its own security.

**(7) Imperialism, Colonialism, Racism:**

The author believes that most conflicts in the world arise because of imperialism, colonialism and racialism. The need for expansion in order to further one's economic, political and territorial interests is what causes countries to come into conflict with each other and more so when this is resisted by the country that is being exploited. Code this category if any of the above three concepts are referred to either directly or indirectly.

**(8) Inequality:**

The author believes that inequality among nations is a prime source of conflict. Here, inequality refers to economic variables like resources, technology, capital, trade potential etc., which divides the world into have and have-nots. Code this category if the author suggests that for example that "division between the rich and poor nations are likely to cause more wars than alliances or the arms race."

**22 Sources of Conflict (2nd reference):**

If there is more than one reference to the source of conflict in a paragraph, this category should be used. Use this to code the 2nd reference.

**(1) Human Nature:**

Reference to the source of conflict in some quality that is that is seen as widely

shared by human beings; for example, selfishness, irrationality, limited ability to cope with complexity etc. If the reference is to the personal attributes of a specific leader ( for example, Hitler's madness) or a group of leaders ( shiite priests) it should be coded under #3 below i.e., attribute of states. The test is this: Is there reason to believe that the attribute in question is thought to be widely shared, or does the author believe that it is confined to some individual or identifiable subgroup? The former should be coded as human nature and the latter should not.

**(2) Ideological Attributes of nations:**

Conflict is believed to arise from the qualities of a specific philosophy, religion, or world view (aggressiveness of Islam, messianic goals of Marxism etc.)

**(3) Political Attributes of Nations:**

The author states that the sources of international conflict can be traced to certain types of political, structures and processes. References to conflict arising from the inherent aggressiveness of totalitarian states, on the unstable foreign policy of democratic states, are examples of this category.

**(4) Economic Attributes of Nations:**

This category should be used when the author cites the quality of a particular system of acquisition, production or distribution of material goods as the basic source of conflict. It should also be used when there is a reference to conflict arising from other economic attributes of the nation, for example, when the motives for expansion or aggression are traced to a nation's lack of sufficient resources, requirements for markets etc.

**(5) Nationalism in the International System:**

This category is used for reference about conflict arising from antipathies between two or more ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious groups.

**(6) Power Politics:**

Here, conflict is seen to arise from the interaction of nations searching for or threatening national security. Reference to conflict stemming from arms races, alliance commitments, the security dilemma, geopolitical manoeuvring etc., would all be coded under this category, as would statements indicating that conflict is inherent in an international system in which each state is responsible for its own security.

**(7) Imperialism, Colonialism, Racism:**

The author believes that most conflicts in the world arise because of imperialism, colonialism and racialism. The need for expansion in order to further one's economic, political and territorial interests is what causes countries to come into conflict with each other, more so when this is resisted by the country that is

being exploited. Code this category if any of the above three concepts are referred to either directly or indirectly.

**(8) Inequality:**

The author believes that inequality among nations is a prime source of conflict. Here, inequality refers to economic variables like resources, technology, capital, trade potential etc., which divides the world into have and have-nots. Code this category if the author suggests that for example that "division between the rich and poor nations are likely to cause more wars than alliances or the arms race."

**23 Conditions of Peace (1st reference):**

Does the author discuss the necessary or sufficient conditions for establishing or maintaining peace? There are a wide range of possible answers to this question. Probably most of them will fall into one of several clusters. For example, better education, knowledge, or communication among people and nations to break down misunderstandings, suspicions etc; eliminate or transform a specific nation, or nations of a particular class, or otherwise affect changes in the attributes of nations and the international system; eliminate inequalities among nations, maintain balance of power, transform some basic features of the international system, promote non-alignment, regional co-operation and improve economic conditions in the poor countries etc. Check one of the following:

**(1) Education, Communication, Negotiation:**

The author states that better education and information, or better communication between nations and peoples will allay the misunderstandings, misperception, lack of trust, xenophobia, irrational hatreds and other sources of conflict. Better education and communication can lead to an understanding and appreciation of the fundamental harmony of interests.

**(2) Eliminate offending nations:**

The author indicates that the necessary or 'sufficient' conditions of peace require the elimination or transformation of a specific nation or a class of nations (for example, communist nations, fascist nations, capitalistic nations etc.).

**(3) Eliminate Inequalities:**

The author states that eliminating inequalities among nations will create the conditions for peace. This theme is more likely to occur with reference to wealth, resources, productivity, standard of living and other aspects of economics.

**(4) Maintain Balance of Power:**

The author asserts that the best or only means of ensuring peace is to maintain a balance of power, to prevent expansion by ambitious adversaries, to deter aggression, to maintain stability etc. Sometimes this is expressed in some form of the 'para bellum' doctrine: "If you want peace prepare for war."

**(5) Transform the System:**

Categories 4 and 5 above focus on the international system, but both of these responses accept the system and its basic features (for example, the primacy of the nation state). Others may propose some significant changes in the structure and functioning of the system. For example, various types of proposals for world government illustrate this category of response, as do suggestions that international organizations be given primary responsibility for maintaining the security of member nations.

**(6) Promote Non-Alignment:**

Here, the author suggests that peace can be obtained only if more and more countries become non-aligned and get out of the vortex of big power politics. Non-alignment would more likely lead to peace, with its emphasis on political, economic and regional co-operation. With peace as its ideal, it would foster a better world climate.

**(7) Promote Regional Co-operation:**

This would foster the spirit of friendship and promote the idea of co-operative solutions to world problems, which in turn will make way for a positive kind of peace.

**(8) Improve Economic Conditions:**

The only way to bring about peace is to improve the economic conditions in the poor countries and provide for better living standards, since great disparities in wealth are a prime source of conflict.

**(9) Non interference:**

The author believes that peace can be maintained or established if no country interfered with another country's internal or external affairs.

**24 Conditions of Peace (2nd reference):**

If there is more than one reference to the conditions for peace in a paragraph, this category should be used.

**(1) Education, Communication, Negotiation:**

The author states that better education and information, or better communication between nations and peoples will allay the misunderstandings, misperception, lack of trust, xenophobia, irrational hatreds and other sources of conflict. Better education and communication can lead to an understanding and appreciation of the fundamental harmony of interests.

**(2) Eliminate offending nations:**

The author indicates that the necessary or 'sufficient' conditions of peace require the elimination or transformation of a specific nation or a class of nations (for

example, communist nations, fascist nations, capitalistic nations etc.).

**(3) Eliminate Inequalities:**

The author states that eliminating inequalities among nations will create the conditions for peace. This theme is more likely to occur with reference to wealth, resources, productivity, standard of living and other aspects of economics.

**(4) Maintain Balance of Power:**

The author asserts that the best or only means of ensuring peace is to maintain a balance of power, to prevent expansion by ambitious adversaries, to deter aggression, to maintain stability etc. Sometimes this is expressed in some form of the 'para bellum' doctrine: "If you want peace prepare for war."

**(5) Transform the System:**

Categories 4 and 5 above focus on the international system, but both of these responses accept the system and its basic features (for example, the primacy of the nation state). Others may propose some significant changes in the structure and functioning of the system. For example, various types of proposals for world government illustrate this category of response, as do suggestions that international organizations be given primary responsibility for maintaining the security of member nations.

**(6) Promote Non-Alignment:**

Here, the author suggests that peace can be obtained only if more and more countries become non-aligned and get out of the vortex of big power politics. Non-alignment would more likely lead to peace, with its emphasis on political, economic and regional co-operation. With peace as its ideal, it would foster a better world climate.

**(7) Promote Regional Co-operation:**

This would foster the spirit of friendship and promote the idea of co-operative solutions to world problems, which in turn will make way for a positive kind of peace.

**(8) Improve Economic Conditions:**

The only way to bring about peace is to improve the economic conditions in the poor countries and provide for better living standards, since great disparities in wealth are a prime source of conflict.

**(9) Non-interference:**

The author believes that peace can be maintained or established if no country interfered with another country's internal or external affairs.

**25 Nature of Conflict:**

Is conflict viewed as a zero sum situation (one actor's gain is another actor's loss) or is it non zero sum (both parties may gain, or both may lose in a given situation) in nature? Alternatively, what types of conflict are zero sum in nature and what are non zero sum? Check one of the following:

**(1) Zero Sum:**

This refers to situations in which the gains of one party result in an equal loss to the other. Sometimes the same idea is expressed as a 'fixed sum' situation -the total of the values for which the parties are competing is fixed and therefore whatever one gains is at the cost of others. Poker, for example, is a zero sum game. In international politics, territorial disputes often have this character.

**(2) Non Zero Sum:**

In a non zero sum situation, both parties may gain, both may lose, or the gain of one may be greater or less than the other's loss. That is, the sum of values rather than being fixed may either expand or contract. Unlike a zero sum situation in which the interests of the competing parties are diametrically opposed, in this case there is atleast some degree of common interest, co-operative action may increase the sum of values, whereas conflict may reduce the total. The following example would indicate a belief that a conflict situation was a non zero sum one: "The more secure the Soviet Union's deterrent forces, the greater one's own security." (that is , the sum total of security is not fixed, and in some circumstances both the US and USSR may gain). "In a nuclear war there can be no winners, only losers, or both nations will inevitably suffer catastrophic devastation." (that is, one party's loss in this case is also seen as the other's loss)

**(3) Mixed:**

Use this category when the author indicates that on some issues there are mutual interests, whereas on others they are diametrically opposed.

**26 Scope of Conflict:**

Are all issues linked as part of a broader, more fundamental conflict, or are the issues seperable so that one may deal with each one on its own merits? In the former case, one would expect to find (a) conflict readily spilling over from one issue area to another, rather than remaining contained within the original issue and, (b) a similar lineup of friends and enemies on each issue.

**(1) All Issues Linked:**

Believes that each issue is a part of a larger or more fundamental conflict. For example, that all important issues in politics are essentially part of a larger struggle between the forces of freedom versus those of repression.



**(2) All Issues Seperable:**

Each issue to be appraised on its own merit, one should avoid the temptation to link each conflict with a larger or more comprehensive one.

**(3) High Spillover:**

Although not necessarily viewing all conflicts as linked, the belief that each one has a high potential for spilling over into others - spillover from one issue area to another; (for example, economic conflict to political etc.) and from one geographical area to the others; (for example, local conflicts in the far east will spread to other regions).

**27 Role of Conflict:****(1) Desirable:**

Conflict is regarded as not only indispensable for the achievement of important goals and for progress, but it is also viewed as inherently valuable in its own right. Conversely, the absence of conflict is believed to result in stagnation and lack of progress.

**(2) Undesirable:**

Conflict is not really necessary or valuable for the achievement of important goals and progress. Conflict can only cause stagnation and lack of progress.

**(3) Mixed:**

For some goals or in some circumstances conflict may be necessary or functional but in others it is not.

**(4) Functional:**

According to this view, conflict may be costly or even distasteful, but it also helps one to achieve important goals. Conflict is a necessary cost to be borne in the pursuit of one's goals.

**(5) Dysfunctional:**

Conflict is viewed as standing in the way of achieving important goals, or otherwise diminishing the prospects for success.

**28 Character of Political Opponents:**

What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents? This category includes beliefs about goals, strategies, tactics, sources of motivation, approaches to political calculation and other characteristics of major opponents.

This category is restricted to one fundamental question: What does the author believe are the fundamental goals of the opponent?

(1) Destructive:

the opponent is believed to have virtually unlimited goals, such as universal hegemony, destruction or radical transformation of the existing international system, destroying or otherwise eliminating other actors in the system, conquest or enslavement and the like.

(2) Expansionist:

The opponent is perceived as wanting to maintain or to extend its territorial control over the other side's territory.

(3) Aggressive:

The opponent is regarded as aggressive in the pursuit of its interests and in seeking areas of weakness in which it can expand its influence. It is active and opportunistic in pursuing its interests, but its goals will usually fall short of those sought by destructionist states, for example, they do not include destruction or radical transformation of the international system.

(4) Defensive:

A defensive opponent is believed to be primarily concerned with its own security or maintenance of the status quo rather than with aggrandizement for its own sake. The search for security may lead to the infringement on the security - or even the sovereignty - of others; the conception of what constitutes adequate security may be rather grandiose; and the fears that motivate it may be poorly grounded in fact. Moreover, the status quo that the opponent is trying to maintain may be regarded as neither justified or legitimate (for example, Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe). Nevertheless, the opponent is regarded as motivated primarily by preservation rather than by further aggrandizement.

(5) Conciliatory:

The opponent is viewed as ready and willing to undertake at least limited accommodation when it is in its interest to do so.

(6) Active Seeker of Peace:

This category is not likely to be used often in connection with adversaries, as it expresses the belief that the opponent is prepared to undertake major initiatives and to make important concessions in the interests of international stability and better relations with others.

(7) Domestic Development:

The opponent's goals are basically domestic, political, economic, and/or social development and change.

**(8) Restorative:**

The opponent is believed to be primarily concerned with restoring territory, status, human or non human resources etc., that had been previously held or owned, as opposed to acquiring something not previously owned.

**29 Sources of Opponent's Goals:**

In formulating goals and policies, is the opponent believed to be acting primarily as a result of its own qualities and dispositions (for example, the ideology, beliefs, values, or personality traits of a particular leader or group of elites; its historical goals or policies; structural and other characteristics and requirements of its society, government, major institutions etc.)? Alternatively, does the author believe that the adversary is acting in response to situational forces (for example, pressures and constraints from the international environment; the search for security within a system of power politics; policies of other actors, including one's own nation etc.)? This distinction largely corresponds to the belief that the opponent's motivations come from internal and external forces, respectively. Check one of the following answers:

**(1) Ideology/Religion:**

The opponent's goals and aspirations are prescribed by a philosophy, world view, religion, or other forms of doctrine.

**(2) Historical Goals:**

The opponent is seen to be pursuing goals that have traditionally been associated with that nation, irrespective of the regime, leadership, or specific circumstances.

**(3) Internal Needs:**

The policies of the adversary are seen as stemming from pressures and constraints within its own borders. These may take a variety of forms, including: responses to the needs and demands of powerful segments of the society (for example, the army), actions that are designed to divert attention from a particular domestic problem, or to overcome a lack of certain types of resources or capabilities.

**(4) Leader Traits:**

This category should be checked when the author asserts that the opponent's goals and aspirations essentially reflect the needs, motivations, values, aspirations, or personalities of its present leaders.

**(5) Power Politics:**

The opponent's goals and aspirations are believed to be essentially similar to those of any nation (for example, security, self extension, the pursuit of power and influence etc.), irrespective of its social, political, or economic institutions, or the nature of its leadership.

**(6) External Pressures:**

The opponent is believed to be responding primarily to pressures from its external environment. That is, the adversary is essentially reacting to and constrained by the policies of others, rather than initiating foreign policy undertakings that reflect its own goals.

**30 Generality of Adversary's Hostility:****(1) General/Permanent:**

The author believes that the opponent's hostility or opposition is not limited to a specific issue, nor does it arise from sources that are rooted in such broad, basic differences that neither a single policy initiative nor resolution of a particular issue is likely to change the fundamentally antagonistic nature of relations between the nations.

**(2) General/Temporary:**

The author believes that the opponent's hostility is not limited to a specific issue, but he believes also that such hostility is not rooted in any fundamental differences between one's own nation and the enemy.

**(3) Specific/Permanent:**

Although the range of the adversary's hostility is limited to a specific issue or a set of issues, the differences between the two sides is so deep and fundamental that it is highly unlikely to be resolved in the near future.

**(4) Specific/Temporary:**

The author believes that relations with the adversary are shaped by conflict on issues of a specific nature that, if resolved, would result in at least normal relations between the opponent and one's own nation. Thus, the adversary's hostility or opposition is likely to be limited to the period of time required to resolve the issue. It should be added that the specific issue in question need not be merely a trivial one; it might, for example, be as important as "normalization of relations between India and Pakistan", "the granting of independence to Bangladesh".

**31 Likely Response to Our Conciliatory Moves:**

This category deals with the author's estimate of the manner in which the opponent would respond to conciliatory moves, concessions etc.

**(1) Reciprocate in this Situation:**

The author believes that a conciliatory move will lead the opponent to reciprocate with a conciliatory move or with concession on the particular issue under consideration. The adversary is likely to accept conciliatory moves at face value and respond in kind.

**(2) Reciprocate in other Situations:**

If one undertakes conciliatory actions the adversary is believed to be willing to make concessions in other issues as well. That is, the author believes that there will be a transfer or spillover from one issue to others as a consequence of conciliatory moves one might undertake, resulting in generally better relations.

**(3) Ignore:**

The author believes that whatever concessions one might make are quite irrelevant to the opponent's policy calculations. The adversary's goals and means of pursuing them are not sensitive to any actions one might undertake. They are thus unlikely to be affected in any significant way by one's conciliatory moves.

**(4) Take Advantage in this Situation:**

According to this view, if one makes a concession or a conciliatory gesture, the adversary will seize the opportunity to register a gain, will interpret it as a sign of weakness that may safely be exploited, or will otherwise make an effort to put it to his advantage rather than to ignore it or reciprocate with a similar move. Taking advantage is limited to the specific issue under consideration.

**(5) Take Advantage in other Situations:**

This view is very close to the Munich syndrome. That is, the author believes that not only will the adversary take advantage of a conciliatory move on one issue, but it will take it as a sign that one's own nation lacks resolve everywhere. Therefore, the likely result of such policy moves is that the adversary will be emboldened to probe, or push forward on other issues or in other areas as well. Put somewhat differently, matters of resolve and credibility are seen as tightly linked because the adversary's characteristic manner of appraising one's actions and responding to them.

**32 Likely Response to our Policy of Firmness:****(1) Back Down:**

By pursuing a policy of firmness or boldness, one will cause the opponent to back down, to concede important points, or even to abandon major foreign policy undertakings. For example, "By standing firm we can force the enemy to back down (the enemy may be bluffing, testing our resolve, probing etc.). If, however, the enemy does not back down, this demonstrates that it is prepared to go to war, and we might as well have the showdown now rather than later."

**(2) Ignore:**

The enemy is believed to be acting on the basis of its own firm goals and timetable. Therefore, our firmness is not likely to have any significant effect one way or the other, on the opponent's policies.

**(3) Reciprocate in this Situation:**

If we pursue a policy of firmness or a hard line, the opponent is likely to harden its own position with respect to the particular issue under consideration. That is, the author believes that within the context of the given issue a firm policy will result in deadlock at minimum, and possibly escalation as well.

**(4) Reciprocate in other Situations:**

The author believes that the result of our policy of firmness will be that the opponent will harden its own policies on other issues or in other situations. That is, the confrontation or escalation is likely to spillover into other issues.

**(5) Respond Impulsively/Irrationally:**

The author believes that if one pursues a firm or hard line, it is likely to push the adversary into a corner, creating a situation in which the enemy may respond impulsively or in an emotional rather than in a calculating manner. For example, the author may believe that a hard line will result in frustration of the opponent to the point that it may respond with an aggressive response that is not rational in the circumstances.

**33 Opponent's Image of one's own Nation:**

This category refers to the author's beliefs about the manner in which the opponent views the author's nation. Essentially the same categories used for coding the opponent's goals (column 28) are employed here.

**(1) Destructive:**

the opponent is believed to have virtually unlimited goals, such as universal hegemony, destruction or radical transformation of the existing international system, destroying or otherwise eliminating other actors in the system, conquest or enslavement and the like.

**(2) Expansionist:**

The opponent is perceived as wanting to maintain or to extend its territorial control over the other side's territory.

**(3) Aggressive:**

The opponent is regarded as aggressive in the pursuit of its interests and in seeking areas of weakness in which it can expand its influence. It is active and opportunistic in pursuing its interests, but its goals will usually fall short of those sought by destructionist states, for example, they do not include destruction or radical transformation of the international system.

**(4) Defensive:**

A defensive opponent is believed to be primarily concerned with its own security or maintenance of the status quo rather than with aggrandizement for its own sake. The search for security may lead to the infringement on the security - or even the sovereignty - of others; the conception of what constitutes adequate security may be rather grandiose; and the fears that motivate it may be poorly grounded in fact. Moreover, the status quo that the opponent is trying to maintain may be regarded as neither justified or legitimate (for example, Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe). Nevertheless, the opponent is regarded as motivated primarily by preservation rather than by further aggrandizement.

**(5) Conciliatory:**

The opponent is viewed as ready and willing to undertake atleast limited accomodation when it is in its interest to do so.

**(6) Active Seeker of Peace:**

This category is not likely to be used often in connection with adversaries, as it expresses the belief that the opponent is prepared to undertake major initiatives and to make important concessions in the interests of international stability and better relations with others.

**(7) Domestic Development:**

The opponent's goals are basically domestic, political, economic, and/or social development and change.

**(8) Restorative:**

The opponent is believed to be primarily concerned with restoring territory, status, human or non human resources etc., that had been previously held or owned, as opposed to acquiring something not previously owned.

**34 Opponent's View of Conflict:****(1) Inevitable:**

The enemy believes that sooner or later there will be some type of ultimate show down with one's own nation.

**(2) Avoidable:**

The opponent believes that such show down can be avoided.

**(3) Desirable:**

The author asserts that the adversary welcomes or seeks conflict as a means of coping with domestic problems, of enhancing the prospects of realizing certain aspirations, or of maintaining vigilance.

**(4) Undesirable:**

The opponent is believed to regard a diminution of conflict as a necessary or desirable condition for the effective pursuit of goals.

**(5) Inevitable/Desirable.****(6) Inevitable/Undesirable.****(7) Avoidable/Desirable.****(8) Avoidable/Undesirable.****35 Opponent's decision making process:****(1) Unitary Actor:**

The opponent's nation is seen as a unitary actor insofar as making foreign policy decisions is concerned. The adversary's political system is a monolithic one or, at least for purposes of diagnoses and understanding the opponent's foreign policy, one may overlook the existence of parties, pressure groups or other factions.

**(2) Bureaucratic Model:**

Policies are believed to reflect the inertia and other attributes and consequences of policy making by large, bureaucratic organizations. Thus, policy is likely to be characterized by continuity (even when circumstances have changed enough to result in something less than totally rational policies). Leaders come and go, but the main contours of policy change at a glacial pace if at all, because pre existing organizational processes, commitments, etc., importantly influence policy.

**(3) Competing Factions:**

The author conceives of the government as being composed of competing factions. Policy may be seen as emerging out the interplay of that competition, or the author may believe that there are at least groups within the opposing nation that would pursue different policies. Sometimes the latter view is couched in terms of hard liners versus soft liners; for example, the author may indicate the present ruling group represents the moderates, at least in the sense that they are more likely than alternative elites to be people one can deal with.

**36 Opponent's Decision Making Style:****(1) Calculating:**

The adversary is regarded as a rational actor. Decisions are made on the basis of careful cost-benefit calculations. The author rejects suggestions that the opponent's policies may also reflect, at least in part, such factors as accident,



miscalculation, inadequate information, errors of judgment, misperception, or failures of control over subordinates. Thus, when the adversary engages in a particular type of activity, it is by design.

(2) **Impulsive:**

The adversary is seen as capable, at least at times, of making decisions on the basis of emotional or other non rational considerations.

37 **Opponent's Choice of Objectives (1st):**

(1) **Optimizer:**

The opponent is believed to identify and pursue the best goal - that is the highest payoff, the maximization of values - existing in any situation.

(2) **Satisficer:**

The opponent is regarded as being prepared to settle for a goal that is satisfactory in a given set of circumstances, even if it falls somewhat short of the ideal.

38 **Opponent's Choice of Objectives (2nd):**

(1) **Realistic:**

Indications that the opponent is believed to set goals that can reasonably be regarded as attainable in a given set of circumstances should be coded as realistic.

(2) **Unrealistic:**

The adversary is believed to set unattainable or utopian goals.

39 **Opponent's Choice of Objectives (3rd):**

(1) **Flexible:**

References to the opponent's ability to reassess and alter goals in the light of feedback should be coded as flexible.

(2) **Inflexible:**

The opponent is regarded as adhering rigidly to goals, once established, no matter what the indications that they are outdated.

40 **Opponent's Choice of Objectives (4th):**

(1) **Predictable:**

The adversary is believed to adhere to a consistent and discernable pattern of behaviour in foreign policy.

**(2) Unpredictable:**

The opponent is not adhering to any specific pattern.

**41 Opponent's Pursuit of Objectives:****(1) Prepare Ground:**

The author believes that the opponent pursues goals by making very careful prior preparations (for example, a thorough search for relevant information etc.).

**(2) Try and See:**

In pursuing goals, the opponent is likely to take action as a way of testing what is feasible and what is not, what will work and what will not. It is not necessary - or possible - to determine in advance precisely what outcomes can be expected; therefore the adversary may adopt a try and see approach as a useful way of obtaining information on this score.

**(3) Incremental Strategy:**

The adversary is likely to adopt a piecemeal approach that emphasizes the value of limited gains on various parts of the problem. Settling for a slower, piece by piece approach does not constitute an abandonment of fundamental goals; instead, an incremental approach is not only prudent, but a series of limited achievements on parts of the problem will have an important cumulative effect.

**(4) Blitzkrieg Strategy:**

The author believes that the opponent's strategy involves committing a major portion of its resources and a full scale effort to deal with the problem. A try and see or incremental approach is likely to prove ineffective, a waste of one's resources, and gives up a number of important advantages such as surprise.

**(5) Mobilizing Strategy:**

Involves also committing one's total resources but the element of quickness and surprise is not emphasized.

**42 Opponent's Strategy:**

Our concern here is with a basic stance toward the application of goals as related to specific opponents in specific situations. Check one:

**(1) Turn Other Cheek:**

The author believes that the opponent's strategy is to respond to attacks or threats by altruistic behaviour and with co-operative reaction, i.e., return conciliation for hostility. Examples may be to offer concessions, retreat, or surrender in the face of hostile gestures by us.

**(2) Non-Punitive:**

The opponent reacts self protectively with counter attacks or counter threats when attacked or threatened; and reciprocates our behaviour. The author believes that the opponent rewards co-operation and emphasizes on neutralizing or non-rewarding aggressive behaviour. The enemy is offering positive rather than negative incentives.

**(3) Accommodating:**

The author believes that the opponent is acting positively by making compromises. (offers of negotiation, conciliation, etc.). The opponent does not offer unilateral concessions (strategy 1) but emphasizes a two way co-operative strategy, he is firm but co-operative.

**(4) Deterrent Strategy:**

The author believes that the opponent is pursuing a strategy that implies a threatening response to any non-cooperative acts by one's own side, and will counter attack when attacked.

**(5) Gratuitously Aggressive Strategy:**

The emphasis is on the employment of force, engagement in coercive diplomacy, the escalation of conflicts, making threats, increasing demands on us, and the like. For example, the author believes that the opponent thinks that "The only language that India understands is the language of force".

**43 Nature of the Contemporary International/Regional System:**

While the philosophical belief # 1 focused on the more or less permanent features of political life, this one is concerned with the author's beliefs about the most salient characteristics of the contemporary international/ regional system. One may see the political universe as fundamentally harmonious, and yet views the contemporary international/regional system as highly conflictual owing to some more or less temporary conditions (for example, the policies of a particular state or leader which threaten peace and stability). In summary, the rule to follow in coding such materials is to determine where the impact of the interaction is located. Check one of the following:

**(1) Conflictual:**

The author indicates that the present international /regional system is dominated by conflictual relations among nations or coalitions of nations. This category should not be used simply because there is reference to the existence of some conflict within the international system. Rather, it should be reserved for assessments that the most significant patterns of relations are those of conflict.

**(2) Mixed:**

Use this category when there is reference to both conflictual and more harmonious patterns of relations within the contemporary international/regional system. The mixed assessment might arise from geographical variations (for example, reference to East West cooperation on establishing permanent frontiers in Europe, counter balanced by deep American-Soviet divisions on a Mid-East settlement), or from distinctions across issues (for example, an assessment of a mutual interest in some forms of trade, but a complete lack of agreement on how to cope with a dangerous arms race).

**(3) Harmonious:**

The author regards the contemporary international /regional system as one in which mutual interests are dominant - and are recognized as such - even though there may be specific issues on which there is a lack of accord. Where conflicts of interests exist, they are regarded as generally capable of being resolved by means other than recourse to military threats or violence.

**44 Sources of conflict:****(1) Human Nature:**

Reference to the source of conflict in some quality that is that is seen as widely shared by human beings; for example, selfishness, irrationality, limited ability to cope with complexity etc. If the reference is to the personal attributes of a specific leader ( for example, Hitler's madness) or a group of leaders (shiite priests) it should be coded under #3 below i.e., attribute of states. The test is this: Is there reason to believe that the attribute in question is thought to be widely shared, or does the author believe that it is confined to some individual or identifiable subgroup? The former should be coded as human nature and the latter should not.

**(2) Ideological Attributes of Nations:**

Conflict is believed to arise from the qualities of a specific philosophy, religion, or world view (aggressiveness of Islam, messianic goals of Marxism, Leninism etc.)

**(3) Political Attributes of Nations:**

The author states that the sources of international conflict can be traced to certain types of political, structures and processes. References to conflict arising from the inherent aggressiveness of totalitarian states, on the unstable foreign policy of democratic states, are examples of this category.

**(4) Economic Attributes of Nations:**

This category should be used when the author cites the quality of a particular system of acquisition, production or distribution of material goods as the basic

source of conflict. It should also be used when there is a reference to conflict arising from other economic attributes of the nation, for example, when the motives for expansion or aggression are traced to a nation's lack of sufficient resources, requirements for markets etc.

**(5) Nationalism in the International System:**

This category is used for reference about conflict arising from antipathies between two or more ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious groups.

**(6) Power Politics:**

Here, conflict is seen to arise from the interaction of nations searching for or threatening national security. Reference to conflict stemming from arms races, alliance commitments, the security dilemma, geopolitical manoeuvring etc., would all be coded under this category, as would statements indicating that conflict is inherent in an international system in which each state is responsible for its own security.

**(7) Imperialism, Colonialism, Racism:**

The author believes that most conflicts in the world arise because of imperialism, colonialism and racialism. The need for expansion in order to further one's economic, political and territorial interests is what causes countries to come into conflict with each other and more so when this is resisted by the country that is being exploited. Code this category if any of the above three concepts are referred to either directly or indirectly.

**(8) Inequality:**

The author believes that inequality among nations is a prime source of conflict. Here, inequality refers to economic variables like resources, technology, capital, trade potential etc., which divides the world into have and have-nots. Code this category if the author suggests that for example that "division between the rich and poor nations are likely to cause more wars than alliances or the arms race."

**45 Conditions of Peace:**

**(1) Education, Communication, Negotiation:**

The author states that better education and information, or better communication between nations and peoples will allay the misunderstandings, misperception, lack of trust, xenophobia, irrational hatreds and other sources of conflict. Better education and communication can lead to an understanding and appreciation of the fundamental harmony of interests.

**(2) Eliminate Offending Nations:**

The author indicates that the necessary or 'sufficient' conditions of peace require the elimination or transformation of a specific nation or a class of nations (for example, communist nations, fascist nations, capitalistic nations etc.).

**(3) Eliminate Inequalities:**

The author states that eliminating inequalities among nations will create the conditions for peace. This theme is more likely to occur with reference to wealth, resources, productivity, standard of living and other aspects of economics.

**(4) Maintain Balance of Power:**

The author asserts that the best or only means of ensuring peace is to maintain a balance of power, to prevent expansion by ambitious adversaries, to deter aggression, to maintain stability etc. Sometimes this is expressed in some form of the 'para bellum' doctrine: "If you want peace prepare for war."

**(5) Transform the System:**

Categories 4 and 5 above focus on the international system, but both of these responses accept the system and its basic features (for example, the primacy of the nation state). Others may propose some significant changes in the structure and functioning of the system. For example, various types of proposals for world government illustrate this category of response, as do suggestions that international organizations be given primary responsibility for maintaining the security of member nations.

**(6) Promote Non-Alignment:**

Here, the author suggests that peace can be obtained only if more and more countries become non-aligned and get out of the vortex of big power politics. Non-alignment would more likely lead to peace, with its emphasis on political, economic and regional co-operation. With peace as its ideal, it would foster a better world climate.

**(7) Promote Regional Co-operation:**

This would foster the spirit of friendship and promote the idea of co-operative solutions to world problems, which in turn will make way for a positive kind of peace.

**(8) Improve Economic Conditions:**

The only way to bring about peace is to improve the economic conditions in the poor countries and provide for better living standards, since great disparities in wealth are a prime source of conflict.

(9) Non Interference:

The author believes that peace can be maintained or established if no country interfered with another country's internal or external affairs.

46 Structure of the International system:

(1) Bipolar:

The author believes that the international system essentially has two centers of decision; a concentration of power under the effective control of one or a limited number of nations in each camp; and a similar line up of allies and adversaries on most, if not all issues. It is seen as a system where the bloc members are typically antagonistic on most issues.

(2) Detente System:

This is a bipolar world in which relations between the two major powers are strongly competitive but the competition is not conflictual. The author believes that the essential feature of the international system is one of collaboration between the two superpowers and agreement to avoid direct confrontation, and a loosening up of internal organization of the two blocs.

(3) Non Alignment as a Key Feature:

The author believes that non aligned states are major role players in the present international system. The the bipolar system is loosening and more and more newly independent states are becoming non-aligned, and by themselves, acting either singly or as a bloc, are able to influence the course of international politics. Non alignment is a key feature.

(4) Existence of Regional Subsystems:

This is somewhat similar to a pluralistic system, where there are multiple alliances or organizations at the regional level (geographically). These alliances or organizations could be either military, political, or economic. (for example, EEC, SAARC etc.)

(5) Interdependence:

The author perceives that the world is totally interdependent and every issue, whether political, economic, military is tied up with one another. Also, what happens in one part of the world is likely to have an impact on the entire international system.

47 Stability of the International System:

(1) Stable:

The author believes that the essential structure and processes of the present international system are relatively enduring. He/she believes that it is unlikely that

a sudden and basic change in the system will occur.

(2) Mixed:

Some elements of the contemporary international system are relatively stable; nevertheless, other structures and/or processes are likely to experience sudden and basic change. For example, while the author may view the totality of the international system as highly stable, he may sense some elements of some instability in some regional systems (for example, Middle East).

(3) Unstable:

The international system as a whole, or atleast its major structures and processes are viewed as inherently unstable.

48 National Role Conceptions:

In this category we are concerned with the author's conception of the role of his own nation in the regional or international system. By national role conception is meant the author's definition of the general orientations, commitments, decisions and actions suitable to his own state and the functions, if any, his state should perform (and/or is performing) on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems'.

(1) Regional Leader/Protector:

The author's country has a responsibility to lead and/or protect the states in a particular region.

(2) Active Independent/Non-Aligned:

This national role conception emphasizes national independence (foreign policy decisions are made to serve national interests rather than the interests of others) and to play an active independent role as a non aligned nation in world politics/forums.

(3) Example:

The author emphasizes the importance of promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by setting an example to other countries. For example "we can accelerate economic growth with the help of certain socialist programs, and set an example to our neighbours".

(4) Nation concerned with Internal Development:

The author believes that his/her country should not involve itself with international political matters, (not economic or technical) but should concentrate on internal economic and social development.



**(5) Mediator/Peacemaker:**

The author perceives his country as capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of states as a continuing task. He/she also believes in a messianic role of advocating, preaching, and maintaining the cause of peace and justice.

**(6) Faithful Ally:**

This role refers to specific commitment to support the policies of another government, for example, Bulgaria's support to USSR, or Luxemburg's total devotion to NATO.

**(7) Promote Economic Conditions through International/Regional Cooperation:**

The theme here is a special duty or obligation to improve economic conditions at home, and assist underdeveloped countries, through cooperation.

**(8) Friendly Neighbour:**

The author believes that the role of his country is to be a friend to all the neighbouring countries and help them in times of need.

**(9) Crusader against Imperialism/ Colonialism/ Racialism/Oppression:**

The author asserts that his/her country should fight against imperialism, racialism, colonialism and be a crusader for the oppressed people. and to seek justice, emancipation and freedom for all peoples in this world.

**49 Prospects for eventual realization of goals (philosophical belief # 2):**

What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental goals? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respect that one and/or the other? Check one of the following:

**(1) Optimism:**

The author believes very strongly that all goals and aspirations will be met.

**(2) Mixed:**

The author expresses optimism with respect to some goals and pessimism with respect to others.

**(3) Pessimism:**

The author indicates that there is a low probability (or worse) of being able to achieve his goals.

**50 Optimism/Pessimism with reference to :**

**(1) Long Term Goals:**

Assertions about major, fundamental, long range aspirations and goals (for example, economic and social development, raising economic growth and standards of living etc.).

**(2) Policy Undertaking:**

Use this category for expressions of optimism or pessimism with respect to more specific policy undertakings and aspirations; for example, resolving the border problem with China, intervening in Bangladesh etc.

**51 Optimism/Pessimism Conditional?**

**(1) Conditional:**

The author asserts that his optimistic or pessimistic appraisal is conditional upon some other action, event or condition being present or absent. Examples include statements of the form: "we can achieve our goal X, but only if we take action Y", or "We are likely to succeed in X, if event Y happens to intervene", or "undertaking X will be successful if Y responds as predicted".

**(2) Unconditional:**

The author asserts that his optimism or pessimism does not depend on the presence or absence of any other action or response.

**52 On whose side is Time:**

This category is for recording expressions about the impact of time. Which way is the tide of history moving? How is time likely to affect the prospects for realization of one's fundamental values and aspirations? How is it likely to affect one's prospects relative to other actors, especially opponents?

**(1) On Our Side:**

The author asserts that in the future one's own situation is likely to become better relative to that of the adversary.

**(2) Time is on the Adversary's Side:**

In the future one's own position is likely to become worse relative to that of the adversary.

**53 Is political Life Predictable Philosophical Belief # 3:**

Some questions have been raised about the difficulty to distinguish between statements of optimism /pessimism and statements of prediction. Optimism is usually linked to one's goals and refers to the likelihood of the goals to be realized in the future, for example, "we look forward to improving our relations

with China and Pakistan, and we think that with some patience and perseverance, we will be able to do that." Statements of prediction are usually linked to a recurring pattern of regularities in human life, for example, "we will triumph as we have always triumphed in the past." If there is no reference to such regularities, the discriminating factor is whether the statement is linked to a specific goal. Consider this example: "In ten years the international system will be a multipolar one". Such a statement should be coded as prediction because it is not explicitly considered as a goal. However, a statement such as " We are working hard to settle our border problems with China, and this problem may finally be solved". This statement is one of optimism, not prediction.

(1) Predictable:

The author expresses the belief that there are discernable patterns in political life, that one can forecast at least the main contours of events, and the likely consequences of one's own actions, etc. Emphasis placed on at least some types of regularities in situations and the manner in which key actors are likely to respond to them.

(2) Capricious:

The author characterizes political life as dominated by uncertainty, chance, the unpredictable, randomness etc. Emphasis is placed on the uniqueness of each situation.

(3) Mixed:

The author asserts that some aspects of political life are predictable, meanwhile he characterizes some other aspects as capricious.

**54** What Aspects are Predictable:

(1) Historical development:

Use this category when the author discusses broad, long term trends and developments. Illustrations would include discussion of: "the prospects of democratic developments", "the evolution of communist societies", "the effects of unrestricted population growth", and the like.

(2) Opponents/Their Behaviour:

Reference to one's ability to predict the opponent's behaviour and reactions. Does the author believe that the opponents actions and reactions can be determined in advance? Code this category if it is in the affirmative.

(3) Policy Outcomes:

This category is used for assertions about one's ability to forecast or predict the results of certain courses of policy; that is, the relationship between means and ends. Assertions will sometimes take the form, "If we do X, then Y (may, will probably, will certainly) occur".

**(4) Specific Events:**

If the author discusses his ability or inability to predict a specific event - an action taken by a specific actor with respect to a given issue - the material should be coded in this category.

**55 Degree of Predictability:****(1) Certainty:**

The author indicates that his ability to forecast certain developments, outcomes, events and the like is not hedged with qualifications or doubts.

**(2) Probability:**

The author asserts that there are developments and outcomes that may be predicted with a moderate to high degree of confidence, but with less than certainty.

**(3) Uncertainty:**

The author states that development and outcomes cannot be predicted, or he asserts that the nature of politics is such as to make predictions inherently impossible.

**56 Control of Historical Developments (philosophical belief # 4):**

How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction? This concerns the feasibility of shaping or controlling historical development and of "making a difference" with respect to important goals. Can one significantly affect the fundamental direction of historical development or are the possibilities largely limited to affecting the pace, costs or details of steps leading to outcomes that are largely determined? What constraints on action must be recognized and respected? Check one of the following:

**(1) Full Ability to Control:**

Man can guide or shape the essential features of historical development.

**(2) Some Ability to Control:**

The author asserts that there are certain situations or events that one can control, and others over which one has no control.

**(3) Inability to Control:**

Here the author suggests that we are not in charge of our destiny, and we have no control whatsoever, over historical development. Fate or chance plays a key role in human affairs.

**57 Should Leader Accept Active Role Philosophical Belief # 5:**

This deals with beliefs about the leader's role and obligations in the sphere of political action. Should the leader accept an active role in attempting to shape historical development, or must he resist the temptation to do so? What role should the leader play in defining goals, selecting means, managing conflicts etc? For what goals or values should one actively attempt to "move" history? For which should one adopt a more passive role? Check one of the following:

**(1) Must Play Active Role:**

The leader must actively use the political process to achieve desired ends. Given wisdom and skilled leadership, most problems can be solved.

**(2) Must Play Passive Role:**

The leader cannot play an active role because he/she cannot control historical developments. So it is better to remain passive and let history take its course.

**(3) Intervene when Necessary:**

The leader should only intervene when necessary, and he thinks that he/ she might make a difference.

**(4) Intervene when Feasible:**

One should actively intervene in human affairs when it is possible to solve problems by doing so. The skilled leader knows which problems are tractable and which are not; that is, he does not expend his political resources in pursuing goals that are unrealistic, or attempting to solve problems that are incapable of being solved.

**(5) Mediate between Contending Forces:**

The author believes that the role of the leader is to act as a broker and to use that role to seek the best resolution of conflicts.

**(6) Discern Historical Trends:**

The role of the leader is to identify the main trends of historical development and to pursue policies that are in harmony with those trends.

**(7) Avoid Intervention:**

One should usually avoid active intervention in conflicts and should let the competing factions resolve their own differences.

## STAGE IV

### 58 Sources of Knowledge about The Operational Code Instrumental beliefs:

In this column, we are interested in the sources of knowledge cited in the paragraphs as related ONLY to instrumental beliefs.

(1) Theory/Ideology:

Author draws upon or cites a body of thought, literature, philosophy, as a guide to support his/her views.

(2) Trends:

The author extrapolates from a series of events.

(3) Experience:

Author draws upon his/her personal experiences to substantiate his/her point.

(4) History:

Lessons of history are cited as evidence of the author's diagnoses or prescription.

(5) Faith:

The author indicates that the point he/she is making has to be accepted on faith without citing some alternative basis for his/her belief.

(6) Specific Events:

Generalizes from specific events.

### 59 Nature of One's Goals (Instrumental Belief # 1):

(1) Achievement of Hegemony:

Here, the author believes that one should set one's goals in the direction of attaining hegemony. The author's goals are virtually unlimited, including such aspirations as universal hegemony and radical transformation of the existing international or regional system.

(2) Elimination of other Key Actors:

The author believes that the goal should be the destruction and elimination of other key actors, adversary nations etc.

(3) Achievement of National Interests:

The most important goal is the achievement of national interests and the author believes that all other goals are subordinate to this important one.

**(4) Protect Security of Home Territory:**

Protecting national interests and the security of the home territory is the paramount goal and all other goals are subordinate to this.

**(5) Maintain Status quo:**

The author believes that the main goal of his/her country is to preserve the existing state of relations and situations in the global and regional system as it is to his/her country's advantage.

**(6) Promote Regional Cooperation:****(7) Promote Peaceful Coexistence:**

The primary goal is to preach peace and harmony in the world and achieve peace by teaching countries to co exist in friendship and harmony. This is a messianic goal.

**60 Best approach for goal selection:**

What is the best approach for selecting goals of political action?

**(1) Comprehensive Framework:**

The author states that goals must be workrd out within an overall framework or masterplan. Without such a blueprint one will be led astray and possibly lose the opportunity to achieve one's major aspiration.

**(2) From Immediate Problem at Hand:**

One should look at the immediate problem at hand and the opportunities afforded by the circumstances, in establishing goals. Useful as an overall blueprint of action might be, it should not stand in the way of establishing feasible intermediate range goals. It is possible to separate issues and deal with each one on its own terms.

**(3) Mixed:**

Depending on the circumstances, the issues, and the nature of the adversaries, one must appraise whether it is best to take a comprehensive or more piecemeal approach to the task of establishing goals. Neither approach is automatically to be condemned.

**61 Type of Goals:****(1) Optimal:**

One should stick to one's fundamental goals. To compromise on matters of principle for purposes of achieving short term gains is to run the risk of abandoning major aspirations in a piecemeal fashion. To settle for half a loaf is to lose the opportunity to attain a whole loaf (which one may do by sticking to

principles). Subdivision of major goals into a series of lesser ones entails the risk that one will settle for less than one could otherwise achieve.

(2) **Feasible:**

In appropriate circumstances, one should be prepared to strive for goals that advance one a limited distance toward the long term goals. One need not fear working toward one's aspirations one step at a time. There are circumstances in which seeking the perfect is to lose the good. It is permissible to subdivide major goals into a series of lesser ones, and to work sequentially toward their achievement.

(3) **Mixed:**

Depending on the circumstances, issues, etc., one may adopt either a strategy of pursuing the optimal or the feasible.

**62 Paths to Achieve Goals:**

(1) **Single Path:**

To achieve a given goal, there is but a single path, strategy, or sequence of events that will yield success. To be flexible about the relationship of means to ends, or to abandon the correct strategy is to lose or endanger the opportunity to achieve one's goals. The author tends to assess the prospects associated with any option as either zero or 100%. It is not enough to stress a single approach, but he must state explicitly that there is but one correct path.

(2) **Multiple Paths:**

There are several paths to provide some prospect for achievement of one's goals. Probabilities of success for any path are likely to be assessed as more than zero but less than 100%.

**63 Linkage between Goals:**

Subsumed under this belief are a number of related questions:

- a. How does one cope with incomplete knowledge and certainty?
- b. How does one calculate the relationship between long-term and short-term objectives, and how does one cope with possible tradeoffs between them? That is, do long term goals dominate and determine those that may be pursued in the short or intermediate term, or should preference be given to a strategy of judging the possibilities for short term gain on their own merits?
- c. How does one cope with the tradeoffs between values in a situation ( that is, with the inability to achieve all of them simultaneously with any single policy)?
- d. How does one establish a schedule of goals?

Check one of the following:



**(1) All Goals Compatible and Linked/No Tradeoffs:**

When two or more important goals or aspirations are being considered, the author expresses the belief that: (a) they are compatible; (b) they are linked in such a way that achievement of one will ensure or enhance the prospects for success in others; or (c) that there exists a course of action that will enable one to achieve all major aspirations.

**(2) Tradeoffs Necessary:**

The author recognizes that two or more major goals are incapable of being achieved simultaneously; that the vigorous pursuit of one goal may retard or even jeopardize the achievement of others. In short the author acknowledges that at least in the circumstances of the moment, there are incompatibilities or conflicts in major goals.

**(3) All Goals Compatible but Tradeoffs Possible:**

Here, the author points out that eventhough all goals are compatible, it is possible to trade one goal for another. Even though the goals are linked trading one goal for another will not diminish the possibility of the others being achieved.

**64 Effective Way to Pursue Goals (Instrumental Belief # 2):**

How are goals of political action pursued most effectively? The first instrumental belief is concerned with establishing the goals for political action. Instrumental belief # 2 focuses on the most effective strategies for pursuing these goals. This category focuses on the following questions: Under what circumstances is it permissible to modify, substitute for, or abandon a goal or a means to achieving goals?

**(1) Modify Goals:**

The author indicates that in a given circumstance one may either scale up, scale down or compromise the original goals being pursued.

**(2) Do Not Modify:**

The author believes that under no circumstances should the goals be modified or compromised.

**(3) Substitute Goals:**

The author indicates that a different goal should be pursued as a replacement for the previous one.

**(4) Do Not Substitute:****(5) Abandon Goals if not Working:****(6) Do Not Abandon:**

(7) Modify Means:

(8) Substitute Means:

(9) Do not Modify/Substitute Means:

## 65 Means to Achieve Goals:

Approaches to the pursuit of goals: This belief revolves around the questions of: what preliminary steps in planning, preparing the ground, etc., should be undertaken? Should one commit resources gradually, on a try it and see basis, or is it better to employ one's resources for a decisive and quick achievement of goals. Check one of the following:

(1) Prepare Ground:

The author believes that the most effective way to pursue goals is to make very careful prior preparations, for example, thorough search for information, consultation with allies etc.

(2) Try and See:

In pursuing goals one should be prepared to take action as a way of testing what is feasible and what is not, what will work and what will not. It is not necessary - or possible - to determine in advance precisely what outcomes can be expected.

(3) Incremental Approach:

The best way to pursue goals is to adopt a piecemeal approach that emphasizes the values of limited gains on various parts of the problem. This view takes the position that an incremental approach is not only prudent, but that a series of limited achievements on parts of the problem will have an important cumulative effect.

(4) Blitzkrieg Strategy:

The author believes that the most effective strategy involves committing a major portion of one's resources and a full scale effort to deal with the problem. A try and see or an incremental approach is likely to prove ineffective, a waste of one's resources, and gives up a number of important advantages (for example, surprise).

(5) Mobilizing Strategy:

Involves also committing one's total resources but the element of quickness and surprise is not emphasized.

## 66 Strategy:

What are the various strategies that may be used to pursue goals? Our concern here is with a basic stance toward the pursuit of goals, that is, broader range of

possible strategies. Specific application of a strategy or tactic (for example, air strikes, military intervention, blockade etc., all of which are specific applications of force) will be coded under categories 76 thru 78, and not under this. Check one of the following:

(1) **Aggressive:**

Here the author believes that the basic stance must be to employ force, engage in coercive diplomacy, escalate the conflict, make threats, forcefully increase demands on the other party, issue an ultimatum etc.

(2) **Conciliatory:**

Here, the best approach is to adopt a more accommodating position, (for example, delay conflict, seek conciliation, enter into negotiations etc.).

(3) **Mixed:**

The author believes that there should be a combination of aggressive as well as accommodative strategies, that is, the carrot and the stick.

(4) **Turn the Other Cheek:**

The author believes that the best strategy is to respond to attacks or threats by altruistic behaviour and with cooperative reaction, that is, return conciliation for hostility. Examples may be to offer one sided concessions, (as opposed to strategy # 2, which regards concessions as a two way cooperative strategy) retreat, or surrender in the face of hostile gestures from the opponent.

(5) **Non-Punitive:**

The best strategy is to react self protectively with counter attacks or counter threats when attack or threatened; otherwise the author believes in reciprocating the opponent's behaviour. The author places his emphasis on rewarding cooperation and on neutralizing or non rewarding aggressive behaviour. He appeals to the self interest of the enemy through positive rather than negative incentives.

(6) **Deterrent Strategy:**

The author believes in pursuing a strategy that implies a threatening response to any non cooperative acts of the opponent, and to counter attack when attacked. This is different from strategy # 1, in that this strategy is assumed only when the opponent looks threatening. In strategy one, the author believes in being aggressive and employing force regardless of whether the opponent threatens the use of or uses force.

(7) **Gratuitously Aggressive Strategy:**

The emphasis is on the gradual employment of force in a conflict situation. If all other avenues fail, then the use of force is justified.

**(8) Cooperative:**

This strategy involves total cooperation and accomodation, without being firm. This also implies cooperation from the other side.

**67 What Actions Preferable:**

Under what circumstances is unilateral/multilateral action is preferable?

**(1) Unilateral Action:**

The author prefers his own nation acting alone.

**(2) Multilateral Action:**

The author expresses preference for action in concert with allies, regional and or global organizations, etc.

**(3) Bilateral:**

The author prefers to act with another country on a one to one basis rather than a multilateral forum.

**68 How are Risks Calculated (Instrumental Belief # 3):****(1) Comprehensive Framework:**

Risks are assessed in relation to all of one's goals and aspirations, rather than just the specific problem under consideration.

**(2) Specific Undertaking:**

Risks are calculated in light of a particular policy or undertaking.

**(3) Specific Tactics:**

Risks are assessed solely in terms of the tactics that may be pursued in a given situation. This category may be appropriate if one appraised the risks of a bombing raid solely in terms of the prospects of success or failure, rather than with a broader framework.

**69 Controlling Risks:**

What approach should be employed to limit or control risks?

**(1) Scaling Down Goals:**

Limit or scale down goals to be pursued.

**(2) Scaling Down Means:**

Limit or scale down means to be employed.

**(3) Assessment of Means:**

Assess carefully your means.

(4) Assessment of Opponent's strategies:

(5) Change Strategy:

70 Assessment of Risk:

(1) Risks to be Avoided:

(2) Take Risks if Necessary:

71 Tradeoffs Associated with Risks:

(1) Maximize Gains:

(2) Minimize Losses:

72 High and Low Risk Policies:

Under what circumstances (what situations, what issues, what opponents) are high or low risk policies mandatory? permissible? prohibited?

(1) High Risk Policies Mandatory:

(2) High Risk Policies Permissible:

(3) High Risk Policies Prohibited:

(4) Low Risk Policies Mandatory:

(5) Low Risk Policies Permissible:

(6) Low Risk Policies Prohibited:

73 Importance of Timing (Long Term)(Instrumental belief # 4):

What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?

(1) Very Important:

Timing spells out difference between success and failure.

(2) Not Very Important:

Timing does not make a difference for the success or failure of a long term objective and/or a policy undertaking.

**(3) Somewhat Important:**

Timing is a matter of managing one's own resources prudently, but it is not a matter of fundamental strategy.

**74 Importance of Timing (Short Term):****(1) Very Important:**

Timing spells out difference between success and failure.

**(2) Not Very Important:**

Timing does not make a difference for the success or failure of a long term objective and/or a policy undertaking.

**(3) Somewhat Important:**

Timing is a matter of managing one's own resources prudently, but it is not a matter of fundamental strategy.

**75 Beliefs on Action (Instrumental Belief # 5):**

When is action required, permitted or prohibited? The purpose of this item is to assess the circumstances under which one must avoid, temporize, delay action, when one must take action, and when it is permissible but not necessary to do so.

**(1) Act Quickly when Opportunities Arise:****(2) Act when Enemy Provocation is Intolerable:****(3) Delay Conciliatory Action until Strong:**

Delay conciliatory action until in a position of strength.

**(4) Delay Escalation until Strong:****(5) Avoid Premature Action:****(6) Do Not Yield to Enemy Provocation:****(7) Do Not Act without Assessing Relevant Issues:****(8) Act Before Opposition Gains Position of Strength:****76 Military Force:**

What is the utility of different means for advancing one's interests? Whereas, instrumental belief # 2 deals with the broad approaches to the pursuit of goals, instrumental belief deals with specific tactics. What tactics are likely to be effective in what situations? Against what opponents? This category focuses on

questions related to the utility of military force to advance one's interests and how to apply military force in a specific situation.

- (1) Avoid Force:
- (2) Use as a Last Resort:
- (3) Only Viable Means to Advance one's Interests:
- (4) Resort to it than Surrender/or be Defeated:

**77 Method of Using Force:**

- (1) Use Alone:
- (2) Supplement with other Types of Economic or Political Action:
- (3) On Large Scale:
- (4) On Small Scale:

**78 Tactics:**

How to apply military force to advance one's interests?

- (1) Dont Launch First Strike:
- (2) Take Initiative:
- (3) Retreat/Regroup than be Trapped:
- (4) Hold and Fight than Retreat:

**79 Military Supremacy:**

- (1) Crucial:
- (2) Not Crucial:

**80 Conception of Power:**

We are concerned here with what the author believes to be the key elements of politically relevant power. Does he/she conceive of power in a strictly military sense or is his definition a broader one?

- (1) Military:
- (2) Multidimensional:

**APPENXIX 2**  
**QUESTIONNAIRE 1**

**The Operational Code of Mrs. Indira Gandhi**

**General Belief About Politics and the  
Political Universe  
(Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs)**

**Questionnaire # 1**

**Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Place:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Time:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Name of Interviewee:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Current Position:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Position During Mrs. Gandhi's rule:** \_\_\_\_\_



1. **Nature of the Political Universe:**

1. **Conflictual:** conflict is normal state of relations in political life and inherent part of politics. War of all against all.
2. **Mixed:** both consensual and conflictual elements. Harmony in some type of issues and conflict in others.
3. **Harmonious:** many shared interests between men and nations. War or conflict may be temporary.

2. **Sources of Conflict:**

1. **Human nature:** e.g., selfishness, irrationality of man (general and not attributed to one person or a group).
2. **Ideological attributes:** conflict arising from a specific ideology, philosophy, religion or world view.
3. **Political attributes:** due to certain types of political structures or processes.
4. **Economic attributes:** economic scarcity, lack of resources, capital, etc.
5. **Nationalism:** fight for independence, conflict between two ethnic or linguistic groups.
6. **Power politics:** arms race, alliance commitments, geopolitical maneuvering.
7. **Imperialism, colonialism, racism.**
8. **Inequalities:** economic disparities.

3. **Conditions of Peace:**

1. **Education, communication, negotiation:** better education and communication will eliminate misunderstanding, hatred, etc.
2. **Eliminate offending nations:** e.g., world composed of democratic nations will be peaceful.
3. **Eliminate inequalities.**
4. **Maintain balance of power:** to maintain balance, prevent expansion, deter aggression. To maintain peace, prepare for war.
5. **Promote non-alignment.**
6. **Promote regional cooperation.**
7. **Improve economic conditions in poor countries.**
8. **Non-interference.**

4. **Scope of Conflict:**

1. **All issues are linked:** all important issues essentially part of a larger struggle between forces of freedom and those of repression - good versus evil.
2. **Issues separable.**
3. **High spillover:**
  - a) from one issue area to another.
  - b) from one geographical area to another.

5. Role of Conflict:

1. **Desirable:** indispensable for achievement of goals.
2. **Undesirable:** stands in the way of achieving important goals.
3. **Mixed:** sometimes necessary, sometimes not.
4. **Functional:** even though conflict is distasteful, it is necessary to achieve important goals.

6. Character of Political Opponents:

<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>	<u>China</u>	
1	1	1	<b>Destructive:</b> destroying and eliminating other actors in the system and aiming at hegemony.
2	2	2	<b>Expansionist:</b> wanting to extend its territorial control.
3	3	3	<b>Aggressive:</b> aggressive in the pursuit of its interests and expanding its influence but not to destroy.
4	4	4	<b>Defensive:</b> concerned with security and maintenance of its territory (preservation).
5	5	5	<b>Conciliatory.</b>
6	6	6	<b>Active seeker of peace:</b> (willing to make concessions for the sake of peace and stability).
7	7	7	<b>Domestic development.</b>
8	8	8	<b>Restorative:</b> territory, status, resources, etc., previously owned.

7. Sources of Opponent's Goals:

1. **Ideology/religion.**
2. **Historical goals:** goals associated with that nation, irrespective of leadership or regime.
3. **Internal needs:** policies stemming from pressures and constraints from within its borders - responses to the needs and demands of powerful segments in the society, e.g., army; actions designed to divert attentions from domestic problem or to deficiencies in resources or capabilities.
4. **Leadership traits:** reflects needs, values, motivation, personality of its leader.
5. **Power politics:** e.g., security, self extension, pursuit of power and influence.
6. **External pressures:** responding to pressures from outside, i.e., other major powers.

8. Generality of Adversary's Hostility:

<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>	<u>China</u>	
1	1	1	1. General/permanent: not limited to specific issue and can't be resolved.
2	2	2	2. General/temporary: not limited to specific issue but such hostility is not rooted in any fundamental differences between the two countries.
3	3	3	3. Specific/permanent: specific to an issue and differences between two countries so deep that it is unlikely to be resolved.
4	4	4	4. Specific/temporary.

9. Likely Response of Adversary to Our Conciliatory Moves (1971):

1. Reciprocate in this situation.
2. Reciprocate in other situations.
3. Ignore.
4. Take advantage in this situation.
5. Take advantage in other situations.

10. Likely Response of Adversary to our Policy of Firmness (1971):

1. Back down.
2. Ignore.
3. Reciprocate in this situation.
4. Reciprocate in other situations.
5. Respond impulsively/irrationally.

11. Opponent's Decision-Making Process:

1. Unitary.
2. Bureaucratic model.
3. Competitive.

12. Opponent's Decision-Making Style:

1. Calculating.
2. Impulsive.

13. Opponent's Choice of Objectives:

- 1a: Calculating.
- 2a: Impulsive.
- 1b: Realistic.
- 2b: Unrealistic.
- 1c: Flexible.
- 2c: Inflexible.
- 1d: Predictable.
- 2d: Unpredictable.

14. Our Policies Toward the Opponent:

1. Highly non-conciliatory.
2. Non-conciliatory.
3. Conciliatory, emphasis on bilateral negotiating.
4. Highly conciliatory: active policy of accommodation.

15. National Role Conceptions:

1. Regional leader/protector.
2. Active independent, non-aligned.
3. Example.
4. Nation concerned with internal development.
5. Mediator/peacemaker.
6. Faithful ally.
7. Developer.
8. Friendly neighbor.
9. Crusader against imperialism/racism/oppression.

16. Prospects for Eventual Realization of Goals:

1. Optimism unconditional.
2. Mixed: optimism with some and pessimistic with others.
3. Pessimism.
4. Optimism conditional.

17. Optimism/Pessimism with reference to:

1. Long-term goals.
2. Policy undertakings.

18. Is Political Life Predictable:

1. Predictable.
2. Capricious.
3. Mixed.

19. What Aspects are Predictable:

1. Historical developments/long-term goals.
2. Opponents/their behaviors.
3. Policy outcomes.
4. Specific events.

20. Degree of Predictability:

1. Certainty.
2. Probability.
3. Uncertainty.

21. Control of Historical Developments:

1. Full ability to control.
2. Some ability to control.
3. Inability to control.

22. Should Leader Play Active Role:

1. Must play active role: define goals, select means, manage conflicts.
2. Must play passive role.
3. Intervene when necessary.
4. Intervene when feasible: does not expend political resources in pursuing unrealistic goals.
5. Mediate between contending forces: broker.
6. Discern historical trends: identify main trends of historical development and pursue policies which are in harmony with those trends.
7. Avoid intervention: avoid active attempts to intervene in human affairs. Most issues are best dealt with by letting them unfold at own pace and most problems will either resolve themselves or disappear.

23. Nature of One's Goals:

1. Achievement of hegemonial position.
2. Elimination of other key actors.
3. Achievement of national interest.
4. Protect security of home territory.
5. Maintain status quo.
6. Promote regional cooperation.
7. Promote peaceful coexistence.

**24. Best Approach for Goal Selection:**

1. Comprehensive framework/master plan.
2. From immediate problem at hand/individual issues.
3. Mixed.

**25. Type of Goals:**

1. Optimal: no compromising principles for short-term gains.
2. Feasible: one step at a time toward major goals. Dividing goals permissible.
3. Mixed.

**26. Paths to Achieve Goals:**

1. Single path.
2. Multiple paths.

**27. Means to Pursue Goals:**

1. Flexible.
2. Inflexible.
3. Mixed.
4. Modify/substitute/abandon goals.
5. Do not modify/substitute/abandon goals.

**28. Means to Achieve Goals:**

1. Prepare ground: search for information.
2. Try and see: trial and error.
3. Incremental strategy: one step at a time.
4. Blitzkrieg strategy: full scale effort.
5. Mobilization: committing total resources.

**29. Strategy:**

1. Aggressive.
2. Conciliatory.
3. Mixed.
4. Cooperative.
5. Deterrent.

**30. Preference for Unilateral or Bilateral Action:**

1. Unilateral.
2. Multi-lateral.
3. Bilateral.

**31. Assessment of Risk:**

1. Risks to be avoided.
2. Risks to be taken.

**32. Military Force:**

1. Avoid use of force.
2. Can use it as last resort.
3. Only viable means to advance one's interest.
4. Resort to it rather than surrender or be defeated.

**33. Military Supremacy**

1. Crucial.
2. Not crucial.

**34. Conception of Power**

1. Military.
2. Multi-dimensional (economic, resources, etc.)

**APPENDIX 3**  
**QUESTIONNAIRE 2**

**The Operational Code of Mrs. Indira Gandhi**

**Questionnaire, General, Open Ended**

**Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Place:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Time:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Name of Interviewee:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Current Position:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Position During Mrs. Gandhi's rule:** \_\_\_\_\_



Part I - General

1. Was Mrs. Gandhi's foreign policy reactive and did it have short-term implications or would you say her beliefs about the nature of the world and international politics influenced her actions and determined her policies? (2a) Did Mrs. Gandhi have a definite world view when she came to power? (2b) If so, what was her vision of the world and for India's place in the world, i.e., what role did she envisage India playing?
2. Did she have clear cut views regarding the direction India's foreign policy was to take and have set guidelines for policy. She constantly articulated concepts such as peaceful coexistence, non-alignment, international peace and cooperation, equality, independence in decision making, and freedom from domination. Do you think that she attempted to relate such pronouncements to concrete policy decisions?
3. There are numerous references to the concept of "National Interest" in her speeches, but did Mrs. Gandhi really define it in concrete terms and did she have a clear formulation of our basic foreign policy goals. Comment.
4. Even though she repeatedly talked of a crusade against colonialism and domination of any kind, why did she support Mrs. Thatcher in the Falkland Island crisis or the Soviet Union during the Czechoslovakian crisis in 1968.
5. Disarmament, international peace and cooperation, non use of force are terms that appear frequently in her speeches. Did she feel that she contributed in some measure to disarmament or arms reduction, either in the international or regional arena? Are there any concrete instances where she has acted as a peacemaker or bridge builder?
6. Mrs. Gandhi defined her brand of non-alignment as "judging each issue independently on its own merit", but were the "independent judgments" more in the form of moral pronouncements or did they amount to anything substantial, i.e., in terms of actual policy, e.g., Indian position on Vietnam and Czechoslovakia.
7. Did Mrs. Gandhi have an active and clear conception of power in international relations?
8. In the late '60's and '70's there was more of an awareness of the importance of economic factors and their implications in foreign policy and a shift in the conceptualization of power. Would you say Mrs. Gandhi's policies reflected such an awareness?

9. Did she have any meaningful affiliation with any political ideology and connect that ideology to foreign policy, e.g., socialism.
10. Her commitment to socialism may have been due to her father, but was she interested in Marxism as an intellectual discipline?
11. Did she pay more attention to foreign policy just to get away from the problems of domestic politics as her critics accuse? And did she completely exclude the external affairs ministry and parliament in the formulation of foreign policy?

### Part II. Regional

12. Would you agree that in foreign relations she seems to have focused only on the superpowers and on devices to avoid or exploit them and did not have a place for South or Southeast Asia in her world view. Did she really concern herself with South or SE Asia?
13. Did she really treat the smaller nations of South Asia in an imperious manner as claimed by Pakistan? Did she do anything to dispel the notion?
14. Was she interested in dominance in the subcontinent only to the extent that it reduced the opportunities for great power interference in the area? Was independence from such interference and not the authoritative building of power the primary consideration of her policy?
15. Why did she fail to draw the neighbors toward an Indian center of power in a regional subsystem after 1971?
16. Why didn't she do anything about the instability in the subcontinent, e.g., 1975 coup in Bangladesh, insurrection in Sri Lanka, etc.? Was it because of her policy of non-intervention or because she had not formulated a long-term subcontinental policy and reacted only to isolated incidents?
17. Why didn't she form some sort of an Asian regional arrangement to contain China? She could have made common cause with other nations in the region.
18. Even though Mrs. Gandhi spoke a lot about regional cooperation, did she do anything to follow through? There seems to be an inability to link national strategic and economic concerns to a regional environment.

**Part III. The Superpowers**

19. **Mrs. Gandhi always insisted on identity of interests with the Soviets, but India neither shared Soviet values or their world view. Was she paying just lip service in order to keep the Soviets in good humour, or did she believe that India and the Soviet Union had a lot in common?**
20. **Why didn't she evolve a broader policy, vis a vis the super powers? Couldn't she have conceived of a policy which would give equal importance to both and have produced both American wheat and Soviet steel?**
21. **How did the U.S. pressure to devalue the rupee in 1967 affect Mrs. Gandhi?**
22. **Why did she not actively criticize the Soviet shipment of arms to Pakistan in '68? She instead justified Soviet action publicly by saying that the Soviets were trying to improve relations with other nations. She never said the same when the U.S. supplied arms to Pakistan.**
23. **Although the signing of the '71 treaty with the Soviet Union was a smart move, do you think that either China or the U.S. would have really intervened in the event of a war between Pakistan and India in the absence of the treaty?**
24. **Was the treaty necessary at all? Wouldn't a unilateral declaration by the Soviets that they would support India have worked as well--or even a public letter from Kosygin to Mrs. Gandhi?**
25. **Was a treaty for 20 years necessary for the limited purpose of forestalling Chinese or U.S. intervention?**
26. **Although the Indian government has been stating in no uncertain terms that the treaty does not violate India's nonalignment, does it not represent a shift in the basic tenets of nonalignment?**
27. **Was the treaty a result of the Soviets equating Indian and Pakistan?**
28. **Was the secrecy due to the fact that there would be heavy opposition to the treaty from within the country and abroad and that it was better to present the country with a fait accompli?**

Part IV. Pakistan

29. When one looks at the problems India has had with Pakistan since partition, one would imagine that the government would have a long-term policy governing relations with that country. Did Mrs. Gandhi have a clear foreign policy, vis a vis Pakistan, or was it essentially reactive, i.e., did she deal with problems with Pakistan on an ad hoc basis with no long-term implications?
30. Although Mrs. Gandhi believed and clearly indicated that "outside forces" and "external pressures" determined Pakistan's policy toward India and that any conflict between the two countries were a part of the super power configuration and power politics in the subcontinent, to what extent was she able to convince Pakistan that it was in its best interest to resolve any problems with India bilaterally and how far was the Simla Conference successful in keeping the super powers from interfering?
31. Did she believe that Pakistan's ideology, historical needs, religion, and/or individual leaders were additional reasons for its antipathy toward India?
32. Why didn't Mrs. Gandhi decisively solve the problem of Kashmir one way or another? She "dilly dallied" with this problem throughout her prime ministership. Did she ignore problems that seemed incapable of being resolved in a hope that it would resolve by itself or disappear? Other examples: Assam, Punjab, etc.
33. Is it true that she was not in favor of the Tashkent agreement because she believed Shastri gave in too much to Ayub Khan ?
34. Why was she so indecisive about Bangladesh or East Pakistan's problem early in the crisis? Was it once again a way of ignoring a problem by stating non-interference--or did she really think it was not India's problem?
35. Why didn't Mrs. Gandhi's tour to all the western capitals in '71 generate much support (apart from moral and financial support for the refugees) for the Bangladesh and Indian position? In fact, the vote in the United Nation was 104-11 against Indian intervention.
36. Kissinger has accused her of dismembering Pakistan just in order to establish India's pre-eminence on the subcontinent as a part of a planned realpolitik strategy. Was that really her intention?
37. Why did she fail to relate her success in 1971 to any long-term objective of establishing India's supremacy on the subcontinent? She did not restructure policy with Pakistan and she failed to keep Bangladesh dependent.

38. Why didn't she recapture Pakistan occupied Kashmir in 1971 when she was in a position to do so. She did not seem to care for world opinion when she liberated Bangladesh--why should she care about what the world would say if she took Kashmir? Was her hesitation to do so due to a vacillating policy?
39. Was the unilateral ceasefire in '71 premature or was it because of Soviet and American pressure?
40. Did she follow an unrealistic policy, vis-a-vis the middle East, by supporting the Arabs despite their obvious support of Pakistan?

#### Part V. Nuclear Explosion

41. Given her commitment to disarmament why did she authorize the explosion of a nuclear device? Was it really for peaceful purposes as she claimed or an attempt to demonstrate India's power?
42. Was the explosion also a calculated effort to boost her waning popularity and bring back memories of victory of 1971? What was her motivation?
43. Why did she risk exploding the bomb knowing that it would alert Pakistan to India's nuclear capabilities, alienate the U.S. and Canada, and make the other countries in the subcontinent view India with fear and hostility, i.e., (1) Was it to show China and Pakistan of India's preparedness in the event of a war? or (2) Was it to draw attention away from domestic problems?

#### Part VI. Personal

44. As a leader how was her performance in the foreign policy arena?
45. Did she have a definite set of perceptions and beliefs about the nature of international politics, and did they change over time?
46. Was she consistent in her beliefs about India's role in world politics or in her perceptions of Pakistan, China, the United States, and the Soviet Union?

**END**

**26 05 93**

**FIN**